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FOREWORD
It is a distinct pleasure to commemorate the 40th Anniversary of
the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy.
In these 40 years the world has changed in ways we could not have
imagined. The Journal was one of the first scholarly publications spe-
cializing in international law and has remained in the forefront, bring-
ing the best in international law and policy to academic peers and the
public, and promoting the rule of law in the international arena.
This celebration is the reward for countless hours of hard work by
hundreds of student staff members to meet a uniformly high standard
of quality -- the early Journal staffs vividly recall the late nights and
weekends sitting in the fourth floor cafe in the old College of Law build-
ing downtown, proofreading manuscripts in teams and often having to
retype an entire page of text simply to correct a minor error.
The College of Law is duly proud of the Journal and its accom-
plishments over four decades. I know that the editorial boards of the
Journal, in turn, have felt gratitude and appreciation to the faculty who
have continued to support it in so many ways. On this special occasion,
we must acknowledge the vision of the late Dean Emeritus Robert B.
Yegge, who nurtured the Journal with "strategy meetings" at Yegge
Peak and took tremendous pride in its maturing on his watch.
It goes without saying that the College of Law treasures the life-
long work and commitment of my friend and colleague Ved Nanda, the
standard-bearer of our flagship International Law program and in
many ways a mainstay of the College. Congratulations, Ved, on this
Festschrift in celebration of your achievements!
Martin J. Katz, Dean




Messages to Professor Nanda from Some Former Students
Ian B. Bird, JD '76
DJILP Managing Editor 1976
Dear Ved,
It is no small task to remind you of the impact you have had on so
many lives. One can point to the enormous body of your scholarly work,
your influence on decision-makers the world over, or your impact on hu-
man rights law, environmental law, and so many other substantive areas of
law. Your vision has created and sustained the world class international
law program at DU's College of Law where your teaching has informed,
and formed, thousands of students over a couple of generations. You
founded the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, which has for
four decades given voice to scholars, practitioners and students in many ar-
eas of international legal practice. And these are but the tip of the iceberg
with respect to your global influence.
And yet, these fantastic accomplishments are only part of the story
of your impact. Perhaps your most profound influence has been on your
students. That is certainly true in my case. Forty years ago, I arrived at
DU knowing only that I wanted a career in "international law" without
much understanding of what that might mean or how to achieve that goal.
Through you I learned about both. Of course, you taught me what I needed
to know about the law. But more, you convinced me that it would really be
possible for me to spend my life in the international arena. Your encour-
agement over the years has helped me achieve my goal. Throughout my
years at DU, and in the many years since, you have been a mentor, counse-
lor and friend, offering kind words, sound advice and a warm smile through
times of personal and professional challenge.
Since returning to Denver after many years away, it has been deep-
ly gratifying to assist you in developing and implementing plans for the
Ved Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law. In a small way
this lets me return some measure of the great gifts you have given me over
the years. Your legacies are many, varied and significant. It is truly my
honor to be one of many partners in advancing this one.
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This milestone anniversary of the DJILP is the perfect occasion to
celebrate you and your myriad contributions to the global community. It is
also the perfect occasion to offer a simple "thank you" for being such a
good and great friend.
With the greatest affection, I am
Yours sincerely, Ian
Sharon K. Black, JD '95
DJILP Editor-in-Chief, 1994-1995
Alumni Excellence Award Recipient, 2010
Most of us -- at one time or another -- have met someone who impressed us
and positively impacted our lives. Ved Nanda does that every day -- for
many people.
Many of us also know Professor Nanda as someone whose life and work
has made a true difference in the world - benefiting all citizens of Earth.
Those of us in Denver are fortunate to call him "one of our own," to be able
watch his example daily, and to have the pleasure of learning from him.
I have known Ved for more than 20 years, since 1991, and seen him work
his "magic" in international law. As Editor-in-chief of the Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy (1994-1995) and a practicing attorney in
international telecommunications law in Colorado, here is some of what I
have learned from him over the years:
1. Live with a purpose. Ved lives the words: "Each time a man stands up
for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against
injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope... and crossing each other
from a million diferent centers of energy and daring those ripples
build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression
and resistance." Robert F. Kennedy
2. Be gracious and treat all with respect. Talk softly and treat everyone
you meet with kindness and caring. Ved does this so well. All who
know him have experienced it.
3. Live your message. Be proactive and dive into the "tough" stuff.
Where the world is unjust, Ved works to change it. When he sees a
need, he doesn't wait for other leaders, but rather asks those he knows
to join him, person to person, to find an answer. He lives the phrase:
"You must be the change you wish to see in the world." Mahatma
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Gandhi. If everyone joined him in fighting injustice we would make
real progress toward humanity.
4. Start now - even if you don't feel you are ready. Ved lives that: "No-
body needs to wait a single moment to start improving the world."
Anne Frank, and that: "There is no time like the present and no present
like the time. " - James Durst.
5. Know that everyone can contribute - in both large and small ways. Ved
teaches that: "The world is moved more by the aggregate of each hon-
est worker than the actions of large forces." He states that: "I am only
one, but I am one. I cannot do everything, but I can do something.
And I will not let what I cannot do interfere with what I can do." He
knows that great opportunities do not always come, but small ones sur-
round us every day. These are powerful for all who know him.
6. Use your unique skills. In Ved's opinion, talent, intelligence, and wis-
dom are worthwhile only if used for good.
7. Be a teacher in whatever you do. Open doors for those who come be-
hind you. Don't just share your strengths, but help others to learn their
own strengths. Ved believes that sharing never decreases one's impact.
8. Acknowledge those who help and support you in your work. None of
us succeeds alone. Katharine and Anjali Nanda and many others walk
with Ved in his work, and each of us has our own families and col-
leagues who sustain us.
9. Don't expect always to be recognized or paid for what you do. Ved
states that: "Real joy does not come from the praise of others, but from
doing something worthwhile. " Ved has made a living, lovingly sup-
porting his family in a responsible way, but the fuller measure of his
wealth is in what he has given to the world. It is a good lesson for all.
10. Be joyful. Focus on the positive and generous -- not on the deficits.
When a snapshot of Ved's life is taken, eternity will remember him
smiling.
11.Work for good in the future; even though you know you will never see
the result. Ved encourages us to live life working toward something
that will outlast us - to "plant trees, under whose shade we do not ex-
pect to sit. "
Such great lessons -- Thank you Professor Ved Nanda!
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Steven A. Christensen, JD '79
DJILP Editor-in-Chief 1979
As a former Editor-in-Chief of the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy, it is a great honor to have an opportunity to recall my associa-
tion with Professor Nanda. Ved Nanda had a literally life-changing hand
in my pursuit of a legal career. Ved was not only an excellent professor,
but he used his personal time to help direct and tutor students under his su-
pervision. His patience in explaining how to organize the law journal, deal
with publishers, engage in soliciting new articles, and deal with occasional
"unruly" staff members, was invaluable assistance. During my third year I
had to take turns with my wife in watching our baby daughter, Stephanie.
Accordingly, Stephanie was present at numerous law school functions, in-
cluding Myers S. McDougal Distinguished Lectures. Upon my graduation,
Professor Nanda had a special diploma printed for Stephanie as an honor-
ary graduate for all of her time spent at the law school. Professor Nanda
even took the time to meet and interact with my entire family, including my
wife, children, my parents and even my in-laws. In fact, after moving from
Colorado, I attempted to keep in contact with Professor Nanda, who was
always very obliging, and who made me feel as welcome as if it had only
been yesterday that we had seen each other.
My experience with Professor Nanda was so exceptional that I spoke high-
ly of him to my family. Based upon Ved's presence at DU, subsequent to
my daughter's graduation from college, as she was exploring different law
school options, I made an appointment with Ved and introduced him to my
daughter, Karissa Christensen Young. Meeting Ved was sufficient to sway
her decision into attending the University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law. This in itself is not that extraordinary, but, due to my and my daugh-
ter's interactions with Professor Nanda, my son, Zachary Christensen, de-
cided to attend DU, and graduated from the Sturm College of Law in 2009.
Following Zachary and Karissa's experiences at DU with Professor Nanda,
their younger brother, Zane Christensen, also decided to attend the Sturm
College of Law, and is currently a 2L. He, too, has enjoyed extended inter-
action with Professor Nanda.
All hail Ved Nanda!
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Ralph B. Lake, JD '73
DJILP Editor-in-Chief 1972-1973
The Journal, like so much of the University of Denver's best, was
the brainchild of Ved Nanda. He encouraged, muscled and ordered a group
of his acolytes, myself included, to produce the first few issues with money
he had scrounged from generous Denverites. These people had no connec-
tion with the University other than the kind of personal devotion to Profes-
sor Nanda which virtually everyone he touches quickly develops. Our quar-
ters were a section of the basement of the now twice removed law school
building. The "walls" were stacks of cardboard boxes from which late night
editorial sessions were sometimes interrupted by the unmistakable sounds
of rodent scratching. The Journal became the most enjoyable aspect of my
law school experience. It is a joy to see how it has flourished into a re-
spected and authoritative source of international legal scholarship.
Katharine K. Nanda, JD '81 & Anjali D. Nanda, JD/MBA 'll
We congratulate the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
on its 40th Anniversary volume, the first three issues of which are col-
lected in this book. Our husband and father (and yes, our professor),
Ved Nanda, has given tirelessly to his students for so many years, in
the spirit of his own mentor, Professor Myres S. McDougal. The Journal
is a testament to his personal impact upon the international lawyers of
tomorrow, and this Festschrift is a fitting tribute to his passionate
commitment to their education and to the cause of world peace and the
rule of law.
William K. Olivier, JD '74
DJILP Editor-in-Chief 1973
As a world-renowned scholar and expert on international law, Pro-
fessor Ved P. Nanda is a treasure of the University of Denver Sturm Col-
lege of Law. Yet, for all his lofty accomplishments, he is a most humble
individual who cares deeply about his students. It was a pleasure to learn
international law from Professor Nanda and to work with him on the Den-
ver Journal of International Law and Policy. The thing I remember most
about him is, when anyone referred to the Journal as the "Denver Journal
of International Law" in his presence, he always would add emphatically
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"and Policy." Every time I think of or refer to the Journal, I always hesitate
near the end, smile, emphasize "and Policy," and think about Professor
Nanda.
Thanks, Ved. You are the best. I wish you and the Journal a long continued
life.
John G. Powell, JD '88
DJILP Editor-in-Chief, 1987-1988
Ved's Help
Since I First Met Ved,
The Berlin wall came down
And Ved helped;
Bloody tyrants have lost impunity
And Ved helped;
R2P grows into customary law
And Ved helped;
A throng learned to work for peace
And Ved helped;
My grandsons live in a safer world
And Ved helped;
Thank you so much for your help
And, Ved, please keep helping.
Connie Cox Price, JD '78
Benefactor of the Ved Nanda Center for
International and Comparative Law
While traveling in India I feel that Ved is everywhere. As I learn
more about the history, the culture and Hinduism, I can more fully under-
stand his commitment to education, service and peace. Good thoughts,
good words and good deeds: that seems to sum up the basic philosophy. He
introduced me to meditation and it is what keeps me grounded, centered
and grateful as I navigate life. Ved was the most important person to Jon
[Cox, JD 1971, MA 1970] after his father. I feel blessed that our family has
had the long and rich relationship with Ved that we have.
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Nicole C. Salamander, JD '08
DJILP Editor-in-Chief, 2007-2008
When deciding where to go to law school, I called the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law and inquired about the international law opportuni-
ties. The operator transferred me to Professor Nanda's office. I recall talk-
ing just briefly with his administrative assistant, who told me that Professor
Nanda ran the international law program at DU. When I asked more about
Professor Nanda, she said, "well, why don't you talk with him, he's right
here." Professor Nanda picked up the phone, and as you can imagine,
where I would attend law school was a done deal. Professor Nanda was so
informative in that humble and persuasive way that is uniquely his, and so
very personable and warm, that I had no chance of resistance. DU it would
be!
I am so grateful for that very first conversation with Professor Nanda, and
the countless conversations with him that followed. I credit Professor
Nanda with laying the foundation for all that is international at DU, includ-
ing the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, the Philip C.
Jessup International Law moot court team, the Willem C. Vis International
Commercial Arbitration team, a chapter of Amnesty International, the In-
ternational Law Society, and of course, the esteemed named lectures and
symposia initiated and sustained by Professor Nanda over the years. It is
his passion and inspiration that made (and continue to make) these wonder-
ful opportunities possible, and it is his ambition and dedication that have
created such a premier international law program at the University of Den-
ver.
The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, established by Pro-
fessor Nanda forty years ago, continues to lead the study and practice of
international law with relevant and timely analysis. Some of my best
memories from law school come from participating on the DJILP staff:
finding sanctuary in the DJILP office, late nights with my best friend (the
Bluebook), thought-provoking conversation with other staffers stimulated
by an article in review, and hosting our guest lecturers, which was a won-
derful way to meet practitioners and leaders in the international legal com-
munity. I loved my law school experience, and DU's international law
program made all of the difference.
Over the years, I have heard Professor Nanda emphasize the strength and
gravity of symbolism. He would pound on the podium and shout, "sym-
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bols matter!" And they do. We have flags, mascots, religious icons, ges-
tures, and some would say, certain treaties and international organizations.
Symbols communicate, represent, and inspire. This book is a symbol of
Professor Nanda's devotion, intelligence, foresight, and uncanny ability to
bring people together. Thank you, Professor Nanda, for who you are and
all that you do. Your legacy will far outlast all of us, and your work will
continue to guide and encourage students, alumni, practitioners, and schol-
ars throughout the world for many years to come. Through your care and
motivation, DU is a meaningful symbol of excellence in all that is interna-
tional.
Douglas G. Scrivner, JD '77
DJILP Editor-in-Chief 1976
Founding Benefactor of the Ved Nanda Center
On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy, which I had the honor of serving as
Editor-in-Chief in the mid-1970s, it is appropriate to reflect on the myriad
contributions of its founder and mentor, Ved Nanda, not only to the Jour-
nal and the Sturm College of Law and the University of Denver but also to
international legal studies in the US and around the world.
I had the pleasure of working with Ved throughout my three years at the
DU law school from 1974 to 1977, as his student in several classes, as an
editor of the Journal, as his research assistant, as conference coordinator
for a regional meeting of the American Society of International Law he or-
ganized in Denver in 1977, and in other capacities over the years.
It was a great pleasure for my wife and me to help create and fund the Ved
Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, to institutionalize
and perpetuate the influence Ved has had for so long.
To think about Ved's contributions in the traditional academic framework
of teaching, scholarship and service is to risk missing much of his impact.
But as a teacher, he has touched not only thousands of DU students over
almost 45 years but has also, as a visitor and lecturer at institutions and or-
ganizations all over the world, brought his excitement and commitment to
international law to thousands of others. As a scholar and writer, he has
been prolific and wide-ranging, with a portfolio of work that is truly awe-
some. His service to the law school and to the University (including his
stint as Vice Provost for Internationalization, as a result of which DU is a
leader in creating international experiences for its undergraduates) are more
than matched by his commitment to service through countless societies, as-
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sociations, and organizations throughout the world. He has also been a
wonderful popularizer and explainer of complex issues to the general pub-
lic through his periodic columns in the Denver Post and elsewhere for
many years. And an extraordinary and gracious friend to many.
To the DJILP on its 40th anniversary, congratulations, and to its guiding
hand and spirit, our dear friend, Ved Nanda, thank you for all you have
done for all of us.
Clayton E. Wire, JD '09
DJILP Editor-in-Chief 2008-2009
The Honor was Kindly Mine
As many other University of Denver Sturm College of Law stu-
dents, I came to DU because of its excellent International Law curriculum.
Of course, there really is no way to mention DU and international law
without in the same breath mentioning Ved Nanda. In addition to his wide
range of articles, participation in internationally significant events and im-
pact on the evolution of international law as we now know it, Professor
Nanda was able to establish and maintain a globally recognized Interna-
tional Law program in Denver, Colorado, of all places. The Denver Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy and the Nanda Center are truly a tes-
tament to the hard work and dedication of Professor Nanda.
During my time at DU I was privileged to serve as the Editor-In-
Chief of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. Through my
experiences with this excellent and ever evolving journal I was able to gain
a much deeper appreciation for all the things Professor Nanda has contrib-
uted to our legal community. A poignant example of this is the collection
of editorial board pictures in the Journal's office, each one portraying Pro-
fessor Nanda smiling warmly next to a dozen or so young law students.
When you look back at the faces of generations of lawyers that Professor
Nanda has imbued with a passion for International Law, you realize that he
has helped to shape the way that International Law is viewed not only with-
in DU, but also within the American legal community as a whole.
In addition to my time on the Journal I was also privileged to en-
roll in the Capitals of Europe study abroad program at which Professor
Nanda taught. During this program we travelled throughout Western Eu-
rope visiting various international tribunals and important sites in interna-
tional law. It was during this trip that I truly became aware of the signifi-
cant impact that Professor Nanda has had on International Law throughout
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the globe. I distinctly remember Professor Nanda being greeted by judges
and dignitaries wherever we went. After you see Professor Nanda warmly
greeted by yet another Justice from the ICC, you begin to realize that his
impact extends far beyond the walls of the Sturm College of Law.
The experiences that I had at the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy have and will continue to influence me for the rest of my
career. Professor Nanda's respect for life, human rights and peace has left
a lasting impression on me. Therefore, on this the 40th Anniversary of the




The editors pay tribute to and honor the editorial board and staff of the
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, who were so dedicated and
who worked so tirelessly to make this anniversary book more than just a
reality, but a top quality academic publication. We also acknowledge with
deep gratitude the assistance of Ms. Joan Pope, Computer Support, and Ms.
Karlyn Shorb, Administrative Director of the Ved Nanda Center for Inter-




THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
DINAH SHELTON*
It is a privilege to participate in honoring the great scholar,
teacher, and friend Professor Ved Nanda. Under Professor Nanda's
leadership, the University of Denver has developed a program that is
recognized as a major contributor to many subject areas of international
law: human rights, economic development, and international
environmental law to mention just a few. Professor Nanda's own
scholarship is always on the cutting edge, helping to define the
international agenda and tell us what we will be thinking a year from
now.
Professor Nanda has also provided long and invaluable service to
the American Society of International Law. He chaired the 75th annual
program committee and served on the executive council, research
projects and committees. Most memorably, together with Professor
James Nafziger, we wrote a Jessup moot court problem addressing the
international protection of cultural property based in part on the still
unresolved dispute over the Elgin or Parthenon Marbles.
Professor Nanda and his wife Katharine have also provided long
and valued friendship. Whether consulting over an academic issue,
providing hospitality in Denver, or driving through a snowstorm to
spend time with a snowbound traveler at the old Stapleton airport, they
have always supplied abundant kindness and generous support.
This contribution in honor of Professor Nanda, based on the 2011
Myers McDougal lecture, examines the place of international law in the
United States legal system, its importance in the past, and its
diminishing role today. The conclusion argues for continuing to apply
the legal precedents that give effect to international law as a part of
U.S. law, in our national interest and as intended by the authors of the
Constitution.
1
* Manatt/Ahn Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. This
contribution is a revision of the McDougal Lecture delivered at the University of Denver,
Sturm College of Law on February 27, 2011.
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1. AT THE ORIGIN
While accepting that the Constitution is a living instrument and
must be applied as such, the original text and writings
contemporaneous with its drafting are the critical starting point to
understanding our legal system and how it was intended to function.
The place of international law begins with Article VI of the
Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.'
The importance of Article VI and other references to international
law were discussed by the constitutional drafters in the Federalist
Papers.2  These writings enhance our knowledge of the original
understanding of the role of international law in the U.S. legal system,
in some instances providing a stark contrast with current attitudes.
John Jay, Supreme Court Justice and negotiator of the Treaty of
Paris that legally settled U.S. independence from Great Britain, wrote
in the third Federalist Paper that:
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either
from violations of treaties or from direct violence.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that
she observe the laws of nations towards all [foreign]
powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more
perfectly and punctually done by one national government
than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies....
Because, under the national government, treaties and
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will
always be expounded in one sense and executed in the
same manner. ... 3
Madison added that "[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it
clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."4
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST: OR, THE
NEW CONSTITUTION (Max Beloff ed., Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1987).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 10 (John Jay) (Max Beloff ed., Basil Blackwell 2d ed.
1987).




Hamilton and Madison thereafter spoke to the qualifications to be
desired for those elected to Congress:
No man can be a competent legislator who does not
add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain
degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to
legislate ....
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the
acquirements of a federal representative . . . is that of
foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought
to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the
United States and other nations, but also with the
commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not
to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations . . 5
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a
wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases,
particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has
not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how
many efforts and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and
propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried
by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part
of mankind.6
Jay then returned to speak of presidential powers, including the
treaty-making power, and the role of treaties in the U.S. legal system:
Some are displeased with [the treaty-making power],
not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as
the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they
should be made only by men invested with legislative
authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the
judgments of our courts, and the commissions
constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as
binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws
passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of power,
whether in the executive or in the judicial department,
have as much legal validity and obligation as if they
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 275-76 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Max
Beloff ed., Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1987).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 321 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Max
Beloff ed., Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1987).
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proceeded from the legislature . . . . It surely does not
follow, that because they have given the power of making
laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise
give them power to do every other act of sovereignty by
which the citizens are to be bound and affected.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in
the mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme
laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that
treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at
pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this
country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often
appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a
treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would
be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain
with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be
bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt,
amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they
who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us
not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the
contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as
the consent of both was essential to their formation at first,
so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them.7
Finally, Hamilton spoke on the obligations of the federal judiciary:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign
powers for the conduct of its members. And the
responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied
with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or
perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as
in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought
to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of
other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to
the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of
the public tranquility.8
These writings clearly suggest an awareness of the importance of
respecting international law and giving it effect in our legal system.
Official acts followed along the same lines, especially regarding
customary international law or the law of nations, as it was then
known. U.S. Attorney General Randolph, a member of the
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 331-32 (John Jay) (Max Beloff ed., Basil Blackwell 2d
ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 406-07 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., Basil
Blackwell 2d ed. 1987).
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Constitutional Convention, issued an opinion on this matter because
customary law was not addressed in the same detail in the
Constitution, as were treaties.9 Randolph stated officially that, "The
law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution or any
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation
commences and runs with the existence of a nation, subject to
modifications on some points of indifference."' 0
While the leaders in federal government were unanimous in their
thinking, in practice, then as now, debates over international law were
contentious, at least when the self-interest of various states or sectors of
the public were involved. The first major incident occurred after George
Washington sent John Jay to England to negotiate the terms of
independence from Great Britain." By February 1795, reports arrived
that Jay had concluded the agreement and Washington convened a
special session of Congress on June 8 of that year to debate approval of
ratification. The treaty contained trade concessions and England
consented to abandon forts on the Great Lakes, but other provisions,
such as compensating loyalists for confiscated property, were less
popular. Indeed, Washington tried to keep the terms of the treaty in, as
he described it, "impenetrable secrecy" until June. The treaty passed
with exactly two-thirds of the Senate voting in approval but before
Washington could sign it, the text was leaked and uproar ensued. "By
the July Fourth celebrations, Jay had been burned in effigy in so many
towns that he declared he could have traversed the entire country by
the glare of his own flaming figure."' 2 Jay was not the only one vilified:
Hamilton had stones thrown at him when he spoke in favor of the
treaty at a rally in New York. Opponents surrounded the presidential
mansion, called for further war against England and cursed
Washington. Washington likened the opposition to the ravings of a mad
dog. 13
A year after ratification of the peace treaty, the Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether the treaty would be enforced in the face of
state legislation contrary to some of its provisions on property
restitution. In Ware v. Hylton, the Court was clear:
9. Who Privileged from Arrest, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Randolph, Att'y Gen.).
One may speculate that customary international law was more widely known and
understood by the drafters than were treaties. See ANTHONY AUsT, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2007). Prior to the emergence of permanent international
organizations in the twentieth century, multilateral treaties were almost unknown and
most international law was developed through custom. Id.
10. Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 9, at 27.
11. See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 729-32 (2010) (this description of events
is based on a more detailed discussion in the text).
12. Id. at 731.
13. Id. at 732.
2012 5
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
A treaty cannot be the Supreme law of the land, that is
of all the United States, if any act of a State Legislature
can stand in its way. If the Constitution of a State (which
is the fundamental law of the State, and paramount to its
Legislature) must give way to a treaty, and fall before it;
can it be questioned, whether the less power, an act of the
State Legislature, must not be prostrate? It is the declared
will of the people of the United States that every treaty
made, by the authority of the United States, shall be
superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual
State; and their will alone is to decide ....
. . [I]t is the declared duty of the State Judges to
determine any Constitution, or laws of any State, contrary
to the treaty (or any other) made under the authority of the
United States, null and void. National or Federal Judges
are bound by duty and oath to the same conduct. 14
The founding period saw some of our most outstanding jurists on
the Supreme Court. According to David McCullough's masterful
biography of John Adams, the second president called his proudest
appointment that of John Marshall to be Chief Justice of the United
States. 15 In making the appointment, Adams paid his highest
compliments to Marshall: he described the jurist as "plain . . sensible .
. . cautious, and learned in the law of nations." 16 Marshall proved to be
all of those, and his legacies remain with us, in particular his
knowledge and use of the law of nations. He is particularly cited for
two landmark doctrines concerning international law: the Charming
Betsy rule of construction and the doctrine of self-executing treaties.17
In the matter of Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, a
case concerning neutral shipping, Marshall commented that the parties
had observed during the litigation "that an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . 1. According to Marshall, the principle cited
was correct and "ought to be kept in view in construing the act now
14. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796).
15. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS illus. 55 (2002) (noted in caption).
16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Cannon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 486 (1998)
(explaining John Marshall's role in developing the Charming Betsy rule); David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 147 (1999) (explaining John Marshall's
role in developing the doctrine of self-executing treaties).
18. Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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under consideration."19 The Charming Betsy has provided a canon of
statutory construction for over two hundred years, ensuring that
legislation is interpreted where possible to conform to obligations under
international law unless Congress unmistakably dictates otherwise. 20
The doctrine of self-executing treaties emerged in the case of Foster
and Elam v. Neilson. Appellants sued to recover land that they claimed
under a Spanish land grant, in reliance on a treaty concluded in 1819
between the United States and Spain. The treaty provided that
all the grants of land made before the 24th of January
1818, by his Catholic majesty, or by his lawful authorities,
in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United
States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in
possessions of the lands, to the same extent that the same
grants would be valid if the territories had remained under
the dominion of his Catholic majesty. 21
The Court held that the treaty did not in and of itself operate to
ratify or confirm the appellants' title. Marshall, writing for the court,
articulated the doctrine of self-executing treaties, noting the general
view that, "A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not
a legislative act." Therefore, it "is carried into execution by the
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument."22 He went
on to add:
In the United States a different principle is
established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the
law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in courts
of justice as equivalent to an an [sic] act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engage to
perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for
the Court. 23
Marshall looked to the language of the treaty, which, he noted, did
not say that the land grants "are hereby confirmed."24 Had such been
its language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and would
19. Id.
20. See, e.g, United States of America v. The Palestine Liberation Organization, 695
F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987 to conform to
the United Nations Headquarters Agreement).
21. James Foster and Pleasants Elam v. David Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 310
(1829).
22. Id. at 254.
23. Nelson, 27 U.S. at 254.
24. Id.
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have repealed those acts of Congress that were repugnant to it. Use of
the future tense, "shall be ratified" indicated that something more had
to be done by the legislature.
Herein follows a lesson for all law students, lawyers and judges.
Several years later, another land grant case involving the same treaty,
United States v. Percheman, came before the Supreme Court.25 The
lawyers presented new evidence, with decisive results. As Marshall
describes the matter:
The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in
the English languages; both are originals, and were,
unquestionably, intended by the parties to be identical; the
Spanish has been translated; and it is now understood, that
the article expressed in that language is, that 'grants shall
remain ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of
them, to the same extent,' &c., thus conforming exactly so
the universally received law of nations. 26
Here Marshall noted that although the words "shall be ratified and
confirmed" could be viewed as words of contract, stipulating some
future legislative act, they did not have to be read that way:
... [T]hey may import that they "shall be ratified and
confirmed" by force of the instrument itself. When it is
observed, that in the counterpart of the same treaty,
executed at the same time, by the same parties, they are
used in this sense, the construction is proper, if not
unavoidable.
In the case of Foster v. Elam, 2 Peters, 253, this court
considered those words importing a contract; the Spanish
part of the treaty was not then brought into our view, and it
was then supposed, that there was even a formal difference
of expression in the same instrument, drawn up in the
language of each party. Had this circumstance been known,
it is believed, it would have produced the construction which
is now give to the article. 2 7
As this very summary review of some of the early writings and
jurisprudence of the United States indicates, the law of nations and
treaty obligations of the country were deemed an important part of the
law during the early decades following independence. There was a
justifiable fear of the costs and consequences of war. The country was
young and relatively weak. It depended for its very existence on respect
25. United States v. Juan Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 52.
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for international law, the recognition of other nations, and their
willingness to engage in trade with the new country.
II. THE MODERN CHALLENGES
In the two centuries since the United States became an
independent nation, the government has concluded hundreds of
bilateral and multilateral agreements deemed to be in the national
interest. It has also demanded respect for the law of nations, now
known as customary international law, and enforced it domestically. As
in the early days of the republic, however, challenges are often mounted
when local interests are seen as affected adversely.
Today, Marshall's legacy is being questioned. A portrait of him in a
respected law school's moot court room omits the treaty clause from the
text of Article VI that he is shown carrying. Some courts are
questioning the constitutional doctrines Marshall formulated and which
have not only served this nation well for two centuries, but have become
judicial doctrine in many other countries applying international law in
their domestic legal systems. In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,28 a
district judge declined to give effect to the Charming Betsy rule to
reconcile the Copyright Act 2 9 with the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty ("WCT") and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty ("WPPT"). 30 This was despite
the evidence that former Presidents, Congress, and the Register of
Copyrights have consistently suggested that the Copyright Act
implements the WIPO right in question. In Sampson v. Federal
Republic of Germany, the Seventh Circuit further diminished the
Charming Betsy canon of interpretation.31 The Court noted that while
international law is "part of our law," it does not follow that federal
statutes must be read to reflect the norms of customary international
law. 32 In Medellin v. Texas, 33 discussed further below, the Supreme
Court seemed to suggest, contrary to Foster v. Elam, that treaties are
presumptively not self-executing. 3 4
In practice, international obligations are sometimes violated at the
local level out of lack of knowledge about those obligations. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations 35 and its Optional Protocol
28. Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
29. Id. at 1226.
30. Id. at 1210.
31. Jacob Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 1152.
33. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
34. Id. at 491-92.
35. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,36 to which the U.S.
is a contracting party, requires notification of consular officials
whenever a national of one party is detained by officials of another
country and also specifies that detainees be informed of their right to
consular assistance. Many local police have been unaware of these
treaty obligations.
On June 29, 1993, Texas law enforcement authorities arrested Jos6
Ernesto Medellin, 18 years old at the time, in connection with the
murders of two young women in Houston, Texas. Mr. Medellin told the
arresting officers that he was born in Mexico, and informed Harris
County Pretrial Services that he was not a United States citizen, but
rather a Mexican national.
Despite the U.S. treaty obligations, Mr. Medellin was not advised of
his right to seek assistance from the Mexican consul, nor was the
Mexican consulate notified of his detention. Mr. Medellin claimed he
was unaware of his right to seek consular assistance either before or
during his capital trial. He was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his
conviction and sentence. 37
One month later, Mexican consular authorities learned of Mr.
Medellin's detention for the first time when he wrote to them from
death row. They promptly began rendering him assistance. 38 On March
26, 1998, Medellin filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus
arguing, among other things, that his conviction and sentence should be
vacated as a remedy for the violation of his consular rights. The trial
court denied relief and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 39
Mr. Medellin then turned to the federal courts. He filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, which was denied, 40 and appealed. While
his appeal was pending before the Fifth Circuit, the International Court
of Justice decided the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.).41 In Avena, the ICJ held that the United
States was required to give review and reconsideration to the
convictions and sentences of 51 Mexican nationals, including Mr.
Medellin, whose rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular
36. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
37. Medellin v. State, No. 71, 997 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997) (unpublished).
38. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).
39. Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Ex parte Medellin, No. 675430-A (Tex.
Crim. App.).
40. Medellin v. Cockrell, Civ. Action No. H-01-4078 *28 (SD Tex., June 25, 2003).
41. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
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Relations had been violated.42  Although the effect of the Avena
judgment had not been briefed or argued, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Vienna Convention was not judicially enforceable.43 Mr. Medellin
petitioned for certiorari on the question of the effect of the Avena
judgment in the cases of Mexican nationals whose rights the ICJ
adjudicated in Avena.
On December 10, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted
Mr. Medellin a writ of certiorari 44 to decide whether, under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, courts in the United States must
give effect to the United States' treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ
judgment in Avena. While the case was pending before the Supreme
Court, the President of the United States announced that the United
States would "hav[e] State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51
Mexican nationals addressed in that decision." 45 The President also
decided to denounce the Optional Protocol giving the ICJ jurisdiction
over cases involving the Consular Relations Convention, something
permitted by the terms of the treaty.46
Given the prospect that Mr. Medellin would obtain relief in the
state court, the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted. 47 On March 24, 2005, Mr. Medellin filed an
application for post-conviction relief in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. 48 That court set the case for briefing and heard oral argument,
at which the United States as amicus curiae supported Mr. Medellin's
request for relief. On November 15, 2006, however, the Texas court
denied relief, expressly holding that the President of the United States
has no authority to enforce the undisputed treaty obligation of the
United States to abide by the Avena judgment in the cases of the
Mexican nationals addressed in that judgment. 49 Mr. Medellin again
sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ultimately held in
favor of Texas. The state of Texas executed Mr. Medellin on August 5,
2008.50
42. Id. at 60.
43. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004).
44. Medellin v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 1032, 1032 (2004).
45. Memorandum from the President of the United States of America to the Att'y
Gen. on Compliance With the Decision of the Int'l Court of Justice in Avena (28 February
2005), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/429c2fd94.html.
46. Id.
47. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 667 (2005) (per curiam).
48. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
49. Id. at 352.
50. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
medellin-v-texas (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
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In the meantime, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals came to
a very different conclusion from that of the Texas courts. In Osbaldo
Torres v. The State of Oklahoma, the court granted a stay of execution
and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether the lack
of consular assistance caused prejudice in the original criminal trial.5'
Justice Chapel explained the rationale for the order, quoting the
Supremacy Clause:
There is no question that this Court is bound by the
Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol. . . .The federal
government's power to make treaties is independent of and
superior to the power of the states. Every state or federal
court considering the Vienna Convention, for any reason, has
agreed that it is binding on all jurisdictions within the United
States, individual states, districts and territories. Several
courts have expressed concern that any failure of United
States courts to abide by the Vienna Convention may have
significant adverse consequences for United States citizens
abroad. Treaty violations not only undermine the "Law of the
Land," but also international law, where reciprocity is key. If
American law enforcement officials disregard, or perhaps
more accurately, remain unaware of the notification provision
in Article 36, then officials of foreign signatories are likely to
flout those obligations when they detain American citizens.
... The United States voluntarily and legally entered into
a treaty, a contract with over 100 other countries. The United
States is bound by the terms of the treaty and the State of
Oklahoma is obligated by virtue of the Supremacy Clause to
give effect to the treaty. As this Court is bound by the treaty
itself, we are bound to give full faith and credit to the Avena
decision.
... In order to give full effect to Avena, we are bound by
its holding to review Torres's conviction and sentence in light
of the Vienna Convention violation, without recourse to
procedural bar. Common sense and fairness also suggest this
result. Torres, like many foreign nationals, was unaware he
had the right to contact his consulate after his arrest for
murder. Torres's Vienna Convention claim was generated by
the State of Oklahoma's initial failure to comply with a treaty.
. . . [W]e cannot fulfill the goal of a fair and just review of




Torres's case if we refuse to look at his Vienna Convention
claims on the merits. 52
The Oklahoma judgment seems more consistent with constitutional
law than the approach of the Texas courts. However, it was not popular
with many in the state. Following the Torres case, the state of
Oklahoma presented to its voters in November 2010 a proposed state
constitutional amendment.53  Although, or perhaps because, the
proposed text was not reproduced on the ballot, over 70 percent of
voters approved it.54 It would amend Article 7, section 1 of the
Oklahoma constitution, instructing the state's courts when exercising
their judicial authority to:
... uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United
States constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statues and
rules promulgated thereto, and if necessary the law of another
state of the United States provided the law of the other state
does not include Sharia law, in making judicial decisions. The
courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or
cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider
international law or Sharia law.55
There are considerable constitutional problems with this provision
and on November 9, 2010, the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma entered a temporary restraining order, enjoining
defendants from certifying the election results for State Question 755.56
In the meantime, some dozen other states57 have proposed legislation to
effectuate similar prohibitions - despite the protests of businesses that
will be unable to enforce bilateral investment agreements as a
consequence. The laws will also preclude state courts from deciding on
issues of Indian law, which are governed by more than 1400 treaties.
52. Id., at *2-4.
53. H.R.J, Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf.
54. General Election Results 2010, OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD (Nov. 2,
2010), http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/1Ogen.html.
55. H.R.J. Res. 1056, supra note 53, at § 1(c).
56. Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2010) (order granting
temporary restraining order).
57. While most of the statutes address sharia law primarily, Louisiana passed in
June 2010 a law against "international law" being used in its courts. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6001 (2010). South Dakota's House Joint Resolution 1004, says that no court "may
apply international law, the law of any foreign nation, or any foreign religious or moral
code with the force of law in the adjudication of any case under its jurisdiction." H.R.J.
Res. 1004, 86th Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2011).
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Oklahoma alone has 38 federally recognized tribes who are directly
affected if the new provision goes into force.s8
III. WHY?
How can we understand this rejection of international norms that
are only binding if the United States government has consented to them
through the formation of customary international law or the drafting
and ratification of treaties? As noted earlier, the United States was a
small country that needed international law for its very existence at the
beginning. Should becoming an international super-power produce a
change in practice? Some officials and pundits argue U.S.
exceptionalism - that being powerful gives the country a right to be
exempt from rules that apply to others.59 This is neither good law nor
good policy as several examples demonstrate. International law is more
important as a part of our legal system than it has been at any point in
our history since the founding years.
As to why the challenges are occurring, the explanation may derive
in part from the fact that the twentieth century saw vast and almost
daily developments in international norms, institutions and procedures.
The subject matters being regulated intrude into matters that would
have been inconceivable to an eighteenth century agrarian society,
when the city of New York had a total population of 10,000 people.
Some of the matters dealt with internationally today were not even
considered appropriate for federal action in the past.
Looking back, there was rarely, if ever, a period of such rapid global
change as the twentieth century. From its beginning, the telegraph and
telephone, followed by radio, aviation, and television made it possible to
communicate and travel rapidly across borders. And it continues.
Three decades ago, a secessionist group on the island of Bougainville
faxed its declaration of independence to the central government. Today,
revolutions are organized on Facebook and Twitter. The inherent
attributes and potential reach of new technology necessitates global
cooperation, leading to the formation of the first permanent
international institutions.
Much of the resulting international regulation is taken for granted
today, such as being able to pick up the telephone and directly call
almost any place in the world or fly from one country to another with
airlines often registered in different countries. The expansion of subject
matter requiring international attention is vast: there are now treaties
58. Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13278#ok (last updated May 2011).




on cybercrime,60 international adoption, 61 parental abduction of
children 62 and criminal cooperation. 63
Despite this, we remain in the founding decades of many
international institutions and of the efforts to regulate increasingly
frequent and complex interactions of individuals, companies, and
governments across borders. The difference today is that there is a
broad legal framework on many transboundary issues; while
lawmaking will of necessity continue as new problems arise, the
emphasis has turned to compliance and enforcement.
The international legal system has necessarily changed when
presented with each challenge or opportunity. The first decades of the
United Nations system and regional organizations like the Council of
Europe, the Organization of American States and the European Union
were largely devoted to elaborating and giving effect to fundamental
new principles in the aftermath of World War II. In particular,
international organizations in the post-war period reflected an
overwhelming consensus that henceforth human rights must be a
matter of international concern and colonial territories must become
free.
International organizations also became the venue for negotiating
rules and regulations to govern a host of newly-emerging issues. When
it became possible to exploit off-shore oil resources, an agreement had
to be reached on whether or not a state's coastal jurisdiction should
extend to its continental shelf or whether exploitation should be open to
all states. 64 The launch of Sputnik required states to give thought to
the legality of satellites passing overhead and to elaborate rules to
govern activities in outer space;65 the result has not only been an
60. See Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185.
61. See Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (entered into force May 1, 1995).
62. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, T.IA.S. No. 11670.
63. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Nov. 11,
1990, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493).
64. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
65. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space
Treaty"), Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (adopted by the General Assembly in its
resolution 2222 (XXI) and entered into force on 10 October 1967); Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (the "Rescue Agreement"), Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (adopted by the
General Assembly in its resolution 2345 (XXII) and entered into force on 3 December
1968); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the
"Liability Convention"), Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (adopted by the General
Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI) and entered into force on 1 September 1972);
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration
2012 15
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
absence of subsequent conflict but a remarkable degree of international
cooperation based on the agreements concluded in the 1960s.
Other challenges and opportunities face policy-makers and lawyers
today, with inevitable consequences for our legal system.
Migration and movement. A recent survey of U.S. colleges revealed
that among large universities, the University of Colorado has the
highest number of Peace Corps volunteers (GWU is highest among
medium sized schools). 66 These young persons give two years of their
lives to contribute to the well-being of those living in other countries.
During these two years, as the Oklahoma court in Torres indicated,
they are entirely dependent on the rule of law for their well-being - not
only the domestic law of the state where they are assigned, but the
international rule of law. Without respect for the consular immunities
treaty, they will lack the protection of the U.S. government in the event
that they are injured, wrongfully arrested, or otherwise in harm's way.
Tourists, business travelers and diplomats are also at risk. It will be
difficult at best to insist that other countries respect the rights of U.S.
nationals if the U.S. ignores the rights of foreign nationals.
A second emerging issue is the increasingly scarce and critical
freshwater on which life depends. Freshwater is less than three
percent of the total water on earth.67 Much of it is frozen in ice, and the
remainder is found almost entirely in some two hundred and sixty-one
trans-boundary river systems and lakes, covering nearly half of the
land-surface of the earth. 68  We share water systems with our
neighboring states to the north and south, whose populations and
economic activities compete to use the waters for drinking, sanitation,
irrigation, and industrial activities. Canadian pollution enters the
United States and the United States exports it in turn to Mexico.
Around the globe, drought, desertification, pollution, and over-
extraction lead to water shortages, tensions, and conflicts between
states. Water wars are predicted unless agreements are made and
upheld. The U.S. is fortunate to have a comprehensive Boundary
Convention"), Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (adopted by the General Assembly in its
resolution 3235 (XXIX) and entered into force on 15 September 1976); Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon
Agreement"), Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (adopted by the General Assembly in its
resolution 34/68 and entered into force on 11 July 1984). See also P.J. Blount, Renovating
Space: The Future of International Space Law, in this book.
66. Philip P. DiStefano, Chancellor's Letter: CU No. 1 in the Peace Corps, COLORADO
DAILY (Feb. 2, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://www.coloradodaily.com/cu-boulder/ci_17273010#
axzzlZTOq8EwA.
67. UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 3: PAST,





Waters Agreement with Canada,69 which has allowed us to avoid major
disputes for nearly a century.
Biological resources underlay an estimated forty percent of the
global economy. 70 Some eighty percent of all pharmaceuticals are based
on plant genetic resources.71  The cures for cancer, macular
degeneration, and dengue fever may be found in rapidly disappearing
forests where the uses of native plants are known only to indigenous
people who are themselves disappearing, along with their cultures,
languages and knowledge; over 1000 groups are predicted to disappear
within the coming decades. 72 Species extinction is occurring at a rate
estimated to be 1000 times the natural rate. 73  Of perhaps more
immediate concern, more than half the world's commercial fish stocks
have reached their yield limit and many fisheries are crashing, taking
away the major protein source for nearly a billion people. 74
Globally, nearly three billion people, or about half the world
population, live on less than two dollars a day and one billion survive on
less than two dollars and fifty cents a day.75 The Gross Domestic
Product of the poorest 48 nations is less than the combined wealth of
the world's seven richest individuals.76 In the developing world, one in
five children every year do not live to see their fifth birthday.77 In
addition to the humanitarian disaster this poses, there is a proven
69. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat.
2448.
70. Convention of Biological Diversity's Tenth Conference of the Parties (CBD COP
10), INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://ictsd.org/ilevents/dialogues
/62258/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
71. See generally Biodiversity, Wild Species, GLOBAL ENV'T, http://www.admweb
studios.co.uk/Biodiversity3.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
72. See SECRETARIAT OF THE PERMANENT FORUM OF INDIGENOUS ISSUES, DEP'T OF
ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (2009), available
at http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/unpfiildocuments/SOWIP-web.pdf.
73. Press Release, Secretary General, With Biodiversity Loss Accelerating, 'We are
Bankrupting Our Natural Economy' Says Secretary-General in Remarks at Event to
Launch International Year, U.N. Press Release SG/SIV12739/ENV/DEV/1108/OBV/851
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsml2739.doc.htm.
74. FOA FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE DEP'T, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 3 (2010), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/il820e/il820e.pdf; UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME,
VITAL WATER GRAPHICS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S FRESH AND MARINE
WATER (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.unep.org/dewaivitalwater/articlel64.html
(follow "Economic activities: Fisheries and ecotourism" Under Chapter 3; then follow
"Fishing yield").
75. Anyp Shah, Causes of Poverty, GLOBAL ISSUES (Sep. 4, 2011), http://www.global
issues.org/issue/2/causes-of-poverty.
76. Id.
77. Pollution in the Developing World, BLACKSMITH INSTITUTE, available at http://
www.blacksmithinstitute.org/files/FileUpload/files/Additional%/o20Reports/hidden.pdf.
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correlation between poverty and armed conflict: of the 32 countries at
the low end of the U.N.'s Human Development Index, 22 have
experienced conflict at some point during the past 15 years,--8 including
nine of the ten countries at the bottom of the list.79
The value of world merchandise exports was US $12.15 trillion in
2009, while world commercial services exports came to US $3.31
trillion.80 The U.S. imports 13.6 percent of its goods and merchandise.81
As of April 2010, average daily turnover in global foreign exchange
markets was estimated at US $4.0 trillion.82 Some firms specializing on
foreign exchange market had put the average daily turnover in excess
of US $4 trillion. Four years earlier the average global turnover totaled
US $3.3 trillion. 83
Half of all revenues for Hollywood films now comes from abroad. 84
McDonald's has 14,000 restaurants in the United States but 17,000 in
117 other countries.85 Ninety percent of the 1000 restaurants it opened
in 2008 were outside the United States.86 Boeing's 777 jet aircraft is
assembled in Boeing's plant in Everett, Washington from a fuselage
made in Japan, wingtips coming from Korea, rudders from Australia,
dorsal fins from Brazil, the main landing gear from Canada and France,
and flight computers from the United Kingdom.87
Two-thirds of all this trade is transported by sea, but products are
not the only travelers. 8 According to the World Travel and Tourism
Council, tourism and its related economic activities employ 200 million
people, and transport nearly 700 million international travelers per
78. Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads:
Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World, United Nations Development Programme,
12 (Charlotte Denn ed., 2005), http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDRO5complete.pdf.
79. Id. at 151.
80. WTO Forecasts Global Trade Will Experience 9.5% Record Growth in 2010,
MERCO PRESS (March 27, 2010), http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/27/wto-forecasts-global-
trade-will-experience-9.5-record-growth-in-2010.
81. U.S. Trade Deficit Narrows in July, TRADING ECONOMICS (Sep. 8, 2011, 1:41 PM),
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/imports.
82. Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and OTC Derivatives Market
Activity in April 2010 - Preliminary Global Results - Turnover, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS (Sep 1, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/pl00901.htm.
83. Id.
84. Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop, Hollywood Presses Its Global Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/business/medial 23film-
screensingapore.html?pagewanted=all.
85. George F. Will, Lovin' It All Over, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 27, 2008, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/26/AR2007122601485.html.
86. Id.
87. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ASSESSMENT OF FAA's RISK-BASED SYSTEM





year. This figure is expected to double by 2020.89 Foreign visitors are
the main source of foreign currency for more than one-third of all
countries.90 International telephone calls increased from 33 billion
minutes in 1990 to 70 billion minutes in just six years' time.9'
Criminal activities have gone international as well, including drug
and human trafficking, illicit arms trade, stolen art and artifacts, illegal
wildlife trade, dumping of hazardous or toxic products and waste,
currency counterfeiting and money laundering, and high tech crime.92
Just one international investment fraud case involved more than 2,000
victims from 60 countries who were defrauded of approximately US
$200 million. 93 On Sept. 3, 1998, law enforcement agents in 32 U.S.
cities and Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden raided the
homes of suspected internet child pornographers.9 4  Cooperative
transnational law-making and enforcement is increasing in recognition
of the fact that law enforcement will not be effective without such
agreements and cooperation.
Finally, since 1990, more than three million people have died in
armed conflicts and about 25 million people are currently internally
displaced because of conflicts or human rights violations. 95 Notably, at
the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War, the first reservists called up were
six lawyers of the 46th International Law Detachment.96
In sum, almost no topic in the professional life of a lawyer remains
exclusively regulated by domestic law. The reality is that no country is
capable of defending itself and ensuring the welfare of its citizens
without international cooperation and the rule of law. In 1946, Hersch
Lauterpacht, looking back at the work of one of the founders of
international law, Hugo Grotius, commented that even in the 17th
89. Russell A. Mittermeier, Forward to Costas Christ ET AL., Tourism & Biodiversity:
Mapping Tourism's Global Footprint at v (2003), available at http://www.unep.fr/
shared/publications/pdflWEBx0O16xPA-TourismFootprint.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Press Release, Geneva Press Kit, Statistical Snapshot of Soc. Dev., U.N. Press
Release 8 - DPI/2117 (June 26-30, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
geneva2000/text-version/news/presskit.htm.
92. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 3-11 (Dec. 2000)
available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000497956/DOC_0000497956.pdf (assess-
ment prepared by a U.S. Government interagency working group in support of and
pursuant to the President's International Crime Control Strategy).
93. INTERPOL, AT WORK: ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2005) http://www.interpol.int/
content/download/770/6083/version/5/file/iaw2005.pdf.
94. Michael Grunwald, Internet Child Porn Ring Raided, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3,
1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/washtech/daily/sept98/02/techl.htm.
95. U.N.D.P. Rep. on Human Development (2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR05_chapter_5.pdf.
96. Steven Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, 77 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1991).
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century Grotius opined that "the impact of economic interdependence or
of military security [is such] that there is no state so powerful that it
can dispense with the help of others."97 Today, if the United States
wants the cooperation of states to combat drug trafficking, it must
bargain on other issues like global climate change and agricultural
subsidies. If it wants a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, it
must cease creating secret prisons and kidnapping for rendition the
nationals from those states. The web of global interrelationships is a
fact known to all heads of state and government; if not earlier, then
certainly it was brought home on September 11, 2001.
The test of the rule of law does not come in ordinary times. As
Louis Henkin has famously said, most nations obey most international
law most of the time.98 They do it every time an airplane flies from one
country to another, every time the postal service delivers a letter with a
foreign stamp on it, every time a foreign ship docks and its cargo is
unloaded, every time a foreign film is distributed and shown, every time
a diplomat or head of state is received within another state. The
question is how well the law is enforced when it is inconvenient, costly,
or society is under threat.
Some nations have not performed well in this regard, but it is
critical to recognize that the failure is usually of law generally, not just
international law. As we have seen in various countries, governments
which perceive threats to their power or interests suspend constitutions
or give them restricted application, exile or arrest dissidents, harass or
kill disfavored minorities, and write memos justifying torture. It is
perhaps demanding too much to expect international law to be
respected by those who willfully disregard their own national laws and
constitutional limitations and those who fail to distinguish threats to
their political survival from threats to the national security. Claims
that a head of state or government is above the law generally do not
stop at international law but demand unlimited executive powers
unrestrained by the legislature, the judiciary, or for that matter,
conscience or morality.
Respect for the rule of law and political courage are necessary not
only to resist the temptations of expanding power, but also to resist
public calls for action and demands for retaliatory measures when lives
have been taken and enemies fail to respect basic norms of conduct.
The U.S. Civil War was a time of enormous bitterness and hostility,
sometimes fanned by the press, and there were indeed failures of law,
but also examples of where it held despite public pressure. When
97. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 31 (1946).




reports of the conditions suffered by Union prisoners in Andersonville
were widely reported, the Chicago Board of Trade sent a letter to
President Lincoln urging that the federal government set aside an
equal number of Confederate prisoners and subject them to the same
treatment, ensuring that they would die; the Chicagoans called for
"retaliatory measures as a matter of necessity."99 Instead, on April 24,
1863, President Lincoln approved General Orders No. 100,100 today
known as the Lieber Code, the first modern codification of the laws of
war. Article 16 said "Military necessity does not admit of cruelty -
that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge,
nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort
confessions." 101 The Lieber Code migrated to Europe, leading to the
first Geneva conferences and conventions, emerging into international
treaties and customary norms that are binding on all nations.
Thus, in conclusion, the nation must remain with Chief Justice
Marshall and those who wrote the Constitution, who believed that the
international rule of law needs to be respected and enhanced for our
own interest - an interest indivisible from that of the rest of the world.
A.H. Robertson, a prominent European human rights lawyer, poetically
likened the effort to building the Cathedral of Strasbourg, which took
over 350 years to complete, with mistakes along the way. 102 The
individuals who began the work and who contributed a stone, window,
or a statue, knew they would never see the entire magnificent
monument that has stood now for more than five hundred years - no
single day passing without some further adjustment or repair or
addition being needed. While lawyers must not have the arrogance of
thinking that they can solve every societal problem domestically, much
less globally, they should also not settle for too little. There are great
legal minds in the world, each of which can place his or her stone,
statue, or window in the Cathedral being built. As Margaret Mead
reportedly said: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful,
committed individuals can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing
that ever has."103
99. BRUCE CATTON, A STILLNESS AT APPOMATTOX: THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
TRILOGY 277 (1990).
100. See The Lieber Code of 1863: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863), available at http://www.civilwarhome.com
/liebercode.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
101. Id.
102. Interview with A.H. Robertson, in Strasbourg Fr. (1971).
103. MARGARET MEAD, MARGARET MEAD: THE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY WESTERN
CULTURES 12 (Robert B. Textor ed., Berghahn Books 2005).
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THE FUTURE OF HUmAN RIGHTS
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
Professor Nanda is far too well known in academic circles for me to
add anything new or different about his scholarship and contributions
to legal education and to international law and human rights. What I
can add, however, is my personal tribute to him as a person of integrity
and moral character. We have been friends since 1965, and over the
years, we have worked together on a number of academic projects,
including the first two volumes on international criminal law ever
published in the United States in 1973. Subsequently, we also co-edited
another volume on specific crimes arising under international criminal
law. During these years, we remained bound by an abiding friendship
arising out of mutual respect and affection, and it is my privilege to
contribute this manuscript to a volume of the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy, which he founded and which is dedicated
to him. The thoughts that follow are in keeping with his concerns about
human rights.
THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS WE HAVE COME To KNOW IT
The aftermath of World War II brought about a paradigm shift in
positive international law with respect to the individual's relationship
to the state. The latter ceased to be considered as an object of
international law and became a subject thereof. This meant that the
individual could not only be the recipient of certain rights but also their
rightful claimant from states.
Experts have debated the moral, philosophical, ideological, and
historic origins of human rights.' Legal historians have found the very
concept to be part of legal systems going back five thousand yearS2
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law Emeritus; President Emeritus, International
Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; President, International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Italy; and Honorary President,
International Association of Penal Law, Paris, France.
1. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 2-14 (2004).
2. 1-2 JEAN IMBERT ET. AL., HISTOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS ET DES FAITS SOCIAUX
(1956); 1-3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF WORLD LEGAL SYSTEMS (Wm. M. Gaunt
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while theologians have found the rights of human beings posited in
almost every religion, particularly the Abrahamic faiths, Hinduism and
Buddhism. 3 But it was the European Age of Enlightenment that
established the philosophical foundations for the nineteenth century
liberalism4 that in turn developed the conceptual framework of the post
WWII International Human Rights Law regime.5
Postmodernism denies the proposition that there is a master
historical account that would help us understand how human rights
have come to be and how they have evolved, while on a parallel track,
contemporary multiculturalism places every group in a victim category.
But, when everybody is a victim and there is no historical framework,
how can there be a human rights system other than a chaotic
environment where anything and everything goes and where ultimately
power prevails? Paradoxically these postmodernism and
multiculturalism postulates acknowledge human rights values as
primary factors in historical and socio-political transitional phases such
as post-colonialism. From post WWII to the era of globalization, no
matter what method is used, various stages of history reveal a process
of historic thought accretion whose transmission substantiates, within
and among civilizations, a theory of historic evolution that leads to the
conceptual framework of post WWII human rights articulations.
Thereafter, the legal methods of international law were used for the
actualization of human rights values and their transference to legally
enforceable norms and standards. In turn, this post WWII actualization
of human rights is being tested in the transitional phase of
globalization by emerging systems, processes, structures, actors,
resources, and changing dynamics in the interrelations of states,
private sector entities, and individuals and groups. How and when the
present transitional phase ends is difficult to identify, but when it does,
human rights as we have known it since the end of WWII is likely to
take on a new shape. This applies to all three complementary legal
regimes, described below, whose "value-oriented goals" 6 encompass
human rights.
& Sons, 1992) (1928); PIERRE-CLEMENT TIMBAL & ANDRE CASTALDO, HISTOIRE DES
INSTITUTIONS PUBLIQUES ET DES FAITS SOCIAUX 13 (11th ed. 2004); RENE DAVID & JOHN
E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (2d ed. 1978).
3. DAVID S. Noss & BLAKE R. GRANGAARD, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS
(13th ed. 2011).
4. WILLIAM M. SPELLMAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 109
(2011).
5. ISHAY, supra note 1.
6. The late professor McDougal and his Yale colleagues are credited with having
developed in the 1960s a new framework and methodology for understanding
international law. This "New Haven" school, as it became known, employed its own
terminology, which includes the term used above. Professor Nanda was an early student
of the New Haven school. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW
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If history teaches us anything, it is that certain fundamental values
will survive no matter what historic exigencies may dictate. History
does not evolve in cycles but in repetitions triggered by the occurrence
of certain human experiences. It may simply be the case that when it
comes to human affairs, history records variations on the same themes.
How different societies under different circumstances adapt to new or
newly perceived realities is like the flow of a river, which in some places
runs deep and slow, and in others shallow and fast. At times the river of
human history also runs stagnant and even likely runs dry until new
confluents energize its flow. The course of the human river, however,
keeps going on and maybe, just as it started out in its evolutionary
course, it will proceed into its conclusionary one. 7
What this transitional phase of globalization means to the general
scheme of history is beyond prediction. But that it will affect human
rights as we have understood them since WWII seems rather certain.
2. THE THREE COMPLEMENTARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES
ENCOMPASSING HUMAN RIGHTS
Since WWII, three different international legal regimes have co-
existed whose "value-oriented goals" include the protection of human
rights.8 They are: International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"),
International Criminal Law ("ICL") and International Human Rights
Law ("IHRL"). These regimes are, at once, complementary and distinct
as to, inter alia, their respective spheres of application, subjects,
contexts, and normative schemes. These differences, which characterize
these regimes whose historical origins are also different, necessarily
evidence overlap and gaps in the overall protective scheme of human
rights. This would have been avoided had all three been part of an
integrated legal regime, which is not the case. But what is significant is
that all three international legal regimes recognize: (1) the individual
as a subject of internationally established rights and obligations arising
directly under international law, (2) these rights and obligations
override national law, (3) that they are binding upon states, and (4) that
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION (1961); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASWELL, & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
7. See generally HENDRICK WILLEM VAN LOON, UPDATED BY JOHN MERRIMAN, THE
STORY OF MANKIND (1999); THEODORE ZELDIN, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF HUMANITY
(1994).
8. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6; MCDOUGAL, LASWELL, & CHEN, supra
note 6.
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they require (in different and varying ways) international and domestic
enforcement measures, sanctions, and ultimately remedies for victims. 9
The recognition of the individual as a subject of international law
protected by legal rights limits the powers of the state. It is the other
side of the coin that provides for the individual's international criminal
responsibility.10 This was first embodied in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal ("IMT")'l and the Statute of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"),12 both of
which relied on the customary international law of armed conflicts to
carry out individual international criminal responsibility based on what
was known as war crimes. 13 The Charter and Statute added to the core
"war crimes" charge, those of "crimes against humanity"14 and "crimes
against peace,"'" both of which criminalized conduct that violated the
right to life and to physical integrity. Shortly after the IMT and IMTFE
concluded their proceedings, the United Nations adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.16 Since then, aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes became the four core crimes of International Criminal
9. The latter is of more recent vintage. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law G.A. Res.
60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/146 (Dec. 16, 2005); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 203 (2006); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; International
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, Rule
85 (2000).
10. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Discipline of International Criminal Law, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 21 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd ed. 2008); see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 64 -71 (2003).
11. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis art. 1 (Aug. 8, 1945) 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (entered into force Apr. 26, 1946).
13. For the failed post-WWI efforts to establish international criminal responsibility,
as was subsequently the case after WWII, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I "The
War to End All Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice
System, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 244 (2002).
14. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 95 (2011).
15. See WHITNEY HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR
CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, 1945-1946 (1999).
See also Yoram Dinstein, The Distinctions Between War Crimes and Crimes Against
Peace, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds.
1996).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2d ed. 2009).
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Law ("ICL").17 ICL and International Humanitarian Law ("IHL") paved
the way for the paradigm shift mentioned above that was indispensable
for the establishment of the IHRL regime.
What all three international legal regimes have in common is the
protection of certain individual human rights from violations committed
by states. Some of these rights extend to collective rights, but they too
are posited in the nature of a relationship between a given collectivity
and a given state.
The International Human Rights Law Regime (IHRL)
International Human Rights Law applies to states. The first,
second, and third generations of human rights under IHRL are not
absolute rights that can be claimed by the protected person or persons
against other individuals or organizations whether they be IGOs,
NGOs, or business legal entities (with some exceptions).1 8 Conceptually,
the new post WWII paradigm of the individual being the subject of
internationally established rights and obligations is only in relationship
to a state and even in that respect there are some limitations as to
which state that may be. Individual rights are usually limited in their
application to the state of nationality or the state of residence with
some exceptions for certain human rights violations which are not
limited to these two categories of states such as migrant and refugee
rights,19 racial discrimination, 2 0 and the right to be free from cruel,
unusual, and degrading treatment or punishment under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") Article
1521 and the CAT.22
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human RightS23 and the two
1966 Covenants on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")24 and Economic
17. Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 9, arts. 5 - 8.
18. Contra ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
(2006). The author postulates the proposition that human rights protect the individual
from any source of harm. The author is ahead of his time, but that is maybe where
globalization is heading. This writer is more skeptical though sympathetic to Chapham's
desideratum.
19. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
20. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD].
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; art. 41 entered into
force Mar. 28, 1979) [hereinafter ICCPR].
22. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987)
[hereinafter CAT].
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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and Social RightS2 5 formed the core of what scholars refer to as the
"International Bill of Human Rights." 2 6 While the Universal
Declaration27 was at first deemed declaratory, it subsequently became
part of customary international law. 28 The two covenants originated as
binding positive international law, though prescriptive in nature. They
prescribed that certain individual rights were protected from state
infringement, but they did not provide for enforceable remedies even
though, in time, many of these individual rights were recognized as
constituting part of customary international law and thus presumably
binding upon non-state parties.
The declarative and prescriptive stages of IHRL were followed by
two subsequent stages, the specialization stage of normative
prescriptions and the proscriptive stage (described below under
"ICL").29 The first was characterized by a number of international
conventions whose subject matter and normative prescriptions
addressed, with varying degrees of specificity, some of the rights that
were enunciated in more general terms in the ICCPR. They include
women's rights,30 children's rights,3' racial equality, 32 migrants'
rights,33 rights of the disabled, 34 and other subject matters of human
rights protections. 35 This new stage of normative prescriptive rights
provided specificity to different subject matters and offered the promise
24. ICCPR, supra note 21.
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
26. John P. Humphrey, The International Bill of Human Rights: Scope and
Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 528-34 (1976).
27. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1, 45-49 (1975). See also PETER MALANCZUR, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 39-48 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
28. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW, 42 (1989).
29. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law
in the Processes of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
193 (1982).
30. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
31. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in armed conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S 222; Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2,
1990).
32. See ICERD, supra note 20.
33. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force July 1, 2003).
34. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
35. See Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, ST/HR/1/Rev.6,
U.N. Sales No. E.02.XIV.4 (2002).
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of enforcement through the established treaty-bodies. 36 The treaty-
bodies were designed as implementation mechanisms for each of these
covenants and conventions; they were intended to enhance compliance
and reduce violations of the human rights protections guaranteed by
these international instruments. But these objectives were hardly
achieved. 37 Treaty mechanisms were never assessed in terms of their
effect on enhancing compliance and reducing violations.38 In fact, these
mechanisms have proven to be nothing more than procedural devices
that limit the consequences of a state party's violation to the mere
issuance of periodic reports by the respective treaty-body. 39 Considering
that most of these treaty-bodies are staffed by government officials and
former government officials, it is no wonder why so many of these
treaty bodies have done so little to induce state parties' compliance and
thus reduce violations.
The declarative and prescriptive stages of IHRL brought about a
large number of multilateral instruments, which in turn had an impact
on the contents and terminology of national constitutions, criminal
legislation, procedural norms, and evidentiary standards. 40 Thus, while
it is impossible to assess whether the adoption of these international
legal instruments have enhanced state compliance with what is now
commonly referred to as international human rights norms and
standards, it is nonetheless possible to assess their impact on national
normative developments. 41 Thus, the center of gravity of human rights
has, as it should, moved from internationalization to nationalization,
much as this writer believes that the future of international criminal
36. See NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: WHAT FUTURE
FOR THE UN TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PROCEDURES? (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & William A. Schabas eds., 2012) (listing the Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
Human Rights Committee; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women; the Committee against Torture; the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture; the
Committee on the Rights of the Child; the Committee on Migrant Workers; the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances).
37. Id.
38. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS MACHINERY, supra note 36, at xi - xxii.
39. None of them provides for independent fact finding as they are essentially
predicated on periodic reports by governments with are then reviewed by the respective
treaty bodies who issue periodic reports containing whatever findings and
recommendations these bodies elect to make.
40. BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 10, at
583-671.
41. Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: From Diversity to Rapprochment, 17
NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES (1998); The Regionalization of International Criminal Law
and the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 65 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF PENAL LAW (1994); Inquisitorial-Accusatorial: The collapse of dogmas in criminal
procedure, 68 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PENAL LAW (1997).
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justice and ICL and IHL as a whole are destined to follow this path. The
future of IHRL, ICL, and IHL is their absorption into national legal
systems whose enforcement mechanisms are likely to have a far more
effective impact on compliance than any assisting or prospective
international set of mechanisms.
The International Criminal Law Regime (ICL)
Following the normative prescriptive stage of IHRL described
above, another stage in the development of human rights protections
ensued through specialized conventions proscribing violations of certain
fundamental human rights as in the case of torture,42 slavery and
slave-related practice, 4 3  human trafficking, 4 4  and enforced
disappearances. 4 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment46 ("CAT") remains
the most striking example of the proscriptive stage of IHRL through
ICL. It criminalizes the commission of torture by any state party to the
said convention. Scholars have also concluded that the prohibition of
torture as reflected in CAT, the Universal Declaration,47 the ICCPR,48
and other regional instruments declaring the prohibition of torture49
amount to customary international law binding upon all states
42. See CAT, supra note 22; SIR NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (3rd ed. 2009); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT (1988).
43. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227;
ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 8; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266
U.N.T.S. 3; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 254; see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 445
(1991).
44. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319; Elizabeth Bruch,
Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2004).
45. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A[RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
46. CAT, supra note 22.
47. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23.
48. ICCPR, supra note 21.
49. Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 8, May 22, 2004 (entered into force Mar. 15,
2008), reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Reps. 893 (2005); African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1986); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1978); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953).
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irrespective of whether a given state is a state party to any of these
multilateral conventions.50
The proscription of other international human rights violations
reflect certain human values protected by IHRL as in the protection of
vulnerable groups such as civilians threatened by "terrorism."5 1 Fifteen
multilateral conventions and seven regional conventions address
different manifestations of "terrorism."5 2 The proscription of certain
50. See RODLEY & POLLARD, supra note 42.
51. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937 - 2001)
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Terrorism": Reflections on
Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, in VALUES AND VIOLENCE: INTANGIBLE ACTS OF
TERRORISM 233 (Ibrahim A. Karawan, Wayne McCormack & Stephen E. Reynolds eds.,
2008); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing "Terrorism" into the New Millennium, 12 DEPAUL
BUS. L. J. 1 (2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 83 (2002).
52. Multilateral Conventions: 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 10, 2010 (not yet
in force), DCAS Doc No. 22; see also 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Relating to International Civil Aviation, adopted Sept. 10, 2010 (not yet in force), DCAS
Doc. No. 21; Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, adopted Nov. 1, 2005,
LEG/CONF.15/22; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted Oct. 14, 2005, LEG/CONF.15/22
(entered into force July 28, 2010); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002);
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, Working Document
Submitted by India, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (Aug. 28, 2000); International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (entered into
force May 23, 2001); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 (entered into force Jan. 15, 1999); Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122
U.N.T.S. 359; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Mar. 10, 1998, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627;
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167
(entered into force Feb. 20, 1977); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into
force Sept. 30, 1962).
Regional Conventions: Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on
Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/publisher,OIC,,,3de5e6646,0.html (deposited with the General Secretariat of the
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acts of terror-violence are not only deemed harmful to the state and to
international peace and security, but it also constitutes violations of
different individual human rights such as the right to life, physical
integrity, personal safety and security, and the enjoyment of
international means of travel.
States' efforts at controlling "terrorism" have in turn produced
human rights violations when they resulted in the curtailment of
certain human rights for those deemed as "terrorists" by states. This is
evident in the commission of torture at the Guantanamo facility (Cuba)
established by the United States, the commission of torture in Iraq
(notably at Abu Ghraib prison) and Afghanistan (notably at Bagram Air
Force Base), and extrajudicial executions and torture in the context of
what the United States has euphemistically referred to as
"extraordinary rendition." 53
Organization of the Islamic Conference); OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism, June 14, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3f4b1f714.html (deposited with the Secretary General of the Organization
of African Unity); Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, available at
http://www.unher.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb290.html (deposited with the Executive
Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States); Arab Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/publisher,LAS,,,3de5e4984,0.html (deposited with the Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States); SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov.
4, 1987, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr-ctd/cbrctd_36.html
(deposited with the Secretary-General of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/090.htm (deposited with
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe); Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are
of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/treaties/a-49.html (deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of
American States).
53. See, e.g., Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in
Europe 1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 952-53, 965-66 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, Above
the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345,
345-73 (2007); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 824-51 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture
and Impunity: President Obama's First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 151, 151 n.1 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 359-61 & n.1 (2009); see Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary
Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1200 (2007); Michael P. Scharf, Keynote Address: The T-Team, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L.
129, 130-31, 134-35 (2010); symposium, Philip Zelikow, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight
War, David Cole, The Taint of Torture: The Roles of Law and Policy in Deciding Whether
to Torture or Execute a Human Being, Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility:
Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 Hous. L. REV. (2012); Indefensible: A Reference for
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While ICL is a regime essentially geared to sanction what has come
to be regarded as international and transnational crimes, these crimes
are committed by individuals and groups in different contexts and for
different purposes. 54 Non-state actors include: (1) groups that pursue
ideological purposes by violent means and that are referred to as
"terrorists," (2) groups that seek to obtain profit by the use of violence
that are referred to as "organized crime" 55 groups and, (3) groups that
are parties in conflicts of a purely internal and non-international
character.56 These groups' activities overlap and frequently drift in and
out of these legal categories, which reveals the failure of international
legislative policy.
The "value-oriented goals"5 7 of these multiple sub-regimes of ICL
include not only human rights considerations but the preservation of
international peace and security and the security and public interests of
Prosecuting Torture and Other Felonies Committed by U.S. Officials Following September
11th, WORLD ORG. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS USA (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Int'l Human
Rights Law Clinic, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2012, at 3-19, 38-156; Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee, United States of America, U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006, 10, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18,
2006); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United
States of America, U.N. Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., May 1-19, 2006, 14 (the
U.S. "should recognize and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, whether in
peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction...."), 1 15 ("provisions
of the Convention apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective
control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world."), T 19 (there
exists an "absolute prohibition of torture . . without any possible derogation."), 24 (the
U.S. "should rescind any interrogation technique, including methods involving sexual
humiliation, 'water boarding,' 'short shackling' and using dogs to induce fear, that
constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in all places
of detention under its de facto effective control, in order to comply with its obligations
under the Convention."), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly Res. 1433, Lawfulness of Detentions by the United States in
Guantanamo Bay, 1 7(i)-(vi), 8(i)-(iii) (vii)-(viii) (Apr. 26, 2005); U.N. Comm. on Human
Rights, Situation of the Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) (by Leila Zerrougui et al.) [hereinafter U.N. Experts'
Report]; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High
Value Detainees" in CIA Custody (Feb. 2007), available at http://pegc.us/archivel
Organizations/ICRC rpt-hvd_20070214.pdf., quoted in Mark Danner, U.S. Torture: Voices
from the Black Sites, 56 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, ch. 1 (Apr. 9, 2009).
54. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15-25 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
55. TOM OBOKATA, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-19
(2010).
56. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Symposium: Redefining International Criminal Law: New
interpretations and New Solutions: Criminal Law: The New Wars and the Crisis of
Compliance With The Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 713-14 (2008).
57. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 262-63, 302; MCDOUGAL, CHEN, &
LASWELL, supra note 6, at 3-6.
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states. The balancing of these interests necessarily affects the goals and
methods pursued by states, individually and collectively. That which at
one time can tip the scales in favor of human rights, can also tip them
in the direction when considerations of security are deemed to affect
those pertaining to human rights.
The International Humanitarian Law Regime (IHL)
Another international legal regime protecting human rights is
IHL. The four Geneva Conventions 8 of August 12, 1949 and the two
Additional Protocols of 197759 are the normative cornerstones of this
regime that also includes the customary law of armed conflict.60 The
IHL legal regime applies to the protection of certain persons, targets,
and means employed during the course of international and non-
international conflicts but does not extend to purely internal conflicts. 61
The protected scheme of IHL has been interpreted by states as having
greater application in the context of conflicts of an international
character than conflicts of a non-international character, even though
doctrine has equated the protective rights for non-combatants as well as
combatants in these two contexts. 62 The practice of states however has
not followed the writings of scholars in connection with the same
applicability of IHL protections in both contexts, but international
tribunals have. 63
IHL and IHRL overlap, as evidenced by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") decision in the Wall case involving Israel's treatment of
58. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
59. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
610.
60. 1 MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR 134-
39 (3rd ed. 2011); ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force, 8-10 (July 2011).
61. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 17-19 (1990).
62. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 554-55 (1995).
63. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT- 94-1-A,
Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 4, 1998).
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Palestinians and Palestinian occupied territories. 64 As evidenced in this
case, the ICJ held that the two regimes are simultaneously applicable
but that IHL, being the lex specialis, prevails over IHRL, which is the
lex generalis, thus there is a gap in the protection of human rights
during conflicts of purely internal nature. 65
IHRL and ICL also overlap in that ICL criminalizes some of the
conduct prohibited by IHRL, but in different contexts. An example of
the overlap between the two regimes is in connection with combatants
in conflicts of an international and non-international character who
engage in collateral activities proscribed by ICL as "organized crime"6 6
activities, "terrorism," 67 or drug trafficking. 68 It has not yet been
established by the ICJ or by experts how to address the overlay between
ICL and IHRL. 6 9
More importantly, conflicts can shift from primarily internal to
international and during this shift multiple legal regimes are
applicable. This overlap will occasionally bring about IHL's supremacy
over ICL and vice-versa.
3. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Although international criminal justice has made progress with the
establishment of such institutions as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 70 International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda,71 International Criminal Court, 72 and the mixed model
64. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 106 (July 9).
65. Id. 105-06.
66. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res.
55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383, art. 2(a) (Nov. 15, 2000).
67. Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note
51, at xxv-xxix; Karawan, McCormack, & Reynolds, supra note 51, at 233-35.
68. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 3, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on
Psychotropic Substances art. 1, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 1, Mar. 25, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 3; Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, As Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 art. 1, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151.
69. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4-7 (2d ed. 2008); ILIAS
BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 19-20 (Hart Publishing, 4th ed. 2010);
ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 15-17 (2008).
70. S.C. Res. 827, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
& PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 202-08 (1996); 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 37-48 (1995).
71. S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); See VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1-2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 37-46
(1998).
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tribunals, 73 the values of international criminal justice have not yet
become part of the goals of globalization. 74 The present stage of
globalization has emphasized economic and financial interests over
humanistic and humanitarian values and principles. Economic and
financial interests, whether in the public or private sectors, continue to
prevail over humanistic and humanitarian values. Contemporary
economic and financial crises in the world dominate the interests of
states to the detriment of their interest in human rights. Moreover,
concerns for internal security and stability have prevailed as states'
interests over the interests of humanitarian and humanistic values.
Efforts by the international community to advance the theory of
universal jurisdiction for certain international crimes, which are
designed to protect human rights and prevent genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, torture, and extrajudicial executions, have not
been successful.7 5 Universal jurisdiction remains a desideratum that
has been thwarted by the interest of states seeking to advance their
state interests. Realpolitik has once again prevailed over the lofty
humanistic and humanitarian values reflected in so many international
conventions and in the writings of scholars. 76 For maybe similar
reasons, states have resisted the proposition that human rights are
universal and should be universally enforced. The international
community is as reluctant to enforce ICL universally as it is to
universally enforce IHRL.
This is evident in the high number of general amnesties provided
by states after internal conflicts. The number of amnesties has reached
125 out of a total of 313 conflicts that occurred between 1945 and
72. See Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 1.
73. Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757, art. 1 (May, 30 2007); Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art.
1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; GA Res 52/135, 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (Feb.
27, 1998); S.C. Res. 1272, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (created the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, 5, U.N. Doc. S[RES/1244
(Jun. 10, 1999) (created the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo);
BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 10, at 548-50.
74. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 269, 276 (2010).
75. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 137 (2001); see L. REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1-3
(2003); The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN
LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, 22-29 (2001), http://lapa.princeton.edulhosteddocs/univejur.pdf.
76. Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 291;
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Challenges Facing a Rule-of-Law-Oriented World Order, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 4 (2010); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict between
International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 546-47 (2006).
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2008.77 Accountability for International Crimes is also an area that is
more talked about than carried out, as evidenced by the fact that in the
313 conflicts mentioned above-which resulted in the deaths of at least
92 million-only 727 international prosecutions took place.78
4. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Globalization has created new spatial and political opportunities
for human rights to develop including speed and access to information
and social media, which increases the individual's ability to galvanize
one another and generate massive popular movements. New horizons
are likely to include individual and political rights as well as collective
social, economic and cultural rights. New agents of change have,
however, emerged in this transitional phase which have the capability
of enhancing future human rights prospects. These agents include
international and national civil society and a sensitized private sector
economy, which can more directly impact human rights outcomes than
any other segment of the globalized society. For those whose interest is
to categorize the periods of evolution or development of IHRL, the new
horizons of human rights in this globalized era will probably be
classified as the fourth generation of human rights.7 9 But this new
generation of human rights will be based on a number of paradigm
shifts whose outcomes cannot be predicted.
First, human rights claims by individuals and collectivities are no
longer going to be directed only towards states, for they too will be
impacted by the processes of globalization and the uncertainty about
what will make state structures and powers is uncertain. Moreover, as
the powers of states are diluted in the era of globalization, there exists
no specific globalized counterpart or authoritative process to replace the
state. Power and decision-making are likely to be more diffused in
globalized society than in a Westphalian state based system.80 At the
same time, states have lost a substantial part of their capacity to
govern. Thus, a tectonic shift is taking place with respect to states'
decision-making powers and effectiveness that will impact the states'
77. Christopher Mullins, Post-Conflict Justice 1945-2008, in THE PURSUIT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, vol. 1, at 80 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 2010).
78. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, vol. 1, 34
(2010) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 280;
Jane E. Stromseth, Justice of the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen
Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies?, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 87, 90
(2009).
79. See generally ISHAY, supra note 1, at 245-313.
80. See THOMAs ALFRED WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 147-48 (1899);
see generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 20 (1948).
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capacity to carry out their obligations under the traditional terms of a
"social contract."81 Whether the shift towards globalized systems and
processes is likely to replace that which is being eroded is at least
speculative.
Globalization of the world's economy and financial systems and
methods of communication have also resulted in new ways to infringe
on individual human rights. This includes predatory economic and
financial practices by multinational corporations, control of the right of
access to information, intrusions on privacy, and threats to the
environment. The transition phase of globalization is witnessing the
erosion of states' powers, in fact, because of the shift in decision-making
power to new globalized institutions and processes, and in part because
the increased ungovernability of contemporary societies. The reduced
capabilities of governments to protect, preserve, and enforce human
rights, in the absence of collective exercise of parallel power by the
international community in the present context of international
relations and the international law systems, have not been substituted
by anything new that globalization may eventually offer. This raises a
number of issues which include, whether there is something called the
global society that could be held accountable for the violation of human
rights in this transitional phase to globalization and whether
individuals will be able to make human rights' claims against the global
society and if so, in what manner and before what forum?
The first and second generations of human rights were tailored to
apply to states where national fora offered the prospects of adjudicating
a human rights violation and of obtaining a remedy. The third
generation of human rights has proven to be of little effect. The fourth
generation of human rights in this transitional phase to a globalized
society is not likely to offer better outcomes than its precedent one.
Although globalization mainly encompasses the multiplicity of
international processes and collective decision-making bodies consisting
mostly of states, the private sector has also developed informal
processes that are capable of producing outcomes that are similar to
those of structured state control decision making bodies. The impact of
these and other phenomena of globalization have not been the same
everywhere in the world or similar with respect to different categories
of rights. Thus, the expansion of a globalized free market economy that
seems to have had the most impact throughout the world, has not
necessarily witnessed a concomitant rise of labor rights though it has no
doubt energized the discourse on labor rights as human rights
throughout the world. The globalization of a free market economy,
which requires the free flow of goods and movement of materials across
81. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Dover
Publications 2003) (1762).
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national boundaries without hindrances, has extended to the free
movement of people across state boundaries but not necessarily to the
freedom of people to immigrate without discretionary restrictions
imposed by host countries, save for certain minimal rights of asylum. 82
Another unexplained perverse consequence is the regression of the
rights of immigrant labor forces and the hardship suffered by refugees
fleeing wars, repressive regimes, economic exploitation, and poverty.
Western societies, which are economically among the world's most
advanced, have been the more resistant to these and other human
rights claims deriving from globalization based on their interpretations
of cultural relativism and claims of nationalistic cultural rights.
Cultural differences continue to stand in the way of the universality of
human rights. Last but not least, globalization has not impacted the
bottom billion people of the world who live in poverty. 83
Globalization is not necessarily a recipe for a more harmonious
world or for one that is more likely to uphold human rights on a
universal and non-discriminatory basis. It is bringing about new
realities in the lives of individuals whose traditional family support
systems have disappeared or substantially eroded. The state, as has
been evident in the last 200 years or so, has not been able to provide a
substitute for these support systems other than by offering social
services devoid of the human element that is so important in the life of
persons. Can one expect a globalized society to do any better? Surely
international and national civil society, which will expand in the era of
82. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); see generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-24 (2005).
83. See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT,
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 100 (2011), available at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org
/sites/default/files/pdfsfWDR2011_FullText.pdf (discussing the correlation between
human rights and economic development. According to the 2011 World Development
Report, 1.5 billion people live in countries suffering from continual political and criminal
violence. This can only be overcome through strengthening of "legitimate national
institutions and governance" which provide the foundation for security, justice,
employment and, accordingly, the risk of violent conflict. In particular, more than 90
percent of civil wars since 2000 occurred in places that previous civil wars in the last
three decades. This sort of endemic violence seriously impacts the capacity of states to
develop and escape poverty. It is noteworthy that not a single "low-income fragile or
conflict affected[ed]" state has achieved one of the UN's Millennium Development Goals.
Poverty is, on average, 20 percent higher in those countries than in their conflict free
neighbors. One of the clear lessons is the need to build strong and effective governments
with a rule of law, as countries without the requisite governmental institutions are 30-45
percent more likely to see a civil war than those with such institutions. In sum,
unemployment, corruption, injustice, exclusion and the systemic violation of human
rights remain the strongest causes and predictors of violence). See generally PAUL
COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING & WHAT CAN
BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007) (discussing the correlation between economic development and
globalization).
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globalization, are not likely to provide a substitute for the traditional
(and now maybe historic) support systems of family community, tribe,
or village. But no one can anticipate the outcomes of realigning social
structures.84
CONCLUSION
Since WWII, human rights norms and standards have developed at
the international, regional, and national levels, though with varying
degree of effectiveness. Human rights instruments have influenced
national constitutions and permeated the legal systems of most states.
International criminal justice has also made inroads at the national
level, increasingly reaching heads of states who have committed human
rights violations. But even though the principle of accountability has
been widely recognized, its application is at least symbolic. 85
The economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences on world poverty
and the crisis of governability are eroding the ability of states to fulfill
their part of the traditional "social contract." As a result, states'
legitimacy is being undermined and peoples are turning to other ways
to protect human rights. What we have come to know as human rights
since WWII is increasingly conditioned by economic and socio-political
realities evidenced in state practices and in collective state actions and
inactions. One such example is the failure of the fledgling principle of
the Responsibility to Protect 86 to become part of an institutionalized
process of decision-making leading to consistent practice by the
international community. The failure of the international community to
intervene for the protection of peoples from genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes is reflected in the 313 conflicts that have
erupted in various national contexts since the end of WWII that
resulted in 92 million casualties.87 The conduct of states during these
conflicts reveals that they intervene mostly when their national
interests are at stake and not necessarily when the human rights of
peoples are subject to large scale depredations are at risk.
84. Francis Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the
Decline of the Middle Class? 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53, 59-61 (2012).
85. Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at 284.
86. See U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 138-39, U.N.
Doc. A/60!L.1 (Sept. 15, 2005); see generally GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY To
PROTECT: ENDING MASs ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 50-54 (2008); ALEX J.
BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT To END MASS ATROCITIES 1-
5 (2009). See also Jennifer Moore, R2P=MDGs, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
Through the Millennium Development Goals, in this book.
87. BASSIOUNI, THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 78, at
34.
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What is more likely to characterize the next phase?
1. The economic disparities between what is called developed,
developing states, and the less developed states for the some one billion
people of the world88 are increasing. The bottom billion is likely to
increase by 50 percent to 100 percent in the next 20 years (for
demographic and economic reasons) while the top billion will likely
suffer from the economic crisis that erupted in 2008. Many will fall
below the poverty level and the so-called middle class will struggle more
to preserve its hitherto economic privileges. States will increasingly be
unable to provide the economic and social services they historically
offered or promised. Their part of the "social contract" will be
increasingly unfulfilled, and the states' legitimacy will be undermined.
The globalized system will not be a substitute for state's social and
economic responsibilities. Individual human rights will shift from social
and political rights reflecting the ideas of liberal democracy to basic
needs rights deriving from economic necessities. Distribution of wealth,
resources and allocation of public services will become a priority over
what will seem as the luxury of individual social and political rights in
the exercise of democratic freedoms.
2. The legitimacy of state powers will no longer derive from the
protection of liberal democratic freedoms and their exercise by as many
individuals as the state may help accede thereto. Rather, state powers
will derive from insuring human survivability and public safety. In the
process of this focus shift, individual and collective social and political
rights will be eroded while emphasis will shift to the exigencies of
survivability. This focus shift will be driven by increased difficulties and
costs of governments, which has been referred to herein as the
governability crisis that seems to have permeated so many governments
whether they be in developed, developing, or less developed states. But
new factors will emerge at the global level in such dimensions that
states' capabilities to confront them will be significantly challenged.
This includes famine and natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis,
earthquakes, and other consequences of climate change, and industrial
disasters whether related thereto or such nuclear ones. In the last few
years alone, the world has witnessed a number of these tragic
situations in Africa and Asia, evidencing the inability of states to
prevent and to effectively respond. 89 As the effects of climate change
increase while the global community stands hopelessly unable to
88. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 83, at 1-2.
89. See, e.g., Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html?sp=10&sq=disasters% 2in%20
africa&st=cse; see, e.g., In-depth: When disaster strikes: the response to the South Asia
Earthquake, IRIN (June 5, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthld
=6&ReportId=34369.
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prevent further deterioration, the impact on the basic human rights to
life and safety will increase. The priority of protecting individual
human rights will fall in consideration of these new threats.
3. The economic and social factors described above have already
resulted in more than 40 failed and failing states out of a total of 194
states. 90 It is within these states that internal conflicts usually arise
necessitating external intervention at enormous costs that other states
and the international community are increasingly finding beyond their
means. Failed and failing states also impact the stability and economy
of neighboring states, thus increasing the range of their negative
situations beyond their borders. But it is the enormity of the human
harm produced by these states that challenges every conception of
human rights. 91 Will globalization provide for a better solution or will it
be an escape hatch for states to resume the status quo of looking the
other way irrespective of the harmful human rights outcomes likely to
result?
4. The contemporary tension between human rights and security is
reminiscent of the historical tensions between states' exercise of power
from time immemorial up to the nineteenth century and the rights of
individuals recognized since WWII. No one today argues that states,
because they are states, have the right to arbitrarily kill a person or to
engage in torture. Instead the contemporary argument is that even
though the right to life and physical integrity is recognized, there are
exceptions justified by security needs. The United States makes this
argument in connection with its usage of drones to attack individuals
who are deemed (by a small segment of persons in government, namely
military and intelligence establishments) to pose a threat to the
security of the United States. 92 In the same vein, "extraordinary
rendition" and torture in Guantanamo, Cuba, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram
have been used by U.S. military and intelligence personnel as well as
private contractors. 93 At no time did the Bush Administration, which
engaged in this practice, argue that torture was not illegal. What was
argued was that these acts either did not constitute torture or were
90. The Failed States Index 2011, FOREIGN POLICY, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/06/1 7/2011_failed states indexinteractive-map-and.rankings (last visited
Feb. 10, 2012).
91. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 83, at 3-4.
92. Scott Shane, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-armsracehtml?
pagewanted=all.
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justified for national security reasons. 94 Seldom is the argument of
human rights, let alone of the rule of law, given much acknowledgement
in political and even legal circles.
The security argument is a de facto displacement of the
applicability of human rights. In other words, it is a theory of
exceptionalism that is gaining public recognition primarily in the
United States and in some Western European countries who now join
the list of states that have consistently resorted to such exceptionalism
as a way of safeguarding their national political interests. The U.S.'s
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan are two such examples, as is NATO's
bombing of Libya. All three had one thing in common, regime change,
and few raised concerns over the human rights violations caused by
these armed attacks.
5. The outlines of a new historical phase for human rights are
already identifiable. It will include a new paradigm shift from the
protection of individual human rights vis & vis states to the
predominance of state interests over those of individuals as was the
case before WWII. This paradigm shift will emphasize individual
responsibilities and the primacy of collective security interests within
and between states over the post WWII approach, which emphasized
the predominance of certain fundamental individual human rights over
state interests. But the decline of human rights in the context of
relations between the state and the individual will be counterbalanced
by the strengthening of collective rights vis a vis states and the
international community. 9
6. A number of indicators point to the erosion of human rights as
we came to know them since the end of WWII. What will replace it is
difficult to foresee except in one respect. The concept of human rights as
the embodiment of human dignity has become both the ethos and the
pathos of so many in our seven billion world population. The fact that
states and the global society may be unable to deliver their sides of the
new social contract will not affect the demand side for human rights.
And the demand in keeping with the market laws of free enterprise
capitalism, which is an integral part of globalization, will play its part
in preserving the supply side, namely states and the institution and
processes of the globalized society. What these new processes will be,
and how they are likely to produce positive human rights outcomes is of
course difficult to predict. But to paraphrase Mark Twain, news about
the complete demise of human rights is premature. But news about its
transformation is reasonably certain. Whether the new human rights
94. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington
/04interrogate.html.
95. COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS 380 (2000).
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outcomes will make a positive contribution to peoples' lives in the new
era of globalized society and with respect to what sectors of that society
is something crystal ball gazers in our field have yet to discern. But for
sure, the new globalized society will face daunting global problems that
will take priority over individual human rights if, in the trade-off, the
human rights of the masses are better protected, the balance sheet will
be acceptable. Considering, however, the dimensions of the problems
that the global society faces and will face in light of states' willingness
to collectively address what is in the offing, the prospects are not too
positive.
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE - U.S. POLICY
AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON
BY JOHN CERONE*
The pioneering work of Professor Ved Nanda in the field of inter-
national criminal law,' as well as his commitment to international jus-
tice, inspired the subject to the present article - the legitimacy of in-
ternational criminal courts.
In his July 10, 2011 opinion piece in the Denver Post, Professor
Nanda wrote of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) issuance of ar-
rest warrants for Moammar Qaddafi, his son Seif al-Islam, and his in-
telligence chief.2 As Libya is not a party to the ICC Statute, the Court's
jurisdiction arose from a Security Council resolution referring the situa-
tion in Libya to the Court. Alternatively, the Security Council could
have followed past practice and established an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, or a hybrid tribunal, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
to prosecute international crimes perpetrated in Libya.
The decision to establish an ad hoc tribunal is necessarily a politi-
cal one. In elaborating the statute of such tribunal, the Security Coun-
cil could decide the personal, geographic, and temporal scope of its ju-
risdiction, as well as the crimes that would fall within its subject matter
jurisdiction. The law establishing and shaping the tribunal's jurisdic-
tion is similarly driven by a political process. The jurisdiction of such a
tribunal could be limited temporally to a relatively narrow period of a
few months - perhaps January through March 2011. It could be limited
geographically to the territory of Libya, or even to subdivisions of Liby-
an territory. Its personal jurisdiction could be limited to Libyan na-
tionals, or to those fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi regime. It is even
conceivable that its personal jurisdiction could be limited to certain
named individuals.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law & Policy at
New England Law, Boston.
1. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1973).
2. See, e.g., Ved Nanda, Justice Will Find Khadafy, DENVER PosT (July 10, 2011,
1:00 am), http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_18436020.
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The U.S. government has played a key role in establishing and cir-
cumscribing the jurisdiction of international and hybrid criminal courts.
In so doing, the U.S. has not been shy about insisting on certain juris-
dictional exclusions. It is debatable whether the fashioning of the con-
tours of an international tribunal's jurisdiction is subject to any legal
constraints. The present article focuses on whether there are con-
straints of a different nature. Is there a point at which the fine-tuning
of a tribunal's jurisdiction deprives it of legitimacy?
This article traces the evolution of policy strands underpinning the
U.S. government's attitudes toward international criminal courts and
examines how these policy strands converged in a position of support
for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). It also demonstrates how
U.S. foreign policy interests helped to shape the contours of the STL.
The article then discusses some of the features of the tribunal that flow
from these interests, and examines the merits of challenges to the legit-
imacy of the tribunal made at least in part on the basis of these fea-
tures. It concludes with an examination of a spectrum of policy choices
in relation to the creation of international criminal courts and implica-
tions for their legitimacy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS 3
Assessing the state of U.S. policy toward international criminal
courts is a complex, if not impossible, undertaking. Indeed, there is no
coherent U.S. policy on international criminal courts generally. This is
attributable on the one hand to the multifaceted nature of international
criminal courts, and on the other to the fact that U.S. policy is an amal-
gamation of diverse views reduced in some cases to written form, which
is itself subject to varying interpretations. Policy is also in a continual
state of flux, and its fluctuations in this arena are particularly dynamic
at the present moment in history.
Nonetheless, examining the behavior of the U.S. government over
the past one hundred years or so reveals a pattern of identifiable policy
lines relevant to the establishment of international criminal tribunals.
The U.S. has been generally supportive of the development of interna-
tional law, and of the law of armed conflict in particular. It has also
supported the establishment of international courts and the incidental
development of international legal jurisprudence. Nonetheless, its sup-
port of international courts has never been absolute, and has always
been subject to competing foreign policy interests.
3. This section summarizes a more extensive historical analysis first published by
the present author in the European Journal of International Law. John P. Cerone, Dy-
namic Equilibrium: The Evolution of U.S. Policy Regarding International Criminal
Courts, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 277 (2007).
2012 45
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Its selective use of international courts is most visible, and perhaps
most controversial, in the realm of international criminal justice. While
the U.S. has been generally supportive of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, it has consistently taken the position that there should be no
international criminal court of universal compulsory jurisdiction, and in
particular vis-i-vis the United States and its nationals.
U.S. Attitudes in the Pre- World- War II Era
The U.S. has been a strong supporter of the development of the in-
ternational law of armed conflict since at least the mid-nineteenth-
century. However, the issue of whether international law should pro-
vide rules regulating armed conflict is quite different from whether
there should be an international mechanism to adjudicate whether
those rules have been violated.
During the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 & 1907, the U.S. sup-
ported the creation of an arbitral tribunal to resolve inter-state dis-
putes. Although it was unwilling to submit to compulsory jurisdiction
matters implicating strong national interests, the U.S. nonetheless wel-
comed the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with its
purely consent-based jurisdiction, in part because of the role it would
play in developing an international jurisprudence.
At the conclusion of World War I, the victorious powers at the Paris
Peace Conference considered the creation of an international criminal
court to prosecute abuses committed during the war. The U.S. was op-
posed to the creation of such a court for a range of reasons. Perhaps
most significantly, accountability for war crimes simply did not rank
high on President Woodrow Wilson's post-war list of priorities. He was
far more concerned with a "moderate peace, a viable democratic gov-
ernment for Germany, and, most of all, a League of Nations to secure
future peace." 4 The U.S. delegation was instructed to express serious
reservations, rejecting the tribunal and opposing the trial of the Kaiser,
who, in the meantime, had found refuge in the neutral Netherlands.5
Specifically, the U.S. argued that there was no "precedent, precept,
practice, or procedure" for such a tribunal, and that perpetrators should
instead face prosecution before national military justice machinery.6
Specifically, the U.S. favored the creation of a joint, multinational tri-
bunal or commission. In this way "existing national tribunals or na-
tional commissions which could legally be called into being would be
4. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 15 (1992).
5. Id. at 14.
6. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforce-
ment of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919,
Annex II: Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United
States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L.
95, 142 (1920).
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utilized, and not only the law and the penalty would be already de-
clared, but the procedure would be settled."7
The creation of an international criminal court was also considered
under the auspices of the League of Nations. Proposals to create such a
court never came to fruition. The U.S. view at that time, and indeed the
prevailing contemporary position, was that the creation of such a court
was premature. Manley Hudson, U.S. jurist and former judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, wrote in 1944, "[i]nstead of
attempting to create an international penal law and international agen-
cies to administer it, perhaps attention may more usefully be given to
promoting the cooperation of national agencies in such matters as ex-
tradition, judicial assistance, jurisdiction to punish for crime, and coor-
dinated surveillance by national police." 8 Hudson speculated that "[t]he
local impact of anti-social acts inspires the desire of States to safeguard
local condemnation and local punishment, and impingement on nation-
al prerogatives in this field will become possible only as the need for in-
ternational action is clearly demonstrated."9
U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts in the Post-
World- War II Era
The horrors of World War II provided the necessary catalyst to
overcome the inertia of the international community. In striking con-
trast to its position at the 1919 Paris Conference, the U.S. was strongly
supportive and played a central role in the establishment of both the
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals (IMTs). While
the U.S. was initially reluctant to endorse the proposal to create these
tribunals, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson is credited with persuad-
ing the U.S. government to adopt a "judicial solution" to dealing with
Axis war criminals. 10
Although U.S. support for the creation of the IMTs may appear ir-
reconcilable with the position taken by the U.S. delegation to the 1919
Paris Conference, it is worth noting the similarities between the IMTs
and the U.S. counterproposal to create a multinational commission or
tribunal. In addition to being run by the military, the tribunals were
operating in Germany and Japan, territories over which the U.S. was
exercising authority as an Occupying Power. Another key feature of the
tribunals is that their personal jurisdiction was expressly limited to
those acting on behalf of enemy states. Thus, there was no possibility
that those acting on behalf of the Allies would face prosecution.
A key difference from the "mixed tribunals" proposed by the U.S. in
1919, however, is that the IMTs were mandated to prosecute violations
7. Id. at 147.
8. MvANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 186 (1944).
9. Id.
10. TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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of international law, and not the domestic law of any country. Both tri-
bunals were given jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Early UN Efforts to Create an International Criminal Court
From the earliest days of the United Nations, the creation of an in-
ternational criminal court was on its agenda. In 1946, acting on the ini-
tiative of the U.S. delegation," the UN General Assembly affirmed the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter and judgment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Not long after, the U.S. expressed support
for the creation of an international criminal tribunal during debates
surrounding the drafting of the 1948 Genocide Convention. However,
the U.S. also took the position that a treaty creating a permanent court
was of such a magnitude as to necessitate a separate project, and thus
opposed creating a tribunal in the Genocide Convention itself.
In 1950, the General Assembly designated a Committee that in-
cluded the U.S. to prepare a preliminary draft convention relating to
the establishment of an international criminal court. Initially, there
was a wide range of views on the subject, which included strong opposi-
tion from the U.K. Although the U.S. appeared supportive, it insisted
that the envisioned court should only be able to try individuals whose
state of nationality had recognized the court's jurisdiction by treaty. Af-
ter five years of work attempting to draft a statute, differences among
UN Member States, exacerbated by the Cold War, led the UN to aban-
don the project. It was not until the Cold War ended in 1989 that the
creation of an international criminal court would once again find a place
on the UN agenda.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda
U.S. support for ad hoc international criminal justice mechanisms
was clearly visible in the creation of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The U.S. was the driving force behind the
establishment of both tribunals, contributing the greatest share of polit-
ical and financial muscle. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. gained
a substantial degree of control, primarily through the Security Council,
over UN mechanisms, and was thus more inclined to make use of them.
Both the ICTY and ICTR have jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. However, unlike the IMTs, vio-
lations of the jus ad bellum are not within either tribunal's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The geographic jurisdiction of both tribunals is strictly
limited. For conduct occurring outside the territory of Rwanda, the ju-
11. Formulation of Nilrnberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 181, 29, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/22.
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risdiction of the tribunal is limited by nationality. The temporal juris-
diction of the ICTR is limited to calendar year 1994.
Overall, the U.S. has been highly supportive of both tribunals and
criticism has generally focused on bureaucratic and financial concerns.
Nonetheless, U.S. support has weakened in situations where the work
of the tribunals has conflicted with other U.S. foreign policy objectives,
such as the ICTY Prosecutor's review of the NATO bombing of Serbia
and the indictment of Radovan Karadzic in the run-up to the Dayton
Accords.
The International Criminal Court
U.S. policy toward the International Criminal Court has been the
most visible and perhaps the most notorious. From the 1998 Rome Con-
ference to the present time, U.S. policy toward the ICC shifted from the
traditional U.S. pragmatic approach to firm opposition and then back to
pragmatism.
In the early 1990s, the United States was generally supportive of
the idea of a permanent international criminal court, but the U.S. was
quite clear that such an institution should not have jurisdiction absent
either the consent of the state of nationality of the perpetrator or a Se-
curity Council referral. After the Rome Conference, at which the United
States was not completely successful in having its concerns addressed,
U.S. support waned. Nonetheless, it remained engaged in the prepara-
tions for the establishment of the Court and ultimately signed the Rome
Statute to enable its continued participation.
U.S. support lessened upon the election of George W. Bush, who
brought with him an administration that was generally anti-
internationalist. This sentiment was augmented following the attacks of
September 11, 2001. By the spring of 2002, while the U.S. maintained
an official position of neutrality towards the Court, as expressed by the
U.S. in its notification that it would not proceed with ratification of the
ICC Statute, U.S. opposition to the ICC was clear. This opposition be-
came increasingly visible, manifesting itself in the passage of legislation
and the adoption of diplomatic strategies that appeared to constitute
frontal attacks against the ICC.
Later developments, including the Security Council's Darfur refer-
ral, the transfer of the Charles Taylor trial to The Hague, and the waiv-
er of legislative sanctions on states cooperating with the ICC, indicated
a lessening propensity for ideologically rooted or visceral responses and
a recognition of the value of the ICC in the attainment of other foreign
policy objectives. Toward the end of the George W. Bush administra-
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tion, this led the then State Department legal adviser to characterize
the U.S. attitude as "pragmatic."1 2
Internationalized, Hybrid and Related Criminal Tribunals
This pragmatic approach is also visible in U.S. support for so-called
hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).
The SCSL is distinct from the ICTY and ICTR in number of respects.
The Special Court was established by a treaty between the UN and Si-
erra Leone, and the Sierra Leonean government was heavily involved in
its creation. The Court is not a subsidiary body of the Security Council.
Oversight is carried out by a Management Committee drawn from a
group of interested states (who are also the principal funders), includ-
ing the United States. The substantive criminal law to be applied by
the Court, codified in the Statute of the SCSL, was derived from both
international law and domestic law. The personnel of the Court are also
mixed, employing both foreign and national staff.
The U.S. was the prime sponsor of the Court as it was an oppor-
tunity to build an international justice mechanism that it viewed as
preferable to the ICC. The U.S. was also insistent that the SCSL Prose-
cutor be a UN national with a military background. U.S. support came
not only from the Executive branch. For a variety of reasons, the Con-
gress was also extraordinarily and uncharacteristically supportive of
the SCSL.
Another key feature of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is found
in its jurisdictional limitations. The scope of personal jurisdiction of the
SCSL was a matter of concern for a number of UN Member State dele-
gations. 13 These delegations initially sought to limit the personal juris-
diction of the Court to Sierra Leonean nationals. 14 Indeed, this was
stipulated in the original draft statute of the Court. 15 In the course of
the negotiations, the nationality limitation was dropped in exchange for
an exemption for peacekeepers.16 This exemption is subject to Security
Council override, which of course would require the consent of its per-
manent members.
12. John Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep't, Legal Advisor Bellinger's Re-
marks on International Terrorists, at the 29th Roundtable on Current Problems of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (Sep. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov
1s/1/2006/98254.htm; see also John Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep't, Speech by
Legal Advisor John B. Bellinger, III, "The United States and International Law" (June 6,
2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s//2007 /112666.htm. The Darfur referral,
the offer assistance of the OTP in Darfur, and the transfer of the Taylor proceedings "re-
flect our desire to find practical ways to work with ICC supporters to advance our shared
goals of promoting international criminal justice."
13. Interview with non-U.S. diplomat involved in the SCSL negotiations (name with-
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The U.S. has also been generally supportive17 of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The Extraordinary
Chambers differ from the Special Court in a number of respects. They
form part of the Cambodian judiciary, they were created on the basis of
domestic legislation, and their subject matter jurisdiction is circum-
scribed by this same domestic law. A treaty between Cambodia and the
UN regulates UN participation in the operation of the ECCC. In addi-
tion, as with the other hybrids, U.S. support was facilitated by the in-
clusion of restrictive language in circumscribing the scope of the Cham-
bers' jurisdiction. The Chambers have jurisdiction to prosecute only
"Suspects," who are defined essentially as those members of the Khmer
Rouge who committed international crimes from 1975 - 1979.18
The U.S. has also been largely supportive of other courts with an
international dimension, including the internationalized Kosovo and
East Timorese court systems, and the Bosnian War Crimes chamber.
Similar to the ad hoc courts mentioned above, the U.S. has provided po-
litical, financial and personnel support in the work of each of these in-
stitutions. All of these institutions bring justice closer to the national
level in some respect, and the establishment of each dovetailed with
other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In general, as hostility toward international institutions increased,
the United States began to show increasing support for hybrid institu-
tions. However, as with other international criminal justice mecha-
nisms, U.S. support for the hybrids has been strongly influenced by
competing foreign policy objectives, as well as the possibility of prosecu-
tion of U.S. nationals, especially U.S. agents.
The Obama Administration and the Policy of "Principled Engage-
ment"
The Obama Administration has adopted a policy of "principled en-
gagement" with international organizations, including the International
Criminal Court. The generally positive tone adopted by his administra-
tion heralded a continuation of the trend toward constructive engage-
ment already in evidence during the latter years of the Bush admin-
istration. It also signaled a continuation of a pragmatic approach.
17. At times, U.S. political support for the ECCC has been tepid. This is attributable
in part to conflicting views within Congress and opposition to the Chambers on the part of
a number of human rights NGOs. Congressional ambivalence results from the fact that
different Cambodian diaspora groups, as constituencies of several members of Congress,
have different views on the Chambers. Although all of these groups want to see an ac-
countability process, they are divided as to whether the Extraordinary Chambers can pro-
vide credible justice.
18. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
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The U.S. under Obama re-engaged with the ICC Assembly of States
Parties, and was a highly visible and intensely active participant at the
ICC Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010. The large U.S. dele-
gation exerted intense pressure to narrow the definition of the crime of
aggression, and to limit its personal scope of application. It strove to
ensure that the Court would not have jurisdiction for the crime of ag-
gression over U.S. nationals or nationals of NATO allies. While it was
unable to secure agreement on giving the Security Council the exclusive
power to trigger aggression prosecutions, the U.S. did succeed in obtain-
ing an exemption for nationals of non-States Parties, even when their
conduct occurs on the territory of States Parties.
Nonetheless, the Obama administration has undertaken initiatives
that indirectly support the work of the ICC. In October 2011, President
Obama "authorized a small number of combat equipped U.S. forces to
deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are
working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield."19
The ICC has been seeking the arrest of Kony since 2005. At the same
time, Obama's announcement of this initiative made no mention of the
International Criminal Court arrest warrant, or indeed of any criminal
justice response.
Principles and Themes of U.S. Policy toward International Crimi-
nal Courts
The U.S. continues to publicly base its policy toward international
criminal courts on the following principles.
1. The United States is in principle committed to justice and ac-
countability for all. This does not mean, however, that the United
States seeks accountability at any cost. Even in cases in which the U.S.
attitude toward international criminal courts is at its most favorable,
these institutions are not viewed as ends in themselves. The U.S. ap-
proach is pragmatic - each institution is assessed in terms of its ability
to advance U.S. interests, which include, but are not limited to, promot-
ing accountability and the rule of law on the international level. When
accountability efforts at the domestic level fail, the U.S. resorts to a
balancing of interests. When international accountability efforts conflict
with strong national interests, those interests will prevail.
2. It is best to prosecute crimes, including all international crimes,
at the national level. Prosecution by any other court (including domestic
courts of other countries) 20 should be the last resort.
19. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army, (Oct. 14,
2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-
speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore.
20. There are of course strong parallels with the U.S. position on the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction.
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3. The Security Council should have the final word on prosecution
by any other court. The United States is strongly interested in main-
taining the primacy of the Security Council in matters of peace and se-
curity. The United States regards the existence of the ICC as a threat to
this primacy. Most observers assert that this position is a direct conse-
quence of the status of the United States as a permanent member of the
Council.
In addition, the historical survey above reveals certain consistent
themes underlying U.S. attitudes toward international criminal courts.
One consistent element would appear to be the (un)likelihood of prose-
cution of U.S. nationals. The United States has tended to support inter-
national criminal courts when the U.S. government has (or is perceived
by U.S. officials to have) a significant degree of control over the court or
when the possibility of prosecution of U.S. nationals is either expressly
precluded or otherwise remote. This was certainly the case for the post-
World War II military tribunals, as well as the Security Council ad hoc
tribunals. U.S. support for the hybrid tribunals was similarly facilitated
by the inclusion of jurisdictional limitations and other assurances of
nonprosecution of U.S. nationals.
If the United States is assured that U.S. nationals will not be pros-
ecuted (or, at least, not without its consent), it will engage in a balanc-
ing of interests to determine its level of support or opposition. Ideologi-
cal leanings will of course color this balancing of interests and at times
define some of those interests. To the extent an administration's ideo-
logical strain in favor of criminal accountability is stronger than its ide-
ological strain opposed to the creation of international authority, the
prospect of U.S. support of a given international criminal court seems to
increase.
II. THE U.S. AND THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established in the
wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri, and the STL's jurisdiction is tightly focused on this crime.
France was the driving force behind the creation of the tribunal.
France was keen to establish the STL for a number of reasons, includ-
ing its historical ties to Lebanon as well as the close personal relation-
ship that had existed between Hariri and Jacques Chirac, then Presi-
dent of France. In its quest to have the tribunal established, the French
government was willing to accommodate concerns of other permanent
members of the Security Council.
The STL was originally envisioned as a hybrid tribunal to be estab-
lished by bilateral treaty between the UN and Lebanon, modeled after
the treaty establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In early
2006, "[r]ecalling the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Sec-
retary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting inter alia
the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all
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those who are found responsible for" the Hariri assassination, the UN
Security Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate an
agreement with Lebanon for the establishment of such a tribunal. The
Secretary General proceeded to do so. However, the Lebanese govern-
ment failed to take the necessary internal steps to bring the agreement
into force. In response to this impasse, the Security Council decided to
use its Chapter VII authority to bring the agreement into force.
The U.S. is extremely supportive of the mission and work of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 21 The U.S. is the largest funder,
after Lebanon; it is a member of the Tribunal's Management Commit-
tee; and it is actively supporting the extension of the Tribunal's man-
date. 22 The U.S. has also made clear that its support is not contingent
on the continued support of the Lebanese government. A spokesperson
for the U.S. State Department recently stated, "The Special Tribunal's
work represents a chance for Lebanon to move beyond its long history of
impunity for political violence. The Lebanese authorities' support for,
and cooperation with, the work of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a
critical international commitment."23
A review of some of the Tribunal's features demonstrates why U.S.
support for the Tribunal is unsurprising. The initial request for the
creation of a Tribunal came from Lebanon. Although based in the
Hague, it is a hybrid tribunal, with both Lebanese and foreign person-
nel. The STL, while originally envisioned as being a treaty based court,
was ultimately created on the basis of the Security Council's Chapter
VII authority. Oversight is conducted by a Management Committee, of
which the U.S. is a member.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is very narrowly circumscribed.
The STL's jurisdiction encompasses only the assassination of Hariri and
other related "attacks" between October 1, 2004, and December 12,
2005. The Tribunal can take jurisdiction over subsequent related at-
tacks only with the consent of the Security Council. Thus, any member
of the Security Council may veto jurisdiction over acts committed after
December 2005. The tight focus of its jurisdiction lessens the chance of
mandate creep, and is backed up by the requirement of Security Council
authorization for expansion.
Further, the STL's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to crimes
under Lebanese law, including those "provisions of the Lebanese Crim-
inal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terror-
21. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Opening of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (Mar. 1, 2009) available at www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2009/03/119896.htm.
22. The Agreement establishing the Tribunal included a three-year sunset provision.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, United States Welcomes the Funding of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Nov. 30, 2011) available at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177953.htm.
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ism." 24 As a hybrid institution, it conformed to the U.S. position that
justice should be done as close to the domestic level as possible, and
that prosecution should only be internationalized to the extent strictly
necessary. Internationalization was deemed necessary for security and
for capacity reasons, including bolstering judicial independence. Leba-
nese law was deemed a sufficient basis for criminal responsibility.
In addition, the Statute of the Tribunal does not expressly abrogate
immunities. It also includes a somewhat higher threshold for the liabil-
ity of superiors than that set forth in the ICC Statute. These features
arguably help to keep the Tribunal focused on Lebanese actors by creat-
ing additional obstacles to prosecuting foreign officials.
Other foreign policy interests factored into U.S. policy toward the
STL. The U.S. had been keen on supporting Lebanon against Syria.
The focus on the assassination of the pro-Western / anti-Syria Hariri
meant that the tribunal's findings would likely implicate forces un-
friendly to the west, namely Hezbollah and Syria.
However, the Statute of the STL was being drafted during the
summer of 2006, while an armed conflict raged between Israel and
Hezbollah on Lebanese territory. The conflict inflicted extensive harm
to life, infrastructure, and property, and was accompanied by grave al-
legations that international crimes were being committed by Hezbollah
and Israeli forces. This of course added an additional dimension to U.S.
concern over possible mandate-creep by the Tribunal. As such, the U.S.
pushed strongly for the tight jurisdictional limitations.
The U.S. also insisted that the subject matter jurisdiction be lim-
ited to crimes under Lebanese law. The U.S. feared that the inclusion
of war crimes and crimes against humanity within the Tribunal's juris-
diction would lead to difficult questions as to why its temporal jurisdic-
tion did not extend to the armed conflict with Israel, or perhaps to re-
quests to the Security Council to extend the temporal jurisdiction on
that basis.
The U.S. had an unlikely ally in Russia in its attempts to preclude
prosecution of foreign officials. Russia was keen to protect Syria, and
similarly insisted on the exclusion of international crimes, as well as
the exclusion of any abrogation of immunity.
All of these features - the exclusion of international crimes; the ab-
sence of a provision abrogating immunity; the heightened standard for
superior liability; the tight, event-based jurisdiction; the temporal limi-
tation with extension subject to Security Council approval - make pros-
ecution of U.S. officials or those of U.S. allies highly unlikely, clearing
the way for U.S. support.
24. S.C. Res. 1757, Sec. I, art. II, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 757 (May 30, 2007).
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III. LEGITIMACY AND THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM
The legitimacy of the STL has been challenged on a number of
grounds. Some have impugned the legitimacy of the STL by reference
to the fact that its jurisdiction is focused on only one event; that the ap-
plicable criminal law is limited to domestic Lebanese law; that the
Statute of the Tribunal, initially drafted as a treaty, could not be
brought into force by Security Council resolution; that the temporal ju-
risdiction was limited to preclude the possibility of prosecuting Israelis
for conduct committed in the 2006 armed conflict; that the Statute per-
mits trials in absentia; that the creation of the STL constitutes an im-
permissible interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon; that it was
an inappropriate use of the Security Council's Chapter VII power; and
that it constitutes selective justice.
Most of these challenges can be readily dismissed whether by refer-
ence to existing, accepted practice or on the level of principle. Nonethe-
less, it is useful to examine each challenge, as well as their cumulative
effect.
That its jurisdiction is focused on only one event: There is no reason
in principle to object to the creation of a tribunal with jurisdiction to
prosecute conduct related to a single event. To begin with, international
criminal justice is still primarily rendered on an ad hoc basis. To the
extent that this essentially reduces to a charge of selective justice, it
will be addressed below. If for now, we accept the principle of ad hoc
justice as legitimate, then the breadth or narrowness of jurisdiction is
not of itself problematic. Each ad hoc tribunal created to date has had
jurisdictional limitations tied to an event, or series of related events.
The jurisdiction of the Rwanda tribunal centers around the genocide
that took place there in 1994, and the tribunal's temporal jurisdiction is
thus limited to calendar year 1994. Of course there is a difference in
the scale of the violence perpetrated there and the Hariri assassination,
but that distinction goes to the legitimacy of the decision to create a tri-
bunal in response to the event, which will be addressed below.
That the applicable criminal law is limited to domestic Lebanese
law: The STL is not the only hybrid tribunal to apply domestic law. In-
deed most of the hybrid tribunals created to date were given jurisdiction
to prosecute certain violations of the domestic law of the relevant state.
Indeed, the subject matter jurisdiction of the ECCC consists entirely of
Cambodian law. Many of those crimes are derived from international
law, but the same could be said of the crime of terrorism within the sub-
ject matter of the STL. Indeed the STL has drawn upon international
law to inform its interpretation of the crime of terrorism under Leba-
nese law.
That the Statute of the Tribunal, initially drafted as a treaty, could
not be brought into force by Security Council resolution: This challenge
is limited to the technical issue of the Security Council's legal authority,
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and whether that authority extends to the bringing into force of a trea-
ty. If the Security Council is properly acting pursuant to its Chapter
VII authority (an issue that will be discussed below), there is no doubt
that it would have the power to create the Tribunal and to impose upon
Lebanon all of the obligations set forth in the Agreement and Statute of
the STL. This is settled by the accepted practice of the United Nations
and its Member States in relation to the creation and operation of the
ICTY and ICTR.
The particular objection here is thus of a highly technical nature -
whether the Security Council can bring into force the treaty as such. It
is now generally accepted that the Security Council when acting within
the scope of its mandate may impose legal obligations on UN Member
States. Indeed, this power has even been interpreted to extend to a
quasi-legislative authority, as seen in the Security Council resolutions
following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the Unites States that re-
quired all states to adopt domestic legislation to criminalize certain ter-
rorism related conduct. The International Court of Justice has opined
that in ascertaining the legally binding character of Security Council
resolutions, the touchstone is whether the Council intends to bind
Member States. The clearest expression of this intent is the use of the
term "decides," as it is "decisions" of the Security Council that all Mem-
ber States are legally obliged to carry out under Article 25 of the UN
Charter. By expressly invoking its Chapter VII authority and by using
the term "decides," the Security Council clearly demonstrated its intent
to legally establish the Tribunal and to impose upon Lebanon the legal
obligations contained in the Tribunal's Agreement and Statute, which
were annexed to that Resolution.
More broadly, the Security Council's Chapter VII authority is now
generally understood to include the power to impose legal obligations on
all UN Member States, and indeed even on those states that are not
members of the UN; to override the non-intervention principle; and, es-
sentially, to substitute its consent for that of Member States (e.g. waiv-
ing immunities of a Member State's officials or substituting consent to a
treaty).
That the temporal jurisdiction was limited to preclude the possibil-
ity of prosecuting Israelis for conduct committed in the 2006 armed con-
flict: The exclusion of the 2006 armed conflict from the STL's jurisdic-
tion follows directly from the ad hoc nature of the tribunal. The STL
was created, as are all ad hoc tribunals, to deal with a particular event,
or series of connected events, occurring in a particular time and place.
Is there a principled basis for excluding crimes committed during the
2006 armed conflict from the jurisdiction of the STL? It is simply that
that is not the event for which the tribunal was created. In order to
keep the work of the STL focused on the Hariri assassination, the tri-
bunal's jurisdictional limitations were intentionally designed to prevent
mandate-creep. The fact that the international community has not de-
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cided to employ a tribunal to deal with the issues that arose in the 2006
armed conflict is a separate matter, and will be addressed below under
the charge of selective justice.
That the Statute permits trials in absentia: The STL Statute pro-
vides for trials in absentia, and the STL Trial Chamber recently decided
to proceed with trials in absentia for the four accused, all of whom are
members of or otherwise connected to Hezbollah. Not since the post-
World War II IMTs has an international criminal tribunal been empow-
ered to hold trials in absentia. At the same time, the inclusion of this
facility in the STL Statute is unsurprising since the domestic law of
Lebanon expressly permits trials in absentia within the Lebanese crim-
inal justice system. Trials in absentia are also permitted under inter-
national human rights law, subject to certain conditions. The drafters
of the Statute included these conditions in the Statute in order to en-
sure compliance with international human rights law. 2 5
That the creation of the STL constitutes an impermissible interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of Lebanon: The Lebanese government, and
indeed Lebanese society, is deeply divided between primarily two politi-
cal camps. Those who assert that the STL is illegitimate regard this po-
litical dispute, of which the Hariri assassination is one element, as a
purely internal matter, and that interference by foreign states or by the
United Nations constitutes a violation of the principle of non-
intervention, one of the bedrock principles of the international legal
system. The most straightforward response 26 to this challenge may be
found in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which codifies the non-
intervention principle. Article 2(7) states, "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in mat-
ters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement un-
der the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli-
cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." This last phrase is
a sufficient rejoinder to claims of unlawful intervention. The Security
Council expressly invoked its Chapter VII authority in bringing into
force the legal basis of the Tribunal. Whether the Security Council act-
ed properly in invoking its Chapter VII authority in the context of the
situation in Lebanon is addressed next.
That it was an inappropriate use of the Security Council's Chapter
VII power: The decision to invoked Chapter VII authority is essentially
25. Id. Sec. III, art. XXII
26. It could also be argued that there has been no interference since the Prime Minis-
ter of Lebanon initially requested the establishment of the Tribunal. However, this ar-
gument is subject to the challenge that Lebanon failed to take the necessary steps to bring
the Agreement into force, necessitating the use of the Security Council's Chapter VII au-
thority.
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a political decision. The Security Council's official justification for cre-
ating the STL is that the climate of impunity for political assassination
in Lebanon must be challenged. There have been dozens of political as-
sassinations in Lebanon over the past few decades. The Tribunal's sup-
porters claim that the prosecution of the perpetrators of the Hariri as-
sassination will serve as a deterrent, discouraging continuation of the
practice of assassination as a political tool.
While this decision is essentially political, there are legal restraints
on the Security Council's discretion. The ICTY, in its seminal Tadic Ap-
peal decision of 1995, set forth the legal limits on the scope of the Secu-
rity Council's Chapter VII authority. It recalled that article 39 of the
UN Charter empowers the Security Council to "determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and
to "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." The
ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the Security Council had broad dis-
cretion to make this determination and to fashion measures in re-
sponse. It is not unreasonable for the Security Council to find the polit-
ical instability in Lebanon to constitute a threat to peace and security.
Nor is it unreasonable to determine that a tribunal focused on ending
impunity for political assassinations is a measure directed toward the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. This is
supported by ample practice. The Security Council has repeatedly
found the situation in Lebanon to constitute a threat to peace and secu-
rity, and it has used its Chapter VII power in other contexts to create
tribunals as measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
That it constitutes selective justice: In light of the above analyses,
it is apparent that the technical legal objections to the STL's legitimacy
are relatively easily overcome. Legitimacy, however, entails more than
just legality.
Several of the charges above relate or reduce to the assertion that
the STL is illegitimate as it constitutes an instance of selective justice.
This is the most complex challenge to the legitimacy of the Tribunal, as
it can be understood on a number of levels. It is also the charge against
which U.S. policy in relation to the STL is most vulnerable.
On one level, all justice is selective, both in the international legal
system and in domestic legal systems. In no legal system is every crime
prosecuted. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so. Prosecutorial dis-
cretion is a common feature of legal systems around the world. The
failure to prosecute every crime does not by itself undermine the legiti-
macy of assigning criminal responsibility for those crimes that are pros-
ecuted.
This is all the more true in the international legal system, with its
lack of central authority and absence of a universal justice system; its
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relatively fragile and immature institutions; the challenges in accom-
modating the diversity of values and of infrastructures of national sys-
tems; and the lack of a democratic basis for international authority27 as
the system is presently constituted. U.S. pragmatism in relation to in-
ternational courts is a response to this reality.
The U.S. "pragmatic" approach was summed up by former State
Department Legal Advisor John Bellinger when he stated in May 2006:
In our view, such courts and tribunals should not be
seen as an end in themselves but rather as potential tools
to advance shared international interests in developing and
promoting the rule of law, ensuring justice and accountabil-
ity, and solving legal disputes. Consistent with this ap-
proach, we evaluate the contributions that proposed inter-
national courts and tribunals may make on a case-by-case
basis, just as we consider the advantages and disad-
vantages of particular matters through international judi-
cial mechanisms rather than diplomatic or other means.28
A pragmatic approach meant that there was an international crim-
inal tribunal for Rwanda, a hybrid tribunal for East Timor, and no tri-
bunal for Colombia. In this sense, selective justice refers to the decision
to employ an international tribunal to deal with the situation in one
country or region, and not in another. The idea put forward by the U.S.
is that international courts are but one tool in the toolbox, and that the
international community should use that tool when it would be appro-
priate, helpful, and otherwise in its interests. This type of selective jus-
tice is a consequence of the political nature of the decision to create a
court in a system where courts are not a given. It is seen as an inevita-
ble consequence of the present phase of development of the internation-
al legal system, and has been accepted as a legitimate feature in a
fragmented system.
To say that international tribunals are policy tools, however, is not
to say that the U.S. does not regard them as courts. In a sense, all
courts, whether international or domestic, are tools - tools for govern-
ance and dispute resolution. They can serve other interests as well.
The important caveat is that there are certain features of courts that
make them courts, and these features cannot be erased without delegit-
27. The United Nations was not designed to be a democratic system. It is embedded
in the traditional interstate system. The General Assembly is sometimes referred to as a
more democratic organ than the Security Council because each state has a vote in the
General Assembly. Of course, it is hardly democratic that China and Tuvalu should each
have one vote considering the vast difference in population size. More importantly, there
is no requirement that government delegations represent the views of the people of that
state.
28. John Bellinger, Statement given at George Washington School of Law: Interna-
tional Court and Tribunals and the Rule of Law (May 11, 2006).
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imizing the institution as a "court." It might become something else,
and might be a legitimate 'something else,' but it would no longer be a
court.
An indispensable feature of any court is independence. The notion
of judicial independence, and indeed of judicial supremacy in determin-
ing and interpreting the applicable law, is deeply rooted in U.S. consti-
tutional history. It is because of this recognition of the independence of
courts, and the understanding that courts as independent organs will
take on a life of their own, that the U.S. has been careful to front-load
jurisdictional limitations that will restrict the scope of who can be pros-
ecuted.
This of course leads to a different kind of selective justice. Instead
of referring to the decision to create a tribunal here and not there, selec-
tive justice in this sense refers to delineation of the scope of possible ac-
cused. Once a decision is taken to employ a tribunal in response to a
particular event or series of events, the tribunal's creators have discre-
tion to define its jurisdiction. Are there limits to this discretion?
Certain jurisdictional limitations flow from traditional principles of
international law. Thus, limiting jurisdiction by reference to territory
would seem uncontroversial. Hence, the territorial jurisdiction of the
ICTY extends only to the territories of the former Yugoslavia, which is a
reasonable limitation in light of the Tribunal's mandate. But would it
be permissible to limit the ICTY's personal jurisdiction to a particular
ethnic group? Jurisdictional limitations on grounds of ethnicity, race,
religion, gender, or national origin would seem to conflict with basic
principles of human rights law, and would arguably deprive a tribunal
of legitimacy.
Would it be more acceptable if the limitation were based on nation-
ality? Would it be legitimate if the ICTY's personal jurisdiction had
been limited to prosecuting only those of Croatian nationality? Can
such a question only be answered by reference to generally accepted
facts about a given situation? Another critical feature of courts is even-
handedness. This would clearly be compromised in the case of the ICTY
if it were restricted to prosecuting only perpetrators of one nationality.
Is it ever permissible to limit the personal jurisdiction of a tribunal
to one group? The ECCC's personal jurisdiction is essentially limited to
members of the Khmer Rouge. There would likely be very little objec-
tion on the part of states if an international tribunal were established to
prosecute exclusively members of Al Qaeda, or even if a tribunal had
been established just to prosecute Osama bin Laden.
The IMT at Nuremberg was limited to prosecuting only those act-
ing on behalf of the Axis Powers. Consider also the jurisdiction of the
Rwanda tribunal. Some have suggested that the restriction of the Tri-
bunal's jurisdiction to calendar year 1994 essentially meant that only
Hutus would be prosecuted. If international crimes were committed by
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all parties to these conflicts, are jurisdictional restrictions justified be
reference to the relative scale of criminality by group?
Coming back to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, it might be ar-
gued that the selection of the event that would form the focus of the
STL's jurisdiction was essentially a proxy for prosecuting a particular
group. As such, even if the Tribunal's independence is guaranteed, its
deployment constitutes selective justice in the narrow sense - that it
was essentially deployed against one party in an ongoing political con-
flict that has deeply divided Lebanon. Is it a case where there is politi-
cal consensus on the identity of the 'bad guys'? The U.S. regards Hez-
bollah as a terrorist organization, but this perception is not universally
shared among states. Is it sufficient that Hezbollah is seen as more
prone to utilize the tool of political assassination than the other political
camp?
It is in this sense that the charge of selective justice resonates to a
degree - that the jurisdiction of the STL was not fashioned with an
even-handedness with respect to the ongoing political conflict in Leba-
non.
Ultimately, however, the legitimacy of the STL can be grounded in
a few simple observations. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is focused on
what appears to be the intentional killing of a human being. Murder is
universally recognized as a crime. It is criminally prohibited in every
legal system in the world. The final characterization of the crime and
the determination of criminal responsibility are left to the Tribunal.
The STL is mandated to provide a fair process and to comply with in-
ternational human rights standards. In this manner it provides protec-
tion against unwarranted accusations and unjustified assertions of
criminal responsibility. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is broad enough to
thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the assassination
and to make a reliable determination of criminal responsibility. It is
certainly the case that there have been other serious crimes committed
in Lebanon and that there are many other victims deserving of justice,
but that fact does not delegitimize this murder prosecution.
Nonetheless, of all the ad hoc tribunals created to date, the STL ar-
guably represents the clearest example of the instrumental use of in-
ternational courts, and as such, comes the closest to legitimacy's tipping
point. Although it may be appropriate for politics to play a role in shap-
ing a court's subject matter jurisdiction, even in relation to conduct that
has already been committed, it must be undertaken with caution. Ex-
cessive manipulation of a tribunal's jurisdiction could compromise the
perception of even-handedness and could also lead to a de-
contextualization of, and thus misapprehension of, conduct.
This is also the greatest challenge to the U.S. pragmatist position.
The idea of a court comes with a lot of ideological baggage, some of
which resounds in other value-laden areas of international law. Indeed,
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international law as a whole has been permeated by the development of
human rights law, as well as older notions of equality before the law
and other principles of natural justice. Although this baggage may not
be essential to a court's technical operation, it still serves an important
purpose. Courts find their credibility and legitimacy in that baggage.




Thinking about the future of international law, as an authoritative
process, all but requires us to identify its functions in global society. A
key function in the future will be its management of transnational
administrative activity, itself organized on a functional basis. Of
course, projecting trends of any sort to forty years from now - a
biblical-sounding span of time, to be sure - borders on pure
speculation.' Still, such ambitious forecasting can help reveal the
evolving reality and breadth of international law in its administrative
mode, 2 fresh ways of defining it, and the options for improving it.
Exactly forty years ago, two proponents of the transnationalist
approach to the study of international relations urged "[s]tudents of
international law and organizations . . . [to] become involved in the
study of transnational relations not merely for the sake of
understanding reality, but also in order to help change reality."3 How
true that still is!
* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Willamette
University College of Law.
1. This essay, which I was invited to write as a "lightly footnoted think piece"
concerning the next forty years of international law, pays tribute to the forty-year history
of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, on whose Board of Advisors I have
had the privilege to serve. I also wish to congratulate and honor the founder and prime
mover of the Journal, my esteemed and dear friend, Professor Ved P. Nanda. Although
Ved still has the appearance and energy of a 39-year-old, it is now clear from this fortieth
anniversary commemoration that outward appearances can be deceiving.
2. I have chosen this phrase, awkward as it may seem, advisedly. The terms
"international administrative law" or "transnational administrative law," as currently
understood, do not seem broad enough insofar as they usually refer to limited regulation
and dispute resolution within confined, rather formal organizational structures. Nor am I
even certain that such a distinct body of law exists as yet. On the other hand,
international law in a general sense does in fact govern a broad range of transnational
administrative activity, and I foresee a robust future not only for the growth of this
regime, but also - and this is worth emphasizing - for the increasing prominence of this
particular mode of international law in the future.
3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert 0. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World
Politics: An Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS, 25 INT'L
ORG. 329, 349 (Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1971). Transnationalism
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During the past forty years, the international (or, if you will,
transnational) legal system has expanded substantially beyond
traditional nation-state relationships, including those within
intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs") such as the United Nations
and its specialized agencies. The growing democratization and, with it,
pluralization of civic society has necessitated that development. Most
spectacularly, the individual, only recently endowed with legal
personality, has assumed a primary role on the global stage,
particularly in the context of human rights. Less visibly, some
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have also acquired a limited
measure of international legal personality. Countless other NGOs have
joined the supporting cast of these international legal actors by
initiating international legislation, lobbying within IGOs, interpreting
international law, serving as amici curiae, and promoting state
compliance with international obligations.4
The resulting complex of communication channels, specialized fora,
decision-making bodies, and tribunals for resolving disputes is almost
mind-boggling - so much so that considerable attention has been
lavished on problems of overlapping and sometimes conflicting legal
authority5 and tribunals. 6 The aspirations for a neat, federalized world,
universal collective security, and highly centralized socioeconomic
cooperation - as in the original design for the United Nations - are
largely gone, as are the aesthetic and therapeutic virtues of simplicity
and centrality in the international system. The system is messier than
it was forty years ago, but perhaps also more promising.
The promise of international law will lie in its capacity to fit within
the contours of the messy, complex global society based on, but
transcending, the traditional nation-state framework of governance.
The international legal system will therefore need to be cosmopolitan
and capable of productively coordinating public and private processes.
was a particularly prominent approach in the 1960s and 1970s, reappearing as the civic
society movement in the 1990s and, since then, being partially absorbed within the
concept of globalization.
4. See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 348, 352-53 (2006) (providing an informative historical and
analytical survey).
5. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found.
v. Council & Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351 (2008) (quashing the European Union's
Council's implementation of an initiative by the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee that had been established by the United Nations Security Council and holding
that the Security Council-based procedures for that implementation, involving the
freezing of assets owned by designated terrorists, violated regional law).
6. See, e.g., Barton Legum, Focus: Emerging Fora for International Litigation (Part
I): The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 531
(2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 191
(2003).
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In keeping with democratic and egalitarian values, these processes will
need to be transparent and closely attuned to basic human needs.
Today, efforts are underway to remap an international system left
incomplete by Rand McNalley and GPS devices. Nation-states and
IGOs are no longer the only pieces in the global puzzle. Instead, for
reasons of convenience, budgetary restrictions, lack of expertise and
otherwise, governments and IGOs have designated, deferred to or co-
opted a broad range of NGO and other private entities to manage
important transnational activities and the issues and disputes they
generate. These activities range from utilities, postal service, and
banking to humanitarian relief, sports, and arbitration of commercial
disputes. The consequential growth of a "global civil society"7 is not so
much an instance of "privatization" as it is a sensible redeployment of
expertise and administrative competence in public-private
partnerships.
Forty years ago, the indispensable role of functional NGOs within
the international system had already become apparent.8 Even earlier,
in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the tripartite
structure of the new International Labor Organization enabled
representatives of labor unions and management to join governments in
the initiation, drafting, and supervision of international social
legislation. After the Second World War, several studies highlighted
the emergence of functional organizations in the new world order and
forecast a robust role for them.9 These organizations included public
international utility corporations with limited international legal
personality such as the Scandinavian Airlines System ("SAS"), the
Basel-Mulhouse Airport, the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Company, the
International Moselle Company, and the Central African Power
Corporation. A leading international law scholar observed as follows:
Post-war developments have clearly demonstrated that such
progress as the nations have achieved towards cooperation for
common purposes and objectives have overwhelmingly occurred
on the functional level, i.e., by the establishment of specific -
bilateral or multilateral - institutions and organizations for
7. See, e.g., JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 8 (2003) (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., Kjell Skjelsbaek, The Growth of International Nongovernmental
Organization in the Twentieth Century, in NYE, supra note 3, at 345.
9. See, e.g., DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (1966); ERNST B. HAAS,
BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133-34,
442-43 (1964) (concerning the work of the International Labor Organization); and J.J.
LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 104-07 (1963).
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defined purposes, rather than by general constitutional
transfers from national to international sovereignty.' 0
During the last forty years, several significant NGOs have acquired
a limited measure of international legal personality. These include, for
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, a Swiss
corporation charged with responsibilities under the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (particularly under Common Article 3); the
Olympic Movement, also Swiss-based, as the core family of institutions
in the organization of international sports with evolving responsibilities
that extend far beyond the quadrennial Olympic Games; and the
institutes that serve as surrogates for governments in conducting
diplomacy and normal relations with Taiwan. These NGOs, as well as
others with or without international legal personality, have indeed
"come to assume an enormously important role, not only at the domestic
level, but also in global regulation."11
External developments, normally beyond the control of
governments, are increasingly instrumental in shaping the global civil
society and its expectations. The most important of these developments
has been the extraordinary profusion and diffusion of electronic data,
new internet technologies, the emergence of the social media, and a
resulting informality of transnational decision-making in civic and
political affairs.
Meanwhile, despite the efforts to remap the international system,
the portrayal of its formal structure is still old-fashioned. The more
things change, the more they are viewed in the same way. This is
understandable, both because the adjustment of our view of the global
order is always gradual and because the Westphalian system of nation-
states remains fundamental. Unfortunately, the formal legal structure,
as we are apt to envisage it, does not conform to the complex, pluralistic
social system that we can almost see growing by the day, and it cannot
be relied upon to deal with the serious challenges that confront global
society.
We are therefore struggling to define a new legal structure that is
equipped to meet challenges beyond the competence of established
doctrines, institutions, and jurisdictional limitations. We need to be
keenly aware of significant trends in the normative order. One such
10. See Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Introduction, in G.O. ZACHARIAS SUNDSTROM,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATIONS xi (1972); G.O. ZACHARIAS SUNDSTROM,
THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATION (1971) (serving as an earlier, more
extensive version of the book).
11. Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A
New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 870 (2011)
(referring to the "many self-regulatory and public-private schemes that have blossomed at
the international level").
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trend that we will need to acknowledge in forecasting international law
forty years from now is the steady growth in its administrative mode.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Formal Structure
The concept and science of international (or transnational)
administrative law, as currently understood, is at least one hundred
years old.12 In practice, however, this regime of law has expanded only
modestly, cabined as it is by the formal structure of international law.
A few leading examples of this regime will suffice to define its limited
scope. Employment-related disputes are resolved within the United
Nations, its specialized agencies, and other IGOs by administrative
tribunals and appellate mechanisms, tempered by advisory opinions of
the International Court of Justice. The Appellate Bodies of the World
Trade Organization review administrative decisions in disputes among
member states. And the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement, as a
construct of administrative procedure, may require the pursuit of local
administrative remedies by investors and other private parties before
they may properly claim the diplomatic protection of their national
states against other states.
For the most part, this constricted view of international
administrative law fails to include the myriad claims and counterclaims
within the purview of often low-level administrative decision-making
within IGOs, NGOs, and transnational networks. By and large, the
major controversies that beset the global community - armed conflict,
environmental damage, climate change, human rights, and so on -
escape our blinkered vision of international law in its administrative
mode. This is entirely understandable given the strict limitations we
impose on the formal structure of international legal authority, the
reluctance of governments to expand that authority, and the
unwillingness of IGOs to expose their units and individuals to scrutiny,
let alone liability, within the international legal process.
The shallowness of the traditional regime of international
administrative law is also understandable as a reflection of domestic
practices. They, too, formally rely on an outmoded framework that is
12. See, e.g., Paul S. Reinsch, International Administrative Law and National
Sovereignty, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1909); MITRANY, supra note 9, at 145-46 (forecasting
(perhaps too optimistically) that the working, and especially the co-ordination, of
functional activities would build up not only sectors of international administration but
gradually also a body of international administrative law, which in the end might do more
toward unifying the ways of the world than attempts at codifying abstract juridical rules
and principles. International society will acquire a living body not by our pledging each
other in solemn pacts and charters but by our working together in the humble tasks of
everyday life).
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defined largely in terms of administrative organization and review. The
fact remains, however, that the actual scope of administrative authority
has expanded greatly at both domestic and international levels. 1 3 At
the international level, this is primarily because of both the external
factors noted earlier, globalization, and an increasingly pluralist global
society. If so, simple justice would seem to call for more attention by
the global community to administrative processes below the level of
national governments and beyond an exclusively public domain. 14
B. A New Model
As we have seen, the formal structure that defines the role of
administrative law in the international legal system is inadequate and
unrealistic because it fails to embrace the emerging pluralism and
breadth of global authority, with its mix of private and public
institutions. A realistic portrayal of that role would depict a more
complex process by which international law is routinely brought to bear
on the process of discrete and often low-level decisions and dispute
resolution. This is an empirical observation. Just as important is a
normative observation that, in looking to the future, a broader, more
realistic concept of international law in its administrative mode will
better serve global society in addressing the big issues of the day at
their grass roots.
A proposed new model of domestic administrative law, based on
comparative insights, recasts it as "an accountability network of rules
and procedures through which civil servants are embedded in their
liberal democratic societies."15 This model, though still more or less
13. Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 694,
746 (2011) (concluding a persuasive commentary on the internationalization of citizenship
and acknowledging that this "is not to say that international law now delivers a
comprehensive regulatory regime. States will retain important discretionary powers into
the future. But no function of governance will be shielded from international law as a
categorical matter, membership decisions included."). The same observations would seem
to apply in the context of international law in its administrative mode.
14. See EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE 22-23 (2010) (observing that,
"[g]lobalization has also been associated with state restructuring and challenges to the
political domination of the nation-state as the exclusive political space for defining
citizenship, legal systems, and hence justice itself. Struggles for justice, more than ever
before, stretch across political scales, from the global to the local . . . [T]he theory of
justice needs to be reconstituted in a "post-Westphalian" world, referring to the origins of
the now outdated nation-state system. All struggles over democracy, solidarity, and the
public sphere revolve around rethinking the concept of justice.").
15. Bignami, supra note 11, at 860-61 (elaborating on the purpose of recognizing the
new model by noting that
Theories of administration and administrative law have changed
dramatically in recent times. The traditional hierarchical image of state
bureaucracy has been confronted by an increasingly disaggregated reality of
autonomous service-delivery bodies, independent regulatory agencies, newly
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political, would replace the orthodox but antiquated model that reposes
confidence in expert bureaucracy to accomplish public purposes and
therefore focuses largely on formal aspects of administrative
organization and review.
In redefining administrative law, this shift from a hierarchical
concept, based simply on administrative organization and review,
toward an ethically-based approach of accountability to the general
public would seem to encourage the best practices of international law
in its administrative mode forty years hence. In fact, the architect of
the new model of domestic administrative law has noted its potential
applicability within the international legal system of administrative
governance.16 After all, the correspondence between domestic and
international systems is well- established. For example, the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have
adopted German doctrines of administrative law such as
proportionality, equality, and legitimate expectations. The judicial
decisions based on these doctrines have been influential throughout
Europe, thanks to their dissemination in regional networks of legal
elites.17 Why not global networks? A dichotomy between the pluralist
tradition for representing interests in such countries as the United
States, and a contrasting neo-corporatist tradition in continental
Europe, would not seem to be an impediment. Transnational
management would necessarily defer to different structures in different
states for the representation of interests so long as accountability for
transnational administrative actions is the controlling principle.
powerful local governments, and a plethora of transnational and
international regulatory bodies. Private actors, ranging from industry, self-
regulatory bodies, to individual firms, to public interest groups, are now
recognized as vital participants in the administrative process, sometimes as
substitutes for public administration, sometimes as critical collaborators. A
number of procedural innovations have rendered the administrative process
more transparent, participatory, and flexible than before, thereby
empowering the expanded constellation of public and private actors to
actively shape and check administrative action. Fittingly, in the work of
legal and public policy scholars focused on domestic and, increasingly,
transnational administrative systems, the old notion of an expert
bureaucracy swiftly carrying out the democratic will has been replaced by a
networked understanding of how public and private actors combine to
accomplish administrative purposes.
16. Id. at 860, 906 (offering valuable insights into how the new paradigm that she
proposes fits within the international legal system by asking, "How should political
accountability, interest group representation, judicial review, and diffuse accountability
be organized in the European Union, the World Trade Organization, transnational
networks of banking regulators, and other sites of global governance? The natural first
place to look is to domestic systems of administrative law, with their numerous legal
variations, long histories, and rich experience.").
17. Id. at 900.
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It has been said that administrative law, however defined, is
constitutional law made concrete. Broad requirements are brought
down to earth. Transposed to the international level, this observation
suggests, similarly, that foundational regimes - "the law of the sea,"
"human rights law," "the law of armed conflict," and so on - become
concrete when they are reduced to specific exercises of administrative
authority and discretion. A focus on the accountability of such
derivative decision-making, whether public or private, would surely
broaden our understanding and use of international law in its
administrative mode.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE MODE
It is well-established that "[a]dministrative law is implicitly
functional law, and so is administrative practice."18 It does not follow,
however, that all NGOs, merely by performing a desirable function in
global society, need to be integrated into a workable system of
international administrative law. Indeed, for reasons of manageability
and coherence, the administrative regime should be selective.
Although hundreds of NGOs are experienced actors in
international governance - a few with limited international legal
personality - their legal status generally is uncertain, as it always has
been in the modern era. 19 NGO claims to be acting on behalf of what
has been called "global stakeholder communities" 20 have raised endless
issues of legitimacy and representativeness. 21
Some of the skepticism about the legal status of many NGOs is well
founded. Although many NGOs have observer status in the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) 2 2 and enjoy other forms of recognition,
18. MITRANY, supra note 9, at 19, 201 (explaining the growth of administrative law by
stating, "Every functional link helps to build up a common legal order specific but
also concrete and cumulative, one which does not stay aloof in the atmosphere of
diplomatic and juridical pacts but which enters everywhere into the daily life of the
peoples themselves.").
19. Of course, in a bygone era, the "legal" status was never in doubt of such
extraordinary NGOs as the Hanseatic League, medieval guilds, and the Dutch East
Indies Company. Interestingly, all of these entities relied on combinations of
governmental chartering, recognition, and funding or transactional support.
20. See TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND
REPRESSION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 40-41 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, Global Civil Society: A Skeptical View,
in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5, at 26, 30, 36-38 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005).
22. U.N. Charter art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned
with matters within its competence."); Consultative Relationship Between the United
Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, E.S.C. Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996),
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eresl996-31.htm (defining the rather
relaxed terms of this relationship).
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the strength of their functional competence is often dubious, as is the
claim of some of them to be acting on behalf of a constructed, global
civic society. Moreover, NGOs are not always blameless, for example,
when they have fomented disorderly, physically injurious protests. 2 3
Much of the skepticism about the legal status of NGOs, however, is
because they are typically lumped together and analyzed uniformly.
This analysis is not only overgeneralized, but often backward. Instead
of asking whether NGOs as a whole bear certain constructed
characteristics of legitimacy and representativeness, each NGO should
be independently analyzed in terms of the normal expectations for
recognition by states under international law, such as effective, self-
regulatory control. Moreover, short of anointing a particular NGO as a
whole with limited international legal personality, states and IGOs
could recognize the legal status of discrete mechanisms within NGOs in
order more fully to portray international law in its administrative
mode.
A current trend that we may expect to continue during the next
forty years is toward a litmus of accountability rather than legitimacy
and representativeness to define the status of NGOs with the
international legal system. 24 We should ask whether a particular NGO,
or a discrete unit of it, in performing its recognized function or
functions, truly benefits a community of stakeholders and perhaps the
larger global community. Is the NGO adequately regulating itself? Is it
performing its designated functions according to its own charter? What
is it really accomplishing administratively? Posing these questions
brings NGOs squarely within the new model of administrative law
based on the principle of accountability to the public.
Another trend has been described as "the most striking recent turn
of the governance debate . . . at the forward intellectual margin."25 It
involves the inclusion within the ambit of international law of
technocrats linked by intergovernmental networks. Their legitimacy is
23. See Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2000, at 25, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/276931.
24. See, e.g., NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & INNOVATIONS 196, 208-
09 (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuijl eds., 2006).
25. Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means - and Does Not Mean
(Review Essay), 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 170, 176 n.30 (2009) ("The growth of global
administrative governance, technocratically legitimate forms of global governance arise in
which NGOs are curiously left aside in favor of the technocrats of intergovernmental
networks. The question of political legitimacy proffered by NGOs, as global civil society,
is no longer an interesting issue. Neither, for that matter, is the legitimacy of
international organizations as political organizations as such. 'Legitimacy,' in the new
administrative-technocratic model, comes therefore not from any genuinely 'political'
source at all, but is instead simply a by-product of the competent provision of
administrative services. Legitimacy, in such case, is no longer a matter of
representativeness but merely a matter of who is able to make the internet run on time.").
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defined by their competence in providing administrative services.
Again, we should ask whether such a network is truly accountable to
the public in providing such services.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is a clich6 to say that we will all be living increasingly in a
diffuse, pluralist world. This trend means that international law in its
administrative mode must take myriad administrative practices into
account, as they evolve in our cybernetic era of mixed private and public
decision-making and dispute resolution. The law must therefore
capture the significance of public-private networking and
nongovernmental authority, realities that are easily overlooked when
we rely on an antiquated concept of administrative law that is limited
to formally established structures of organization and review.
A new model of administrative law, based on accountability rather
than a hierarchy of formal organization and review, is certainly an idea
whose time has come. This new model for the application of
international law in its administrative mode can readily embrace both
"private" (often NGO) and "public" (often IGO) entities. Although an
intergovernmental structure of international law will remain essential,
it is likely that a more pluralistic definition of administrative law,
couched in requirements of accountability, will substantially expand the
horizons, excite the imaginations, and tax the skills of international
lawyers during the next forty years.
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EDWARD GORDON*
"[A]n institution, once established, acquires a life of its own,
independent of the elements which have given birth to it, and it must
develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in
accordance with the requirements of international life."I
I am honored and pleased to contribute to this Festschrift for Ved
Nanda. It was at Ved's invitation, four decades ago, that I contributed
some thoughts to the very first issue of the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy. 2 They concerned the International Court
of Justice's abrupt and highly unpopular dismissal of a suit brought by
Ethiopia and Liberia challenging the legality of the application of South
Africa's apartheid policy in South West Africa, a territory South Africa
administered pursuant to a League of Nations Mandate. In what was
expected to be the merits phase of the litigation, the Court had
reversed, or seemed to reverse, a ruling it had made four years earlier
in the suit's preliminary objections phase, this time holding that the
Applicants had not established that their legal rights in the
administration of the Mandate were sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. 3
The earlier ruling had been obtained by a slim margin: eight to
seven. 4 Its reversal came on a seven to seven tie vote, broken, pursuant
to the Court's Statute,5 by the casting (i.e., second) vote of the Court's
President, Sir Percy Spender. Judge Spender had been in the minority
in the earlier phase, co-authoring a joint dissenting opinion with Judge
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. The minority in the first phase of the litigation
* Honorary Vice President, American Branch of the International Law Association. LL.B.
Yale, Dipl. Int'l L., Cambridge.
1. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, at 68 (May 28) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez).
2. Edward Gordon, Old Orthodoxies Amid New Experiences: The South West Africa
(Namibia) Litigation and the Uncertain Jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice, 1 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65 (1971).
3. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 6, 61 (July 18).
4. South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21).
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 55(2), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
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became the majority in the second in large part because two judges who
had been in the majority the first time were prevented by illness from
participating thereafter, and a third was forced to recuse himself from
participating in the second phase because of the partisanship implicit in
his having been appointed as ad hoc judge by the Applicants prior to
being elected to the Court as a regular member.
Dismissal of the Applicants' claim did not speak to the merits of the
case against apartheid, only to the Applicants' right to sue. Other than
among lawyers and legal scholars, though, the distinction was too
subtle to matter. What mattered was that the World Court had ruled in
favor of South Africa and against opponents of apartheid. Not to reach
the merits of the dispute meant leaving the status quo unchanged, with
the effect magnified, in this instance, by the ability of the respondent
state's friends to block effective remedial action by the UN's political
organs.
More than the Applicants themselves, and by extension critics of
apartheid, it was the Court itself, and by extension international law,
that had lost. The ruling came at a critical moment in history.
Colonialism was coming to its end. African colonies in particular had
gained independence with spectacular speed and decisiveness. The case
had been expected to demonstrate to newly independent states, and to
their citizens, that the procedures and institutions of traditional
international law could be used to promote their distinctive goals in
international life.6 Instead, it left the impression that international law
was in cahoots with the past, with the prerogatives of inherited power,
and in this instance with white supremacy. That the two judges seen to
be principally responsible for the suit's dismissal - Spender and
Fitzmaurice - were of Australian and British nationality, respectively,
only reinforced this impression. Both the Court and international law
were seen to be on the wrong side of history - and humanity.
Some observers wondered if members of the Court had been
influenced by adverse reaction to its Certain Expenses opinion,7 issued
the same year as its ruling in the preliminary objections phase of the
South West Africa case. The Certain Expenses opinion had raised - or
renewed - suspicion in some quarters that the Court was interpreting
its position as the UN's "principal judicial organ"8 to mean that it was
under an obligation to cooperate with the UN's political organs, rather
than to act as an independent court of law. Could the Court's
subsequent dismissal of Ethiopia and Liberia's claim have been
6. See Richard A. Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21 INT'L ORG. 1,
1 (1967).
7. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July
20).
8. U.N. Charter art. 92.
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influenced by a feeling that it might be better to not decide the case at
all than to be seen as deciding it solely to associate the Court with a
politically popular cause?
The impression that the Court had become beholden to UN politics
was enhanced in 1971, when the UN Security Council gave the Court
an opportunity to redeem itself, politically, by requesting from it an
advisory opinion on the compatibility of the application of apartheid in
South West Africa with international legal obligations. 9 The Council
had already expressed its own views on this subject, leaving the Court
in the position of either agreeing with the Council's opinion or openly
defying it. It agreed, deciding by a vote of thirteen to two that South
Africa was under a legal obligation to end its administration of South
West Africa,10 and by a vote of eleven to four that members of the UN
were under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's
continuing presence there and the invalidity of acts it undertook on
behalf of the territory. 11
Technically, its opinion in 1971 was not inconsistent with its
dismissal of Ethiopia and Liberia's suit five years earlier. The
questions on which its opinion was requested did not relate to standing.
But if in 1966 the Court appeared to be an agent of the past, then in
1971 it seemed to be kowtowing to UN politics, getting itself back on the
right track politically, but at considerable cost to its credibility as an
independent decision process. 12
Much of my article recounted this history. 13 But its main thrust
was directed less at the litigation itself than at the legal community's
reaction to it - not so much its revulsion against the support the Court
seemed to have given apartheid in 1966, or its apparent obeisance to
the Security Council in 1971, but rather the assumption that in neither
instance had the Court acted independently of all political
considerations, as a court of law should do. It was a reaction that
seemed to me to assume the existence of relatively stable expectations
about courts of law as adjudicative institutions. Specifically, it assumed
that courts are homogeneous, sui generis, regardless of differences
among them in formal structure or in the patterns of interaction with
contending social processes that empirically determine how they direct
their institutional energies. I found these assumptions unjustified, both
logically and empirically.
9. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 June 21.
10. Id. 118.
11. Id. 119.
12. See STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-24 (2011).
13. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 72-91.
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A LEGACY OF AMBIGUITY
Here in the United States, attitudes towards the ICJ as an
institution have tended to assume that it was created in the image of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was, indeed, the
prototype of an international tribunal that the American delegation
proposed when the idea of establishing a permanent international court
was first discussed at the diplomatic level, in 1907, at the second Hague
Peace Conference.14 In its idealized form, which is how it was
presented to the Conference and to the public, the proposed tribunal's
function was to have been simply that of applying existing principles of
international law to the facts of an international dispute, as it found
them, let the chips fall where they may.
Its advocates argued that the Supreme Court model's suitability to
the international arena had been demonstrated by its success in
deciding disputes between the states of the American union. 15 Though
less than sovereign in an international sense, the American states were
every bit as protective of their presumed prerogatives as sovereign
states were. If the Supreme Court could settle their disputes, why
could ones like it not be equally successful in resolving disputes
between sovereign nations?
In retrospect it is easy to recognize that the enthusiasm its
advocates brought to the proposal may have struck some delegates as
parochial, if not downright arrogant. Institutions like the Supreme
Court were not invariably found in other national legal systems.
Doubters were disinclined in any event to find merit in the misgivings
the Americans expressed about the more traditional model of
international arbitration, whose principal mission was understood to be
that of settling disputes by finding diplomatic solutions, taking law into
consideration but not attributing to it a deciding quality.16
To the Americans, the difference between the two approaches was
critical. In his instructions to the American delegation Secretary of
State Elihu Root had written:
It has been a very general practice of arbitrators to act, not as
judges deciding questions of fact and law upon the record before them
under a sense of judicial responsibility, but as negotiators effecting
settlement of the questions brought before them in accordance with the
traditions and usages and subject to all the considerations and
influences which affect diplomatic agents. The two methods are
radically different, proceed upon different standards of honorable
14. See EL1HU ROOT, MEN AND POLICIES: ADDRESSES 325-26 (Robert Bacon & James
Brown Scott eds., 1925).
15. See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS 40-41 (1925).
16. See id. at 245.
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obligation, and frequently lead to widely differing results. It very
frequently happens that a nation which would be very willing to submit
its differences to an impartial judicial determination is unwilling to
submit them to this kind of diplomatic process. 17
To lawyers outside the United States, however, the distinction did
not appear to be of great moment; Root's argument gained little traction
at the Conference.18 A measure of agreement did exist as to the
benefits of a permanent judicial panel, rather than the constantly
shifting clusters of judges characteristic of ad hoc arbitral panels. The
absence of a permanent judiciary was seen by many to render the
rulings of ad hoc tribunals spasmodic, discontinuous, and lacking in
coherence, depriving them of any credible capacity to clarify or develop
the rules of international law. 19
Even this was not invariably regarded as a defect. International
law was largely uncodified, the specific content of its norms having not
developed to anything like the degree of specificity or certainty that
characterized the long-established, comprehensive codes courts in civil
law countries apply. Such of its rules as were settled seemed
unconnected with one another, gaps between them being so wide that
bridging them was seen to afford judges a degree of discretionary
authority many states were reluctant to concede to them.20 Among
some observers, even in the U.S., the discontinuity of awards made by
ad hoc tribunals was a blessing in disguise, precisely because the rules
on which the awards were based applied only to a particular dispute,
without generating anything like precedent or "clarifying" existing rules
and principles. 21
17. Id. at 219.
18. See id. at 215.
19. Cf. JOHN W. FOSTER, ARBITRATION AND THE HAGUE COURT 60-61 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1980) (1904) (discussing the benefits for a permanent arbitration tribunal,
noting especially the increased uniformity).
20. See HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 118 (Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1920):
[N]o Court of the Nations can possibly satisfy the world unless it administers
a known and written code of international law. On many important
questions of international law there is no general agreement and the actual
practice of nations has in fact differed widely. It cannot be expected that
the nations of the modern world will be willing to leave important rights at
the mercy of judges who are fettered by nothing stricter than their own
predilections.
21. J.M. Dickinson, a prominent American lawyer, had said:
No one ever expected infallibility from any human court Under the
corrective influence of international jurists, unsound doctrine will be
repudiated. There will be a constant change in judges. As new cases
arise, not having any pride of opinion in the decision of others, they will the
more promptly expound as the law that which the enlightenment of the time
shall demand, for international law will always develop and stand as the
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The feature of the Supreme Court model that appears to have made
the least impact on the Conference and may well have been regarded as
symptomatic of its advocates' naivet6 was its assumption that an
international court which ignores the political consequences of its
decisions - i.e., where the chips fall - could flourish. The idea of
submitting disputes to third-party decision itself represented a
substantial concession from the presumed prerogatives of national
sovereignty. It was tolerable only because - and to the extent that - it
provided an opportunity to resolve international disputes amicably, in a
way the parties could live with, so as to prevent the differences between
them from festering into a justification for war, which often meant
before they could be exploited by domestic political elements.
Nevertheless, if the only models discussed at the 1907 Conference
had been those of diplomatic arbitration and adjudication modeled after
the Supreme Court, respectively, the differences between them might
have been accommodated in a compromise that would have permitted
the would-be court to adopt either approach as circumstances
warranted and the parties to a dispute preferred. But there were not
just two models; there were three. 22 Among small states, both the
adjudicative and the arbitral models were received with skepticism.
With ample historical justification, they suspected that, whatever its
ostensible mission, the proposed court would end up serving the
interests of the great powers unless it embodied the principle of
sovereign equality. This, they made clear, meant that every state party
to a treaty establishing the court had to be empowered to appoint one of
its judges. 23 In essence - and as immediately noted - this would have
endowed the court with the distinctive earmarks of a constituent
assembly.
In the end, the differences between the three models were so
substantial they could not be resolved at the Conference. 24 It concluded
in stalemate, the delegates able to agree only upon a general outline of
exponent of such international justice and morality as the consensus of
nations shall approve.
FOSTER, supra note 19, at 73-74.
22. See A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 516 (1909).
23. See id.
24. The name by which the court was to be known was itself a subject of contention,
each suggested name being suspected of harboring a hidden institutional agenda. See
WILLIAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 378-79 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1908).
The word "court" drew opposition, for example, "Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration" and
"Permanent Institution of Arbitration" being suggested as alternatives. In exasperation,
Joseph H. Choate, head of the U.S. delegation, finally said to the other delegates: "Give us
the baby and you may baptize it as you will!" See JAMES BROWN ScoTT, THE JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 57 (1927). The name finally agreed upon, i.e.,
the Court of Arbitral Justice, was discarded at Versailles. See infra note 27.
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a permanent court and the hope that the differences could be resolved
by diplomatic negotiation.
VERSAILLES AND THE CREATION OF THE PCIJ
But they could not be, and the outbreak of the First World War put
the whole idea of a permanent international court on the backburner
until after its conclusion. When discussions began again, prior to,
during and after the post-war peace conference at Versailles, the
circumstances that had existed in 1907 had changed dramatically.
Versailles was a victors' conference, smaller states participated but
were given few options beyond accepting positions assigned to them by
the powers, which had won the war.2 5
The influence that the U.S. model exerted in the design of the new
international court appears to have peaked during the discussions and
in the recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, a group
of experts appointed by the League to recommend a plan of organization
for the proposed court. Meeting in The Hague in the summer of 1920,
the Committee adhered closely to the plan Root had promoted in 1907,
causing one American participant to proclaim afterwards that the
Committee's plan was "as closely modeled on the Supreme Court of the
American States as one tribunal can resemble another without being
identical." 26
But the members of the League did not follow all of the Advisory
Committee's recommendations. To be sure, the new court was given the
bland name Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), rather
than that of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as the 1907 Conference had
proposed (and the U.S. had bitterly opposed). 27 It was also kept
separate from the League, at least formally, again in keeping with the
wishes of the U.S., in this instance to leave open the possibility that the
U.S. Senate would consent to U.S. participation in a world court even if
it ultimately rejected U.S. membership in the League itself.2 8
To what extent its name and formal separation from the League
ever motivated the PCIJ's judges or affected the political community's
reactions to their rulings is difficult to say. The separation was more
formal than substantive. The PCIJ's budget still had to be approved by
the Assembly of the League. 29 Of at least equal importance, in order to
25. See ScoTT, supra note 15, at 222.
26. Id. at 221.
27. See SCOTT, supra note 24, at 57; Manley 0. Hudson, The Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 440, 445 (1933).
28. See Ake Hammarskjold, Sidelights on the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 25 MICH. L. REV. 327, 336 (1927).
29. See id. at 345. The budget of U.S. federal courts has to be approved by Congress,
too, a circumstance that gives Congress influence over them, but not to the extent of
80 VOL. 40:1-3
THE ICJ: ON ITS OWN
break the stalemate that had stymied the 1907 Conference, the
Advisory Committee, at the suggestion of Root and his British
counterpart, Lord Phillimore, recommended and the League
subsequently adopted a compromise under which the judges would be
elected by both the Council of the League, which the big powers were
expected to (and did) control, and the Assembly, where the influence of
the smaller states was expected to be (and was) more substantial, even
decisive. 30
In any event, differences between the PCIJ and the Supreme Court
model were substantial enough to call into question the assumption
that the two institutions were cut from the same cloth or in anything
like the same size. Beyond the absence of a formal institutional
relationship, a crucial difference is that the PCIJ was never accorded
compulsory jurisdiction, much less given political machinery to enforce
its judgments. 31 Either feature would have been an anathema to
perceived prerogatives of national sovereignty. Without them the PCIJ,
and later the ICJ, was destined to hear cases having far less
international significance than ardent advocates of a world court had
hoped for.
Another feature separating the PCIJ, and later the ICJ, from the
Supreme Court model is the authority to render advisory opinions. 32
Early in its own institutional history, the Supreme Court had
determined that giving advice, which can be ignored, is incompatible
with its adjudicative role. The U.S. opposed giving the PCIJ authority
to render advisory opinions for just this reason, as well as because
critics in the U.S. Senate regarded the advisory opinions as a device
designed to circumvent the ostensible denial of compulsory
jurisdiction 33 - that is, by allowing the PCIJ to decide issues important
to specific disputes that the parties were unwilling to submit to
preventing them, inter alia, from overturning congressional legislation they deem to be
incompatible with the Constitution.
30. See Lord Phillimore, Scheme for the Permanent Court of International Justice, 6
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUs SOC'Y 89, 90-91 (1920).
31. Jan Hostie, The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 38 AM. J.
INT'L L. 407, 427 (1944); History, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1&p2=1 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
32. The final draft of the PCIJ Statute did not mention advisory opinions, the
Assembly having eliminated a draft article that explicitly authorized them. The Covenant
of the League itself did, however, in Article 14. While empowering the Council of the
League to formulate plans for the establishment of the Court, Art. 14 added that "the
Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the
Council or the Assembly." Early on, the PCIJ decided that since, by virtue of Article 1 of
its Statute it had been established "in accordance with" Article 14 of the Covenant, Article
14 should be considered an integral part of the Statute.
33. Quincy Wright, The United States and the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1927); MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 510-11 (1943) [hereinafter HUDSON].
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adjudication. As it turned out, advisory opinions became a mainstay of
the PCIJ's case load, proving to be of far greater value than had been
anticipated. 34
Coincidentally, it was one of the Court's advisory opinions that so
severely weakened its standing that it virtually ceased to operate soon
after the opinion was issued. The Customs Regime case was a political
hot potato that the Council of the League sought to avoid by handing it
off to the Court.35 The legal question it presented was whether a
proposed merger of Germany and Austria's customs offices was
consistent with treaty commitments the two countries had made
following their defeat in the war. Formality aside, the decisive question
was whether the proposed customs union was likely to lead to a political
union - a question whose determination entailed an irreducibly political
judgment. The Court was unable to deal decisively with the issue,
much less to settle the underlying dispute. It decided, by a vote of only
eight to seven, that the union was incompatible with an agreement
Austria had made not to compromise its political independence. But
the majority gave few reasons for their opinion, and the minority
included several of the most eminent, learned and impartial members of
the Court. Rightly or not, the ruling left the impression that politics,
not law, had carried the day.36
Like the South West Africa (Namibia) cases decades later, the 1931
Customs Regime case demonstrated that the line separating political
and legal disputes is evanescent, if not utterly illusory, when the
litigants are sovereign nations and the issues are of substantial
importance to them. Virtually all cases an international tribunal hears
have political overtones; the very act of taking a case to an
international court politicizes it.37 That the norms of international law
themselves are not as insulated from politics as conventional wisdom
had assumed was also becoming too obvious to deny in the name of
theoretical constructs.
These changes in perception had been occurring independently of
the work of the PCIJ. As much as anything, they reflect incursions
made by the social sciences in the analysis of law and legal institutions,
long hallowed grounds reserved exclusively to an aristocracy of lawyers
and legal scholars. What initially had taken the form of criticism from
34. See HUDSON, supra note 33, at 513-24.
35. Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931 PCIJ
(ser. A/B) No. 41, at 1 (Sept. 5).
36. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 452 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1967) (1952).
37. See Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 848, 852-53 (1995); see Judicial Settlement of International Disputes:
International Symposium Heidelberg, July 10-12, 1972, 32 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 543,
546 (1972) (remarks by Professor R.Y. Jennings).
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within the ranks of the legal profession - legal realism, as it was known
- expanded into an interdisciplinary recognition that, in the final
analysis, legal concepts and institutions are not nearly as unique as
lawyers and legal scholars maintain; that treating them as unique
serves principally to preserve a professional monopoly; and that the
idea that law and courts of law are unaffected by the social and political
currents in which they swim is untenable.
One of the victims these insights claimed was the idea, originally
considered critical to the Supreme Court model, that the application of
rules of law in a given case can and should be indifferent to how well it
serves the policies the rules were meant to implement. The notion that
an international court can be indifferent to social and political outcomes
suffered a loss in credibility, other than among those who remain wary
of the tendency of policy perspectives to merely rationalize judges'
personal or political biases.38
REORGANIZING THE COURT
The ambiguity of its institutional role notwithstanding, the PCIJ
had been active enough in its first decade to justify hopes that once the
world community reorganized itself after the end of the Second World
War, the Court could be given a new lease on life. 39 If in the final
analysis it had proved to be less than the adjudicative institution the
U.S. had wanted, or the dispute-settling, war-preventing diplomatic
mechanism other states were hoping for, or the constituent assembly
implicit in the principle of sovereign equality applied to the selection of
judges, nonetheless until it came a cropper in the Customs Regime case
it had shown enough promise to justify its continuation.
This, and little more, accounts for the reestablishment of the PCIJ
in the form of the ICJ. In most respects, the language of the ICJ's
constitutive instrument follows that of the PCIJ fairly closely -
conspicuously so. The significance of the Charter's designation of the
ICJ as the UN's "principal judicial organ" is often exaggerated. If it had
been intended to endow the Court with a qualitatively different
institutional role than that of its predecessor, its legislative history
should make the point clearly. It does not. In fact, it suggests only that
by the time the UN was established no purpose would have been served
38. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of
the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 143 (1987) ("The business of
courts is to apply the law and preserve the integrity of the legal order, without regard to
any perceptions of the relative power or moral purity of the parties."); and SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 62 (1961) ("[I]t cannot be too often emphasized that the Court is a court of justice
and not of ethics or morals or of political expediency.").
39. Over the eighteen years it was formally in operation (1922-1939), the PCIJ heard
twenty-four contentious cases and gave twenty-seven advisory opinions.
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by continuing to maintain a formal separation between the Court and
the world organization with which it was substantively tied anyway.
The implication that either the language of the Charter or the intention
of its framers compels the ICJ to defer to the wishes of the political
organs of the UN represents little more than political ambition
masquerading as original intent.
Whether as a matter of policy the Court should seek to align its
judgments and opinions with those prevailing in the political organs of
the UN, or for that matter with its own perceptions of where humanity's
best interests lie, are very different questions, ones whose answers
must be found, over time, in the world community's reaction to the
Court's assertions of authority and in the Court's own prudential
adjustment to the institutional limitations under which it operates.
Despite the global implications suggested by the word international
in its name, the PCIJ had been a European court. Virtually all the
cases it heard involved the interests of European states, many of the
legal issues arising from changes in legal relationships and obligations
brought about by the outcome of the First World War and treaties
entered into upon its conclusion. The most influential of the PCIJ's
judges were Europeans or European-trained, as well.4 0 In truth, much
of the success the PCIJ enjoyed, and the reassuring familiarity it
presented to its predominantly European target audience, can be
attributed to the mutuality of the judges' legal training, habits of
reasoning and expectations of judicial propriety, and to their familiarity
with the codes and traditions of interpretation that form the bases of
law throughout Europe. 41
These advantages were not available to the ICJ once European
states began establishing regional dispute-settlement institutions soon
after the ICJ itself was established. Litigants and issues which might
once have found their way to the Court were thereafter more apt to be
heard by the European Court of Justice or the European Court of
Human Rights, instead. In contrast to the early experience of its
predecessor, the ICJ, from the outset and for several decades thereafter,
had a very light case load. Members of the Court took to openly
40. See Ole Spiermann, Judge Max Huber at the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 115, 116 (2007). American nationals were routinely elected to
the Court so as to encourage public opinion in the U.S. to regard the Court as something
other than a threat to U.S. sovereignty. But the absence of the U.S. from both the PCIJ
and the League limited American influence. See SEAN D. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: COPING WITH ANOMALIES 14 (2007),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edulinternationalhrcolloquiumi/ documents/PICT
ProjectlCJPaper.pdf.
41. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PAUL MARTIN LECTURES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND LAW 66-67 (1987).
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soliciting new cases from governments and from the UN's political
organs. 42 International law associations established blue-ribbon panels
to suggest ways the Court could be made more accessible and attractive
to potential litigants.43
The reluctance of non-European states to fill the void has many
explanations. One, already noted, lies in the suspicion among newly
emerging states that international law, as applied by the ICJ, was too
respectful of the past and the past's allocation of power, wealth and
status, and insufficiently hospitable to perceived contemporary needs,
especially ones entailing the amelioration of inherited inequities. 44 But
another, every bit as influential, was the countervailing perception that
members of the Court were becoming altogether too sensitive to world
politics, and thereby too biased politically to give independent
judgments based solely upon existing rules of law. 45
Given this divergence, and the unresolved conflict among differing
perceptions as to the Court's proper institutional role, it is not
surprising that no consensus has emerged with respect to the qualities
members of the Court should possess or whether it is desirable for them
to have had judicial experience prior to their election to the Court.
Consensus or not, over time, the fact that so many members of the
Court have served in or for their country's foreign ministry, while so
few have had prior judicial experience, has served to reinforce the
impression that the Court is a quasi-political body whose members lack
genuine independence from their governments or the blocs of states
that secure their election.
This perception has been intensified as a result of the unseemly
and demeaning politicking that attends the selection process itself. To
some extent, this is a byproduct of the frequency of elections, a triennial
cadence in which one-third of the Court's fifteen judges are elected
every three years.46 The election process is openly political: candidates
and their foreign office sponsors lobby for months at a time; vote-
trading is commonplace; votes are known to be motivated as much by
42. See, Paul C. Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Vol. II 499, 499-500 (1976)
(discussing the creation of UN organs designed to solicit opinions from International
Court of Justice in order to address the Court's low caseload).
43. The American Society of International Law established two such panels, their
papers published as THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Leo Gross
ed. 1976), and INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed. 1987),
respectively.
44. See R.P. Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1, 3-4 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
45. See Thomas R. Hensley, National Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 568, 568 (1968).
46. Shabtai Rosenne, The Composition of the Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 337, 377 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
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political considerations as by merit, with little or no distinction made
between the requirements of a judicial and non-judicial post. Worst of
all, the process is almost entirely lacking in public scrutiny or political
accountability. 4 7
The possibility that the selection process would become politicized
had been foreseen in 1920, when the decision was made to give both the
Council and the Assembly of the League a role in the election of the
judges. The Root-Phillimore compromise had recommended that
nominations be made, not by governments themselves, but by groups of
four lawyers each government is free to name to a registry of
individuals available to act as arbitrators, known then and now -
misleadingly - as the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 48 These so-
called National Groups, in turn, were expected to consult with
professional groups within their own country prior to making their
nominations. No one expected the scheme to eliminate political
influence in the choice of nominees or in their election. But it was
hoped that the professional standing of individuals who are deemed to
be qualified to act as arbitrators would ensure that greater attention
would be given to the professional qualifications of candidates for the
Court than would be likely if governments were left to make the
nominations themselves. 49
The recommendation found its way into the constitutive
instrument of the PCIJ, and later that of the ICJ, but as an option, not
a requirement.50 It is still there, but is all but ignored in practice, even
by governments like the U.S. that adhere to the formula in form, but
reduce the role of their National Group to that of bit players or that
name to the Group persons so closely tied to their governments that the
distinction between the two is inconsequential.5 1 As much as the
elections themselves, the breakdown of the system intended to assure
independent screening of nominees detracts from the capacity of the
47. For an empirically-based analysis of these and similar shortcomings in
international judicial elections, see RUTH MACKENZIE, KATE MALLESON, PENNY MARTIN &
PHILLIPPE SANDS, SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS
1 (2010) [hereinafter MACKENZIE ET AL.].
48. S.K. VERMA, AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (2004).
49. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 229.
50. Stephen M. Schwebel, National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International
Court of Justice, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 899, 891, 899 (1999).
51. The U.S. National Group that in 2010 nominated the State Department's
Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Joan Donohue, for a place on the ICJ consisted of the
Department's Legal Adviser, two of his predecessors in that post, and a former Deputy
Legal Adviser.
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judges' own professional standing to imbue their rulings with a
compelling authority. 52
The onset of the Cold War, coming as it did at the same time as the
UN and the ICJ were being established, had something to do with the
politicization of elections to the Court. It froze many of the leading
states into rival blocs, intensified the political ramifications of
everything that went on at the UN, and led to the nomination by some
states of candidates whose lack of independence from their government
was virtually taken for granted.53  Ironically, the proliferation of
international tribunals since the end of the Cold War seems only to
have compounded the problem, having transformed what had been a
small judicial elite into a sizeable professional corps such that, as one
group of scholars put it recently, for lawyers in foreign offices and
international organizations an international judgeship has become "a
natural part of career progression." 54
EXPANSION AND PROLIFERATION
Among the most critical factors bearing upon the evolution of the
ICJ to this point has been the unprecedented expansion in the scope of
claims made in the name of international law, the degree of
specialization that has come with it, and an acceptance within the
international law community of a degree of discretionary authority in
judicial interpretation that might once have been considered
overreaching. In theory, these developments should open up a vast new
array of issues for the Court to resolve.55 In practice, this has not yet
happened to the extent one might have expected, in part because so
many of the issues international law now raises are being handled by
specialized dispute-settlement mechanisms like the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the appellate body of the
World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court and ad
hoc criminal tribunals. 56
52. MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 47, at 64-66. In contrast, the professional
qualifications of the members of the PCIJ were never questioned. WALTERS, supra note
36, at 170.
53. See Michael Reisman, Judge Shigeru Oda: Reflections on the Formation of a
Judge, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 57, 68 (2002).
54. MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 47, at 58.
55. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 1-2 (1999).
56. The high visibility enjoyed by some of these tribunals and the cases they hear
attenuates the image the Court once enjoyed as international law's central adjudicative
instrumentality. One cannot help but observe that, in contrast to what one would have
found at the time the South West Africa (Namibia) cases were decided, the ICJ is seldom
referred to these days as the World Court or even the World Court.
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The expansion of international criminal law is especially significant
in this respect, but so, less dramatically, is the expansion in claims
being made in the name of the rights and obligations of individuals and
other non-state actors. Generally speaking, these subjects are
independent of the rights and obligations of states as such, and since,
other than through requests for advisory opinions, only states have
access to the ICJ, they are being raised in forums other than court.
Knowing this, the UN's political organs by now might have acceded
to requests to increase accessibility to the Court or to install it at the
head of a hierarchy of international courts. They have chosen not to do
so, however, instead creating ever more courts, even in the face of
arguments that proliferation could lead to a fragmentation of
international law.5 7 It is not beyond the realm of possibility, in fact,
that some foreign offices find the prospect of fragmentation appealing,
and are disinclined for this reason alone to establish a judicial
hierarchy. Seen from the perspective of political power, after all,
institutions like the Court are useful when they lend compelling legal
authority to political will, but only so long as their authority is
insufficient to enable them to question the legitimacy of that will when
it conflicts with fundamental community standards or goals. Blocs of
small states are every bit as likely as powerful states to proclaim their
adherence to international law while resisting any attempt to endow
the judicial system with sufficient authority to apply it to their own
actions.
In any event, while the proliferation of international tribunals may
increase the risk of fragmentation, it also raises the possibility that, if
only for reasons of collective professional or bureaucratic self-interest,
proliferation could lead to cross-fertilization, not only in the headiest
realms of jurisprudence but in routine matters of practice and
procedure as well. If so, it could end up endowing international law
with a degree of cohesion - and thereby authority - it has never before
had.
It is not difficult, in fact, to envision the emergence of a global
common law - a judicially constructed common law, not one pronounced
by academics, theologians or apologists for governments, as has been
true throughout much of international law's post-Westphalian history.
The absence of a structural hierarchy among international tribunals
57. E.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is
It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 272 (2001); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger
of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 791, 792 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Impact on the International Legal System of
the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 698
(1999).
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does not preclude appreciation of the mutual benefits that symmetry
can bring.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The obscurity into which the Court seemed to have fallen after the
South West Africa (Namibia) cases proved to be ephemeral. It hears
more cases today that it ever has.5 8 Whether this reflects an increase in
confidence, though, is problematical. Some cases submitted to the
Court appear to be motivated less by a desire to clarify legal rights than
by a desire to obtain diplomatic cover for practical solutions the parties
are willing to accept anyway. The ICJ is not likely to be an effective
deterrent to the use of military power by militarily powerful states
determined to have their way or to play a decisive role in the settlement
of inter-state disputes threatening world peace.
But the very breadth of its mission affords the Court an
opportunity to amalgamate and blend evolving elements of
international law that specialized tribunals do not possess. Ironically,
this attribute, aided by the ambiguity of the Court's role, could end up
providing it with a central position inverse to its loss of glamour. As it
matures according to the requirements of international life, the Court
may find itself inadvertently well-positioned to fashion an institutional
life of its own making.
58. Douglass Cassel, Is There a New World Court?, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. iii, vi
(2003).
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THE WAR ON TERROR: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, ARE,
AND SHOULD BE GOING
DAVID ARONOFSKY'
It is with pleasure and gratitude that I write this Chapter to honor
Professor Ved Nanda and the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy ("Journal") in commemoration of the Journal's 40th Anniversary.
Before getting to know Professor Nanda as a friend and colleague, I
long admired his work and insight into the crucial international law
issues of the day while using his ideas in my own teaching. I have
participated in several Sutton Colloquium programs since first meeting
Professor Nanda in Montana, and always welcome these opportunities
to come to the University of Denver to share thoughts. I also greatly
appreciate the Journal's willingness to publish several of my past
writings. I have chosen one of these writings here, co-authored with
Matt Cooper who is one of Professor Nanda's very best international
law students among the many he has taught and inspired, to assess the
war on terror as to where we have been, where we are, and perhaps
most importantly, where we should be going. 2
In 2009, Matt and I wrote that Europe, and particularly the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), seemed to have a much
sounder approach, based on established rule of law and human rights
law principles set forth in the European Human Rights Convention
("Convention"), than the U.S. in confronting most legal aspects of the
war on terror. We looked at case law developments involving
extraordinary renditions, military commissions, and related habeas
corpus proceedings to challenge them in connection with suspected
terrorist detentions, warrantless electronic surveillance, official
complicity in aiding human rights violations - including torture against
terrorist suspects by overseas governments and their officials - state
secrets as a basis to bar legal claims, and the marked U.S. court
tendency to dismiss legal claims against the U.S. and its officials on
1. The University of Montana. The Author has been the General Counsel and an
adjunct law faculty member at The University of Montana since 1994. His academic
specialty areas include international law, which he has been teaching at The University of
Montana Law School for the past 18 years. The views expressed herein are solely the
author's personal ones and not attributable to The University of Montana.
2. David Aronofsky & Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and International
Human Rights: Does Europe Get It Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567 (2009).
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various technical grounds. These developments were contrasted with
the ECHR decisions allowing lawsuits against European states to
proceed. We concluded that the U.S. should follow the European
approach of allowing lawsuits challenging alleged violations of basic
rights of terrorist suspects to be decided on their legal merits. In
retrospect and based on a review of U.S. and European case decisions
since publication of our article, nothing has altered my position.
Before getting into reasons, however, I think it is appropriate here
to cite some of Professor Nanda's own legal views regarding the War on
Terror as it has progressed since the September 11, 2001 tragedy
because he has, in many respects, been a voice for all of us in
identifying legal issues which matter. For example, in 2001 he
reminded us that international law is a fundamental weapon in waging
the war on terrorism and stated that "the war against terrorism will be
won only if concerted national action is taken . .. for that to happen, we
need to provide credible leadership that we can be proud of and we need
to take the moral high ground that will set an exemplary precedent."3
That same year, he also noted:
Among policy alternatives to combat terrorism, the use of
military force dominates the U.S. agenda today. The
implications of this are far-reaching. As historically
unprecedented as the challenges are, it would appear that
more creative approaches are urgently called for,
approaches that do justice to the multi-faceted character of
this problem. 4
Even more to the point, he cautioned:
The use of military force to combat terrorism must be seen
as a new powerful tool being wielded by the United States.
Having employed it first in Afghanistan and now in Iraq,
the US has been emboldened by its reception at home and
seemingly undaunted by criticism of it overseas. Its
implications are far-reaching, perhaps especially for the
integrity of the law itself.5
Time and circumstances proved Professor Nanda to be an accurate
prophet.
Professor Nanda studied the U.S. approach to waging the war on
terror as it continued after 9/11, and in 2006 he addressed the issue of
3. Ved Nanda, The Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism, 10 MICH.
STATE UNIV. -DETROIT COLL. L. J. INT'L L. 603, 608 (2001).
4. Ved P. Nanda, Foreword: Combating International Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y vi, x (2002).
5. Id. at ix.
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terrorist suspect detentions head-on by urging that the detainees "must
be treated humanely" and with "basic fairness."6 He captured the
sentiments of many by stating that those directing the U.S. war on
terror "must not lose sight of the need to strengthen international
human rights law and not even inadvertently dilute it."7
It is with Professor Nanda's foregoing thoughts in mind that we
now view where we have been, where we are, and where we ought to be
going with the U.S. war on terrorism.
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS
Matt and I sharply criticized the seeming U.S. judicial willingness
to condone extraordinary renditions by finding no viable cause of action
in U.S. courts to challenge them in Arar v. Ashcroft. After we published
our article, the Second Circuit reheard its prior decision en banc and a
sharply divided court reaffirmed its initial decision barring any legal
claim against U.S. officials or the government itself.8  The U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal.9 Mr. Arar, the plaintiff, was
neither a U.S. citizen nor a U.S. permanent resident alien, thus
deferring for another day the question of whether U.S. citizens would
fare differently in challenging renditions. The Seventh Circuit recently
suggested an affirmative answer in a non-rendition overseas torture
case, Vance v. Rumsfeld,'0 but the Court recently vacated this three-
judge decision and granted en banc review in a development which
bodes ill for rendition case plaintiffs." Meanwhile, U.S. district courts
seem to follow Arar in rejecting rendition claims by any plaintiffs.12 In
addition, it now seems clear that suits against private, non-
governmental defendants participating in rendition are likewise barred
whenever plaintiffs require evidence available solely from classified
information to sustain them. 13
Meanwhile, the ECHR goes in a much different direction:
"[E]xtraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due
6. Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism as an "Internal Conflict" Under the 1977 Geneva
Protocol: Defining "Enemy Combatant" and the International/Domestic Consequences, 14
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 27, 34 (2006).
7. Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of the United
States' "War on Terror," 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 537 (2009).
8. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 582 (2d. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3409 (2010).
9. Id.
10. 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011).
11. Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 10-1687, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct.
28, 2011).
12. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 800 (D.S.C. 2011); AI-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.D.C. 2010).
13. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
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process, is anathema to the rule of law and the values protected by the
Convention."14 Although the Court recognized that sending suspected
terrorists to other countries is permissible, this can only be done when
there are strong, legally binding assurances by the sending and
receiving countries that all legal rights protected in the Convention will
be respected.15 As noted in our prior article, the ECHR has little
hesitation about granting rule of law primacy over security.
ENEMY COMBATANT HABEAS LITIGATION
As Matt and I pointed out in our prior article, the issues of enemy
combatants status and their detention conditions, including indefinite
detention status, has been one pitting the U.S. Government against the
mainstream of international law jurists' views.16  We expressed
concerns about the limited right of habeas corpus and its viability. Our
concerns proved well founded. In case after case since then, detainees
in Guantanamo and elsewhere have used habeas to no avail in their
efforts to challenge their detentions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, which now has exclusive jurisdiction over these detainee
habeas petitions, has proved a habeas legal graveyard, and its decisions
recently prompted a pair of commentators to accuse this Court of
"undermining" the right of meaningful habeas review.' 7 Another has
identified four individual judges on this Court who seem to steer these
cases to predetermined outcomes whenever at least two are on the same
judicial panel, making it impossible for detainee habeas petitioners to
prevail. 18 One specific category of cases involves the evidentiary
requirements to prove these petitioners belong in detention as either
supporters of, or persons who are part of, terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda, under a lax preponderance standard the D.C. Circuit has yet to
find unmet.19 This Court most recently reversed a lower court grant of
one detainee's habeas petition because federal executive branch actions
enjoy a "presumption of regularity" supposedly not considered by the
14. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, 114 (2010).
15. Id. 104-09.
16. The Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted October 28, 2009, now refers to
such combatants as "alien unprivileged enemy belligerents" and "alien privileged enemy
belligerents" but this is a semantic change without any substantive difference - the
former face military commission trials and enjoy limited legal rights, while the latter get
prisoner of war status even though few detainees in U.S. military custody fall into this
category. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1802(6)-(7)(C), 123
Stat. 2190, 2574 (codified as 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(a) (West 2012)).
17. Jon Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the
War on Terror, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1361, 1393 (2011).
18. Stephen I. Viadeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L.REV.
1451, 1488-89 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Khan v. Obama. 655 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Almerfedi v. Obama,
654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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lower court even though the latter appeared to find ample basis to
overcome any such presumption. 20 These results in and of themselves
might not warrant serious criticisms given the small numbers of habeas
corpus writs granted by U.S. courts generally, but here the law is still
unclear about who may be lawfully detained under what status and
evidentiary circumstances. As Professor Chesney notes, "[T]he precise
boundaries of the government's detention authority remain unclear
despite the passage of more than nine years since the first post-9/11
detainees came into U.S. custody."21 Professor McNeal states it better:
"Counterterrorism detention policy in the United States is a mess." 2 2
This problem has likely just been exacerbated by President
Obama's December 31, 2011 signing of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012, which now authorizes indefinite military
detentions of anyone, including U.S. citizens who are "part of or [have]
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces ...
engaged in hostilities against the United States" or anyone who
commits a "belligerent act" against the U.S. or a U.S. ally regardless of
whether the detainee committed any such act on a battlefield and even
such act is committed in the United States. 23 The ACLU has described
President Obama's approval of the legislation as "a blight on his legacy
because he will forever be known as the president who signed indefinite
detention without charge or trial into law."2 4 There is more to say
below about the overall Obama approach to the war on terror and
military commissions.
One black letter legal rule regarding detention seems to be
emerging from these U.S. cases, namely that non-U.S. citizen and
nonresident alien detainees held outside U.S. jurisdiction lose their
right to sue even in the face of horrible atrocities such as those seen in
Abu Ghraib. 25 This includes suits against the government, government
officials, and contractors, with contractors having especially broad
immunity.26
20. Latifv. Obama, No. 10-5319, 2011 WL 5431524, at *7-8 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011).
21. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas
Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 864 (2011).
22. Gregory S. McNeal, The Status Quo Bias and Counterterrorism Detention, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 855, 855 (2011).
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§
1021(a)-(b)(2), 1022(a)(1)-(2)(B), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562-63 (2011).
24. President Obama Signs Indefinite Detention Bill into Law, ACLU (Dec. 31, 2011)
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-signs-indefinite-detention-bill-law.
25. See Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762,
765-66, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
26. Al-Shimari v. CACI, Int'l Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011); Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); but see Dr.
Daniel Warner, Establishing Norms for Private Military and Security Companies, in this
book.
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The ECHR takes a tough approach contrary to U.S. detention cases
by concluding that permissible grounds for detention pursuant to the
Convention do "not include internment or preventive detention where
there is no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable
time."27 This rule applies regardless of where detainees are located
physically as long as they are within the custody of Convention state's
military or civilian authorities. 28 This straightforward approach makes
it difficult to see how any Convention state can lawfully turn over
someone it has detained to U.S. military commissions.
WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE
Another troubling legal aspect of the war on terror cited in our
prior article is the use of judicially unsupervised electronic surveillance.
We found especially problematic the unavailability of legal redress to
challenge the National Security Agency ("NSA") Terrorist Surveillance
Program, in essence giving free reign to U.S. national security agencies
to monitor international electronic communications. Since that time,
one federal appeals court has continued to block judicial access to
litigate whether such surveillance even occurred. 29 Another has only
recently upheld blanket immunity for U.S. telecommunications
companies which aid the government by providing the surveillance
means. 30 However, on a more positive legal note for plaintiffs in these
cases, two separate federal appellate courts have found that certain
organizations and individuals now have standing to challenge the
electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens outside the U.S. under the
current version of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
adopted in 2008, which requires judicial approval of such surveillance,
but does not require any particularized basis for granting such
approval. 31 Whether the award of standing will result in plaintiffs
winning these cases on their merits seems far from certain, however,
because the government still has a number of defenses (including the
"state secrets" argument discussed below) which appear likely to
preclude such a result.
In contrast to the surveillance wars in U.S. courts, the ECHR had
decided, in its 2008 Liberty decision shortly before we wrote our article,
that surveillance without close court supervision is legally
impermissible under the Convention. 32 Since that decision the ECHR
27. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, 1 100 (2011).
28. See id. 84-86.
29. Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 76 (2d Cir. 2009).
30. NSA Telecomm. Records Litig. v. AT&T Corp., No. 09-16676, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25949, at *5, 44 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2011).
31. Jewel v. NSA, No. 10-15616, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25951, at *26-27 (9th Cir.
Dec. 29, 2011); Amnesty Int'l v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).
32. See Liberty v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2008).
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has again reviewed the practice on unchecked national security agency
surveillance with little or no court supervision. In a stronger
statement, the ECHR determined that even the threat of secret
surveillance pursuant to nonexistent or inadequate national laws was
enough to trigger ECHR jurisdiction in order to challenge the threat
under the Convention. 33 The ECHR also rejected the notion that
plaintiff ignorance of the surveillance should bar the action for lack of
legal injury by noting finding mere unchecked threat enough to sustain
the case. 34 The ECHR does not wholly dismiss secret surveillance in
the war on terror. In fact, it has upheld it as long as there are clearly
written laws which prescribe how and when it will be used, define
which categories of persons are susceptible to surveillance, and limit
the surveillance time and means to those "strictly necessary for
safeguarding democratic institutions."3 5  This approach seems far
preferable to the guessing game seen in the U.S., although the Amnesty
and Jewel cases noted above may well result in similar rulings.
POLITICAL QUESTION BARS TO LITIGATION & LIABILITY
Our prior article expressed concerns about U.S. court willingness to
apply the political question bar to litigation and liability against the
U.S. executive branch, even when basic rights are violated. Since then,
our concerns have proved valid as the political question doctrine has
shut down judicial review of executive branch decisions to bomb, kill,
and falsely accuse innocent people and businesses mistakenly identified
as terrorists. 36 The D.C. Circuit explains this with crystal clarity: "The
political question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of
how they are styled, call into question the prudence of the political
branches in matters of foreign policy or national security
constitutionally committed to their discretion."37 Taken literally, this
means an executive branch official can exercise whatever the official
discretionarily determines is appropriate in the war on terror
regardless of the consequences, as long as there is a significant foreign
relations or national security aspect to the decision. In other words, the
lawyers who represent client victims of this war can simply drop their
cases and go home because quite probably no war on terror decisions
involving other countries are non-discretionary in nature.
The ECHR seemingly takes a different approach regarding
discretionary decisions in the war on terror:
33. Iordachi v. Moldova, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2009).
34. Id. 30.
35. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 153 (2010).
36. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C.
2011).
37. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842.
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[I]t would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal
discretion granted to the executive . . . to be expressed in
terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must
indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with
sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference. . .38
The ECHR has indicated quite strongly that only the judicial
branch of government has the power to determine when executive
discretion has overreached at the expense of rights protected by the
Convention.39 It is unlikely that the ECHR would ever accept a
political question bar to judicial review.
STATE SECRETS AND UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE
Matt and I took issue with U.S. judicial inability or unwillingness
to allow litigation by victims legally injured in the war on terror when
evidence in the case flowed from state secrets, even when these cases
have merit. We also expressed concern about how easily state secrets
could be claimed by the U.S. executive branch, which even cites the
doctrine to shield publicly available information, as seen in the 2007 El-
Masri decision. 40 Since that time, two other federal appellate courts in
different circuits have applied the state secrets doctrine to preclude
plaintiffs from pursuing their cases. 41 In addition to these state secrets
cases, other federal courts have refused to require disclosure of witness
identities and other material evidence used to support anti-terrorism
criminal convictions. 42 This means that even when terrorism cases
wind up in federal criminal court rather than military commissions, the
constitutional rights generally available in other criminal cases do not
necessarily apply in these.
The ECHR applies a different standard to evidence denial on
national security grounds. Although the ECHR recognizes the need, at
times, not to make all evidence used in terrorism cases available to
defendants, this need can be met only with great difficulties;
independent courts must be able to assess all evidence used in
particular cases, in consultation with legal counsel for defendants,
38. Kennedy, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 94 (quoting Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 94).
39. A v. United Kingdom, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 173, 202 (2009).
40. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
41. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2009).
42. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abu-
Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3062 (2011).
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before cases involving secret evidence can proceed. 43  Unlike U.S.
courts, the ECHR will readily reject convictions based on lack of access
to evidence rather than find reasons to sustain them. 44
MILITARY COMMISSIONS: ARE THEY LEGITIMATE?
Our prior article joined the large chorus of voices questioning the
legitimacy of military commissions in adjudicating many of the
detainees caught up in the war on terror. We praised the 2006 U.S.
Supreme Court Hamdan decision finding military commissions created
under a then-applicable federal stature invalid based on U.S.
constitutional and international law principles.45 We also suggested
that the Court's subsequent Boumediene decision recognizing
Guantanamo detainee habeas rights had left another legal question
mark hanging over legislatively created military commissions. 46
Congress nonetheless responded first to Hamdan by reconstituting the
commissions in 2006 to create their statutory basis; and again in 2009,
partly in response to Boumediene to set evidentiary parameters for both
civil court habeas proceedings and commission cases. 47 Congress again
acted last December to refine somewhat how commissions are to
function from this point forward.48 Based on this pattern of
congressional enactments, it seems clear the U.S. legislative branch,
with executive branch support, will insist on using military
commissions in the war on terror as long as the judicial branch allows
it.
Whether commissions are constitutionally viable will require yet
another U.S. Supreme Court decision, or two, to decide. Meanwhile,
opinions about whether they meet fundamental legal safeguards are
decidedly mixed as they now hear cases. Two recent commentators
with first-hand familiarity of commissions cases generally give the
commissions positive assessments, and one, Joshua Dratel, has written
a piece well worth reading because he raises points seldom discussed by
critics about how experienced civilian criminal defense counsel can
practice effectively once the cases get underway.49 Other commentators
deplore these commissions, citing serious ethical, evidentiary and
43. A, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 210 (2009); Sangeeta Shah, From Westminster to
Strasbourg: A and Others v United Kingdom, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473, 483-86 (2009).
44. See A, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 25 (2009).
45. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
47. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190.
48. See Obama Signs NDAA, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49. Keith A. Petty, Beyond the Court of Public Opinion: Military Commissions and
the Reputational Pull of Compliance Theory, 42 GEo. J. INT'L L. 303 (2011); Joshua L.
Dratel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Military Commissions, 41 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1339 (2011).
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substantive rights issues, suggesting something akin to Star Chamber
justice.50 One military lawyer with actual case experience provides a
balanced perspective about the pros and cons of the commissions, before
ultimately concluding they should be abolished in favor of using U.S.
civilian courts.5 1 The negative critics conclude without exception that
these commissions lack validity under U.S. constitutional and
international law. Perhaps the harshest criticism of all to date comes
from a U.S. military lawyer who represents Guantanamo detainees,
when he cites "the legal theory underpinning Guantanamo and the
military commissions" as "an assault upon the structure of our form of
constitutional government" flowing directly from the architect of Nazi
Germany's legal system used to support the Holocaust.52
The ECHR would likely agree with the harshest commissions'
critics, given the continuous ECHR line of cases concluding that
military courts can never try civilian terrorist defendants fairly, or in a
manner consistent with Convention safeguards, because they fall too
far outside civilian judicial control. We cited the Kenar case in our
article to illustrate this legal point.53 Since that case, the ECHR has
had no military court decision, but a series of recent cases involving
British military activities in Iraq make clear that the Convention
applies to all aspects of these activities where civilian rights are
concerned. The British Government has yet to prevail in any of these
cases, arguing special military exigencies as a basis for ignoring
Convention rights. 54 Perhaps more to the point, the ECHR has strongly
suggested that countries bound by the Convention would violate it by
extraditing suspected terrorists in European detention to the U.S.,
absent assurances that they would not be tried by U.S. military
commissions. 55
50. James A. Cohen, Lawyering in a Vacuum, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1427 (2011);
Mark Denbeaux, et al., No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the Proceedings of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantanamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1231 (2011);
Shayana Kadidal, Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases: The
Guantanamo Habeas Litigation, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397 (2011); Carlissa Carson, Yes
We Can Revise the Current Military Commissions System, But Why?, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L.
389 (2010).
51. David J.R. Frakt, The Practice of Military Law in the Guantanamo Military
Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35 (2011); David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties:
Defending Detainees and the Constitution in the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 545 (2011).
52. Todd E. Pierce, The Guantanamo Facility at 10: An Assault on Our Constitu-
tional Government, The National Law Journal (Jan. 10, 2012).
53. Kenar v. Turkey, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 67215/01 (2007).
54. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6 (2010); Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55721/07 (2011); Al-Sadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 61498/08 (2010).
55. Ahmad, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, T1 117, 119.
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THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS: IS THERE A MATERIAL
DIFFERENCE?
Professor Nanda minced no words in describing "there is broad
consensus that the Bush Administration's war on terror led to
violations of international human rights law as well as international
humanitarian law . . . both domestically and internationally." 5 6 Few
scholars would dispute this view, which does beg the question of
whether the Obama administration has done any better. The answer is
a qualified maybe. President Obama has apparently halted renditions,
torture, and secret detention facility use.5 7
However, despite Obama campaign promises to close Guantanamo,
the detainees are still there and their trials by military commissions of
dubious validity continue. To date no high or mid-level U.S. civilian or
military official has been convicted in civilian or military courts for
violating U.S. detainee rights, including officials tied to the infamous
Abu Ghraib prison. Contractors have also evaded legal accountability
in most cases because "no coherent recourse currently exists, either
domestically or internationally, that can hold PCMFs [Private Military
Contractor Firms] accountable for mistreatment."5 8 Although post-Abu
Ghraib legal review occurred during the Bush administration, there is
no reason to believe results would differ in the current one. These
results are stark regarding the military:
After exhaustive investigations, public fallout, and
internal recriminations, eleven enlistees were court-
martialed, convicted, and sentenced for their conduct at
Abu Ghraib. Their sentences ranged from a reduction in
rank and the loss of one-half of one month's pay to ten
years in prison. As for the officers who ran the Abu Ghraib
prison, only one, the lieutenant colonel who directed the
interrogation center, was charged with crimes relating to
the abuse and subsequent cover-up; he was cleared of all
charges but for one count of willfully disobeying an order
not to discuss the investigation. A few officers were
reprimanded and administratively punished for their
failures of leadership, including then-Brig. Gen. Janis
Karpinski, who lost her star, and Col. Thomas Pappas, who
was relieved of command, reprimanded, and fined. Not a
56. Nanda, supra note 7, at 536.
57. Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The Obama Administration and
Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
33, 43 (2011).
58. Huma T. Yasin, Playing Catch-Up: Proposing the Creation of Status-Based
Regulations to Bring Private Military Contractor Firms Within the Purview of
International and Domestic Law, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 411, 495 (2011).
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single officer, however, was court-martialed for failing to
stop the abuse of prisoners. In fact, Maj. Gen. Antonio M.
Taguba, the Army investigating officer whose report
revealed the extent of military crimes at Abu Ghraib,
damaged his own military career by completing such a
candid, hard-hitting report. 59
One former military prosecutor who also tried ICTY cases suggests
that the notion of command responsibility, used to try numerous high
level military officers for legal rights abuses, seems lacking. She
persuasively argues that
[a] command climate of zero tolerance for law of war
violations, where commanders have strong and targeted
incentives to prevent, detect, and punish abuses, would do
more than achieve the laudable goal of meeting our
obligations under international law. It would also
strengthen our military organization and better enable the
military to accomplish its missions.60
Obama administration Justice Department attorneys argue as
zealously as their Bush administration predecessors against allowing
war on terrorism victims legal redress in U.S. courts which, as seen
above, routinely accept the arguments. If anything, the Obama lawyers
have deepened the habeas legal quagmire since he took office. 61 Most
scholars assessing the Obama administration approach to the war on
terror have harshly criticized it.62 Despite the positive changes
President Obama has apparently brought about as noted above,
detainees can still be held incommunicado, military commissions
continue to try civilians under procedurally defective and ethically
problematic rules, detainees are still returned to countries where they
can be tortured, and in addition, investigations of past alleged torture
in the prior administration have apparently withered on the vine in
breach of U.S. Torture Convention obligations. 63 Although perhaps
some partisanship is expected from a senior Republican Senate staff
expert involved with war on terror legislation, one has difficulty
arguing with his conclusion that:
59. Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct
Unbecoming,"26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5 (2008).
60. Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 64 (2010).
61. E.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 997 (2011).
62. E.g., Nowak, Birk & Crittin, supra note 57.
63. Id. at 66.
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[o]ther than a relatively minor revamping of the military
commissions system, President Obama's pre-election
criticism of Bush administration policies and post-election
discussion of charting a new course in detention policy has
dissolved into paralysis and procrastination. Political
demagoguery and legitimate policy differences among
senators and congressmen create an environment
inhospitable to the development of consensus detention
legislation, but those obstacles could be overcome with
leadership from the President. Without that leadership,
though, detention policy has merely become a tool used by
those on both the political left and right for their own
electoral reasons. 64
Many would agree with Professor Welsh that indefinite
Guantanamo detentions lack legitimacy, yet nothing has been done to
stop them and the 2012 Defense Reauthorization Act ensures their
continuation.65 As Professor Miller notes in comparing Guantanamo
detentions to the World War II Korematsu case, President Obama's
claims of authority to maintain indefinite detentions "for many of the
remaining Guantanamo detainees, underscore . . . the likelihood that
the power he claims will, in Justice Jackson's dissenting words in the
most infamous detention case in our history, lie 'about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need."' 6 6 Professor Yin recently wrote; "[I]t
is now readily apparent that the Obama Administration is pursuing a
counterterrorism strategy . . . broadly consistent with that of the Bush
Administration." 67
As discussed above, the ECHR applies law rather than political
expediency in war on terror cases. The ECHR recognizes command
responsibility as customary international law to allow convictions of
those who fail to prevent subordinates' war crimes. 68 Our prior article
illustrated that the ECHR has long applied strict accountability on
Convention states to conduct thorough investigations of human rights
64. Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and
Detention Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 270 (2011).
65. David Welsh, Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair
Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 261, 269-70
(2011).
66. Bruce Miller, No Virtue in Passivity: The Supreme Court and Ali Al-Marri, 33 W.
NEw ENG. L. REV. 697, 753 (2011) (referencing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
246 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)).
67. Tung Yin, Broken Promises or Unrealistic Expectations?: Comparing the Bush and
Obama Administrations on Counterterrorism, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465,
509 (2011).
68. Kononov v. Latvia, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, T 211 (2010).
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abuses and provide legal redress for violations. These legal obligations
continue.69 The ECHR has also emphasized that any alleged special
war on terror considerations cannot override Convention rights and
protections, in rejecting practices such as extraordinary rendition as
"anathema to rule of law and the values protected by the Convention." 0
The Obama Administration would do well to study ECHR case decisions
protecting basic legal rights and refusing to apply technicalities to
undermine them.
WHERE WE SHOULD Go FRoM HERE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
The ECHR approach to most aspects of the war on terror discussed
above should probably be adopted. Here is what the future likely
portends if this happened.
First, the U.S. would not engage in extraordinary renditions or
similar activities without serious legal consequences. At a minimum,
victims of such renditions would have an automatic right to legal
redress and compensation in U.S. courts, or alternatively, some form of
U.S. administrative tribunal empowered by a future U.S. law could set
reasonable compensation amounts. In addition, those engaged in
rendition acts would be subject to criminal liability. If a particular
rendition were deemed essential under exigent national security
circumstances, a U.S. presidential pardon avoids the criminal exposure
problem. Once rendition victims have access to appropriate
compensation, suing private individuals and companies, such as
Jeppesen, might not be needed and complicated state secrets problems
are avoided.
Second, the U.S. should clarify the habeas corpus for Guantanamo
detainees in a manner consistent with U.S. constitutional and
international law. The ECHR approach requiring all detainees to be
scheduled promptly for criminal prosecutions and trials subject to the
full panoply of defendant constitutional rights meets these concerns. In
the process of cleaning up the detainee habeas legal mess, we should
also define detainee status much more precisely so detainees can know
with certainty why they are detained. Moreover, because Congress
contributed to this mess legislatively, Congress might consider using
new legislation to define some specific criteria for detainee habeas
corpus writs.
Third, warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens and permanent
resident aliens in their person and in their communications needs tight
legal rein by U.S. federal courts. The way to accomplish this is through
specified probable cause for surveillance approved by courts. Even if
69. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6 (2010); Astamirova v. Russia, 51
Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (2009).
70. Ahmad, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, T 114.
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U.S. citizens and resident aliens are taken care of, however, this does
not solve the more complicated issue of protecting basic privacy rights
of others as a human right. The ECHR does not distinguish between
citizens or resident aliens on the one hand, and nonresident aliens on
the other, in limiting such surveillance under the Convention.71 The
U.S. should assess how to protect all privacy rights without
compromising national security.
Fourth, the U.S. political question bar to litigation and liability
should be disallowed in cases involving basic legal rights violations.
This is not to say that litigants deserve automatic standing to sue
because they must still demonstrate tangible legal injury, but when
they do so their lawsuits should proceed.
Fifth, the use of state secrets and undisclosed evidence in all war
on terror criminal cases should either cease altogether or face
substantial curtailment. The U.S. Government seems able to get quite
a few convictions in terrorism-related cases without any apparent need
to resort to these flawed legal tools. Facing one's accusers and
witnesses who support them reflects a bedrock principle of U.S.
constitutional law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed. 72 This has already become such a serious problem that rather
than face the prospect of numerous detainee acquittals, the government
has found it necessary or desirable to release hundreds of Guantanamo
detainees without charging them. 73 Although these releases might well
suggest the problem is now self-correcting, nothing precludes
widespread detentions from recurring in the future and the detainees
still at Guantanamo have yet to see much of the evidence needed to
defend themselves. On a related note, either Congress or the U.S.
Supreme Court should overturn the D.C. Circuit Court decision barring
Confrontation Clause application in detention habeas proceedings
because otherwise, detainees may have no way to bring a meaningful
habeas writ for lack of available evidence to support it.74
Sixth, military commissions should be eliminated except in cases
involving non-US military personnel as defendants. In this regard the
ECHR view that military courts can never ensure fair trials for civilians
has no persuasive counter-argument. The fact that a growing number
of current and former military lawyers with direct Guantanamo case
experience now view commissions' elimination as contrary to core U.S.
71. Liberty v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2008).
72. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
73. Welsh, supra note 65, at 283-84.
74. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1814 (2011).
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constitutional and international law principles makes the elimination
case a legal cinch.
Seventh, President Obama should keep all his campaign promises.
The U.S. is the star actor on the world stage as a nation which once led
the world in rule of law adherence. The Bush administration opted to
sacrifice this role after 9/11 and it should not be forgotten that
President Obama won his election in no small part because of his
campaign promises to regain it. As seen above, the differences between
the Bush and Obama administrations are not legally sufficient, and the
recent 2012 Defense Authorization Act reestablishing indefinite
detentions takes the U.S. in the wrong direction.
Finally, there should be legal accountability once and for all for
U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as private party
accomplices, who choose not to play by the rules of respecting basic
individual legal rights in the future. What is done may now already be
done, but the ECHR requirement of competent and thorough
investigations of all significant legal rights abuses, accompanied by
meaningful legal remedies when these abuses are found, is one the U.S.
is long overdue to adopt. The imposition of command responsibility on
U.S. political and military leadership could fix most of these problems,
and if the day ever comes when the U.S. loses a military conflict we may
well find it imposed by others.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The U.S. war on terror has created many casualties. Perhaps the
greatest casualty of all is a loss of the core rule of law focus which
differentiated the U.S. from so many other countries on the global stage
decades before this war began. In order to win it, the U.S. must regain
its leadership in not only advocating, but practicing rule of law
principles predicated on respect for, and protecting, basic individual
rights. As Professor Nanda accurately wrote, the war on terror must
"be fought in the realm of ideas."75 In doing so, the United States "must
scrupulously follow principles of international law." 76 Following
Professor Nanda's sage counsel here will bring permanent victory to the
endeavor.
75. Ved Nanda, Terrorists Are Here, and Are Waiting, DENVER POST, Sept. 24, 2009,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13404545?IADID=Search-www.denverpost.
com-www.denverpost.com.
76. Ved Nanda, We Must Adhere to International Law, DENVER POST, Jan. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_11454961.
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In the Spring of 1992, in a lovely setting in Sweden just north of
Uppsala, I attended a conference of the Life & Peace Institute on "The
Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations?" The
setting was lovely. Sigtuna is on beautiful Lake Malaren and the hosts
made every effort to see to our comfort.
The actual conference, as I remember, was not as stimulating as
the surroundings. What I do remember vividly, however, some 20 years
later, was that I made a comment at a plenary session, followed by a
comment by a small distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian
accent. The session soon ended and the distinguished gentleman
abruptly walked up to me and announced, "Let's go for a walk; we are
going to be friends for life."
I was neither shocked nor offended by the comment. Indeed, we
went for a long walk along the lake, and continued our conversations
bilaterally throughout the conference. In spite of all the efforts of the
conference organizers, the conference will not go down in history as
having made a major contribution to peace in the world. However, the
distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian accent had made an
astute prediction: Ved and I became friends for life. Whether it is in
Denver or somewhere else in the United States, whether it is in Geneva
or somewhere else in Europe, whether it is in serious discussions about
the world or exchanges about family; the distinguished gentleman with
a decidedly Indian accent was more than prescient and we have become
more than just friends.
We have not been able to see each other often, but Ved's friendship
has inspired me in several ways. First, he has opened a competition
with me that he doesn't even know about. When Ved was younger, he
vowed to visit every country in the world. He did quite well, except that
at the time of his travels there were certain large confederated
countries that eventually broke up, such as the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. When I first visited Ashgabat and Almaty, and Skopje and
Ljubljana; I was so proud because I felt that I was in places Ved had
never seen. I had one upped him.
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Second, on my first visit to Denver, Ved introduced me to many
people; all of them his best friends, including federal judges. But what I
remember most was the way he introduced me to the people working in
the university cafeteria as his best friends as well. I had not seen that
kind of empathy and openness since I was on the campaign trail with
Bobby Kennedy. Everyone admired and loved Bobby, and I sensed that
all the people at the university admired and loved Ved in many of the
same ways, although Ved was not looking for their votes. He was
genuinely concerned about them, as they were about him.
Finally, I can mention one other Nanda inspiration. Several years
ago, Ved had an emergency operation that should have required some
serious R&R. Instead of resting, he resumed teaching at the university
in a wheel chair with 67 stitches still in his leg. Soon after, against
doctor's orders and to the consternation of his family and the
Chancellor, he flew to Geneva for a meeting of an organization that will
remain nameless, but which, like the Sigtuna conference, will never
change the world. When I met Ved at the airport and tried to scold him
for his irresponsible behaviour, he looked at me with his doleful eyes
and said, "Danny, they asked me to come and I just couldn't let them
down."
From speaking to youngsters in elementary schools in Denver to
explaining international politics in his tuxedo to the Lions Club; from
participating in doctoral seminars for Ph.D. students at prestigious
universities to vulgarizing complex problems in public media including
print and television; and from consulting with the most grass-roots non-
governmental organizations throughout the world to advising leaders at
the highest levels in the innermost circles of governments, Ved has
always been there for all who asked, and in this way, he is also an
inspiration to all of us.
At a prestigious international law conference, when former U.S.
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said,
"All I know about international law I owe to Professor Nanda," she was
speaking for thousands if not millions of people throughout the world.
He has not just taught law; he has lived and exemplified a life of dignity
and respect for all.
NORM SETTING FOR PMSCs: BACKGROUND
In his distinguished academic career, Ved has written extensively
on so many subjects, such as human rights, graduate legal education in
the United States, international environmental law, international
dispute settlement in the United States, nuclear weapons and the
World Court, refugee law and policy, law and transnational business
transactions, and law in the war on international terrorism. In all he
has written, he has stressed the role of law and particularly
international law. He has tried to grasp the role of the normative in
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setting some type of standards for societal behaviour within and outside
the United States. Whether in the private or public sectors or whether
within domestic or international law, as a proper disciple of Myers
McDougal, Harold Laswell and the New Haven School of Yale Law
School, Ved has always been concerned with the interaction between
society and rules and norms, and not only in the formal sense of treaties
and domestic legislation. What follows is a very current example of the
international community, under Swiss leadership, trying to establish
rules and norms in the intersection between public and private sectors,
something very close to Ved's interests. In addition, the subject of the
intersection and private military and security companies is of the
highest importance as violence is no longer limited to interstate
conflicts.
Recently, various sources above the state level, such as
supranational bodies like the European Union, and below the state
level, such as non-state actors like multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and armed groups,
have challenged the state-centric system initiated in the Peace of
Westphalia. In this new environment, there are several new private
threats to international security; among them piracy, organized crime,
and citizen militias.' Where States are no longer able or are unwilling
to provide security, private actors have stepped in or governments have
hired them to provide security. Private threats to peace and security
have increased and private solutions to threats to peace and security
have increased as well.2 States and international organizations, such as
the United Nations, are hiring companies to provide traditional public
functions in the security sector, including military operations, mission
support, and security maintenance. Private companies have also been
involved in training police forces and state armed forces as well as
collecting intelligence information. 3 In addition, multinational
1. See generally Anne-Marie Buzatu & Benjamin S. Buckland, Private Military &
Security Companies: Future Challenges in Security Governance (DCAF Horizon 2015,
Working Paper No. 3, 2010), available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/
DCAFO9/124737/ipublicationdocument-singledocument/da297ble-cOe5-4076-94fd-67ce94
5163a6/en/PMSCo20webo20version.pdf. This paper provides a most helpful overview of
the situation. The following summarizes much of the paper.
2. In terms of security sector reform and development, Abrahamsen and Williams
makes this point: "As the links between security and development have been increasingly
recognized, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become a central part of development
policy. Following a traditional Weberian concept of the state, these programmes are
almost exclusively focused on the public security sector, neglecting the extent to which
people in developing countries have come to rely on private security providers for their
day-to-day security needs." Rita Abrahamsen & Michael C. Williams, Security Sector
Reform: Bringing the Private In, 6 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 1, 1 (2006).
3. See Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy.. .If We Can't Buy!': The Privatization of
Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing Inherently Governmental Functions, 19 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1055, 1055-74 (2008). Chesterman notes that private contractors are more
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companies and humanitarian organizations hire private security
companies for protection 4.
In the new security environment, private military and security
companies (PMSCs) 5 have developed as important actors in the security
sector. Indeed, the growth of private security companies has become a
worldwide phenomenon. Certain statistics from the recent Small Arms
Survey (Survey) are helpful in understanding the growth of this
phenomenon.6 Based on a review of seventy countries, the Survey
estimates that the formal private security sector employs about twenty
million people, which exceeds the number of police officers at the global
level, and holds between 1.7 and 3.7 million firearms.7 Estimates show
that the security market is worth about $100-165 billion and growing at
7-8 percent.8 The company G4S, for example, has an estimated 530,000
employees in 115 countries and Securitas has 260,000 people in 40
countries.9
Where I am now affiliated, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Swiss government have been
in the forefront of developing norms and principles for States as well as
a Code of Conduct for companies in this area; they are trying to bring
some set of rules and norms to the behaviour of States and private
security firms contracted, to hold the States and firms accountable and
to establish some form of oversight. There are several precedents for
this effort of private/public partnerships. For example: Voluntary
present than public officials in numerous intelligence services of the United States
government.
4. See ABBY STODDARD, ADELE HARMER & VICTORIA DIDOMENICO, HUMANITARIAN
POL'Y GROUP, THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS AND SERVICES IN HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS (2008), available at www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2816.pdf.
5. The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Montreux Document] defines PMSCs as 'private
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they
describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding
and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places;
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or
training of local forces and security personnel." Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Montreux
Document 9 (August 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc
002_0996.pdf.
6. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, STATES OF SECURITY 101-27 (2011). The Survey refers
to private security companies as PSCs while we refer to private military and security
companies (PMSCs), but we are talking about the same phenomena as the Survey
indicates that such distinction is misleading (p. 102) and we will continue, therefore, to
use PMSCs.
7. Abrahamsen and Williams estimate that the ratio of private security guards to
police in developed countries is approximately 3:1, while in developing countries it may be
as high as 10:1 or more. Abrahamsen & Williams, supra note 2, at 2.
8. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 103.
9. Id.
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Principles on Business and Human Rights initiative deals with the
extractive industry;10 John Ruggie is the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights dealing with
"Protect, Respect and Remedy"" in the Global Compact. These two
precedents have influenced two recent attempts to establish norms for
States and companies in dealing with private security providers. What
follows is a brief description of those two attempts.
THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT
In 2008, the Swiss Government and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 following a series of intergovernmental
meetings over a three year period, joined with seventeen countries
including, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and France,
to endorse an agreement known as the "Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflicts" (Document). 1 3 It is the first international
document to describe international law as it applies to PMSCs in the
context of armed conflicts and list good practices to help States
implement their international obligations through national measures.
The Document is designed to be a guide to the legal and practical issues
involving PSMCs. The two stated objectives are: 1) to clarify existing
obligations of Contracting States, Territorial States and Home States;
and 2) to develop good practices, regulatory options and other measures
for the same at the national and international levels. 14 To date, over
thirty states have endorsed the Document of twenty-four pages and one
hundred operative paragraphs. There are no legal obligations
involved. 15 Indeed, the Preface clearly states that it is "not a legally
10. See Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, SECRETARIAT FOR THE
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.Voluntary
principles.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
11. See U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative on Business & Human
Rights, Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CENTRE, http://www.business-humanrights.org/
SpecialRepPortal/Home/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
12. It is somewhat unusual for the ICRC to take this type of initiative and equally
unusual for the ICRC to be directly associated with the Swiss Government in this way.
The independence of the ICRC from the Swiss Government is extremely important to its
particular humanitarian neutrality. For a discussion of the relationship between the
ICRC and the Swiss Government and an excellent political understanding of the ICRC,
see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE HUMANITARIANS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS (2005).
13. Montreux Document, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 9.
15. For an excellent insider's overview of the negotiations, see James Cockayne,
Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation,
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 401, 401-28
(2008).
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binding instrument and does not affect existing obligations of States
under customary international law or [treaty law]." 16
The Preface of the Document lays out three potential relationships
between PMSCs and States: Contracting States, including, as
appropriate, when PMSCs subcontract with other PMSCs; Territorial
States on whose territory the companies operate; and Home States
where the PMSCs are registered or incorporated.17 The importance of
these definitions and the inclusion of all three types overlapping in
most of the Document is that "they constitute an explicit recognition by
17 highly affected states that they have a specific duty to protect
human rights during the operation of PMSCs operating from their
territory, or with whom they contract regardless of the extra-
jurisdictional location of the activities of the private entity".18
In Part One, the Document recalls certain existing legal obligations
of States regarding private military and security companies.19 It lays
out the lex lata. Contracting States, the Document notes, have an
obligation within their power to ensure the PMSCs they contract
respect international humanitarian law (IHL).20 It is "a very public
affirmation by a diverse group of states, including the United States, of
the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human
rights to contemporary armed conflict." 21 It is a clear reminder that
States do not act in a legal vacuum in their relationships with PMSCs.
The difficulty, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) saw in the
Nicaragua v. United States case, 22 is the degree to which a court can
directly attribute the actions of a PMSC to a government. The ICJ, you
remember, said that there was not enough evidence to impute
responsibility for the flow of arms between Nicaragua and insurgents in
El Salvador.23 Thus, the Document specifically refers to PMSCs
contracted by States, eliminating any potential confusion. Article 7 of
Part I says, "Although entering into contractual relations does not in
and of itself engage the responsibility of Contracting States, the latter
16. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 9.
17. Id. at 9-10.
18. Cockayne, supra note 15, at 406. (Italics in the original) Cockayne goes on to
recount the controversy during the negotiations concerning the exact nature of that duty.
19. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 9.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Cockayne, supra note 15, at 403.
22. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. the
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, TT 109, 115 (June 27). In its judgment, the Court said: "there is no
clear evidence [that] the United States . . actually exercised such a degree of control . .
as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf . [For the United States to be
legally responsible), it would in principle have to be proved that the State had effective
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are responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, human
rights law, or other rules of international law committed by PMSCs ...
where such violations are attributable to the Contracting State,
consistent with customary international law." 2 4 We also note here that
the Government of the United Kingdom has decided not to engage any
PMSC that has not shown adherence to the Code of Conduct. 2 5
Territorial States, in the Document, also have the obligation,
within their power, to ensure PMSCs operating on their territory
respect IHL. These States also have the obligation to pass legislation
necessary to provide penal sanctions to persons violating the law as
well as to prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having
committed crimes under international law on their territory. Home
States and other States have many of the same obligations including
ensuring respect for IHL, similar to the obligations of the signatories to
the Geneva Conventions. Provisions are made for those in violation or
in serious breach of IHL.
Of particular importance and in anticipation of the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), the
Document has a section on PMSCs and their personnel. The Document
calls for respect for IHL and human rights law imposed by national law,
although the status of the personnel is not clear. The Document says in
paragraph 24, "The status of the personnel of PMSCs is determined by
international humanitarian law, on a case by case basis, in particular
according to the nature of the circumstances of the functions in which
they are involved." 26 If they are civilians, for example, they cannot be
fired upon. If they are incorporated into the regular armed forces of a
State or members of a group under a command responsible to the State,
then their status changes, as does the question of prisoner of war status
according to the relevant Geneva Convention.
There are, as one would imagine, considerable debates in
international law concerning the engagement of PMSCs in armed
conflicts. 27 The question is whether in situations of armed conflict (inter
or intrastate) IHL and international criminal law apply to PMSC
employees. Most lawyers agree that if serious violations occur, national
and international courts can prosecute the employees. IHL and human
rights law also apply to States contracting them, States on whose
territory they operate, and States where they are incorporated.
Some arguments focus particularly on the status of the employees.
Are they civilians or combatants? Most of the employees do not partake
24. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 12.
25. Guy Pollard, Charge D'Affaires, UK Statement at International Signing
Ceremony: Private Military and Security Companies (PSMCs) (Nov. 9, 2010).
26. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 10.
27. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 109.
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in actual hostilities, but that can be a blurry distinction if they are
involved in guarding a military base or intelligence gathering. The
traditional ICRC delineation of civilians and militants loses some of its
meaning here. Courts may hold superiors of PMSCs liable for
international crimes committed by personnel under their effective
authority and control, which, as previously mentioned, is always
problematic to prove. 28 For the moment, courts have prosecuted very
few PMSC personnel for IHL, human rights or criminal violations,
although incidents of armed violence by employees in Afghanistan and
Iraq have caused international furor. 29
Part Two of the Document deals with good practices so as to assist
States, who are not legally bound, to implement their obligations with
the proviso that "any of these good practices will need to be adapted in
practice to the specific situation and the State's legal system and
capacity." 30 The Introduction has several caveats repeating the broad
spectrum given to States to apply the practices where appropriate and
possible. The recommendations, it is noted, may also apply for
international organizations, NGOs and companies. The Document
makes various suggestions concerning the procedure and criteria for the
selection and contracting of PMSCs, as well as the terms of contract
with PMSCs, including numerous quality indicators. It encourages
Contracting States to monitor compliance to ensure accountability. It
gives special attention to the granting and terms of authorization to a
PMSC to operate by the territorial State as well as the Home State,
including sanctions if violations occur.
The significance of the Part Two is the providing of suggestions or
guidance on what good practices by States might be in dealing with
PMSCs. There are 73 "good practices" which have the potential to be
the cornerstone for the further development of regulating PMSCs, such
as the follow-up Code of Conduct.3' In general, however, while the final
Document lays out the existing laws and the good practices, it definitely
moved away from attempts in earlier versions to emphasize victims'
rights to finally stress the legal obligations of the parties. In that sense,
the Document fell below the expectations of human rights groups such
as Amnesty International. But, in general, States were enthusiastic as
well as industry representatives as they saw the Document as a positive
28. "Prosecution by the International Criminal Court requires that an individual's
actions meet criteria for a crime under the ICC Statute. The ICC has jurisdiction over
individuals only, not corporations. This means that the Court has jurisdiction over the
managers of PSCs for negligence in the prevention of the commission of crimes by their
employees." Id. at 128 n.13 (citation omitted).
29. "In cases such as Iraq . . PMSC employees were granted immunity from Iraqi
law from 2004 to 2009. . . ." Id. at 110.
30. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 12.
31. Id. at 12-26.
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step toward clarifying the legal obligations of States and companies as
well as finding an operative mechanism for regulation to ensure
accountability.
THEICOC
In response to industry demands, the Swiss government was
involved in a second initiative to establish international standards for
private security companies. The ICoC 32 is a supplementary measure to
any national governmental measures, but it stands as an outstanding
example of an industry trying to self-regulate. Its objectives are to
establish clear standards for private security providers based on
international human rights law as well as to develop an oversight and
compliance mechanism. In its explanation of the ICoC and how to
become a Signatory Company, the Swiss Government specifically states
that "[t]he ICoC itself creates no legal obligations and no legal liabilities
on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which already exist under
national or international law. However, you will be publicly affirming
your responsibility to respect the human rights of, and fulfill
humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected by your
business activities."3 3
After a series of workshops with different stakeholders and a
conference at Wilton Park in 2009, the Swiss Government and the
stakeholders generally agreed on the need for a structure for the ICoC.
Members of the private security industry and the Swiss Government,
with the help of certain facilitators such as DCAF, agreed on a final
version in September 2010.34 Fifty-eight companies finalised and signed
the ICoC in November 2010.35 By February 1, 2011, the number of
Signatory Companies had risen to seventy-one. 36 Currently, a multi-
stakeholder Steering Committee (StC) is developing the operational
framework for the oversight institution. 37 Whereas the Document was
mostly a government initiative, the ICoC was an industry reflection on
32. See GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES,
http://www.dcaf.ch/Topics/Detail?lng=en&id=121492 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); see also
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
33. Outline About How to Become a Signatory Company, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
PSC o2011-01-17 - ICoCbecoming-a-signatory-companyDCAF.pdf (last visited Sept.
30, 2011).
34. Fact Sheet, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE
PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/FactSheet ICoC March_2011.pdf (last visi-
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what it could do regarding respect for international humanitarian and
human rights standards.
The Preamble states that "the Signatory Companies commit to the
responsible provision of Security Services so as to support the rule of
law, respect the human rights of all persons and protect the interests of
their clients."38 The ICoC is recognized as a founding instrument, and
the Signatories commit to working with multi-stakeholders to establish
objective and measurable standards based on the ICoC with "external
independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight." 39 The
ICoC mentions Certification as the ultimate goal based on the
company's ongoing monitoring, auditing and verification. 40
The general provisions of the ICoC relate to performing security
services in complex environments. It explicitly states that it neither
refers to legally binding obligations nor seeks to limit or prejudice
existing international law. It is, quite simply, an example of soft law,
such as the Deed of Commitment of the NGO Geneva Call dealing with
armed non-state actor groups and the use of antipersonnel mines.41
Just as the Deed of Commitment is not a legal document, although it
has been signed by almost forty armed non-state groups in the City Hall
of Geneva with the Republic and Canton of Geneva as Depository, the
ICoC is a political commitment by companies to voluntarily follow a
code of conduct.42
38. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 3
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONALCODEOFCON
DUCT Final withoutCompanyNames.pdf.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HuMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 291
(2006); Humanitarian Engagement of Armed Non-State Actors, GENEVA CALL,
http://www.genevacall.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). As far as differences between the
ICoC and Geneva Call's (GC's) Deed of Commitment (DoC),
. . the key mechanisms for oversight, certification and implementation of
the ICoC are still under discussion, unlike the Geneva Call procedures which
are comparatively well in place now. The ICoC process allows companies to
sign the ICoC before going through any kind of 'certification' or external
monitoring, the procedures for which are expected to be developed by the end
of 2011. This is different from the Geneva Call approach, as the organization
holds sustained dialogue, meetings and discussions on implementation
before an armed non-State actor can sign a DoC. Presumably, once the ICoC
procedures are established, signatory PMSCs will need to undergo a similar
vetting process before becoming certified and will also be subjected to regular
external oversight. But until this happens, there will be no way of assessing
whether the more than 150 companies that have already signed the ICoC are
actually complying with its important provisions.
Correspondence from Nicolas Florquin, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey, to author
(July 25, 2011) (on file with author). Nicolas Florquin worked for several years for Geneva
Call and was the main author of the chapter on PMSCs in the Small Arms Survey 2011.
42. See GENEVA CALL, supra note 41.
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Not only does the ICoC relate to the companies in general, it has
very specific principles regarding the conduct of personnel, especially
dealing with the use of force, detention, and apprehending persons.
Separate sections deal with the prohibition of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as sexual
exploitation and abuse or gender-based violence and human trafficking.
The ICoC includes management and governance such that the ICoC
becomes incorporated into all aspects of company policy. The ICoC also
demands diligence as far as the hiring of sub-contractors, with special
mention of the management and use of weapons.43
Among the companies that signed in Geneva on November 9, 2010,
it is estimated that at least 80 percent of large, internationally-
operating companies have signed, but there are many small companies
around the world and it is difficult to estimate their importance. 44 It is
anticipated that another forty plus companies will be added to the list of
Signatories by August 1, 2011, but many of them are small maritime
private security companies. 45  Estimates are that companies
representing around 80 percent of money spent on international private
security services are included in the Signatory Company list.4 6
The Document and the ICoC are reactions to the growing
privatization of the use of force and the rapid development of the
private security sector. Many government and industry abuses have
been well documented and there is no need to review them here. We all
know about Blackwater, XeServices LLC and Erik Prince. Reports that
the Central Intelligence Agency hired Blackwater to assassinate al-
Qaeda members or the possible use of PMSCs to conduct authorized
peacekeeping operations have been hotly debated. 47 What is important
to note, and in relation to much of Ved's work, is the developing
crystallization of norms and principles to deal with the interaction
between the public and private sectors, and between the rule of law and
societal behaviour and to try to correct abuses. Ved is a lawyer, but he
is much more than that and the examples of the Document and ICoC
are excellent reminders of the continuing interrelationship between the
political and the legal, something very close to Ved's preoccupations and
the New Haven School, which so influenced his career. Questions of
security, equality, legitimacy and the protection of human rights are
never far from his agenda.
43. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 109.




47. Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Loses a Job for the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/politics/12blackwater.html?ref=blackwaterusa.
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CONCLUSION
I am neither a lawyer nor an international jurist. I do know enough
about the law to see in all of Ved's professional work a driving force that
Lon Fuller, the famous Harvard Law School Professor, spoke of as "the
inner morality of law" and its "unfolding purpose." Justice and dignity
drive Ved in his personal and professional lives to an extent that
inspires and humbles those who try to emulate his example. There are
those who write and preach about human rights, and there are those
who live human rights. There are those who write and preach about
being international; Ved lives the international and he has brought the
University of Denver into the forefront of international higher
education. In both his personal and professional lives, Ved has been a
unique example of humanizing whomever and whatever he encounters.
Indeed, the small distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian
accent has become more than a friend to me, as he has been to so many
people, and for that I feel blessed as should all who have had the
privilege to know him and work with him.
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PALESTINE'S ADMISSION TO UNESCO: CONSEQUENCES
WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS?
LARRY D. JOHNSON*
BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2011, the General Conference of the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) vot-
ed to admit Palestine as its 195th Member State. The vote was 107 in
favour, 14 against with 52 abstentions. Among those voting against
was the United States, which issued a press statement that the vote
was "regrettable" and "premature" and undermined the "shared goal of
a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East."' The
statement also stated that while the U.S. would maintain its member-
ship and commitment to UNESCO, Palestinian membership triggered
longstanding legislative restrictions which compelled the United States
to refrain from making contributions to UNESCO. Palestine's admis-
sion to UNESCO membership was effected by its signature and deposit
of its instrument of acceptance of the Constitution of UNESCO on No-
vember 23, 2011, at the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the
depositary of the Constitution.
Palestine had applied for membership in the United Nations on
September 23, 2011.2 In November 2011, the Security Council's Com-
mittee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, former Assistant Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, United Nations.
1. Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, Palestinian Admission to UNESCO (Oct. 31,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2011/10/176418.htm (by Victoria
Nuland).
2. U.N. Secretary-General, Application of Palestine for Admission to Membership in
the United Nations, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/371 (Sept. 23, 2011).
The covering Note by the Secretary-General transmitting Palestine's application to the
General Assembly made no reference to the receivability of the application. In 1993, when
Macedonia submitted its application for membership, the covering Note stated that the
Secretary-General was circulating the application "following informal consultations held
by the President of the Security Council at the request of the Secretary-General concern-
ing the receivability" of the application. U.N. Secretary-General, Admission of New Mem-
bers to the United Nations, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/876 (Jan. 22
1993). It remains to be seen in the Palestinian case whether it can be argued that by cir-
culating the application without such consultations and lacking a "without prejudice to
receivability" clause, the Secretary-General had concluded, at least prima facie, that the
application was receivable as having been submitted by a "State."
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Palestine submitted its report. 3 The report indicates that the Commit-
tee considered, inter alia, whether Palestine met the criteria for state-
hood, was a peace-loving State, and was willing and able to carry out
the obligations contained in the Charter. Its Chair, in summing up the
debate, stated that the Committee was unable to make a unanimous
recommendation to the Security Council. As of the writing of this com-
ment, no further action has been taken in the Council regarding Pales-
tine's application.
This comment will not survey the various repercussions of Pales-
tine's admission to UNESCO membership in general nor its efforts to
become a member of the UN. Rather, it surveys several ways in which
the membership of Palestine in UNESCO might have consequences
within the United Nations. The three main areas where there might be
consequences are: a) observer State status in the General Assembly, b)
participation as a State in United Nations conferences and meetings
and c) deposit of treaty instruments with the Secretary-General as de-
positary of treaties.
a) Observer State status in the General Assembly
Neither the Charter nor the rules of procedure of the General As-
sembly refers to observers. Allowing non-members to observe and par-
ticipate in the meetings of the Assembly arose purely from practice and
ad hoc decisions of the Assembly.4
As far as "standing" invitations to intergovernmental organiza-
tions and other entities to participate in the work and sessions of the
General Assembly, this is always done by specific decision of the Gen-
eral Assembly. More than 80 such organizations and entities have re-
ceived such standing invitations.
With regard to non-member States, the Secretary-General's prac-
tice of providing observer "facilities" began in 1946 when Switzerland
was provided such facilities. This unforeseen development was report-
ed by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in a 1949 report,
which noted that four non-member States (Austria, Italy, the Republic
of Korea and Switzerland) had appointed observers to follow the work of
the organization at its headquarters. The Secretary-General stated in
the report that he had welcomed the observers and that he had given
their missions every possible facility "though their status [had] not yet
3. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Committee on the Admission of New Members Concerning
the Application of Palestine for Admission to Membership in the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. S/2011/705 (Nov. 11, 2011).
4. Observer status is not accorded in the United Nations in general, but rather in
particular organs such as the General Assembly. For a summary of the development of
non-member participation and observation as of 1978, see Erik Suy, The Status of Observ-
ers in International Organizations, in 160 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 75-180 (1978).
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been determined."5 The Assembly did not react and has never system-
atically dealt with non-Member State observers. As stated in a 1994 le-
gal opinion, "[i]n the case of observer States, the General Assembly does
not take any action; rather it is the Secretary-General who provides ob-
server facilities to non-Member States which establish permanent offic-
es at Headquarters."6
The "facilities" accorded to such observers in the Assembly were
basically a nameplate and seat at the rear of the meeting room, sepa-
rated from Member States. Observers also receive access to unrestrict-
ed documents as well as access to open meetings of the Assembly, its
Main Committees and subsidiary bodies.7 As far as any right to partic-
ipate in meetings, such as making speeches, interventions and the like,
"[t]he function of an observer is defined by his title, that is his role is
essentially to 'observe'. . . he may not automatically take part in the dis-
cussion."8 Rather, the observer made statements only after making a
request to the presiding officer who consults with the body whether to
grant the request (normally speaking after Member States). In the
practice of the Assembly in the early years, requests of observer States
to speak were normally limited to speaking in the Main Committees of
the Assembly, not in the plenary, and were granted by Committees if
the observer State had a direct and immediate interest in the matter
under discussion.9
It may be noted here that this is in contrast to the practice that
began in the 1970s by which organizations, which by virtue of Assembly
decision had been given a standing invitation to participate, began
speaking in the plenary on matters of direct concern to them. Observer
States soon followed to a limited extent, but in each instance, the Presi-
dent of the Assembly would consult the Assembly by informing its
members that he or she had received a request from the non-Member
State observer to make a statement and if there were no objections, he
would grant the request and give the Permanent Observer the floor. 10
Over the years, over a dozen non-Member States establishing of-
fices at Headquarters have been provided observer facilities." But in
5. U.N. Secretary-General, Permanent Missions to the United Nations: Report of the
Secretary-General, 14, U.N. Doc. A/939/Rev.1 (Sept. 12, 1949).
6. 1994 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 463, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33.
7. This article will not deal with the question of the privileges and immunities to be
accorded to observer States at Headquarters.
8. 1972 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 159, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/10.
9. 1974 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 178, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/12.
10. 1978 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 166, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/16 (noting that until 1975,
no observer State had made a statement in the plenary other than Pope Paul VI in 1965,
but that beginning in 1975 and 1976, the Assembly granted requests from some observer
States to speak in the plenary).
11. Austria, Bangladesh, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic
of Viet Nam, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Holy
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providing such facilities, the Secretary-General had to make a judgment
whether the entity concerned was in fact a State. He made that judg-
ment on the basis of the following:
. . . [T]he Secretary-General is not in a position to alone decide
whether or not a given entity possesses all the attributes of a
sovereign State acting on the international plane. It has there-
fore been established by a practice which goes back to the 1950s
that the decisive criterion for determining whether or not an en-
tity is a 'State' for purposes of according observer State facilities
is whether or not the applicant in question has been admitted
as a member State of one of the specialized agencies of the
United Nations. 12
If that is the "decisive criterion," Palestine would seem well
placed to simply request observer State facilities of the Secretary-
General. But in doing so, it could lose the considerable rights and privi-
leges it has obtained over the years first as a national liberation organi-
zation and then as an "entity." Through a series of resolutions adopted
by the Assembly beginning in 1974, Palestine has been granted various
rights and privileges which observer States relying solely on facilities
granted by the Secretary-General do not enjoy. Indeed, as indicated by
a legal opinion in 2000, "Palestine now enjoys several of the rights and
privileges of participation otherwise exclusively enjoyed by States
Members of the United Nations."13 He stressed, however, that those
"enhanced" rights did not affect the legal status of Palestine.
Because of the disparity between the rights of Palestine by virtue
of Assembly decision and the facilities provided by the Secretary-
General alone, observer States began to consider the benefits of having
an Assembly resolution according them the same or similar rights as
enjoyed by Palestine. This is indeed what occurred in 2004, when the
Assembly accorded to the Holy See, the sole remaining observer State,
"enhanced" rights of participation. These rights were not quite as ex-
tensive as those enjoyed by Palestine, but they were certainly more
than what it had enjoyed during the previous 30 years by virtue of the
Secretary-General's "facilities."14
See, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Monaco, Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam.
As of this writing, only the Holy See remains as a non-Member State observer.
12. 1994 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 463, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33. Presumably, the Secre-
tary-General would also accord such facilities to non-Member States who are parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See "the Vienna formula" discus-
sion infra Part B.
13. 2000 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 361, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/38.
14. G.A. Res. 58/314, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/314 (July 1, 2004). The preamble noted that
the Holy See had become a Permanent Observer State at the United Nations on April 6,
1964 (by virtue of a decision by the Secretary-General).
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Thus, while Palestine might request the Secretary-General to be
accorded the facilities of a non-Member State observer by virtue of its
admission to UNESCO and the application of the "decisive criterion"
noted above, what would it gain and what would it risk? Unless the
Secretary-General declined to follow the established practice, he would
simply move the nameplate "Palestine" next to "Holy See" and thereby
indicate that Palestine would be considered a non-Member State ob-
server for purposes of observer State facilities in the Assembly. Pre-
sumably, this would be to Palestine's political advantage, but could pose
risks of losing the "enhanced" rights of participation, which have only
been accorded by virtue of Assembly decision. It would be doubtful if
the Secretary-General would take it upon himself to conclude that the
Assembly-conferred "enhanced" rights of Palestine as an entity could be
transferred by his acting alone without Assembly involvement to Pales-
tine as a non-Member State observer.
This returns to the speculation prior to the UNESCO admission
that Palestine would seek a General Assembly decision acknowledging,
noting, welcoming, or considering Palestine to be an independent, sov-
ereign State on the international plane. 15 In addition, such a resolution
would presumably also "grandfather" or "roll over" the rights and privi-
leges that Palestine had enjoyed as an entity to the rights and privileg-
es that it would enjoy as an observer State.
So while in theory, the admission of UNESCO could have an al-
most automatic consequence in the UN in terms of the Secretary-
General providing, on Palestine's request, non-Member State observer
facilities, in all likelihood that would not be the preferred choice of ac-
tion in view of the risks of losing its considerable rights and privileges
in the Assembly. A separate, distinct resolution adopted by the As-
sembly would most probably be sought.
b) Participation as a State in United Nations conferences and meetings
United Nations conferences and meetings may be open not only
to members of the Organization, but also to other States, presumably to
15. The Palestinian National Council proclaimed the "State of Palestine" in Novem-
ber 1988 but the General Assembly has never formally recognized this designation. See
G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988) (noting that the General As-
sembly "acknowledged" the proclamation, but it chose not to opine on the status of Pales-
tine in the UN. Rather, it decided that the designation "Palestine" should be used in place
of that of "Palestine Liberation Organization" within the UN without prejudice to the ob-
server status and functions of the PLO). See also Question of Palestine, U.N. Doc
A/44/L.50 (Nov. 29, 1989) (proposing a draft resolution circulated by the Arab States un-
der which the Assembly would have decided that the designation "Palestine" should be
construed within the UN "as the State of Palestine"); U.N. GOAR, 44th Sess., 76th mtg. at
2-5, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.76 (Dec. 6, 1989) (noting that the sponsors decided not to press the
draft resolution to a vote).
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advance universality of participation of members of the international
community, particularly in the drafting and adoption of treaties or in-
struments aimed at universal adherence. For example, in 1966, when
the Assembly decided to convene the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties, it invited "States Members of the United Nations, States
members of the specialized agencies, States Parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice and States that the General Assembly
decides specially to invite" to participate.16 The "core" of the invitation
(States members of the UN or of the specialized agencies and Parties to
the Statute of the ICJ, if not already covered by the prior two catego-
ries) subsequently became known as the "Vienna formula." A later ex-
ample is the 1997 General Assembly resolution convening the Rome
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
which invited "all States Members of the United Nations or members of
the specialized agencies" to participate.' 7 An even more recent example
is the 2009 decision to establish a Preparatory Committee for the 2012
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio + 20) with the "full and
effective participation of all States Members of the United Nations and
members of the specialized agencies."' 8
The Assembly also on occasion has employed the expression "all
States" with regard to a conference or meeting. In 1973, the Assembly
requested that "all States" communicate views regarding the World
Disarmament Conference1 9 and that "the Governments of all States"
keep the Assembly informed of their disarmament negotiations. 20 The
1973 legal opinion explaining how the Secretariat would interpret that
language said that the reference to "all States" was to be understood as
referring to States members of the United Nations, of the specialized
agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency (technically not a
specialized agency), States parties to the Statute of the ICJ and entities
which the General Assembly unequivocally considers to be States. 21 In
2000, a legal opinion stated that the phrase "open to all States Members
of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies or of the
16. G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), 4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2166(XXI) (Dec. 5, 1966).
17. G.A. Res. 52/160, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/160 (Dec. 15, 1997). By 1997, all Par-
ties to the Statute of the ICJ were also members of the UN, hence there was no need to
include that category of invitees.
18. G.A. Res. 64/236, T 23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/236 (Dec. 24, 2009).
19. G.A. Res. 3183 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3183(XXVIII) (Dec. 18, 1973).
20. G.A. Res. 3184 (XXVIII) C, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3184(XXVIII)C (Dec. 18, 1973).
21. 1974 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 158, U.N. Doc. STJLEG/SER.C/12. In its invitation formula
for the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Assembly invited States members
of the UN or of the specialized agencies/IAEA, parties to the Statute of the ICJ, and two
specifically named States not covered in the previous categories (Guinea-Bissau and
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam). See G.A. Res. 3067 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3067(XXVIII) (Nov. 16, 1973).
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International Atomic Energy Agency" was known as the "all States
formula." 22
In these circumstances, it is clear that should a United Nations
conference or meeting be open to the full participation of States mem-
bers of the specialized agencies or of "all States," Palestine should be
among the invitees and should participate fully and equally with State
members of the UN or of specialized agencies (seated between Palau
and Panama). 23
This possibility may have been the reason behind the invitation
formula used for the upcoming "Rio + 20" Conference on Sustainable
Development, scheduled to take place in Brazil in June 2012. As indi-
cated above, States invited in 2009 to participate in the Preparatory
Committee for that Conference included both members of the UN and
members of the specialized agencies. In his August 2011 report on
preparations for the Conference, the Secretary-General recommended to
the Assembly that it "decide that the Conference shall be open to all
States Members of the United Nations and States members of the spe-
cialized agencies, with the participation of observers, in accordance with
the established practice of the General Assembly and its conference,
and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Conference." 24
However, when the Second Committee of the Assembly was presented a
draft resolution on the upcoming Conference on November 10, 2011,
approximately 10 days after the October 31st vote on the admission of
Palestine to UNESCO, the invitation formula did not follow the Secre-
tary-General's recommendation, but rather provided that "the confer-
ence . . . will be open to participation by all States Members of the Unit-
ed Nations, the Holy See, in its capacity as Observer State, Palestine, in
its capacity as observer, and the European Union, in its capacity as an
observer, as well as other intergovernmental organizations . . . ."2 5 This
text, which clearly differentiated the position of the Holy See as an "Ob-
server State" from that of Palestine as an "observer," was adopted with-
out a vote by the Assembly in the plenary on December 22, 2011 as res-
olution 66/197.
22. 2000 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 349, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/38.
23. Some governments may not consider Palestine to be a State member of UNESCO,
but as far as UNESCO is concerned, it is.
24. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the
Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the outcomes of the World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development: Report of the Secretary-General, 120(f), U.N. Doc. A/66/287 (Aug.
9, 2011).
25. U.N. Gen. Assembly Second Comm., Sustainable Development: Implementation of
Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Out-
comes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development: Report of the Second Commit-
tee, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/66/440/Add.1 (Dec. 13, 2011).
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Thus, two entities considered by specialized agencies to be States
members (Holy See and Palestine) are limited to observer participation,
and the text differentiates the Holy See as an "Observer State" whereas
Palestine is an "observer." Moreover, two other States members of spe-
cialized agencies but not members of the United Nations, which are also
Pacific Small Island States (the Cook Islands, Niue), are excluded alto-
gether. 26 This change in the invitation practice of UN Conferences may
have had as its object avoiding having to face the question of inviting
Palestine as a full participant in the Conference by virtue of its admis-
sion of UNESCO. This may well be the first consequence in the United
Nations of the admission of Palestine as a member of UNESCO.27
c) Deposit of treaty instruments with the Secretary-General as
depositary of treaties
The Secretary-General serves as depositary for numerous multi-
lateral treaties, recording signatures and the deposit of treaty instru-
ments indicating consent of a State to be bound by a treaty (ratification,
accession, acceptance). Many such treaties provide final clauses which
mirror the "Vienna formula" or the "all States" clauses noted above,
when setting out which States are entitled to sign the text and deposit
treaty instruments concerning the treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 follows
the expanded form of the Vienna formula by providing that it shall be
open to signature and deposit of treaty instruments by members of the
United Nations and of the specialized agencies, parties to the Statute of
the ICJ and to any other State invited by the Assembly to become a par-
ty to the Convention. In reference to treaties open to treaty action by
"all States" or "any State," the Secretary-General has interpreted those
phrases to mean the same as the "Vienna formula." 28 Thus, as a mem-
ber of a specialized agency, Palestine should be entitled to sign or de-
posit treaty instruments related to any such treaty. The number of
treaties to which this would apply are too numerous to mention, 29 but
26. G.A. Res. 66/197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/197 (Dec. 22, 2011). This is in contrast to
the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development, at which States members of
specialized agencies participated equally with UN members (e.g., the Holy See). See G.A.
Res. 45/211, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/211, 7 (Dec. 21, 1990). The Holy See also attended var-
ious UN conferences as a full, equal participant, including the Beijing Women's Confer-
ence and the Cairo Conference on Population and Development.
27. As long as there is disagreement concerning the status of Palestine within the
Assembly, there may not be further invitations along the "Vienna formula" or "all States"
lines unless adopted by a vote.
28. Treaty Section of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the Sec-
retary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties at 22-23, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1
(1999).
29. See id. Some multilateral treaties are not deposited with the Secretary-General
but rather with governments, such as various disarmament treaties (deposited with the
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concern has been expressed regarding the possibility of Palestine depos-
iting a treaty instrument to become a party to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which is open for the deposit of in-
struments of accession by "all States."
The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that in Janu-
ary 2009, Palestine invoked article 12(3) of the Rome Statute in lodging
with the ICC a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court "for
the purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and ac-
complices of acts committed on the territory of Palestine since July 1,
2002." That provision of the Rome Statute allows States not Parties to
the Rome Statute to lodge acceptances of jurisprudence with retroactive
effect. The Prosecutor of the ICC indicated the declaration would be
carefully studied, including whether the declaration of acceptance met
statutory requirements.
Thus, Palestine appears to have a choice between becoming a
State party to the Rome Statute by depositing an instrument of acces-
sion based on its 2011 admission to UNESCO as a member State, or
waiting for the result of the Prosecutor's study of the 2009 declaration
of acceptance of jurisdiction as a non-State party, applied retroactively.
It should be noted, somewhat counterintuitively, that if Palestine were
to become a State Party to the Rome Statute, the ICC would only come
into force for Palestine on the first day of the month following the 60th
day following the deposit of its instrument of acceptance; no retroactive
application is possible in line with standard law of treaties principles.
But if it maintained its declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction lodged
as a non-State Party, jurisdiction might extend retroactively to the date
indicated in its application, July 1, 2002.
Of course, if the Prosecutor were to conclude that the declaration
was receivable as having been lodged by a State and as meeting the re-
quirements of the Statute at the time it was lodged, he or she would
still have to determine how far back in time jurisdiction would begin,
i.e., to the date claimed in the Declaration, to some later time when it
was determined that Palestine had achieved statehood, or to the date of
Palestine's admission in UNESCO. This would entail an interesting
and not-free-from-difficulty analysis, initially on the part of the Prose-
cutor.30 As of the end of January 2012, it is not known whether the
admission of Palestine to UNESCO membership will have an impact on
the Prosecutor's study of the declaration.
In general, treaties that are open to the deposit of treaty instru-
ments by States members of specialized agencies should be available to
Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States) and the four 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions on the Protection of Victims of War (deposited with Switzerland).
30. See Yael Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip: Article
12(3) of the ICC Statute and Non-State Entities, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. L. 3, 3-27 (2010).
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Palestine as a member State of UNESCO, according to the established
practice as described above. In this, as was the case with the other pos-
sible consequences, the Secretary-General is spared having to do any-
thing automatically, but can wait an external event - in this case an
explicit attempt on the part of Palestine to deposit a treaty instrument.
If, for policy or other reasons not discussed here, Palestine decides to
forgo taking that action for the time being, the Secretary-General will
not be placed in a position of having to choose between established and
settled treaty depositary practice and political pressure not to take any
action which could be perceived as taking a decision on his own regard-
ing whether or not Palestine is a State on the international plane.
CONCLUSION
In all three circumstances described above, some future external
event must occur before the consequences of UNESCO membership
would "kick in" at the United Nations: a) a resolution adopted by the
General Assembly deeming Palestine to be a non-Member State observ-
er while maintaining its "enhanced" rights of participation; b) invita-
tions issued by the Assembly to "all States" or to States members of
specialized agencies, to participate in UN conferences or meetings; and
c) Palestine attempts to deposit treaty instruments with the Secretary-








In the coming decades, the world is likely to see continuing conflict
arising from the inherent tension between self-determination and
territorial integrity. In the 1950's and 1960's, the world grappled with
a wave of new states emerging from decolonization. In the 1990s and
2000's, the world witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudan, as well as the separation of
Eritrea from Ethiopia and East Timor from Indonesia. In the 1990's,
almost half of all peace agreements failed within five years. In the 21st
century, 90 percent of civil wars occurred in countries that had already
endured civil war within the last 30 years. As we look toward the
horizon, it is safe to say that deep-seated tension will continue to exist
between groups seeking to exercise their right to internal or external
self-determination, and states looking to preserve their territorial
integrity. While some of these conflicts may play out peacefully, we
know from experience that the clash between self-determination and
territorial integrity leads in most cases to violence met by violence.
If the lessons of the past few years are any indication, it is also
likely that the conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty will be
turned to as a means for bridging the impasse between self-
determination and territorial integrity. Earned sovereignty is the
conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and
authority from a state to a substate entity under international
supervision. The approach, which has its roots in the Northern Ireland
and Bougainville peace agreements, among others, proved successful in
structuring the separation of Montenegro from Serbia, East Timor from
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Indonesia, Kosovo from Serbia, and South Sudan from the Sudan.
Professor Ved Nanda's lifetime of work on the question of self-
determination played a crucial role in the development of the approach
of earned sovereignty.
During the course of advising numerous states and substate
entities on questions of self-determination, I have invariably turned to
the ideas and concepts developed by Professor Nanda. Professor Nanda
has led the field in proposing specific criteria for resolving claims of self-
determination. He has always resisted the temptation to adopt a
"sovereignty first" or "'self-determination first" approach. Rather, he
has endeavored to paint a realistic picture of the effect that sovereignty-
based conflicts have on the stability of our world, and to identify ways
in which these conflicts may be better resolved.
This article will first discuss the significant impact that Professor
Nanda's scholarship has had on the self-determination debate, setting
the stage for the development of earned sovereignty. Next, it will trace
the development of the earned sovereignty approach to its current
status as a widely accepted conflict resolution approach that has been
extensively utilized to resolve sovereignty-based conflicts throughout
the world. This article will then revisit the elements that make up the
earned sovereignty approach and will analyze the successful use of the
approach to resolve the conflicts in Kosovo and South Sudan.
SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
Professor Ved Nanda first staked a role in the self-determination
debate in the early 1970's when he wrote about East Pakistan's right to
self-determination.1 In that first piece, Professor Nanda argued that a
set of criteria for self-determination should be developed, and he
proposed a basic set of elements to jump-start the discussion. 2 At that
time, he urged that claims to non-colonial self-determination were going
to rise quickly and sharply, and that the international community
would be wise to consider certain of these claims. 3 When Professor
Nanda later looked back on the East Pakistani conflict, which had
resulted in the birth of Bangladesh, he again argued for the extension of
1. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law-The Tragic Tale of Two
Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321
(1972).
2. Id. at 336 (arguing that the following factors made self-determination applicable
to East Pakistan: (1) the large distance between East and West; (2) the deprivation of
human rights to the majority; (3) the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences; (4) the
economic exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan; (5) the fact that there had been
a majority determination by vote of the political direction of Pakistan, which had been
forcibly denied; and (6) West Pakistan did not depend upon East Pakistan for its political
or economic viability).
3. Id. at 322.
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self-determination to groups "deprived of the opportunity to participate
in the value processes of a body politic." 4 He reasoned that the test for
evaluating a claim for self-determination should be "the nature and
extent of the deprivation of human rights of the subgroup making the
claim."5
When Professor Nanda revisited self-determination in the early
1980's after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese
intrusion in Cambodia, it was to refine the circumstances under which
secession, as an exercise of the right to self-determination, might be
considered justifiable. 6  To establish whether a right to secede is
legitimate, Professor Nanda suggested focusing on the nature of the
group seeking self-determination and its alienation from the "body
politic," as well as the group's reasons for wanting to secede and the
degree to which its members had been denied basic human rights.7 His
purpose in doing so was to encourage the establishment of criteria for
cases in which the severe deprivation of human rights leaves no
alternative to secession.8
Over a decade later, Professor Nanda reexamined self-
determination in light of the post-Cold War environment, which
included self-determination claims from the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey,
the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and claims for secession in the Balkans,
Caucuses, and throughout Africa. 9 This time around, he analyzed self-
determination in a world that had finally caught on to what he had
insisted for over two decades - that certain claims for self-
determination outside the colonial situation deserve recognition. 10
While Professor Nanda reiterated that the severe deprivation of human
rights may justify self-determination claims, he emphasized that there
were different results of accepting such claims - "the creation of a state,
a federal entity . . . a confederation of states," or "an ethnic power-
sharing arrangement."'1 In order to avoid a resort to violence to resolve
self-determination claims, Professor Nanda encouraged the creation of
mechanisms for pursuing self-determination claims and reconciling
competing claims of sovereignty.12
4. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of
Bangladesh in Retrospect, 1 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 71, 93 (1978-1979).
5. Id. at 85.
6. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 265 (1981).
7. Id. at 275.
8. Id. at 280.
9. Ved P. Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination: Revisiting Self-
Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War
Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 444 (1997).
10. Id.




In the 21st century, Professor Nanda again lent his expertise to the
self-determination debate in light of Quebec's claim to secede from
Canada, and the recent developments in Kosovo and East Timor. 13 He
argued that the cases of Kosovo and East Timor demonstrated that the
international community may be willing to accept unilateral secession
claims in exceptional circumstances, particularly when an
..undemocratic, authoritarian regime" has prohibited "the 'people' [from]
participat[ing] effectively in the political and economic life of the state"
and has followed "a pattern of flagrant violations of human rights."1 4
A GROTIAN MOMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW
In seeking to develop the ability of lawyers to add value to
sovereignty-based conflicts, Professor Nanda accepted an offer by the
Public International Law & Policy Group to cooperate in organizing a
day-long roundtable discussion at the DU College of Law to exchange
ideas on the evolving conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty.
At that time, earned sovereignty was an emerging concept with
origins in the peace agreements relating to the state practice of Serbia
and Montenegro and East Timor, the Northern Ireland and
Bougainville agreements, and the proposed agreements for the
Palestine Road Map and Western Sahara. However, despite the ad hoc
reliance on the earned sovereignty approach by mediators and parties
to conflict, there had been little effort to synthesize the concept or draw
attention to its utility for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. 15 This
roundtable, and the subsequent debate that ensued, 16 began to put flesh
on this emerging trend we dubbed "earned sovereignty," which came to
be recognized as the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign
powers and authority from a state to a substate entity under
international supervision.
13. Ved P. Nanda, Holland and Hart Private International Law Award: Self-
Determination and Secession Under International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305
(2001).
14. Id. at 325.
15. Earned sovereignty first appeared under the name "intermediate sovereignty" in
a 1998 memorandum issued by the Public International Law & Policy Group and the
International Crisis Group as a proposed solution to the conflict in Kosovo. See
International Crisis Group, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolving the Kosovo
Crisis, Europe Report Noo46 (Sept. 11, 1998), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
europe/balkans/kosovo/046 -intermediate-sovereignty- as -a-basis-for-resolving-the-kosovo-
crisis.aspx.
16. See Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf & James R. Hooper, Resolving
Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty, 31 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 349, 353 (2003); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to
Resolving the Conflict Over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 390
(2003); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 373, 374-75 (2003).
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Much has changed since that roundtable discussion a decade ago:
the concept of earned sovereignty has gained considerable traction in
the public international law and conflict resolution communities, and -
most significantly - earned sovereignty has proven itself as a reliable
mechanism for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. Earned sov-
ereignty is no longer an "emerging approach," as my colleagues and I
once described it; it is now a tried and tested process for resolving
conflicts.
The earned sovereignty approach has now been fully realized in
both Kosovo and South Sudan, ending years of armed conflict in those
states. Additionally, earned sovereignty has been proposed by the Moro
in the Philippines,17 the Tamils in Sri Lanka,18 and the government of
Nagorno Karbaugh, 19 as an option for ending conflict and resolving
their claims to self-determination.
17. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was
signed by the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in Kuala Limpur on August 5, 2008, utilized the earned sovereignty approach in
an attempt by negotiators to end the protracted conflict between MILF and government
forces in the Mindanao area. However, the Philippine Supreme Court enjoined the
agreement upon petition from a Christian political leader who claimed they were not
represented in negotiations; after that decision, the government backed away from the
agreement. The MOA-AD outlined the stages of earned sovereignty, and called upon the
parties to later sign a "comprehensive compact" that would guide the transition period.
See Eliseo "Jun" Mercado, MOA-AD, Quo vadis?, AUTONOMY & PEACE REV., July-Sept.
2008, at 9, 10-11 (2008), available at http://www.iag.org.ph/cgi-bin/publications/files/
Volume%204%20Issue%2ONo.%203.pdf (describing earned sovereignty as "the new
paradigm as used in negotiation with MILF, beginning in December 2006" and explaining
the steps of earned sovereignty as outlined in the MOA-AD). For a full text of the MOA-
AD, see Collective, GRP-MILF Full Text of Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) MOA,
PINOY PARA SA KALIKASAN (blog) (Aug. 16, 2008, 7:13 AM), available at http://usap
angkalikasan.multiply.com/journallitem55/GRP-MILFFull Text-ofBJE MOA-AD. For
further discussion by Musib M. Buat, a member of the MILF Peace Panel, on the MILF's
continued pursuit of earned sovereignty, see Darwin Wally T. Wee, MILF Still Upbeat on
Peace Accord Despite Serious Hitches, ZABIDA, Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.zabida.com.ph/component/content/ article/186?ed=16.
18. A statement made by the political wing of the LTTE just before the 62nd General
Assembly of the UN alluded to the notion of earned sovereignty: "[WNe urge the
international community to provide appropriate opportunities to the Tamil people to
express their aspirations, as have been given to the people of East Timor and Kosovo."
Tamil sovereignty, basis of peace talks - LTTE, TAMILNET (Sept. 24, 2007, 5:37 PM),
http://www.tamilnet.comlart.html?catid=13&artid=23362. U.S.-based Tamil legal adviser
Visuthanathan Rudrakumaran has said that "leaving the options of 'earned sovereignty,'
.phased out sovereignty,' and 'conditional sovereignty' off the negotiation table will reduce
the incentive for the Sinhala Nation to put forward a meaningful power-sharing proposal
or even to take the peace process seriously." Earned Sovereignty: East Timor, Kosovo ...
Sri Lanka?, DEFENCEWIRE (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:11 AM), http://defencewire. blogspot.com/
2007/09/earned-sovereignty-east-timorkosovosri.html.
19. See PUBLIC INT'L LAW & POLICY GRP. AND NEW ENGLAND CTR. FOR INT'L LAW &
POLICY, THE NAGORNO KARABAGH CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLUTION 25 (June 2000),
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Earned sovereignty has also gained significant traction in the
public international law and conflict resolution communities as a
method for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. While one scholar has
hailed earned sovereignty as the "most promising solution in ethnically
based conflicts where the prerequisites for self-determination are not
met,"2 0 others have described the advent of earned sovereignty as a re-
conceptualization of sovereignty as a divisible entity, calling into
question the strength of traditional notions of sovereignty and self-
determination.2 1 Some scholars focus on earned sovereignty's utility for
resolving conflictS22 or value as a tool to clarify the transition process, 23
while others focus on the connection the approach draws between
dispute resolution and international territorial administration. 2 4 Still
others, in seeking to improve upon the method for resolving conflicts,
highlight potential dangers of the earned sovereignty approach,
including the possibility of withholding power for too long, the need for
"ownership" over the process in order to achieve sustainable peace, and
the necessity for achievable standards with a clear endpoint. 25 This last
point has received particular attention - and criticism - in the Kosovo
context. 26
Moreover, many scholars have thoroughly analyzed the application
of earned sovereignty to the "standards before status" policy approach
available at http://www.nesl.eduluserfiles/file/center%/20for%/20international%/201aw%/20
and%20policy/nagorno.pdf.
20. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Restructuring Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-Falls,
in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 179, 223 (Armin Von Bogdandy,
Rudiger Wolfrum, Christiane E. Philipp, eds., 2005).
21. Kathleen Clausson & Timothy Nichol, Reconstructing Sovereignty: The Impact of
Norms, Practices and Rhetoric, 10 BOLOGNA CENTER J. OF INT'L AFF. 21, 29 (2007),
available at http://bcjournal.org/storage/BCJ-2007edition.pdf; Joseph Camilleri,
Sovereignty Discourse and Practice - Past and Future, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY:
THE END TO WESTPHALIA? 33, 40 (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008).
22. Nathan P. Kirschner, Making Bread from Broken Eggs: A Basic Recipe for
Conflict Resolution Using Earned Sovereignty, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2007)
(discussing how exactly earned sovereignty can help to resolve conflicts: "sharing
sovereignty fosters dialogue between key stakeholders"; "institution building fosters
competence in the substate entity and provides both the stakeholders and the
international community with assurance of future competency"; and "determining final
status of the substate entity . . . gives the parties an idea of an ultimate reward, a goal
that parties can attempt to obtain. . . . [T]he optional elements . . . keep the parties on
track by rewarding them for tasks accomplished during the implementation process.").
23. Jilrgen Friedrich, UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty, in MAX
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, supra note 20, at 225, 291.
24. RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: How TRUSTEESHIP
AND THE CIVILIZING NATION NEVER WENT AWAY 270 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
25. Friedrich, supra note 23, at 291-92.
26. See, e.g. Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the
Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
637, 641 (2005).
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in Kosovo, 2 7 and others have evaluated its application to Bosnia,28
South Sudan, 29 Bougainville,30 Aceh, 31 and East Timor. 32 Still others
have argued for its potential to resolve other conflicts by applying the
approach to the Kashmir people, 33 the Kurds in Iraq, 34 the ethnic
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, 35 and the Abkhaz in Georgia.36
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IN A NUTSHELL 37
Earned sovereignty, as developed in state practice over the last
decade, seeks to bridge the approaches of sovereignty and self-
determination by providing a mechanism whereby some substate
entities may be guided through a process of transition to statehood or
heightened autonomy in such a way so as not to undermine the
legitimate interests of parent states and of the international
community. Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity
for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts by providing for the managed
devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to a
substate entity. 38 In some instances, the substate entity may acquire
sovereign authority and functions sufficient to enable it to seek
international recognition, while in others the substate entity may only
acquire authority to operate within a stable system of heightened
autonomy. The approach seeks to promote peaceful coexistence
27. See RALPH WILDE, supra note 24, at 238; Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for
Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
153, 174 (2003).
28. See Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to
Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 153, 186 (2003).
29. Kirschner, supra note 22, at 1142-50.
30. Id. at 1152-58.
31. Id. at 1158-66.
32. Heymann, supra note 28, at 179-80.
33. Id. at 195-97.
34. Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 513, 534 (2009).
35. See INT'L CRISIS GRP., NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE, EUROPE REPORT
No167 4, 13 (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/
azerbaijan/167-nagorno-karabakh-a-plan-for-peace.aspx.
36. INT'L CRISIS GRP., ABKHAZIA TODAY EUROPE REPORT No176 3 (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/176_abkhazia-today.ashx (follow link to
Full PDF report) (The Abkhaz believe that they are currently earning their sovereignty.).
37. This section draws heavily from the following articles: Paul Williams & Francesca
Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty & Self-
Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (2004); Williams, Scharf &. Hooper, supra note 16;
Williams, supra note 16, at 388-89.
38. Williams, Scharf & Hooper, supra note 16, at 350 ("The authority and functions
may include the power to collect taxes, control the development of natural resources,
conduct local policing operations, maintain a local army or defense force, enter into
international treaties on certain matters, maintain representative offices abroad, and
participate in some form in international bodies.").
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between a state and a substate entity by establishing an equitable and
acceptable power sharing agreement; it is not intended solely to
promote self-determination claims.
As a conflict resolution approach, earned sovereignty has developed
as an inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time
period. This approach is defined by three core elements: (1) shared
sovereignty, (2) institution building, and (3) a determination of final
status. The process may also encompass three optional elements: (1)
phased sovereignty, (2) conditional sovereignty, and (3) constrained
sovereignty. These optional elements are employed to tailor the earned
sovereignty approach to the unique circumstances of the conflict and to
the particular needs of the parties. The state and substate entities
almost always adopt the elements of earned sovereignty by mutual
agreement, but in some cases the international community may support
or initiate one or more of the elements of earned sovereignty against the
preferences of the state or substate entity.
Shared Sovereignty: Each case of earned sovereignty is
characterized by an initial stage of shared sovereignty, whereby the
state and substate entity may both exercise some sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. Sometimes international
institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in
addition to, or in lieu of, the parent state. In rare cases, the
international community may exercise shared sovereignty with an
internationally recognized state. In almost all instances, an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties'
exercise of their authority and functions.
During the initial stage of shared sovereignty, a provisional
framework may be created within which states, substate entities, and
international organizations share sovereign authority and functions. If
managed constructively, shared sovereignty affords a cooling-off period
during which central authorities and aggrieved people can each
continue to pledge fidelity to their own, mutually incompatible final
aims, while initially suspending violence. The framework for shared
sovereignty may vary according to the duration of the sharing period,
the substantive division of authority, the parties involved, and the goals
to be addressed.
Frequently, shared sovereignty may provide the substate entity
with substantial elements of self-government, so as to considerably
lessen the interest in outright independence and eliminate the causes of
conflict through some form of perpetual autonomy. The period of
shared sovereignty may also be designed merely as a way station to
independence, with the substate entity exercising nearly all the power
and authority of an independent state and equally sharing any
remaining authority.
2012 135
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Institution Building: During the period of shared sovereignty, prior
to the determination of final status, the substate entity, frequently with
the assistance of the international community, undertakes to construct
new institutions for self-government or to modify those already in
existence. The substate entity also works with the international
community to develop the institutional capacity for exercising increased
sovereign authority.
Because functioning democratic institutions are considered the
most effective guarantee to prevent renewed conflict in the long term,
promoting the development of democratic institutions has become an
essential element of modern peace building. In the short term,
institution building is intended to create the capacity for the
assumption of sovereign authority and the functions necessary for the
establishment of an autonomous entity, or a future independent state.
This process usually begins during the initial period of shared
sovereignty and may be addressed by a range of domestic and
international actors.
Determination of Final Status: The eventual determination of the
final status of the substate entity and its relationship to the parent
state is also an essential element of earned sovereignty. In many
instances, the status will be determined by a referendum. In others, it
may involve a negotiated settlement between the state and substate
entity, often with international mediation. Invariably, the
determination of final status for the substate entity is conditioned on
the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
Phased Sovereignty: The first optional element is phased
sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution of
sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or international
community to the substate entity during the period of shared
sovereignty and prior to the determination of final status. The
accumulation of sovereign authority and functions may be correlated
with the ability of the substate entity to assume these powers, as a
reward for responsible state behavior, or a combination of the two.
Depending upon the nature and characteristics of the conflict, it
may not always be possible to achieve even preliminary power sharing
arrangements. Thus, to enhance the relationship between shared
sovereignty and institution building, some earned sovereignty
agreements have incorporated the element of phased sovereignty.
Phased sovereignty can be useful to promote a smooth transition in
those contexts where the adversarial claims of the parties do not allow
for immediate devolution of powers. The timing and extent of the
devolution of authority and functions may be correlated with the
development of institutional capacity and/or conditioned on the
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fulfillment of certain benchmarks, such as democratic reform and the
protection of human rights.
Conditional Sovereignty: The second optional element is conditional
sovereignty. Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the
accumulation of increased sovereign authority by the substate entity, or
it may be applied as a set of standards to be achieved prior to the
determination of the substate entity's final status. These benchmarks
vary depending on the characteristics of the conflict and generally
include conditions, such as protecting human and minority rights,
halting terrorism, developing democratic institutions, instituting the
rule of law, and promoting regional stability. In most cases, the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the
devolution of authority is not automatic - it is subject to evaluation by a
monitoring authority that often involves international institutions.
Such evaluation allows for a margin of discretion to determine when
and how to successfully push forward the process of devolving
authority.
Constrained Sovereignty: The third optional element, constrained
sovereignty, consists of applying limitations on the sovereign authority
and functions of the new state. Constrained sovereignty is often
required as a guarantee for the parent state and the international
community. For instance, the new entity may be placed under a
continued international administrative and/or military presence, or its
sovereign authority may be limited with respect to the right of
undertaking territorial association with other states. Because the
emergence of new states may be destabilizing to the immediate region,
the sovereignty of the new state may sometimes be constrained by the
international community. This threatening destabilization results
either because the state, even after a lengthy period of institution
building, remains incapable of exercising effective authority, or because
the new state's existence in and of itself creates a destabilizing political
dynamic.
Monitoring Implementation: Frequently during the process of
earned sovereignty, a monitoring mechanism is established to build
confidence among the parties, to ensure coordinated implementation of
the relevant agreement, to monitor compliance, and to assist in the
resolution of any disputes. Although not a substantive component of
the earned sovereignty approach, the establishment of credible
monitoring mechanisms can often be a critical procedural element in
safeguarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the approach.
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE
Kosovo: Kosovo is a recent case of the successful application of
earned sovereignty to resolve a sovereignty-based conflict. Kosovo also
represents the most comprehensive example of the use of the optional
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element of phased sovereignty to manage the devolution of sovereign
authority and functions. The Balkans had endured ten years of
regional conflict and violence instigated by Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic when NATO airstrikes began in Kosovo on March
24, 1999. After a number of failed negotiated settlements between the
warring parties, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1244 (1999) on June 10, 1999, which set the groundwork for
the earned sovereignty of Kosovo. 39 Subsequent to Resolution 1244, the
United Nations endorsed a Provisional Constitutional Framework for
Kosovo, which provided that both the UN Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK")
and Kosovar entities would exercise most of the functions typically
associated with an independent state. 40
Resolution 1244 essentially followed the basic elements of earned
sovereignty: it displaced Yugoslav sovereignty, created mechanisms for
establishing democratic self-government and the protection of minority
rights, and mandated the resolution of Kosovo's final status. Resolution
1244 provided that the UN initially would assume control of sovereign
functions and negotiate a constitutional framework, and then begin the
transfer of sovereign functions to Kosovar institutions. Simultaneously,
the UN was mandated to pursue a resolution of the final status of
Kosovo. However, despite a robust mandate, the UN made sluggish
progress and hesitated in transferring substantial sovereign
responsibility to the Kosovars and pursuing a resolution of Kosovo's
final status.
In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed former President of
Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, as special envoy to work toward a settlement
on Kosovo's status. 41 Ahtisaari conducted direct negotiations with both
Kosovo's and Serbia's negotiation teams from February to September
2006.42 The negotiations culminated in Ahtisaari's Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 43 a plan to protect minority
populations and achieve stable and peaceful independence in Kosovo. 44
39. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
40. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On a Constitutional Framework
for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, ch. 1, art. 1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9
(May 15, 2001), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework] (noting that initially
nearly all the authority and functions were designated "reserved competencies" that
remained with United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)).
41. Kosovo's Independence, INT'L CRISIS GRP., http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-
issues/kosovos-independence.aspx (last updated Feb. 2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, Summary of the Comprehensive Proposal




In April 2007, Ahtisaari submitted his plan to the Security Council.45
The plan proposed Kosovo's independence, with continued international
supervision and support,46 while focusing on "protecting the rights,
identity and culture of Kosovo's non-Albanian communities, including
establishing a framework for their active participation in public life." 4 7
The plan called for: (1) a multi-ethnic democracy protected by the
constitution, (2) protection of minority rights and participation, (3)
establishment of an impartial and professional justice system, (4)
protection of refugee rights, and (5) economic development and
security.48 The plan also requested the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to assist in the plan's implementation. 49
Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, honoring
the Ahtisaari plan's recommendations.5 0 As planned, UNMIK's power
dramatically diminished following Kosovo's independence, and the
Kosovo government has since increased control over state functions.51
Serbia, which intended to retain Kosovo, opposed Kosovo's declaration
of independence 52 and sponsored a General Assembly resolution to
submit the question of the declaration's legality to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).53 As a result, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion
finding that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate
international law, or Resolution 1244.54 Currently, over 70 states
recognize Kosovo's independence,55 including the United States,56







51. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
52. Id.
53. U.N. News Centre, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence Did Not Violate
International Law - UN Court, U.N. NEWS SERVICE (July 22, 2010), http://www.un.org
/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=35396&Cr=kosovo&Crl=&Kwl=kosovo&Kw2=independen
ce &Kw3.
54. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 84 (July 22).
55. The World Factbook: Kosovo, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (follow "Introduction" hyperlink)
(last updated Nov. 4, 2011).
56. Background Note: Kosovo, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (NOv. 16, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/100931.htm.
57. UK to recognise independent Kosovo - PM, NUMBER10.GOV.UK (Feb. 18, 2008),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.numberl0.gov.uk/Pagel4594.




DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The newly independent Kosovo is a case of successful earned
sovereignty, though the process was not without difficulties,
particularly the slow transfer of powers from UNMIK to Kosovar
authorities and institutions and the lack of an initial timeframe for a
referendum. Despite Kosovo's newly-won statehood, Serbian defiance
persists. For instance, in May 2008, Serbian areas of Kosovo held their
own local Serbian-only elections, despite UNMIK's admonition against
it.60 Additionally, Serbia continues to support Serbian parallel
institutions in Kosovo, including education, health, and welfare, 61 and
forbids Kosovo Serbs from receiving salaries or any other type of
funding from Kosovo's government. 62
In spite of these problems, the nearly nine-year interim period was
markedly peaceful compared to the decade of violence that preceded
Resolution 1244, and the over three years since independence have seen
relatively little violence.
South Sudan: The new Republic of South Sudan represents the
most recent successful application of an earned sovereignty approach to
conflict resolution. Sudan suffered nearly 50 years of civil war between
the predominantly Arab Muslim North (led by the National Congress
Party (NCP)), and the predominantly Christian and animist black
African South (led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM)). In 2005, the NCP and the SPLM reached a peace deal with
the encouragement and assistance of the international community, and
signed a number of agreements that form the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). 63
The CPA provided for a six-year interim period, during which
heightened political autonomy was granted to the South and a few key
border areas, 64 but without an immediate grant of sovereignty or even a
59. Statement of H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Turkey, Regarding the Recognition of Kosovo by Turkey, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-h-e_-mr_-ali-
babacan_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic--of-turkey_-regarding-the-recognition-
of-kosovo.en.mfa.
60. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
61. Id.; see also Minority Issues, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES - Kosovo,
http://www.ecmi-map.com/map/index.php?option=com content&view=category&layout=
blog&id=30&Itemid=58&lang-en (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
62. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
63. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan People's Liberation Movement,
Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/
General/cpa-en.pdf The CPA consisted of the Machakos Protocol Power-Sharing Section,
a Wealth-Sharing Section, sections on the three key border areas (Abyei, Southern
Kordofan, and Blue Nile), a Security Arrangements Section, and a Ceasefire Agreement.
Id.




guarantee of sovereignty at the end of the interim period. The CPA
recognized the rights of the Southerners to govern the affairs of their
region, and also participate in the National Government located in the
North. 65
During the interim period, the CPA provided for the South to
operate its own government, the Government of Southern Sudan, and
gave the substate entity the authority to operate with increased
autonomy. While the new Southern government was still accountable
to the Government of Sudan in the North, it had its own legislature,
executive, and judiciary. 66  The CPA also provided the South with
autonomy through institutions parallel to entities in the National
Government, 67 and the parties committed to forming an independent
Assessment and Evaluation Commission with representatives from the
North, South, and international community to monitor the
implementation of the agreement. 68 However, the Government of
Southern Sudan did not acquire powers equivalent to that of a
sovereign state, as it could not seek international recognition or enter
into international agreements, 69 and it was still subject to Sudan's
ultimate sovereign authority.
The CPA recognized the right of the Southern Sudanese to self-
determination, which would be exercised through a referendum vote
near the end of the interim period on whether the region would remain
a substate entity within the greater Sudan, or attain sovereignty as an
independent state. 70 The international community supported the full
implementation of the CPA, including the provision on self-
determination, with only a few states expressing concern about the
impact secession may have on other self-determination movements in
Africa and worldwide. The Government of Southern Sudan held its
referendum beginning on January 9, 2011, with elections observers
from the South, North, and the international community. When the
results of the referendum were released on February 7, 2011 with an
overwhelming majority in favor of independence, the Government of
Sudan was one of the first states to recognize the results and indicate
its support for a sovereign South Sudan. At the end of the interim
65. Id.
66. Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement on Power Sharing art. 3, May 26, 2004, available at http://www.goss
mission.org/goss/images/agreements/power sharing.pdf.
67. These parallel institutions included the Southern Sudan Land Commission, the
Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund, and the Bank of Southern
Sudan. Protocol on Wealth Sharing, Jan. 7, 2004, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/
UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.
68. Machakos Protocol, supra note 64, art. 2.4.1, 2.4.2.
69. This power was allocated to the National Government only. Protocol on Power
Sharing, supra note 66, sched. B.
70. Machakos Protocol, supra note 64, arts. 1.3, 2.5.
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period, the Republic of South Sudan declared independence on July 9,
2011 and became a member state in the United Nations on July 14.71
The newly independent South Sudan represents the successful use
of earned sovereignty, though the process was not without difficulties.
Political relations were tense, particularly in the months leading up to
the referendum, over unresolved issues in negotiations and heated
rhetoric from political leaders. The dispute over the Abyei area remains
unresolved, and the North and the South have recently engaged in
violent clashes in the border regions. 72 The benchmarks delineated in
the CPA's implementation modalities were often missed, and many key
modalities were completed in the final weeks before the referendum or
postponed for later resolution.
Despite these problems, the six-year interim period was
remarkably peaceful in contrast to the decades of violence that preceded
the CPA. The long interim period provided time for both the
Government of Sudan and the SPLM to disengage from active violent
conflict, operate separate governments and institutions and resolve
disputes through negotiations. The CPA itself was founded upon the
consent of both the NCP and the SPLM, and the exercise of self-
determination was not made unilaterally, but through an
internationally-recognized vote. 73  Members of the international
community were involved in numerous processes during the interim
period, increasing the legitimacy of both governments and the secession
process itself, while maintaining pressure on the parties to uphold the
agreement. When South Sudan declared independence on July 9, 2011,
it was not met with renewed civil war or an illegitimate status, but
instead had a quick and peaceful transition to sovereignty.
A BRIGHT FUTURE FOR EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
The conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty has emerged
as a response to the increasingly limited utility of the "sovereignty first"
and "self-determination first" approaches to resolving sovereignty-based
conflicts. As self-determination movements become increasingly
intertwined with global terrorist networks, and as "local conflicts"
increasingly undermine regional stability, diplomats are in need of a
71. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 114, U.N. Doc. 65/308 (July 14,
2011); see e.g. Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/worldlafrica/10
sudan.html?pagewanted=all.
72. Sudan: Abyei at a Dangerous Tipping Point, INT'L CRISIS GROUP (May 8, 2011),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/201 1/africa/sudan-abyei-at-
a-dangerous-tipping-point.aspx.
73. Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, INT'L CRISIS
GROUP (Mar. 31, 2006), http://protection.unsudanig.org/data/south/CPA/ICG%/ 20-
%20Sudan%20CPA-The%2OLong%2ORoad%2OAhead%20(MarO6).pdf.
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larger tool kit of approaches for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts.
Moreover, as international human rights norms take on increasing
salience, governments, pushed by public opinion, are less willing to
permit sovereignty-based conflicts to be resolved through the
unrestrained use of force, which frequently leads to massive human
rights violations. The earned sovereignty approach has now been
utilized to successfully resolve a number of sovereignty-based conflicts
around the globe. Professor Nanda's lifetime of contribution to the
comprehensive understanding of the principle of self-determination has
played a key role in the successful development and application of the
conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty.
INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
AND THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM: A CONUNDRUM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
UPENDRA D. ACHARYA*
INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the 21st century, the world was (as it is today) in
the process of working out the power dynamics that would shape this
coming century. China, India, Brazil, and many other countries have
demonstrated that they are financially and politically stable enough not
to be dictated to by the so-called powerful countries. At this time, the
United States continues to face the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania.
Now the world has begun to analyze whether it should allow the United
States' 20th century power monopoly to continue. Will the United
States lose its unilateral power base in the 21st century as Great
Britain did in the 19th century and continental Europe did in the 18th
century? What is the impact that the war on terror has or will have in
terms of the sustainability of the power monopoly of the United States?
These questions are appropriate this year as the United States and the
world community observe the consequences of the decade-long global
war on terror that followed the September 11th, terrorist attacks. Since
9/11, many foreign policy practitioners and international legal scholars
delivered their perspectives and claim that the event changed the
world, the understanding of international law, and the modus operandi
and dynamics of international relations. There is also a contrary view
that U.S. foreign policy and the approach to international law in that
foreign policy has not been world changing. The United States
continues to practice the same foreign policy that it did before 9/11, an
approach that did not change even after the Bush presidency.' The
purpose of this article is to address the 21st century world and what
* Assistant Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law. I am honored to
contribute to the celebration of the Journal's 40th Anniversary Festschrift in Honor of
Professor Ved Nanda. I would like to express my thanks to Professor Gerry Hess,
Attorney Jeannie Young and Professor Amy Kelly for their valuable insights. I also am
thankful to my research assistant, Jessica Campbell, for her hard work, insight and
support.
1. See Melvyn P. Leffler, 9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy,
Reconsidered, FOREIGN AFF., Sept/Oct. 2011, at 33, 33.
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place international law should have in international relations and in
U.S. foreign policy. In addressing this conundrum, the article will
explore the effects of the global war on terror on international law and
U.S. foreign policy, what has resulted from these developments, and
what, if anything, should be done to eliminate or reduce any negative
consequences.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, OR WAR WITH AL QAEDA
On September 11, 2001 members of al Qaeda hijacked four U.S.
commercial aircrafts en route to California from the East Coast. 2 The al
Qaeda members threatened the passengers and attacked the
crewmembers, then redirected the aircrafts to New York and
Washington D.C. and used the aircrafts as weapons to attack the
United States causing the deaths of 2,973 innocent people.3  On the
evening of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush, in an
address to the nation stated:
The search is underway for those who are behind these
evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence
and law enforcement communities to find those responsible
and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them. 4
On September 20, 2001, in a speech to a joint session of Congress,
President Bush announced that the hijackers were part of an anti-
American radical Muslim network known as al Qaeda and whose leader
was Osama Bin Laden.5 President Bush also accused the Taliban
government of Afghanistan of sheltering and supplying terrorists, he
demanded that the Taliban government hand over al Qaeda leaders to
the United States immediately or share the consequences.6 President
2. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 2 4 (2004), [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
3. See id. at 4-14 for a detailed account of the attacks. 9/11 causalities: 2,749 people
were killed at the World Trade Center, 184 people were killed in the Pentagon, and 40
passengers died in rural Pennsylvania. Those figures do not include the terrorists. Id. at
311 n.188.
4. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to the Nation in Light of the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.national
center.org/BushGW9llOlAddress.html.
5. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), [herein after Bush, Joint Session], available at http://articles.cnn.com/
2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript 1 joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.
6. See id. ("[The terrorists] are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods
and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of
terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to
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Bush announced the beginning of the global war on terrorism as
follows:
We will direct every resource at our command-every
means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence,
and every necessary weapon of war - to the disruption and
to the defeat of the global terror network. . . . We will
starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another,
drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or
no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe
haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region, now has a
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded
by the United States as a hostile regime.7
Further, President Bush stated in his 2004 State of the Union
Address to Congress, justifying the global war on terror, "[aifter the
chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our
enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared
war on the United States. And war is what they got."8
The United States invaded Afghanistan to hunt down terrorists
shortly after 9/11. Then in 2003, the global war enterprise extended to
Iraq. The United States led a "coalition of the willing" to topple
Saddam Hussein's government, but never found the weapons of mass
destruction President Bush had claimed were there. 9 Despite the
United States' efforts to bring peace and democracy to these countries,
Iraq and Afghanistan are still in chaos a decade later. 10
When President Barack Obama took office, the new administration
dropped the term "war on terror" and replaced it with "war with al
plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan
and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. . . . The Taliban must
act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their
fate.").
7. Id.
8. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 2004 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20,
2004) [hereinafter Bush, 2004 State of the Union], available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html.
9. See US Invasion of Iraq 'inevitable,' BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle east/2862273.stm.
10. See Dan Zak & Asaad Majeed, Iraq Bombings Kill, Injure Dozens, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 13, 2011, at A5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/ca/2011/10/12/MN161LGVPM.DTL; Afghanistan: Recent Developments,




Qaeda and its affiliates."" This transformation of "Global War on
Terror" to "War with al Qaeda" seemed to change the legal framework
of the war and make it more limited; however, in reality, Obama's
foreign policies are not significantly different from Bush's - the "War
with al Qaeda" is still a global war. 1 2 There was an expectation that
Obama would adopt an approach based on reasoned judgment rather
than a dogmatic ideology, and would dismiss Bush's black-and-white
policy of war on terror (either you're with us or against us). 1 3 Instead,
Obama kept the Bush administration's surveillance program intact, the
Patriot Act remained on the books, the authority to use rendition
continued, the Military Commission was preserved (albeit with more
procedural safeguards), the number of unmanned drone strikes
increased at suspected terrorist hideouts along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border and in Pakistan (the strikes are suspect from an
international law viewpoint and also could be strategically dangerous),
and troop levels in Afghanistan were tripled (immediately after Obama
received the Nobel Peace Prize).14 Obama banned the use of
waterboarding, but refused to release photographs showing abuse of
detainees and a memo about C.I.A. interrogation techniques.15 Finally,
President Obama re-declared that "[olur nation is at war" after the
Detroit terrorist attempt.16 The Economist did not hesitate to declare
President Obama "[a]nother war president, after all."" The global war
on terror continues: Afghanistan and Iraq are still occupied by U.S.
troops, and, moreover, the war is expanding into other states including
Pakistan,'8 Yemen,' 9 and Somalia 20 through the use of unmanned
drones.
11. Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of The United
States "War On Terror," 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 514 (2009) [hereinafter Nanda,
"War on Terror'" (citing Sue Pleming, Obama Team Drops "War On Terror" Rhetoric,
REUTERS, Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/
idUSTRE52T7MH20090330).
12. Id. at 515 (noting that the "[Global War on Terror] raised questions about the
administration's real-contrasted with its professed-commitment to faithfully adhere to
the rule of law."); Peter Baker, Obama's War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 6,
2010, at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.htm ("I
don't think it's even fair to call it Bush Lite . . . . It's Bush. It's really, really hard to find a
difference that's meaningful and not atmospheric. You see a lot of straining on things
trying to make things look repackaged, but they're really not that different.").
13. See Baker, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 3, 6.
16. Id. at 9.
17. See Barack Obama and terrorism: Another war president, after all, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15213339.
18. Jane Perlez & Ismail Khan, Deadly Drone Strike by U.S. May Fuel Anger in
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/
world/asia/23pakistan.html.
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The war on terror has become global in other ways as well. The
United States is no longer the only state fighting a war against
terrorism; other states are employing U.S.-style tactics against their
own "terrorists." Instead of using international legal mechanisms for
dealing with conflict, some states are taking politically driven
unilateral action to suppress dissention within their own states in the
name of fighting terrorism. China, for example, has been accused of
"opportunistically using the post-September 11 environment to make
the outrageous claim that [Muslim Uighurs] in Xinjiang are terrorists"
in order to suppress the Uighurs' religious activities and condemn them
as illegal. 21 Russia's struggle to control separatists in Chechnya also
turned into part of the war on terror after 2001, allowing Putin to
justify his use of force, human rights violations, and Geneva Convention
violations as a necessary part of the global war on terror. 22 Taking a
non-legal political approach instead of relying on lawful means of
conflict resolution as these countries are doing in following the U.S.
approach is threatening to create an anarchistic world order and
contributing to global disorder and chaos.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR
The global war on terror has raised concerns and issues in many
areas of international law and international affairs. These include
questions regarding the use of force, human rights, international
humanitarian law, irregular rendition, torture, the fate of Afghanistan
and other countries that are directly or indirectly said to be connected
with terrorism, the legality of the United States military campaign, and
the extraterritorial reach of individual nations or groups of nations in
securing peace and security in the world. 23 In all of these areas, the
international rule of law has been disregarded or violated.
The U.S. War on Terror undermined different rubrics of
international law, making international law a primary victim of the
19. David S. Cloud, Jeffrey Fleishman, & Brian Bennett, U.S. drone strike in Yemen
kills U.S.-born Al Qaeda figure Awlaki, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), available at
http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-awlaki-killed-20111001.
20. Greg Jaffe & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somali Group
Allied With Al-Qaeda, Official Says, WASH. PoST (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/us-drones-target-two-leaders-
of-somali-group-allied-with-al-qaeda/2011/06/29/AGJFxZrH story.html.
21. China 'crushing Muslim Uighurs,' BBC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4435135.stm.
22. Colonel James P. Terry, Moscow's Corruption Of The Law Of Armed Conflict:
Important Lessons For The 21st Century, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 205 (2006) ("The Putin
government seized upon the September 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda as an opportunity to
recast the war in Chechnya as a 'counter-terrorist operation."').




war. The already questionable status of international law incurred
further distrust. First, the war on terror made provisions of the UN
Charter confusing with regard to the legality of the use of force. It is
clear that, after 9/11 the problem of terrorism was not addressed
through the rules of international criminal law as that law is outlined
in the UN Charter and a majority of treaties and resolutions. 24 The
Bush administration never bothered to determine whether an act of
terrorism constitutes an act of aggression in breach of Article 2(4)
justifying an armed response in self-defense within the scope of Article
51 of the UN Charter 25 or whether an act of terrorism constitutes an act
of aggression in breach of international peace and security that justifies
a collective security approach by the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. 26 There are three primary sections contained in
the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force against
Member States.27 First, Article 2(4) of the Charter provides a blanket
mandate against the use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." 28  Second, Article 51 of the UN
Charter is the initial legal structure for self-defense when an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. 29  Third,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to take
those actions necessary to maintain international peace and security.30
The post-9/11 War on Terror has made international law a quiet
observer by undermining majority resolutions and treaties related to
terrorism and Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.31 Previously,
Article 2(4) was limited to state actors; however, after 9/11, a tacit
interpretation was advanced that not only state actors but also non-
24. See Upendra D. Acharya, War On Terror Or Terror Wars: The Problem In
Defining Terrorism, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 664-68 (2009) [hereinafter Acharya,
Terror) (providing a detailed analysis of Security Council and General Assembly
Resolutions and major treaties suggesting that terrorism should be treated as an act of
crime rather than an act of war).
25. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."); U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations. . . .").
26. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-45.
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 39-45, 51.
28. Id. art. 2, para. 4. This article expressly indicates that a state is prohibited to use
force against another state, it does not bring non-state actors within the scope of this
article.
29. Id. art. 51.
30. Id. arts. 39-45.
31. See Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 664-68; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art.
51.
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state actors can violate Article 2(4).32 The entire international
community rushed to endorse the use of self-defense as a justification of
the United States' actions against al Qaeda, a non-state actor, in
Afghanistan, which in turn eviscerated the thrust of Article 2(4).33
Further, the doctrine of self-defense against the attack by a state under
Article 51 of the UN Charter was distorted when the United States
included Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in the war on terror and
invaded Iraq, giving birth to the concept of preventive self-defense. 34
Now force could be used where a state or non-state actor is believed to
have plans for an attack, based solely on the unilateral prediction of the
country using force that an attack may occur in the near or remote
future - even though that prediction may be baseless. 35 Furthermore,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was violated as well, because the United
States usurped the power and authority of the UN Security Council by
acting unilaterally rather than bringing the pursuit of the 9/11 attack
organizers before the Council for lawful, collective action. 36 On the one
hand, the United States declared a global war on terror and made 9/11
a global issue by claiming that the attack breached international peace
and security and, on the other, it acted in collective self-defense without
letting the Security Council act on the matter of the threat to or breach
of international peace and security. This further eroded the legitimacy
of the Security Council and of international law.
32. See Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 676, for a detailed description of the re-
interpretation of U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 207-08 (4th ed. 2005); Colonel Kenneth Watkin,
Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land
Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
281, 293 n.54 (2005).
33. See DINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 207-08.
34. U.N. Charter art. 51; see GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf ("The greater the threat, the greater is the
risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain
idle while dangers gather.").
35. See Leffler, supra note 1, at 40, for a historical perspective on the United States
and preventative foreign policies.
36. Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 676-77; see U.N. Charter, arts. 39-45; see also
UN Charter art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."); see also Bush, 2004 State of the Union, supra note 8
("America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.").
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In the process of fighting the Global War on Terror, the Bush
administration focused not only on al Qaeda, but also on terrorist
threats generally and on the regimes alleged to harbor terrorists. In
order to gather intelligence, the United States resorted to the indefinite
detention of terror suspects without charging them or giving them a
trial, irregular rendition, torture, and in many cases, the killing of
civilians, forsaking basic human rights and violating international
humanitarian laws.
The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq caused the deaths
of thousands of innocent civilians, frequently in violation of the Geneva
Convention Protocol on the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts. 3 7 In the past 10 years, at least 137,000 civilians were
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. 38 When U.S. AC-130 gunships strafed
the farming village of Chowkar-Karez, 25 miles north of Kandahar,
Afghanistan on October 22 and 23 2001, killing at least 93 civilians, a
Pentagon official said, "[T]he people there are dead because we wanted
them dead."39  The reason? The villagers sympathized with the
Taliban. 4 0  In two accidental air bombings of villages in eastern
Afghanistan resulting in the deaths of 17 people, 15 of them children,
the United States neither apologized nor offered compensation. 41 In the
infamous Haditha killings of November 2005, U.S. Marines shot and
killed 24 Iraqis, including 15 innocent civilians, and then tried to cover
up the incident by filing a false report which stated that the civilians
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.").
38. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of 9/11, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitzl42/English.
39. Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing
of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting, CURSOR (Mar. 2002),
http://cursor.org/stories/civiliandeaths.htm; Murray Campbell, Bombing of Farming
Village Undermines U.S Credibility, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 3, 2001); see also
Merciless U.S Bombing Obliterates Village: 60 Killed, DAWN (Nov. 2, 2001),
http://archives.dawn.com/2001/11/02/intl0.htm. For more on civilian deaths in
Afghanistan, see Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Five Years Later: Narratives
of Progress, Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of Law in a Transitional Islamic
Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 269, 279 (2007); Afghanistan's Civilian Deaths Mount, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 3, 2002), available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouthasia/1740538.stm
("The number of Afghan civilians killed by US bombs has surpassed the death toll of the
11 September attacks ... nearly 3,800 Afghans died between 7 October and 7 December
[2001].").
40. Herold, supra note 39.
41. Ahmed, supra note 39, at 280 n.29 (citing Ahmed Rashid, The Mess in
Afghanistan, THE NEW YORK REVIEW 27 (Feb. 12, 2004)).
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were killed in a roadside bombing, clearly violating customary
international law concerning civilian causalities.42
In addition to the killing of innocent civilians, the War on Terror
under the Bush administration ignored the rights of captured terror
suspects as well. First, by defining them as "unlawful enemy
combatants," which is not a term mentioned in the Geneva Convention
or in other treaties concerning the laws of war, the United States
government could legally justify not allowing detainees basic rights
afforded to prisoners of war under international law.4 3 "Unlawful
enemy combatants" were subject to torture, abuse, and humiliation at
Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq44 and habeas corpus violations at
Guantanamo Bay. 4 5 In a series of recent cases, the United States
Supreme Court attempted to stop the unlawful deprivation of rights
taking place at Guantanamo Bay by holding that the statutory and
constitutional right to habeas corpus review apply at Guantanamo. 46 In
42. Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model For Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 39 (2010); see also Colin H. Kahl, How We
Fight, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./DEC. 2006, at 83, 83-84 (explaining that the attack violated
internationally recognized legal principles regarding civilian casualties, as only
acceptable as a "byproduct of attacks on legitimate military targets" not exceeding "the
anticipated military benefit."); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
43. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Presumption of Guilt: the Unlawful Enemy Combatant
and the U.S. War on Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 539, 539 (2009) ("[B]ecause
terrorists are so-called 'unlawful enemy combatants,' they were not entitled to the
protections of the laws of war as regards their detention and treatment"); Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2601, available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf ("The term 'unlawful enemy
combatant' means-(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is
not a lawful enemy combatant [including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or
associated forces]"); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
44. See ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-
abuse-report.pdf ("between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses
were inflicted on several detainees."); Iraq Torture 'Worse after Saddam, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil5368360.stm.
45. See e.g., Nick Childs, Guantanamo Controversy Rumbles On, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4,
2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/3754238.stm; Kenneth Roth, After
Guantanamo, The Case Against Preventive Detention, FOREIGN AFF., MAY/JUNE 2008, at
9, 11-12 ("The White House claims that it is waging a 'global war on terrorism' and that
terrorism suspects worldwide with alleged connections to al Qaeda can thus be arrested
as combatants. But since this 'war' knows no geographic or temporal bounds, it has
become increasingly controversial as a continuing basis for detention, especially because
many of the Guantanamo detainees were arrested far from any recognizable battlefield.").
46. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal habeas statute conferred
on district court jurisdiction to hear challenges of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process required that United
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response, Congress took counter-actions to deprive United States courts
of their jurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo Bay, giving the
President control over detainees through the use of military tribunals
and limited review of detention. 47
When President Obama took office in 2008, he made some changes
to the Bush detainee policies to conform them to international law. In
2009, President Obama announced he would close Guantanamo Bay in
one year.48 He also ordered that prisoners be treated according to the
mandates of the Geneva Convention and ordered immediate review of
the status of each detainee. 49 Despite these initial steps taken to
restore human rights to detainees (though Guantanamo Bay still has
not been closed), Obama's policies are still "fundamentally consistent
with the positions of the prior administration," especially with regard to
detention of suspected terrorists.50
CONSEQUENCES TO THE UNITED STATES
After 9/11, the United States made Afghanistan and Iraq its
concerted focus and drained its financial and leadership capital on these
two countries in the name of the war on terror. Many scholars argue
that the start of the War on Terror marked the beginning of the decline
of American world dominance. 51
States citizen being held as enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest
factual basis for his detention); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) did not deprive Supreme Court of jurisdiction over
habeas appeal, pending at time of DTA's enactment, by alien detained by Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding
that the habeas corpus privilege and Suspension Clause provided in the United States
Constitution applied to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay).
47. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739,
2742 (2005) ("no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . ."); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §
5, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (2006), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/PL-
109-366.pdf ("No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in
any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a
current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the
United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its
States or territories.").
48. Nanda, "War on Terror," supra note 11, at 516.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 519 (quoting Steven A. Engel, senior attorney for the Bush Administration's
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, in William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label
Terror Suspects as 'Combatants,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at Al.
51. See Malcon Fraser, America's Self-Inflicted Decline, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fraser2/English ("America's
leadership in world affairs began to weaken with the unilateralism of Bush, and today's
economic problems are reinforcing this tendency."); but see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of
American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest, FOREIGN AFF., May/June
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The War on Terror took a huge economic toll on the United States.
According to the Congressional Research Service, as of March 2011 the
United States Congress had approved a total of $1.283 trillion dollars of
funding for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign
aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and for other War on Terror operations since 9/11.52 Military spending
now nearly equals that of the rest of the world combined. 53 The U.S.
budget, which had surplus of $128 billion, was drastically reversed to a
deficit of $458 billion. 5 4 Federal debt as a percentage of GDP rose from
32.5 percent in 2001 to 53.5 percent in 2009.55 Now the United States is
in a financial crisis at home, while its financial strength and dominance
internationally has been seriously weakened, opening the door for
emerging nations like China to step up.56
The War on Terror has also taken a serious toll on the reputation of
the United States abroad. The Abu Ghraib abuse scandal, the use of
torture, extraordinary rendition, deprivation of habeas corpus rights,
and indiscriminate killings of civilians hurt the "moral authority" of the
United States.57 President Bush's "you are either with us or against us"
foreign policy and disregard for the United Nations Charter and other
international laws succeeded only in alienating potential allies.
Although that kind of unilateral action may have worked a decade or
two ago, when there existed a unipolar world in which the United
States was dominant, it does not work well in the 21st century
multipolar or nonpolar world, where the United States is not the only
2008, at 18, 19 (proposing that though America has a "dysfunctional" political system, its
"society is vibrant" and its economy "remains fundamentally vigorous when compared
with others.").
52. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, ii (2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; see id. at 1-5, for a breakdown
of the costs by operation and agency; see also id. at 10 (estimating the approved budget to
reach $1.4 trillion in 2012); see also Leffler, supra note 1, at 37-38 (noting that defense
spending went from $304 billion in 2001 to $616 billion in 2008); Stiglitz, supra note 38
(estimating total War on Terror expenditures to be closer to $2 trillion and to reach $3
trillion by the time all the bills are paid for).
53. Stiglitz, supra note 38.
54. Leffler, supra note 1, at 38.
55. Id.
56. Gideon Rachman, Think Again: American Decline, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 2, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think-again-american decline ("China's
economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the
world.").
57. Stiglitz, supra note 38 ("America's real strength . . is its "soft power," its moral
authority. And this, too, was weakened: as the US violated basic human rights like
habeas corpus and the right not to be tortured . . . "); see also Kahl, supra note 42, at 84
(describing a survey which showed that citizens from many other states "felt that the
United States 'didn't try very hard' to avoid civilian causalities in Iraq.").
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center of power.5 Because of these factors, the United States must now
make extra efforts to convince the world that it still has due regard for
international law and can still act collectively with others.
The War on Terror may have also weakened the United States' own
security and perpetuated an "endless" war on terror. Animosity toward
the United States resulting from military invasions and occupations,
use of torture and detention, killing of innocent civilians, bombing
villages and homes, and the undercurrent of religious warfare, actually
helped terrorist recruiters create more terrorists.59 Once the War on
Terror began, the incidences of terrorism in fact increased, as
presumably did the number of terrorists.60 A 2008 report from the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, an independent non-
partisan think tank, states:
While the United States and its partners in the war on
terrorism have made important strides in combating jihadi
groups worldwide since September 11th, they have not
weakened the jihadis' will or their ability to inspire and
regenerate. . . . Since 2002-2003, however, the overall US
position in the [Global War on Terror] has slipped. To be
sure, the United States has made considerable progress . .
. Those gains, however, have been offset by the metastasis
of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the
spread and intensification of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, the
resurgence of Iranian regional influence, and the growth in
number and political influence of Islamic fundamentalist
political parties throughout the world. Both Salafi-Jihadi
and Khomeinist branches of Islamic radicalism have
spread rather than receded since 2003. The continued
presence of US military forces in Iraq has been a boon for
the jihadi movement's propaganda effort and bolstered the
legitimacy of its call to defensive jihad.6
Though the recent deaths of Osama bin Laden and several other
high-ranking al Qaeda officials have been a positive development for
the War on Terror and its reputation, the overreaction to 9/11 and
consequences of the War on Terror to the United States and to the
58. Bush says it is time for action, CNN.COM (Nov. 6, 2001), http://edition.cnn.com/
2001/US/1 1/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html; see Richard Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity:
What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2008, at 44, 44-45, 51-53.
"The United States will no longer have the luxury of a 'You're either with us or against us'
foreign policy." Id. at 56.
59. Roth, supra note 45, at 16 (arguing that detention begets more detainees).
60. Leffler, supra note 1, at 39.
61. ROBERT C. MARTINAGE, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT, THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.csba
online.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.02.23-The-Global-War-on-Terrorism.pdf.
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world have arguably far outweighed the atrocities committed on 9/11
and the progress of the United States thus far in defeating terrorism.
This begs the question: who won the Global War on Terror - al Qaeda
or the United States? 62 Did the United States take the right approach
toward defeating terrorism? Or perhaps the question should be: can
terrorism be defeated at all?63 To what extent has international law
been accommodated in dealing with the problem of terrorism? Can a
power (realist) approach resolve this problem? Or do we need to employ
legal methods or force of law to address this problem?
U.S. HEGEMONY: IR THEORY AND PASSIVE APPROACH OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGALISTS
The declaration of the global war on terror and the political and
legal tactics used in support of it have resulted in skepticism regarding
the continuation of the leadership of the United States in world affairs.
Why did the United States take such a risk to its status in dealing with
the problem of terrorism? There may be several known and unknown
reasons and answers to this question. One of the answers may be that
the United States engaged in a short-term political fix to serve the
existing power base of governing elites. 64 In other words, U.S. strategy
was dominated by a realist approach that unduly minimized the use of
international law in international relations and in U.S. foreign policy.
What the realist approach does is kill the operational role of
international law in international behavior. When a country does not
allow existing international standards to play their operational roles in
addressing terrorism and other international problems, it drags itself
into a long-term process that peels away its power and authority.
Afghanistan and Iraq are such examples of the effects of the failure of
the United States to follow international legal standards in its foreign
policy. Realists imagined a weeklong military campaign to defeat al
Qaeda in Afghanistan (an already failed state) and, in the name of the
war on terror, the U.S. extended its military reach into Iraq where the
suppression of terrorism remains a dream that has been chased for a
decade. The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq developed because
realists never believed that international law was really law that could
be a useful tool to resolve the problem of terrorism.
62. See William McCants, Al Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War With Islamist
Democrats, FOREIGN AFF., Sept/Oct. 2011, at 20, for a history of Al Qaeda and bin Laden
and their goals.
63. See Haass, supra note 58, at 53 ("Terrorism, like disease, cannot be eradicated. .
The goal should be to reduce the impact of even successful attacks."). I propose that
though terrorism may be a disease; it can still be treated with legal tools and judicial
means.
64. See Leffler, supra note 1, at 37, 41.
156 VOL. 40:1-3
INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS
The question of whether international law is really law is not
new. 6 5 However, the question of what relevance or force international
law can have in shaping states' behavior in international affairs has
received little attention.66 Now is the time to consider more deeply the
question of the relevance and force of international law in addressing
the problem of terrorism and its effects in other areas of international
law and international relations. The question of the reality of
international law is no longer a subject of discussion because of the
existence of a large body of international laws, organizations to
administer international laws, and the reliance of nations on
international laws to either legitimize their actions or enhance their
positions in international negotiations. However, the relevance and
force of international law is still an important question. In order to
address this issue, we need to ponder whether we want to legalize
international politics or politicize international law. The answer to this
question will reveal how the international community will address
terrorism and problems associated with it. The question of whether
international politics should be legalized or whether international law
should be politicized explores the law and non-law nature of
international law in the context of compliance and enforcement. There
are scholars who like to believe that international law in fact matters
and that nations comply with it.67 Other scholars argue that
65. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997), for a detailed discussion on why nations obey international law. Professor
Koh has discussed and analyzed international political and relation theorists and
international legal scholars including Hans Morgenthau, Louis Henkin, Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, Oran Young, Thomas M. Franck and many other scholars. He
describes obedience of international law from ancient and primitive international law to
modern institutional era and post-cold war era of international law. He has mainly
focused on the compliance issue of international law analyzing managerial approach of
Chayes and fairness approach of Franck and has argued that "richness of transnational
legal process can provide the key to unlocking the ancient puzzle of why nations obey."
However, he does not address the issue of international power politics that has been a
major obstacle to the structure, function and thus perception of international law.
66. See Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between
International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980). The author
has analyzed the claim of international politicians that international law is essentially
irrelevant in addressing international problems due to vital national interests and has
suggested that emergence of international organizations might lead to the path where
international law can become relevant in addressing the international problems. He
demonstrates his thesis 'the relevance of international law' by quoting Morgenthau: "[I]n
a world of nuclear weapons systems developed to the current level of technical expertise
where the instantaneous destruction of mankind is imminently possible, power politics as
a principle for the conduct of international relations has become fatally defective and
could ultimately result in the destruction of the human race ..... Id. at 217.
67. See LOUis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979) (asserting that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time"); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK,
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international law does not matter at all,68 or, matters only when it
serves the interests of the nations concerned in the given
circumstances. 6 9  These divided viewpoints regarding the role of
international law in resolving international problems represent various
spectrums of international relations theorists and international legal
scholars. While the divisions among international relations theorists
and international legal scholars are pertinent, Professor Christopher C.
Joyner claims that the divided groups of scholars share a "dirty little
secret" and further explains: "both groups know that the presence of
international law is critical for international relations to occur, and
both know that the practice of international politics is essential for
international law to evolve and function. But each is still reluctant to
admit the necessity of the other."70 Although both groups share a "dirty
little secret," the realist approach of international theory has dominated
U.S. policy on the war on terror. The realist approach believes that
international relations are governed by a selfish lust for power that
defines interests setting the standard that directs political actions and
that universal moral principles are only a pretext for the pursuit of
national politics where state is the unitary actor.71 For the realists,
international politics is a struggle for power where one state is able to
control and influence another state's behavior to serve the interests of
the more powerful state. 72 Realists believe that maximizing political
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 (1990); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in
the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); Oscar Schachter, Dag
Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1962).
68. See Charles Krauthammer, The Curse of Legalism: International Law? It's Purely
Advisory, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1989, at 44. The author dismisses the concept of
international law and says international law may be used after the political action of a
nation for retroactive legal justification. He states:
Legalism starts with a naive belief in the efficacy of law as a regulator of
international conduct. [I]nternational relations is not contract law. And
treaties are not retained simply because their provisions are fully observed or
renounced simply because they are breached. One has to make a larger judgment.
. . That is a policy judgment to which a reading of treaty text, no matter how
close, contributes nothing.. . . [I]nternational law-is an ass.
Id. at 44, 50. This is purely a realist approach to the conduct of international relations.
69. Koh, supra note 65, at 2611 (noting that legal scholars of the Hobbesian
Rationalist approach follow the theory that nations sometimes follow international law
when it serves their self-interests.); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint
Discipline, International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges, 86
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 167, 169-70 (1992); Boyle, supra note 66, at 210-11; Robert
Kaufman, Morgenthau's Unrealistic Realism, 1 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 24, 29 (2006); John K.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory
and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 142-47 (1996).
70. Christopher C. Joyner, International Law Is, as International Relations Theory
Does?, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 248 (2006) (book review).
71. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 24-29.
72. Joyner, supra note 70, at 251.
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advantage rather than justice, morality, or law will prevail in
international politics.7 3 According to the realists, in a global condition
where there is no superior authority, sovereign states are the only
supreme authorities and they must act rationally and their rational
actions are lawful when those actions maximize their political,
economic, and security interests. 74 Basically the realists believe that
"international law-is an ass." 75
There are other approaches in international relations theory that
soften the harshness of the realist approach, but do not distance
themselves from its substance. International legal scholars like to
celebrate the recognition of international law by reference to
international relations theory within the sphere of these less harsh
approaches. The constructivist approach is one of a few other
approaches in which international legal scholars find themselves
attached to international law. The constructivists argue that states and
their interests are socially constructed by "commonly held philosophic
principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse." 76
Rather than arguing that state actors and interests create rules and
norms, constructivists contend that "[r]ules and norms constitute the
international game by determining who the actors are, what rules they
must follow if they wish to ensure that particular consequences follow
from specific acts, and how titles to possessions can be established and
transferred."7 7 Thus, constructivists see norms as playing a critical role
in the formation of national identities. Similarly, the liberal
approach,78 neo-liberal approach, 79 and institutionalist approach8 o have
73. Id.
74. Id. at 251-52. This realist approach can be called rational choice theory.
75. Krauthammer, supra note 68, at 50.
76. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (1996).
For further information on constructivists see ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the
International State, 88 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 384 (1994); Alexander Wendt, Constructing
International Politics, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995, at 71. For a recent, systematic
treatment of norms from a constructivist perspective, see THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
77. NGAIRE WOODS, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations, in
EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945 9, 26 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996)
(emphasis omitted).
78. See Koh, supra note 65. Mr. Koh states "[t]he determinative factor for whether
nations obey can be found, not at a systemic level, but at the level of domestic structure.
Under this view, compliance depends significantly on whether or not the state can be
characterized as 'liberal' in identity, that is, having a form of representative government,
guarantees of civil and political rights, and a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.
Flipping the now-familiar Kantian maxim that 'democracies don't fight one another,'
these theorists posit that liberal democracies are more likely to 'do law' with one another,
while relations between liberal and illiberal states will more likely transpire in a zone of
politics." Id. at 2633 (citing Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992);
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been identified by international legal scholars as justifications for
strengthening the place of international law in international politics.
On the one hand, the realists have undermined the role of
international law in international politics. On the other hand, the
constructivists, liberalists, neo-liberalists, and institutionalists have
softened their arguments regarding the roles of international law and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the Effectiveness of
International Adjudication, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 91, 91 (1995) (positing that
"[1]iberal states will rely more heavily on legal rules--such as those established by
treaties--to govern their relations, and they will more often rely on adjudication to resolve
disputes, both intergovernmental and transnational.")).
79. See S.G. Sreejith, Public International Law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal
Positivism and Neoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 5 (2007). Mr. Sreejith notes that
neoliberalism is a 'global policy regime that comprises free trade and the free flow of
resources via market mechanisms."' Id. at 47 (citing GEORGE DEMARTINO, GLOBAL
ECONOMY, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO
NEOLIBERALISM 125 (2000)). He also notes "neoliberalism is considered the ideology of
the process of globalization. Such a view generally provides an economic logic which
justifies the emergence of a single global market and upholds the principle of global
competition." Id. at 46-47. Mr. Sreejith further states neoliberalism has brought
"multinational corporations, NGOs, and other agents of change--a forum built on the
principles of universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, progress, and
world citizenship. These institutions are imbued with neoliberal culture, concerns,
content, norms, and shape. Although they cannot claim to have totally taken over the
baton from the states, they lobby and criticize states, mobilize around and elaborate
global cultural principles, and convince states to act on those principles." Id. at 51 (citing
John Boli & George M. Thomas, World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of
International Non-Governmental Organization, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 171, 187 (1997)).
80. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 85-109 (1984); David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute
Settlement Understanding: U.S.-Cotton's Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-retaliation in
the World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 135, 160-61 (2010)
("Institutionalists emphasize that international organizations facilitate information
sharing, transparency and monitoring of compliance with obligations, and reducing but
not eliminating obstacles to cooperation posed by power disparities."); see also Robert 0.
Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, INT'L SECURITY,
Summer 1995, at 39 (1995). Within the umbrella of this approach, scholars have
discussed regime theory and rationalism theory. For more information, see generally
ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1984); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (1989); ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS (1979); ORAN R. YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1989); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994); Oran Young, The Effectiveness of
International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-
Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); Robert M . Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986).
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international institutions. Even modern politico-legal realists suggest
that international law is nothing more than "an endogenous outgrowth
of individual state interests," that international law can never constrain
those interests, and that international laws change as the interests of
states change.81 Under this view international law, therefore, has a
very limited operational role, and it promotes limited cooperation when
states' interests make cooperation among states desirable. 82 However,
Kal Raustiala criticizes this politico-legalist view, noting an enormous
growth in the number of international agreements and institutions in
the post-war era as evidence that international law has not been
dismissed. 83 If these international laws and institutions do not have
any roles, he asks, why are states continuing to invest their economic
and political resources in creating them? 84  He also argues that
credibility, reputation, the inherent market system, and the
delegational nature of international law strengthen the role of
international law. 85
Other scholars justify the use of international relations theory in
international law as a diagnostic and policy-perspective tool to address
international terrorism and other international issues.86 Although all
these efforts to reconcile international relations theory and
international law are absolutely apprehensible, they miss a substantial
point: the root of international law is derived from a realist approach
and all other approaches (constructivism, liberalism, neo-liberalism,
institutionalism) are parts of the realist approach. Because all these
approaches of international relations theory make international law
serve the interests of power in a complex international system of
behaviors, less powerful countries struggle to resist the power of
dominant countries. First, less powerful countries perceive that
81. Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 423, 423 (2006).
82. Id. (citing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)).
83. Id. at 426.
84. Id. at 429.
85. Id. at 430-33.
86. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International
Law And International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 369, 373-74 (1998). The authors have analyzed the
use of an interdisciplinary approach to international law and international relations and
have used international relations theory in the development of international law. Id. at
373-74. They argue that international relations theory is valuable in identifying and
resolving international terrorism. Id. at 374. The authors have identified six approaches
for both international relations theory and international law to make a collaborative
research agenda, which are: regime design, process design, basis of shared norms and the
role of power, historical and cultural constitutive structures of international affairs,
government networks within state regimes, and domestically embedded international
institutions (embedded institutionalism). Id. at 369.
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international laws are generally made to enforce the hegemony of
power 7 and second, they make efforts to negotiate to reduce the
influence of power and achieve justice by using existing international
legal instruments and institutions. Most international legal scholarship
is confined to the second aspect rather than addressing how powerful
states create, interpret, and employ international law to maintain the
power status quo.8 8
There are other scholars who have addressed the fundamental
issues of how international law is either abused or dismissed by power,
and international law has come to resemble the 19th century imperial
international law. 8 9 International law as reflected in the UN structure
can be justified on the grounds that because the Security Council's
purpose is rendering order and justice, it can act in furtherance of that
purpose to solve any problem when the Council's five permanent
members find a solution politically feasible. 90 Otherwise, international
law becomes little more than an object to be manipulated by realists in
a political theatre. Other than a few international legal scholars who
explore the roots of international law, scholars pursue the argument
that the development of international law took place within the
evolution of international relations theories. 91 Therefore, there is a
tendency of international legal scholars not only to admit the
importance of international relations theory but also treat it as a
primary discipline and international law as a secondary discipline.
The foreign policy of the United States as reflected in its
international behavior appears to be based on the realist approach of
international relations theory rather than international law. After the
9/11 event, the (dis)recognition of the role of international law in
addressing the global problem of terrorism has been prevalent in U.S.
foreign policy (as prescribed by realist theory). 92 This prevalence has
87. Acharya, War on Terror, supra note 24, at 658-59 (describing how 13
international treaties created to address terrorism were agreed to before 9/11 without the
treaties or the parties having an acceptable definition of terrorism).
88. Upendra Acharya, Is Development a Lost Paradise? Trade, Environment, and
Development: A Triadic Dream of International Law, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 401, 403 (2007).
89. Antony Anghie, Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law, 5 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. Sci. 291, 291 (2009).
90. Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/
pdfs/6/1/1299.pdf.
91. Joyner, supra note 70, at 249-50.
92. U.S. foreign policy is well presented in The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (NSS) as prescribed in 2002 and in 2006. President George
Bush, The National Security Strategy (2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/; President George Bush, The National Security
Strategy (2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
The NSS is important for two aspects in international law, first, preventive use of force is
legal when it is used against rogue states, and second, liberal democratic countries (here
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not only posed questions regarding the behavior (rule of law) of states
and non-state actors concerning terrorism, value (equality) among
nations and peoples of the world, and democracy (process and
transparency) in the governance system of the modern-day world, but
also has downgraded the status of U.S. foreign policy and its insistence
on unilateral international behavior. 93 This declining opinion of U.S.
foreign policy may be credited to the U.S. disregard of international law
and its sole reliance on the realist approach. International legal
scholars have further contributed to this negative perception by
justifying the realist approach mirrored in U.S. foreign policy within
the framework of existing international law. 94 If this is the case, then
international legal scholars have promoted a power politics agenda and
have been oblivious to important legal aspects prescribed by the UN
Charter and other international laws, such as human rights law and
humanitarian law (limited human rights of civilians in the war zone,
treatment of captured detainees, irregular rendition, indefinite
detention without charge, and death of civilians). The use of self-
defense measures, particularly through unmanned drone attacks, is one
example of U.S. foreign policy that undermines the basic tenets of the
laws of war. Drone attacks do not allow opponents to participate in the
the US) can and should take responsibility in maintaining international order and
international peace and security against the threat of terrorism, not rely on international
law and institutions. Anghie, supra note 89, at 292. The United States adopted the self-
defense measures under Article 51 rather than collective security measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Many legal scholars have recognized the US adoption of
self-defense measures while recognizing the problem of terrorism is global and poses a
threat to international peace and security. See Id. at 293-94. If the problem of terrorism
is a global one and poses a threat to international peace and security, it must be dealt
with by adopting the collective security measures. Because the operational role of
international law is undermined there has not been tendency to distinguish self-defense
measures from collective security measures as to when each should be applied. This non-
distinction is credited to the realist approach in its foreign policy and submission of
international legal scholars to this approach. The perception that the United States can
demonstrate its power in keeping and maintaining international law and order by
adopting self-defense measures in order to deal with the global war on terror has caused
undue human, economic, and political (long-run) burdens.
93. See Anghie, supra note 89, at 291-307 (arguing that President Bush invoked
nineteenth century principles of international law and that his foreign policy is dominated
by the realist approach); see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE (3d ed. 2008) (arguing that international law on the use of force after 9/11 is more
speculative than ever before); see also Kaufman, supra note 69, at 29 (discussing Hans
Morgenthau); see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 82, at 225-26. Both Morgenthau
and Goldsmith are lawyers by training who argue that international law is useful if it
corresponds with the interests of powerful states.
94. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 732 (2004). The author argues
that it is naive to rely on international law and international institutions for international
peace and security and self-preservation due to the lack of effectiveness of international
law and institutions.
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conduct of war in the same way that terrorist attacks do not give
opportunity to the attacked party to fight back. 95
The void of collective security measures and the adoption of self-
defense measures in the global problem of terrorism have led to a tacit
competition between the terrorists and the United States, and may
have created a cycle of perpetual war. Therefore, perhaps the solution
to the problem of terrorism has been lingering particularly since the
9/11 event and may continue to linger, which could result in a situation
where politics (power) can have unfettered discretion to abort law
(justice) on both sides of the war of terror - one, giving rise to terrorist
groups and invisible networks of those groups, and, two, giving rise to
short-term, national-interest driven political tactics to suppress the
problem. If power politics is the principle to resolve international
problems, then both sides politicized international law. The launchers
of terrorist activities argue that their actions are not the cause but the
effect of domination and dehumanization, and suppressors of terrorist
activities argue that security within their territory and global peace and
security are of the supreme primacy with or without international legal
guidance. 96 In this scenario, if international law is employed, it will be
used only to justify the interests of power.
CONCLUSION
With the analysis made above, we can arguably come to the
conclusion that there are two approaches to address the problem of
terrorism - first, the legal approach and second, the political approach.
Both approaches have been utilized to address terrorism because the
legal approach has a minimal role within the scope of the realist theory,
where power politics is the primary element in addressing the problem
of terrorism and where law and legal elements have a limited
supporting role, being applied only when they serve the interests of
power. The global war on terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia, and its techniques - indefinite detention,
irregular rendition, torture, and detention without charges - have
killed international law. 97 The cause of death was that, historically,
95. Paul F. M. Zahl, et al., Drones: Is It Wrong to Kill by Remote Control?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2011 at 64.
96. Joe Devanny, Justifying Terrorism, IDEA: INTERNATIONAL DEBATE EDUCATION
AssOCIATION (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic-details.php?topic
ID=309.
97. See Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 7, 17 (2003). The author has expressed his doubt about the core principle of
international law regarding the use of force in his earlier article too. Thomas M. Franck,
Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM.
J. INT'L L. 809, 809-10 (1970). See also Nanda, "War on Terror," supra note 11, at 514;
Sadat, supra note 43, at 545. Both authors have analyzed how the US has violated several
aspects of international law in their respective articles.
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international law was not believed to produce a legal solution to
international problems, including terrorism. The role of international
law is within the domain of international relations theory. It has been
used for ex post facto justification of political decisions for the purpose of
serving national interests and power politics. 98 This is the very reason
why international governance and institutional processes under the UN
structure lack democratic methods. Therefore, the existing system of
international governance does not have complete faith in democracy
and rule of law. 99 On the one hand, it neither supports a formal
majority ruling nor establishes a process for governance by majority.
On the other, treaties related to terrorism are designed to exclude
terrorist activities conducted by powerful nations. International politics
either dictates that weaker nations submit their loyalty to powerful
nations or confront the consequences, or requires nations to cooperate
when the interests are shared. This way, international law and
institutions confirm that powerful nations' activities are legitimate and
civilized. 100 It does carry some value (peace, security, equality, justice
etc.) in its linguistic formality, but does not really bother with the
question of whether those values can be achieved. When these
conditions remain intact regarding the application of international law,
the world is not as safe as we hope it to be. If United States foreign
policy dealing with the problem of terrorism continues disregarding the
principles of international law, basing its policy on international
relations theory (the realist approach) and if American international
legal scholars continue to embrace the approach that international law
is a subsystem in a broader system of a realist approach of
international relations theory, neither the problem of terrorism is
resolved nor will U.S. foreign policy be uplifted. The 21st century may
well become a post-American world where the United States will lose its
appetite for global leadership. The international power dynamics is a
zero-sum game (contrary to what Obama stated during his first visit to
98. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 28.
99. GERRY J. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 165-93 (2004). The
author suggests that the great powers were focused on maintaining power privilege
during the creation of the UN Charter and they were successful in taking the policing
power in international affairs by pushing their hegemony over less-powerful countries.
This way the great powers legalized a class division between powerful and powerless
countries through the UN Charter.
100. See Eyal Benvensti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and
the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 694 (2004) (arguing that
formal inequality among nations is an essential part of international law, and the
international law bows to military and economic power to accommodate needs and to
maintain coherence).
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China)101 if it is exercised without reference to the standards of
international rule of law. Even a prominent advocate of the modern
realist school, Hans Morgenthau, at the Hoffmann's Seminar on
American Foreign Policy admitted that "power politics as a principle for
the conduct of international relations has become fatally defective and
could ultimately result in the destruction of the human race through a
suicidal . . . [w]ar." 102 Therefore, it is important for U.S. foreign policy to
respect the international rule of law and democratic process in the
international system of governance. The United States has a greater
opportunity and responsibility than any other nation to promote the
international rule of law and the virtues thereof in its foreign policy by
respecting international law, complying with it, and making it the
standard for international relations. The exercise of power without
regard to international law and the conduct of war as a manifestation of
power will neither resolve the problem of terrorism nor serve the
interests of the United States' foreign policy. It will only help establish
(and has already created) a never-ending process of war on (or of)
terror.
101. President Obama during his first visit to China, said, "Power does not need to be
a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another... .We welcome China's
efforts to play a greater role on the world stage." See Rachman, supra note 56.
102. See Boyle, supra note 66, at 217.
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A NOTE TO STATES DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: EXAMINING VIABLE ARGUMENTS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
MATTHEW C. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian Intervention (HI) has been a central topic of
controversy within international law scholarship for many years. This
controversy is unsurprising because HI inevitably pits several of the
most fundamental international norms as opposing forces: state
sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force versus the duty of
states to prevent human rights atrocities and protect human life. HI
takes many forms, but it is best defined as intervention into the
sovereign territory of another state, without the host state's consent, for
the purpose of halting atrocity crimes, such as genocide, ethnic
cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.' It is conducted in
one of two ways, with Security Council (SC) authorization or without
such authorization. 2 In either case, HI categorically conflicts with
notions of state sovereignty, and, in most instances, the prohibition on
the use of force. Despite such conflict, HI through the SC has been
universally accepted.3 "Unauthorized" HI, on the other hand, has been
* Matthew Cooper, JD '09, University of Denver Sturm of College of Law; LL.M.,
International Law and International Relations, University of Kent (Brussels School of
International Studies). Cooper has served as clerk for the U.N. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and as a trial attorney for the United States Department of Labor.
He currently practices employment law in Colorado, with a particular focus on mining
and workplace safety. He wishes to extend special gratitude to Professor Ved Nanda, to
whom this book is dedicated, for his past and continued mentorship in the dynamic field
of international law.
1. E.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Introduction, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 1, 1 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds.,
2003) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION]; J.L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian
Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra, at 15, 18; SIMON
CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules?
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 177, 181-82.
3. See Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Lessons
of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 858 (1999).
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more controversial. The primary question addressed herein is whether
states would have a good faith means to justify HI if one day brought
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The central concentration with regard to this question is on the
evolution of HI within customary international law. This subject is not
new, and since the inception of the UN Charter (hereinafter the
Charter) numerous authors have examined the component parts of
custom (state practice and opinio juris) with regard to HI. 4 This
process has revealed many different approaches to this perplexing
problem, as well as a myriad of conclusions. This study differs
primarily in method, as it is written with a focus on the practical
application of the HI doctrine and viable good-faith arguments for
states before the ICJ. This study also differs by demonstrating the
importance of evaluating opinio juris in a contemporaneous fashion. In
other words, through historical analysis of several humanitarian
interventions, this study illustrates that when investigating custom it is
much more telling to assess the statements and actions (or inactions) of
states at the time an intervention is taking place. Subsequent
diplomatic statements cannot be ignored, but undue weight should not
be given to statements most likely aimed at discouraging abuse of this
potentially dangerous doctrine and not the doctrine itself. Doing so is
the only viable means of truly understanding whether the international
community believes an intervening state should be exonerated for
undertaking a true humanitarian intervention. Through such an
approach, it is possible to discern an acceptance by states that
unauthorized HI is lawful (or at least legally justified) in extreme
circumstances, when truly taken for humanitarian reasons and when
conducted proportionately to that purpose.
Existing in conspicuous parallel with HI is the newly emerged
"Responsibility to Protect" doctrine (R2P).5 While HI and R2P are
intertwined, it is erroneous to refer to the doctrines interchangeably.
HI deals with a "right" of states to intervene in the affairs of other
states, whereas R2P deals with the "responsibility," and perhaps even a
4. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures
and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791 passim (1999); Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F.
Muther, Jr. & Amy E. Eckert, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and
Liberia - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law -
Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827, 827-28 (1998); A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian
Intervention and International Law, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 725, 726 (2004).
5. S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter World
Summit]; INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter R2P]; Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 203, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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legal duty, to prevent "atrocity crimes."6 Notably, R2P primarily places
the onus of protection on the state in which atrocities are occurring, 7
and only secondarily upon the international community.8 However, the
2005 World Summit Outcome clearly articulates that the international
community, including each Member State of the United Nations (UN),
also has some form of responsibility for crimes of mass atrocity, even
when occurring outside their own state borders. 9 While R2P's contours
are still evolving, its unanimous adoption by the General Assembly
(GA) has solidified the doctrine somewhere in international law.10
While the predominant focus herein is on the legal "rights" of states to
respond to atrocity crimes and not their "responsibility" to do so, this
study will conclude by evaluating the potential interplay between the
two doctrines in front of the ICJ.
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ALLOWS FOR HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
The Charter is the necessary starting point when analyzing
whether HI is lawful, and for that matter, whether it is even possible
for such a doctrine to arise through customary law alongside the
Charter. Although HI is admittedly nowhere to be found within the
Charter, it is well accepted that customary law and the Charter can
exist in parallel." However, some authors have rightly pointed out that
the Charter could preclude the possibility of a customary exception to
the prohibition on the use of force, even for strictly humanitarian
reasons, if the customary norm were inconsistent with the terms of the
Charter. 12
With regard to HI, the opponents' syllogism goes like this: the
Charter, in Article 2(4), specifically prohibits the threat or use of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations"; this prohibition is comprehensive, except for the explicit
exceptions articulated in the Charter, namely Security Council
authorization and Article 51 self-defense; and, therefore, even if HI
6. See, e.g., World Summit, supra note 5, 11 138-39; David Scheffer, Prevention:
Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111, 111
(2008) (designating genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
as "atrocity crimes" for the purpose of accuracy and simplicity in communication).




11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 178-79 (June 27); see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.;
F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, IT 71-73 (Feb. 20); Asylum (Colom./Peru). 1950 I.C.J. 266,
276 (Nov. 20).
12. E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 100 (2005).
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arose through the component elements of custom (state practice and
opinio juris), HI would still be a violation of international law because it
would violate the superior and affirmative obligations under the
Charter.' 3 In its essence, the argument is based on principles of lex
specialis, and also grounded in the provisions of Article 103 of the
Charter, which affirms that the Charter prevails over all inconsistent
norms. 14
This is an admittedly compelling argument. Indeed, if the
prohibition on the use of force were absolute, apart from the Charter's
explicit exceptions, then Article 103 would bar a customary norm from
overriding its terms, unless of course it rose to the level of jus cogens (a
status HI has clearly not achieved).15 This recognition is extremely
important, but many proponents of HI have regrettably overlooked it.
Nevertheless, there is an answer to this sound argument, and it rests in
the fundamental principles of treaty interpretation, as articulated in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),16 which are also considered to be custom.' 7
The reason states have recourse to these principles lies in the
ambiguity of the terms of Article 2(4).18 Some argue the language
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations" is not ambiguous, and that the provision is a comprehensive
ban on force.19 However, the inability of both states and international
jurists to come to agreement over the Article's full extent lends credible
evidence to the contrary. 20  Consequently, recourse to principles of
13. See id. at 99-100.
14. U.N. Charter art. 103.
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
16. Id. arts. 31-32.
17. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 1 160 (Feb. 26); Legal
Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 94 (July 9); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 83 (Mar. 31); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 99 (June
27).
18. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31.
19. E.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, The U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1999).
20. Compare, e.g., Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 864-65 (arguing that individual
states should be allowed to intervene when international organizations cannot), and
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 6 (3d ed. 2005) (arguing that states may intervene to prevent "severe tyranny
or anarchy" in other states), with W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 861-62 (1999) (arguing
that the general prohibition on the use of force should be read narrowly), and Simma,
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treaty interpretation is necessary to resolve the contours of Article 2(4)
and to determine if HI is absolutely prohibited. Doing so provides
insight into the modern meaning of the provision as well as the
underlying purposes of the UN Charter.
VCLT Article 31 mandates three primary means of
interpretation. 2 1  The first requires "good faith" interpretation in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms "in their context
and in the light of [the treaty's] object and purpose." 22 The second calls
for examination of the context surrounding the treaty, including the
preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the treaty's
conclusion, and any instrument made in connection with the conclusion
of the treaty. 23 The third, which is of utmost importance here, entails
examination of "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation," as well as any relevant rules of international law. 2 4 It
bears explicit mention that all steps are required; none is mutually
exclusive to the others. 25
With regard to the first step, there are good faith arguments on
both sides. Opponents of HI can legitimately argue that the Charter
was put in place in the wake of WWII to prevent states from abusing
their power and invading the sovereignty of others - abuse that during
WWII led to the most horrendous atrocities the world had ever seen.
Specifically, it could be argued that the context of the Charter's
inception points to a full prohibition on the use of force, except when
authorized by the Security Council, for the very purpose of preventing
such abuse. 26 Likewise, the very first words of Article 1(1) are "[t]o
maintain international peace and security," thereby indicating the
primary importance of respecting state sovereignty and refraining from
using force against other states.27 Going a step further, opponents
could even argue, in good faith, that the principles regarding respect for
human rights are subsidiary to this fundamental purpose. 28
On the other hand, proponents of HI can point to the second part of
UN Charter Article 1(1), which envisions "effective collective measures"
supra note 19, at 2-3 (stating that Article 2(4) is meant to be "of a comprehensive
nature").
21. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31.
22. Id. art. 31, para. 1.
23. Id. art. 31, para. 2.
24. Id. art. 31, para. 3 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Petr Valek, Note, Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible
with the U.N. Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1223, 1240-41 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 19, at 3.
27. U.N. Charter art. 1, para 1 (emphasis added).
28. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 24 (1999).
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to respond to threats to the peace, 29 Article 1(3), which highlights the
need "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems, and in promoting respect for human rights," 30 as well as
Article 55, which recognizes that conditions of stability, which includes
universal observance of human rights, "are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations."31 Moreover, proponents of HI can
certainly argue, likewise in good faith, that the very same purpose that
underlies the rationale for both non-use of force and HI are one in the
same - the protection of human life. Therefore, though collective
forceful measures through the SC may have been the ideal means
envisioned for protecting human life at the time the Charter was
formed, once the mechanism breaks down (i.e., because of a P532 veto),
the fundamental right to life itself is what is deserving of protection, not
the means for protecting the right.
In either case, a teleological approach to Article 2(4) does not fully
answer the question. To the contrary, it seems necessary to simply
accept that the Charter's object and purpose is two-fold - to maintain
international peace and security and to ensure protection for
fundamental human rights - both of which embody the most
fundamental of rights, the right to life.
Consequently, the next step is to turn to Article 31(3) of the VCLT,
namely paragraph (b), which mandates examination of "'subsequent
practice."33 Doing so allows examination of Member States' present
agreement to the Charter, which has come to be accepted as dispositive
with regard to a treaty's binding force (as opposed to the framers'
original intent).34 The ICJ has adopted this approach on multiple
occasions. In Namibia, for example, when examining Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Court explicitly stated, "an
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation." 3 5 Likewise, in Nicaragua the Court held that the
Charter "by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use
of force," specifically referring to the area of non-intervention as an
example, and proceeding to examine custom to qualify the terms of the
29. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
30. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
31. Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
32. See id. art. 27.
33. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 31, para. 3 (emphasis added).
34. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 439 (July 18)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup); Competence of General Assembly for Admission of
State into United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Mar. 3) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Alvarez).
35. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, T 53 (June 21).
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Charter. 36 Judge Alvarez similarly addressed the issue of Charter
interpretation in the Admissions Case, stating:
The text [of the Charter] must not be slavishly followed. If
necessary, it must be vivified so as to harmonize it with the new
conditions of international life. When the wording of a text
seems clear, that is not sufficient reason for following it
literally, without taking into account the consequences of its
application.37
As a result, to determine the true confines of Article 2(4),
subsequent practice must be examined. Therefore, whether a
customary norm has arisen, and whether Article 2(4) and the Charter
allow for HI are in fact two parts of the same inquiry. Thus, the
Charter does not absolutely prohibit a customary norm of HI.
Though unnecessary, the Court could also look to the preparatory
work, or travaux prdparatoires, of the San Francisco Conference to
reach the conclusion that Article 2(4) is not absolute. 38  At the
Conference, there was much discussion and debate as to what terms
should be included within Article 2(4). Many proposals were made and
rejected before settling on the current language. 39 Included among
them was a proposal put forth by Norway, by which the Norwegian
representative suggested including the language in Article 2(4) - "not
approved by the Security Council as a means of implementing the
purposes of the Organization" - to unambiguously affirm that only the
Council could authorize force under Article 2(4).40 However, after much
consideration, including discussion that the inclusion of the language -
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
member state" - would leave ambiguity, the drafting committee chose
to reject the specific language, instead adopting the existing open-ended
terminology. 41 This suggests that states were conscious of the evolving
nature of international law, and that they allowed for this reality.
Thus, as former ICJ President Rosalynn Higgins has averred, Article
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 27).
37. Admission of State, 1950 I.C.J. at 17.
38. VCLT, supra note 15, art. 32; Application of Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43,
T 160 (Feb. 26).
39. BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A FRESH LEGAL
APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD RELIGIONS 345-47 (2002).
40. Id. at 346.
41. Id. at 346-47.
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2(4) and the prohibition on the use of force should be treated as evolving
norms.42 Doing so allows for customary HI.
SECURITY COUNCIL INTERVENTION HAS CHANGED THE CONTOURS OF
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Security Council-authorized HI perfectly exemplifies the evolution
President Higgins referenced. Though now accepted as lawful, the
legality of SC-authorized HI was also once controversial. 4 3 The reason
for this stems from Article 2(7) of the Charter, notions of inviolable
state sovereignty, as well as the explicit limits laid out in the Charter
regarding the SC's ability to use force only in situations where
"necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."44
While these concepts have not been outmoded, their parameters are in
continual evolution and have undergone significant modification in the
past 54 years. This is seen through the actions of the SC, the
pronouncements of the ICJ, the international reaction to SC
intervention, and most recently with the unanimous adoption of the
2005 World Summit Outcome document by the General Assembly. 45
Each is examined below.
State sovereignty has always taken center stage in international
law, and was explicitly recognized in Article 2(7) of the Charter, which
states: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ."46 For a long time, so-called
human rights affairs were considered to fall under this provision, and
the SC refrained from acting, no matter how egregious states' human
rights violations were. 47 However, beginning with the close of the Cold
War, the SC found new life and began to act, under Article 42 of
Chapter VII of the Charter, to intervene in situations of extreme human
42. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167-222 (1963) referenced in Jost E.
ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 185 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and International
Society, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 225 (2001). Ayoob argues that human rights abuses and
internal conflicts are domestic matters and that they therefore do not fall under Chapter
VII and should not even be considered by the Security Council. It must be noted,
however, that Ayoob is arguing that human rights abuses and internal conflicts should be
considered "removed from the purview of Chapter VII," not that state practice has shown
otherwise. Id. at 228.
44. U.N. Charter art. 42 (emphasis added).
45. World Summit, supra note 5, IT 138-39, 152.
46. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
47. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment: NATO's Kosovo
Intervention, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834,
835, 838 (1999).
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suffering, even when contained within one state's borders. 48 Such
interventions include Somalia (1991), Haiti (1993-94), Rwanda (1994),
East Timor (1999), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), among others, and
they represent a chapter in international law that gave hope to many
that the UN system was beginning to work as originally envisioned -
for security and the protection of human life.
To find proper authority for such SC authorized humanitarian
interventions does not take much creativity. Clearly the SC has
primary responsibility for international peace and security. 49 It also
has the authority to authorize force in situations that threaten such
peace and security.50 In turning to both Article 55 of the Charter,51 as
well as the direct effects of atrocity crimes, such as massive refugee
flows, strained international relations, the potential for civil and
regional war, the strain on international economic relations, and the
mere fact that such crimes shock the conscience of mankind, 52 it iS well
accepted that the SC has the prerogative to determine whether
situations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
are indeed "threats to international peace and security" and thereby
take action to abate the threat or breach if it indeed exists. 53 This led
states to explicitly accept SC intervention for human rights purposes.
The primary importance of this development is the recognition that
situations of mass atrocity are no longer solely domestic matters
shielded behind the guise of territorial sovereignty. 54 Instead, as the
48. See Cassese, supra note 28, at 26.
49. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/377, at 10 (Nov. 3, 1950); Certain Expenses of United Nations: Article 17,
Paragraph 2, of Charter, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 165-68 (July 20).
50. U.N. Charter art. 42.
51. Article 55 recognizes that the preservation of human rights is a necessary
condition for the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 55.
52. See, e.g., R2P, supra note 5, 4.13, at 31 (recognizing there must be limitations to
the non-intervention rule for exceptional circumstances).
53. See, e.g., World Summit, supra note 5, 139; MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE
POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF ENFORCEMENT 223 (2008); Olivier Corten, Human Rights and Collective Security: Is
There an Emerging Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 95 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008);
Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention:
An Emerging Legal Norm?, 10 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 37 (1999-2000); Simma,
supra note 19, at 5; Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 323, 337-38 (1996).
54. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 169 (2000), [hereinafter ICOK]
(referencing the statements of former Secretaries General Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan); Amy Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and
Humanitarian Interventions, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 48, 52 (2001); Richard Falk, Legality
to Legitimacy: The Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV. INT'L REV. (2006), available
at http://hir.harvard.edulprint/interventionismilegality-to-legitimacy.
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ICJ has now recognized on multiple occasions, atrocity crimes inhere a
legal interest in their protection for all states.56 In addition to SC
action itself, this view is further demonstrated by the response of the
international community, which has either openly praised the SC or
refrained from condemning its actions. In the most pronounced
showing of international support for such action, the General Assembly
unanimously adopted the World Summit Outcome in 2005, which
contained explicit provisions accepting the "Responsibility to Protect"
beleaguered populations, and if necessary, the willingness to act
forcefully through the SC under Chapter VII.56 Such a showing of
unanimous international solidarity is unusual in international
relations, and it speaks loudly to states' concerns with preventing
atrocity crimes. More importantly, it speaks to the position of the
international community that two types of action are unequivocally
lawful: (1) non-forceful measures aimed at the perpetrators of atrocity
crimes, whether authorized or not; and (2) forceful measures taken
through the SC. In sum, the SC has changed the debate regarding
humanitarian intervention, and issues of sovereignty have been
virtually removed from the discussion. 57
THE USE OF FORCE AND EVOLUTION OF "INDEPENDENT" HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Conceptions of "sovereignty" no longer preclude humanitarian
intervention.5 8 However, because the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use
of force still stands, the next question to be answered is what recourse
does the international community have when non-forceful measures do
not sufficiently counteract atrocity crimes and when the SC is either
unwilling or unable to take action. In other words, is humanitarian
intervention without SC authorization ever lawful? Or, in the
alternative, is it ever justified by "necessity" so that the wrongfulness of
a state's action would be precluded before a court of law such as the
ICJ?
55. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 155 (July 9); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33-34 (Feb. 5); Reservations to
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951
I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
56. World Summit, supra note 5, T 139.
57, See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 2 (supporting this outcome by mandating that all
Member States fulfill their Charter obligations in good faith in order to be ensured the
rights and benefits resulting from membership).
58. Eckert, supra note 54, at 50, 52 (pointing out that sovereignty is now viewed as
entailing not only rights, but responsibilities, and when states fail those responsibilities,
they forfeit a part of their sovereignty).
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The question of HI's legality has been addressed many times, with
varying conclusions. 59  Many scholars still maintain that HI is
absolutely forbidden under international law, while others forcefully
argue that a right to HI has emerged under customary international
law. Most interestingly, a number of scholars posit that HI is not yet
lawful, but perhaps "justified."60 The latter is a seemingly sound
position, but this approach has not fully addressed the true real-world
consequences of such a determination. If justified, does that mean legal
liability would still arise if a country were brought before the ICJ and
found to have acted in accordance with the HI doctrine? 61 Or does it
suggest some form of estoppel or necessity doctrine, as adopted by the
ICJ in the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Project,62 which would preclude state
wrongfulness? The actions of states speak loudly to this query and
evidence an acceptance by states that, in certain extreme and limited
circumstances, intervening states should not be condemned or held
legally liable for their humanitarian actions. This evidence is outlined
below.
Note: For the purpose of this analysis, humanitarian intervention
taken without SC authorization, but supported by the international
community (or at least not widely condemned), will be termed
"independent" humanitarian intervention. This designation
intentionally avoids using the term "unilateral" intervention because
unilateral intervention connotes intervention by a single state or small
group of states with little international support. However, there is little
evidence that HI without widespread international support would ever
be justified. Thus, the two must be distinguished and it should be clear
that the conclusions reached regarding arguments available to
59. See, e.g., SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS &
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 26 (2005); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 710-12 (6th ed. 2003); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 2, at 177;
CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 219; Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the
Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at
204-05; LEPARD, supra note 39, at 336; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 3 (3d. ed. 2005); Christopher
Greenwood, International Law and NATO Intervention in Kosovo, Memorandum
Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, reprinted in 49
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 926 (2000).
60. E.g., Cassese, supra note 28, at 25 (stating that "from an ethical viewpoint resort
to armed force was justified. Nevertheless, as legal scholar I cannot avoid observing in
the same breath that this moral action is contrary to current international law."); Franck,
supra note 59, at 226 (arguing "the unlawfulness of [humanitarian intervention] was
mitigated, to the point of exoneration," because the circumstances were brutally
calamitous).
61. For details of what elements must be fulfilled to fall within the doctrine, see infra
Part 5.
62. Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 51 (Sept. 25).
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intervening states are only with regard to "independent" humanitarian
intervention.
The General Assembly and Uniting for Peace: The Often-
Overlooked Origins of Independent Humanitarian
Intervention
The international community collectively addressed the often
underappreciated possibility of inaction on the part of the Security
Council as early as 1950.63 Faced with SC inaction in response to
Russian Vetoes during the Korean War, the General Assembly passed
resolution 377 (V), more commonly referred to as "Uniting for Peace."64
The resolution states that should the SC, because of lack of unanimity
of the permanent members, fail to exercise its primary responsibility to
maintain international peace and security, then states, upon
"recommendation" of the GA, may resort to "armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."65
To ensure that the Resolution would have effect, the GA created the
"emergency special session" (ESS) to ensure prompt action in the face of
a SC stall. 6 6 Accordingly, an ESS can be called within 24 hours in one
of two ways, either (1) at the request of the GA upon a two-thirds
majority vote, or (2) on the basis of a procedural vote in the SC, which
cannot be blocked by a P5 veto. 67
The Resolution can be viewed as the beginning of independent
humanitarian intervention in the modern era for several reasons. First,
the resolution was passed with a vote of 52 to 5, with two abstentions,
which indicates wide international support.68 Additionally, Uniting for
Peace has been invoked ten times since its inception, 69 and in at least
two instances, first in the Suez Canal and then in Namibia, the GA did
in fact call upon states to render military assistance. 70 The response of
the ICJ in both the Wall Opinion and Certain Expenses affirmed the
legality of these "peacekeeping" operations under the authorization of
the GA, and indirectly, of the underlying Uniting for Peace Resolution.71
63. See Uniting for Peace, supra note 49, at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. 1 1.
66. Emergency Special Sessions, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml [hereinafter ESS] (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
67. Uniting for Peace, supra note 49, Annex 1.
68. Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace: General Assembly Resolution 377(V),
Procedural History, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/codlavlhalufp/ufp.html.
69. ESS, supra note 66.
70. G.A. Res. ES-8/2, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-8/2 (Sept. 11, 1981); GA. Res. 1000
(ES-I), 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1000 (Nov. 5,1956).
71. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 28 (July 9); Certain Expenses of United Nations:
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Moreover, the ICJ has explicitly found that a series of GA resolutions
such as those following Uniting for Peace "may show the gradual
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new
rule,"72 and that opinio juris may be deduced by carefully examining the
"attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions . . .
."3 Because Uniting for Peace allowed for force without going through
the SC, manifest evidence indicates a shift away from a SC monopoly on
the use of force as early as 1950.
All in all, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, its subsequent
implementation, and the response of the international community
illustrates widespread state support for the position that the SC is
neither solely responsible for maintaining peace and security nor does it
hold a monopoly on the use of force.74 More importantly, it affirms that
states will be justified, in limited circumstances, in acting without SC
authorization. In short, Uniting for Peace provides an alternative to the
SC when peace and security is threatened, and proclaims that
authorization is not always necessary for states to be justified in the use
of force.
INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CASE STUDIES
Uniting for Peace confirms that the Security Council is not the only
means to address atrocity situations. However, the Resolution could
conceivably work against proponents of independent HI, as it is yet
another mechanism available (arguably through the Charter) to those
states willing to intervene in situations of mass atrocity. In other
words, to have their actions legitimized, states should request a vote
through the GA to act through Uniting for Peace before taking matters
into their own hands. In fact, it could feasibly be argued that if a state
could not attain the two-thirds required support of the GA, then it is not
justified in taking independent action anyway. Uniting for Peace also
seems to answer questions of urgency, as an ESS can be convened
within 24 hours.75 This scenario presents a compelling argument:
because proponents point to the P5 veto as the predominant change in
circumstance justifying HI, and because the international community
has already addressed situations of veto deadlock by allowing Uniting
Article 17, Paragraph 2, of Charter, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 165-68 (July 20);
ALVAREZ, supra note 42, at 126.
72. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
70-71 (July 8); see also Wall, 2004 I.C.J., 3 (separate opinion of Judge Al-
Khasawneh) ("[Rlesolutions ... while not binding, nevertheless produce legal effects and
indicate a constant record of the international community's opinio juris.").
73. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 188 (June 27).
74. Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 165-68; Uniting for Peace, supra note 49.
75. ESS, supra note 66.
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for Peace actions, states must attempt to go through the GA in order to
claim independent HI is justifiable.
While utilizing Uniting for Peace might be desirable, this argument
is not fully persuasive for two reasons. First, even if Uniting for Peace
provides an alternative mechanism, the GA is not "authorizing" force
per se, as only the SC has the power to do. Instead, it is merely
recognizing an independent means for states to act - with international
support. Therefore, there is no legal requirement that the GA
"authorize" forceful HI. Second, state practice indicates that such a
process is not necessary in the face of atrocity crimes. Proponents of
independent HI point to a variety of interventions to support
independent HI, none of which utilized Uniting for Peace, but which
nonetheless lead these distinguished publicists to conclude that HI is
lawful. 76 Some attention is given, for example, to interventions
undertaken in the 1970s by India into East Pakistan, Vietnam into
Cambodia, and Tanzania into Uganda.77  Others also mention
intervention by Belgium into the Congo in the 1960s,78 Syria's Invasion
of Lebanon in 1976,79 France's invasion into the Central African
Republic in 1979,80 as well as India's invasion of Sri Lanka in 1987.81
Admittedly, it is difficult to maintain that these interventions in
themselves led to a custom of HI, primarily due to the concomitant (and
primary) reliance of the intervening states on claims of self-defense for
legal justification. 82 Nonetheless, they represent a development by
which states began to recognize that intervention for humanitarian
motives might deserve a place in modern international law. More
importantly, states began to justify their actions based on HI in a way
that resembled opinio juris, even if not yet explicitly doing so by
claiming "legality" through HI.
Moving to the 1990s, however, a discernible trend became
apparent: for the first time, states began to intervene solely upon
humanitarian justifications, and they began to do so with the explicit
76. E.g., TESON, supra note 59, at 418; Charney, supra note 47, at 838; Greenwood,
supra note 59, at 931; Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 862; Reisman, supra note 20, at 860;
Rogers, supra note 4, at 732.
77. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33-34; TESON, supra note 20, at 207-08; NICHOLAS J.
WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
2 (2000); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 203, 204 (1973-1974).
78. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 84, 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part II) [herein-
after DASR].
79. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 1, at 1, 73, 79, 117.
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support of regional organizations. Four such interventions dominate
the discussion. First, in 1992, the U.S., U.K., and Coalition forces
intervened in Iraq, without SC authorization, to maintain no-fly zones
over parts of both northern and southern Iraq to protect the Kurdish
and Shi'i populations, respectively. Second, the East African
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) engaged in two
humanitarian interventions, one into Liberia beginning in the early
1990s and then into Sierra Leone towards the end of the same decade.
Again, in neither situation did the SC authorize intervention prior to
ECOWAS's use of forceful measures. Finally, the most conspicuous and
highly scrutinized HI is, of course, the unauthorized intervention by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces into Kosovo and
surrounding regions in 1999.
This brings this study to the heart of the matter - whether there
exists sufficient evidence of the two component parts of customary
international law to conclude that HI is acceptable under modern
international law.8 3  Necessarily, this analysis begins with the
"individual" actions and statements of states, but is more fully analyzed
by also examining the "collective" actions and statements of states
through a diverse array of international organizations. The case
studies below provide for such a process.
Iraq 1991-1992
In the wake of "Operation Desert Storm," members of the
international community again invaded Iraq, this time without explicit
SC authorization, to establish no-fly zones aimed at protecting Kurdish
groups in the north and Shi'i groups in the south.84 Both groups had
faced decades of persecution and gross human rights violations under
the reign of Saddam Hussein.85  In the late 1980s, for example,
chemical weapons were used to target the Kurdish population, leading
Human Rights Watch to conclude that the acts amounted to genocide.86
Approximately 182,000 Kurds were murdered during this period, and
some equated the action with the Nazi campaign against the Jews.87
Despite the destruction of nearly 5,000 Kurdish villages and the
83. For further background on the interventions addressed herein, Professor Susan
Breau presents a very comprehensive and well-written review on the factual background
of each intervention. BREAU, supra note 59, at 33-147.
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 88; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE: THE
ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS 17-19 (1995).
87. BREAU, supra note 59, at 89; SHERI LAIZER, MARTYRS, TRAITORS AND PATRIOTS:
KURDISTAN AFTER THE GULF WAR 2 (1996); see also, e.g., SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM
FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 172, 203 (2002).
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displacement of countless individuals,88 the remaining Kurds staged a
meager rebellion in March 1991.89 Hussein again went on the offensive,
targeting Kurd civilians with napalm and brutal targeted bombing
campaigns. By early May, over one million refugees had fled to Iran
and nearly 500,000 to Turkey. 90 Simultaneously, the Shi'i Muslim
population in the south of Iraq was also subjected to gross
mistreatment. Though differing in extent, with no indications of
genocidal intent, the Shi'i were denied basic rights, expelled to
neighboring countries, and subjected to artillery attacks.91 By early
1991, both conflicts undoubtedly involved extensive atrocity crimes and
the clear targeting of distinct ethnic groups.
In April 1991, several countries wrote letters to the SC asking for a
SC meeting to designate the situation in Iraq "a threat to international
peace and security."92 After extensive international pressure, the SC
finally passed Resolution 688, which "demand[ed] that Iraq, as a
contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security
in the region, immediately end this repression . . . ."93 In doing so,
however, Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII, nor did it
set up safe havens or no-fly zones. 94 China and Russian veto threats
prevented any UN-authorized forceful action.
The lack of SC authorization did not prevent forceful humanitarian
intervention, however. On April 17, 1991, "Operation Provide Comfort"
was implemented under the leadership of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France,95 with substantial support from Germany, Italy,
88. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 257-60 (1989), reprinted in IRAQ AND
KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 650-51 (Marc Weller ed., 1993).
89. BREAU, supra note 59, at 89.
90. MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS OF IRAQ: TRAGEDY AND HOPE 52-54 (1992); see
also Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Iraq, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/31 (Feb. 18,
1992) (by Max Van der Stoel) (providing a full report on the situation).
91. Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Letter dated July 29, 1992
from the Special Rapporteur addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq,
reprinted in Charges D'Affaires A.I., Letter dated 3 Aug. 1992 from the Charge D'Affaires
A.I of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the U.N. addressed to the President of the
Security Council, 12-13, U.N. Doc. S/24386 (Aug. 5, 1992); see also BREAU, supra note 59,
at 92.
92. Permanent Rep. of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 2, 1991 from the
Permanent Rep. of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/22435 (Apr. 3, 1991); Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France, Letter
dated Apr. 4, 1991 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22442 (Apr. 4, 1991);
Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 4, 1991
from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22447 (Apr. 4, 1991).
93. S.C. Res. 688, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (emphasis added).
94. See id.
95. BREAU, supra note 59, at 95.
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and the Netherlands. 96 A large northern area of Iraq was officially
declared a "no-fly" zone, and safe havens were provided for the
beleaguered Kurdish populations.97 Threats of forceful action kept
Iraqi forces from entering the predominately Kurdish areas. The
second phase of the intervention, which mirrored the first, began in
southern Iraq in August 1992. Despite GA condemnation of Iraq's
human rights abuses, there was no SC authorization in either
situation. 98 The no-fly zones in both regions continued until 2003.
The primary justification for the unauthorized intervention was
humanitarian necessity. 99 Coalition forces explicitly proclaimed that
they were "operat[ing] under international law . . . [which] recognizes
extreme humanitarian need." 00 The intervening states concurrently
relied upon Resolution 688, claiming "a rubric exists within 688 to avoid
need for a separate resolution" 01 and that the action was "consistent
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688."102 However, to
clarify, the acting states did not claim that their action was authorized
per se. Instead, they argued that the circumstances in Iraq, which
amounted to a humanitarian disaster, justified their actions despite a
lack of explicit SC authorization. Notably, the states made explicit
claims that their actions were not only justified, but lawful. As a result,
Operation Provide Comfort was carried out with an opinio juris placing
independent humanitarian intervention within the realm of customary
law.
In response to the humanitarian intervention, the world responded
with tacit approval. The UN Secretary-General celebrated that the
principle of non-intervention "cannot be regarded as a protective barrier
behind which human rights could be massively or systematically
violated with impunity .. ."10 Likewise, the SC did not even consider
any resolution in opposition to the no-fly zones and safe havens;104 and
in a debate before the GA in 1992 to consider the human rights
96. KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38127 (Vol. 37, Apr. 1991).
97. Id.; BREAU, supra note 59, at 95.
98. See G.A. Res. 47/145, U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/145 (Dec. 18, 1992).
99. BREAU, supra note 59, at 97.
100. Id. at 98 (quoting Douglas Hurd's response to a question on the "Today" Program
regarding lack of a United Nations resolution authorizing action); see also Geoffrey
Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1992, 63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
615, 826-27 (1992).
101. Statement by the UK Prime Minister: A Safe Haven for the Kurds, U.K. Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Press Office (Apr. 8, 1991), noted in NEIL FENTON,
UNDERSTANDING THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: COERCION OR CONSENT? 47-48 (2004).
102. BREAU, supra note 59, at 98 (quoting President Bush speaking during a press
conference on Apr. 16, 1991).
103. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, at 5 (U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 13, 1991).
104. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3105th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3105 (Aug. 11, 1992).
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situation in Iraq, several states explicitly supported the intervention. 105
Admittedly, a number of states also argued that the intervention could
not be justified based on either a right to unilateral intervention or on
the basis of SC authorization. 106 Yet, when GA Resolution 47/145 was
passed, the resolution failed to mention the intervention or condemn
the actions of the Coalition Forces.1 07 In the end, states did not act to
condemn the actions of the intervening states, either legally or
politically.
Liberia 1990-1997
Corresponding with intervention in Iraq, human rights atrocities
were unfolding in West Africa that could no longer be ignored. After
years of civil strife and several failed coups, in late 1989 Charles Taylor
and his rebel troops (the NPFL) invaded across the Ivory Coast border
to challenge Liberian President Samuel Doe's power.108 A "campaign of
savage violence" immediately ensued, in which civilians became the
target of malicious reprisals by both sides.109 The devastation was so
great that it attracted widespread international attention, and both
sides were accused of "ethnic purging." 110 Massacres were frequent,
sexual violence was rampant, and torture was common, prompting
hundreds of thousands to flee in search of refuge in the neighboring
countries of Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone.111 Large-scale war
crimes and crimes against humanity were unmistakable.
In response, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) created a transnational peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to
intervene and protect the civilian population from the ongoing atrocity
crimes. 112 In similar fashion to the concurrent "no-fly zones" in Iraq,
the intervention was conducted in parallel to the United Nations and
the SC, but it was forcefully led by a regional organization without
gaining prior SC authorization. 11 3 From the beginning, ECOWAS took
105. BREAU, supra note 59, at 101-02.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see G.A. Res. 47/145, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/145 (Dec. 18, 1992); United Nations,
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, at 12-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/71 (Feb.
18, 1992).
108. BREAU, supra note 59, at 75-76.
109. I.A. NASS, A STUDY IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS & THE WEST
AFRICAN PEACE INITIATIVE 60-61 (2000).
110. ICRC Report, Liberia: Terrible Human Tragedy, 1990, in REGIONAL PEACE-
KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 123-24 (M. Weller ed.,
1994); BREAU, supra note 59, at 76-77.
111. BREAU, supra note 59, at 76-77.
112. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 150 (1996).
113. See BREAU, supra note 59, at 78-83
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many steps to peacefully settle the conflict. 114 However, after peaceful
means failed, a "total peace plan was adopted."1 5 Part of the plan was
to provide ECOMOG with a mandate for armed intervention. 116
Again, the primary justification for intervention into Liberia was
humanitarian necessity, namely the need to protect human life and
address the threat to international peace and security.117  The
justification was made despite a marked absence of SC authorization to
use force. And in similar fashion to coalition forces in Iraq, ECOWAS's
belief that its action was legal was readily apparent. In 1978 ECOWAS
created a Protocol on Non-Aggression, which affirmed the members'
obligations to refrain from aggressive uses of force under Article 2(4) of
the Charter.118 Nevertheless, ECOWAS explicitly chose to use force
without SC authorization. Thus, ECOWAS's forceful actions in Liberia
and subsequent justifications provide evidence of not only a customary
norm of independent humanitarian intervention, but also reveal the
organization's belief that the Charter does not prohibit such action. In
other words, the members of ECOWAS concluded their humanitarian
actions were non-aggressive, in line with Article 2(4), and lawful. Once
more, the requisite opinio juris element to custom was manifest.
The tremendously positive international reaction buttressed
ECOWAS's position. The explicit support of the SC itself is most
notable. In November 1992, the SC passed resolution 788,119 which
primarily did three things: first, it imposed a complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons to Liberia; second, it declared the situation to be a
"threat to international peace and security"; and, finally, it actually
endorsed and commended the unauthorized ECOWAS intervention.120
In the meetings to resolution 788, countries as diverse as the United
States, Russia, and China all commended the ECOWAS intervention
and its role in resolving the conflict. 121 Likewise, in 1991, the President
of the SC stated: "The members of the Security Council commend the
efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to
promote peace and normalcy in Liberia,"122 repeating these sentiments
114. MURPHY, supra note 112, at 149-50.
115. BREAU, supra note 59, at 79.
116. Id. at 79-80.
117. Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia, J.
HUMANITARIAN AsSISTANCE (Sept. 25, 1995), http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/66.
118. BREAU, supra note 59, at 78-79 (citing ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Agression, Apr.
22, 1978).
119. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
120. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 813, U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (Mar. 26, 1993).
121. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg. at 66, 71, 74-75, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3138 (Nov.
19, 1992).
122. U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991); see also BREAU, supra note 59, at 84.
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again in May 1992.123 In the words of Professor Breau, "the
international community as represented in the Security Council was
unanimous in this approval notwithstanding that there had not been
any type of enabling resolution by the United Nations." 12 4
Sierra Leone 1998
The crisis in Sierra Leone somewhat mirrored the disaster in
neighboring Liberia, leading to the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Sierra Leoneans (about one tenth of the population).1 25
Not only was the conflict in Sierra Leone similar to Liberia, but it also
had a direct link, as Charles Taylor had sent troops across the border
from Liberia in March 1991 in retaliation for Sierra Leone's provision of
an ECOMOG base in 1990.126 The Liberian NPFL joined forces with
the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RUF), and the
groups set up a permanent headquarters in Sierra Leone. 1 2 7 This led to
protracted conflict between the existing government and several rebel
groups competing for power. Within 18 months of the conflict, at least
400,000 civilians had been displaced, 128 and in April the government
was overthrown. 129 The war continued, however, and attacks upon the
civilian population persisted. By late 1994, the RUF attacks had spread
to nearly all parts of the country.13 0
Throughout the conflict, numerous reports emerged documenting
the grave extent of the atrocities. The International Committee of the
Red Cross warned, for example, that something needed to be done to
stop the disaster from turning into another Rwanda. 131 The United
123. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3071st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3071 (May 7, 1992).
124. BREAU, supra note 59, at 85. Professor Breau notes that the Organization of
African Unity also supported ECOWAS's humanitarian intervention, even going so far as
to provide financial assistance, and that Western states, including the United States,
Great Britain, and the European Union, also supported the action by contributing
financial assistance. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 103. Throughout this time, there were several instances of ECOMOG and
British involvement at the request of the existing government. The intervention that this
study focuses on, however, is the ECOWAS intervention of February 1998, which again
occurred independently of Security Council authorization, and was conducted without
consent for the purpose of bringing the humanitarian disaster to an end.
126. Id.
127. STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE
RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 93 (1999).
128. EARL CONTEH-MORGAN & MAC DIXON-FYLE, SIERRA LEONE AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 128-29 (1999).
129. BREAU, supra note 59, at 103.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 104.
186 VOL. 40:1-3
STATES DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
States issued similar reports of torture, rape, and sexual slavery, 132 and
Amnesty International reported that 250,000 Sierra Leonean refugees
had fled to Guinea and Liberia. 133 M6decins Sans Frontiares also
released reports that armed groups in Sierra Leone were "implementing
a policy of terror against civilians."134 Widespread atrocity crimes were
unquestionable.
Heeding these warnings, ECOWAS again took action. And
following a May 1997 coup, the organization convened and issued a
final communiqu6, urging: "that no State recognize the regime installed
following the coup of May 25, 1997, and that every effort be made to
restore the lawful government by a combination of three measures, i.e.:
the use of dialogue; the application of sanctions, including an embargo;
and the use of force."135 But despite continued pressure, by the end of
1997 it was apparent that the rebel groups were not disarming and the
diplomatic peace efforts were not succeeding.136  ECOWAS thus
reconvened and issued the final communiqu6, once again specifically
referencing "the use of force."1 37 In early 1998, ECOMOG engaged in
both bombing campaigns and ground operations.138 The SC had not
authorized the forceful actions.139
The ECOWAS communiqu6s set forth the justifications for its
actions. The organization referred to the "bloodshed and other loss of
human life," the increase of refugees in other neighboring countries,
and the threat to peace and security in the region.140 In similar fashion
to intervention in Liberia, the actions were justified by humanitarian
132. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT ON HUmAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/US-
013098.html.
133. BREAU, supra note 59, at 105.
134. Id.
135. ECOWAS Foreign Ministers Committee of Four, Final Communiqud, 1 9 (June
26, 1997), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/ECOWAS-062697.html;
see also Permanent Rep. of Nigeria to the U.N., Letter dated 27 June 1997 from the
Permanent Rep. of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1997/499 (June 27, 1997) (emphasis added).
136. Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 321, 328-29 (1998).
137. ECOWAS Foreign Ministers Committee of Five, Final Communiqud, 6 (Feb. 5-
6, 1998), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/ECOWAS-020698.html.
138. BREAU, supra note 59, at 108.
139. See S.C. Res 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) The Resolution did not
authorize force, but stated the Council was "gravely concerned" at the . . deteriorating
humanitarian conditions" in Sierra Leone, and reiterating that the SC had "determined"
that the situation constituted a "threat to international peace and security in the region."
Id.
140. BREAU, supra note 59, at 111. Notably, ECOWAS also referred to restoring the
democratically elected government of Kabbah, self-defense of the ECOMOG troops, and
humanitarian disaster. Id.
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necessity. And like the previously mentioned interventions, the
international community responded with approval. In the debates
surrounding SC Resolution 1132, the participating states praised
ECOWAS's continued attempts to halt the conflict.14 The President of
the SC similarly praised ECOWAS,142 and the UN Secretary-General
applauded the diplomacy of ECOWAS and the contributions made by
ECOMOG officers in removing the military junta.143 The SC even took
the extra step and passed multiple resolutions once again
"commending" both ECOWAS and ECOMOG for their intervention into
Sierra Leone.144 For the third time in less than a decade, there was
patent support for independent humanitarian intervention.
Kosovo 1999
Clearly the most important precedent for independent HI is
NATO's intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Not only was the
intervention followed by the clearest claims of humanitarian
intervention as a legal right,145 but it also received near universal
reaction from states, as well as innumerable commentaries from
international lawyers.146 The foremost justification by NATO was that
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities were carrying out
massacres, grave breaches of human rights, mass expulsions of a
particular ethnic group (ethnic cleansing), and that the humanitarian
catastrophe constituted a threat to peace and security.147  It thus
claimed that its intervention was "necessary" to prevent the
humanitarian catastrophe. The situation prompted apt consideration of
the question: "Should one remain silent and inactive only because the
existing body of international law proves incapable of remedying such a
situation? Or, rather, should respect for the Rule of Law be sacrificed
on the altar of human compassion?"148 Perhaps the two options are not
so exclusive.
141. U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822d mtg. passim, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3822 (Oct. 8, 1997).
142. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. SIPRST/1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998).
143. U.N. Secretary-General, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in Sierra Leone, 38, U.N. Doc. S/1998/249 (Mar. 18, 1998).
144. S.C. Res. 1289, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000); S.C. Res 1270, T 7, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999); S.C. Res. 1162, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (Apr. 17,
1998).
145. See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Oral
Pleadings II, at 6 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
105/4515.pdf.
146. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 28, at 28-29.
147. Id. at 25; see U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. passim, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988
(Mar. 24, 1999).
148. Cassese, supra note 28, at 25.
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The conflict in Kosovo stemmed from Slobodan Milosevic's refusal
to recognize Kosovo as autonomous. 149 The refusal led to increased
tensions in the region, and reports of violence against the civilian
population began to surface as early as 1990. 150 For the next several
years, hostilities continued to escalate, accompanied by numerous
reports of discriminatory mistreatment, arbitrary detention, forced
disappearances, and torture. 151 In 1998, full scale armed conflict was
underway.152 And on October 3, 1998, the UN Secretary-General issued
a report to the SC describing the targeting and mass killing of civilians
in Kosovo, comparing them to the atrocities seen earlier in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which included the Srebrenica genocide and other
instances of massive ethnic cleansing. 1 53
On October 9, 1998, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
proclaimed "the danger of a humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo
"loomed large." 154 He contended that "a brutal campaign of forced
deportation, torture and murder" plagued the region, and that the
humanitarian catastrophe was evidence that the threat was spreading
and intensifying.15 5 This contention was supported by a myriad of other
reports by international organizations operating in the area. 156 The SC,
through Resolution 1199, even expressed grave concern at the fighting
in Kosovo "and in particular the excessive indiscriminate use of force by
Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in
numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the [UN]
Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their
homes." 57 The full extent of the situation finally caught the attention of
the international community by early 1999, and the atrocities in Kosovo
were deemed ethnic cleansing.' 5 8
149. See BREAU, supra note 59, at 120; KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 37725-26
(Vol. 36, Sept. 1990).
150. KEESING, supra note 149, at 37725-26.
151. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared
Pursuant to Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council,
T 34, U.N. Doc. S/1998/1068 (Nov. 12, 1998).
152. TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
LESSONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN
Kosovo 5 (2006).
153. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to
Resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) of the Security Council, 9, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/912 (Oct. 3, 1998).
154. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28; see also Simma, supra note 19, at 7.
155. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28.
156. Id.
157. S.C. Res. 1199, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); see also S.C. Res.
1203, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160, at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
158. BREAU, supra note 59, at 125.
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By the time NATO intervened in March of 1999, peaceful means of
settling the conflict had been exhausted.159 Multiple meetings had been
called,160 the SC had imposed arms embargos,161 various international
diplomats visited Belgrade,162 and multiple peace talks were held in the
region. 163 A verification mission was also attempted under the
authorization of the UN to allow NATO flights over the Kosovo
region. 164 However, all efforts failed, and the cease-fire collapsed by
early 1999. NATO made further efforts at negotiation at Rambouillet,
but Milosevic failed to agree to international terms for protecting
Kosovo civilians, stating "he would rather face air-strikes than a
peacekeeping force."165 In response, because the SC was unable to take
decisive action, NATO commenced the most publicized independent
humanitarian intervention to date, and bombing began on March 24,
1999.166
At the time of the intervention, the international community
responded with tacit approval. In the words of Antonio Cassese, no
state or group of states took the action "that would have been obvious"
in the presence of significant disapproval: to bring the matter before the
General Assembly. 167 Regional organizations seemed content with the
intervention, convening no official sessions, and, the SC likewise called
no emergency meeting to order. In fact, when given the opportunity to
unequivocally condemn NATO's intervention, the SC refused, defeating
(by a vote of 12 to 3) a Draft Resolution put forth to denounce NATO for
violating Articles 2(4), 24, and 53 of the UN Charter.168 By voting
against the resolution, the SC tacitly pronounced that the
circumstances of NATO's intervention did not violate those provisions,
effectively endorsing HI. A contrary conclusion would entail a finding
that the SC itself acted contrary to its responsibilities under the
159. Cassese, supra note 28, at 28.
160. S.C. Res. 1160, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (noting that the OSCE
met on March 11, 1998, to condemn Serb actions); Permanent Rep. of Bulg. to the U.N.,
Letter dated 13 March 1998 from the Permanent Rep. of Bulg. to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/234 (Mar. 13, 1998) (issuing a joint
declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe for
Serbian authorities to find a solution to the conflict).
161. S.C. Res. 1199, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160, 8,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 23, 1998).
162. BREAU, supra note 59, at 127.
163. Id.
164. S.C. Res. 1203, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
165. BREAU, supra note 59, at 131.
166. Id. at 132.
167. Cassese, supra note 28, at 29.
168. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999);
see also S.C. Draft Res. 328, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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Charter.169  Going even further, SC Resolution 1244, which
subsequently authorized force under UN auspices, contained no
criticism whatsoever of NATO's use of force, not even implicitly.170
Not only did states tacitly approve of NATO's intervention, but
many actually took the extra step and openly supported the action. For
example, while attending the emergency SC session, Albania and
Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly commended NATO's action. 171  The
European Union also sent a communication to the Secretary-General
endorsing the NATO intervention.17 2  Both responses showed that
Europe, the continent most affected by the tragedy, supported the
intervention. Beyond Europe, states as diverse as the members of the
Organization of Islamic States publically supported the action,
expressing "regret" that the SC failed to uphold its primary
responsibility under the Charter.17 3 The only states explicitly speaking
out against the intervention at the time included the FRY, Russia,
China, Cuba, Belarus, Ukraine, Namibia, India, and, ambiguously,
Mexico.' 74
Equally, if not more, important to the discussion on custom are the
justifications put forth by the acting states themselves. Subsequent to
the intervention, NATO states invoked HI as their sole justification,
referencing it both explicitly and implicitly as a legal doctrine. For
example, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands explicitly
stated at the SC Emergency Session for Kosovo that NATO's action was
legal.175 Belgium also invoked "humanitarian intervention" before the
ICJ in Legality of the Use of Force.176 The United States, Germany,
Canada, and France similarly responded, referring to NATO's action as
"justified and necessary to stop the violence and prevent an even greater
humanitarian disaster." 77 NATO's 19 members echoed this position
169. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; Alain Pellet, State Sovereignty and the Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 1 PUGWASH OCCASIONAL
PAPERS 37, 42 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comment: NATO's Kosovo Intervention,
NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 830 (1999).
170. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); Cassese, supra note 4, at
792.
171. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999).
172. BREAU, supra note 59, at 143-44.
173. Permanent Rep. of the Islamic Rep. of Iran to the United Nations, Letter dated 31
Mar. 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the president of the Sec. Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1999/363
(Mar. 31, 1999) [hereinafter OIS Letter].
174. Cassese, supra note 4, at 792.
175. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999).
176. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 34 (May 10,
1999).
177. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 4, 5, 8, 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999); BREAU, supra note 59, at 137 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K.
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through NATO's official justification of "avert[ing] a humanitarian
catastrophe." 178 NATO had previously gone even further and codified
HI in its Parliamentary Assembly. 179 In sum, the justifications of
NATO states and the international community demonstrate a strong
opinio juris in favor of this proposition: in situations of extreme
necessity, where the SC fails to uphold its primary responsibility to
maintain peace and security, states may be justified in undertaking
"independent" humanitarian intervention.
EVALUATING OPINIO JURIS: CONTEMPORANEOUS STATE ACTION SPEAKS
LOUDER THAN SUBSEQUENT DIPLOMATIC DEFLECTION
In the wake of Kosovo's intervention, the international community
engaged in substantial dialogue over the legitimacy of NATO's action,
as well as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention itself. This
dialogue has continued to date, pitting many states and many of
international law's most highly qualified publicists on opposite sides of
the fence: some claim that independent HI can be lawful in extreme
circumstances180 while others claim that independent HI is always
manifestly unlawful. 181 Others delicately scale the fence, arguing that
HI is legitimate, but not yet lawful.18 2 No matter the conclusion,
discerning opinio juris has always proved perplexing to international
lawyers studying humanitarian intervention. This is the result of often
conflicting state actions and official statements, incompatible acts and
statements across time, ambiguous acts of diplomacy, and, in some
instances, an inconclusive absence of action and/or comment altogether.
This creates an extremely arduous process.
To illustrate: as shown above there is significant opinio juris
favoring independent HI, especially on behalf of acting states.
Nevertheless, numerous states have subsequently, and explicitly,
rejected a "right" to HI. Most notably is the joint statement of the
Group of 77 (G77), which proclaims to reject "the so-called 'right' to
humanitarian intervention . . . ... 183 Assuming that this statement
Albright); PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
THROUGH DOCUMENTS 735-36 (2000).
178. Press Release, Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, Press Statement by
Dr. Javier Solana (Mar. 23, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/doculpr/1999/p99-
040e.htm.
179. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Recasting Euro-Atlantic
Security: NATO's Nineteen Nations-OSCE, 28 (Nov. 1998), available at www.nato-
pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1998/ar290peter-e.asp.
180. See, e.g., TES)N, supra note 20, at 6; Nanda et al., supra note 4, at 866-67;
Reisman, supra note 20, at 861; Rogers, supra note 4, at 735.
181. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 12, at 100; Simma, supra note 19, at 2-3.
182. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 59, at 226; Cassese, supra note 28, at 25.
183. Group of 77, Declaration of the South Summit, 54 (Apr. 10-14, 2000), http://
www.g77.org/summit/DeclarationG77Summit.htm.
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represents the position of all G77 Member States, this evidences the
stance of approximately 130 states.184 Out of the approximate 200
states that make up the international community, this is at least a two-
thirds majority. Thus, the natural reaction may be to conclude that
even if the remaining states demonstrate the belief that HI is lawful, it
would be insufficient to overcome this majority and form a customary
norm. Note, however, that the ICJ has explicitly held that "the mere
fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not
sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary
international law, and as applicable as such to those states."185 In other
words, one must look beyond these declarations and evaluate state
action.
There is a marked difference between this pronouncement made at
the 2000 South Summit and the practice of G77 members when actually
faced with humanitarian atrocities. In fact, practice among these
states, coupled with their legal statements at the times of intervention,
seem rather to affirm some form of HI instead of rejecting it outright.
For example, while sitting on the SC, six states from G77 endorsed the
right of HI by voting against the Draft Resolution to halt NATO
intervention - in effect, they voted in favor of NATO action (Argentina,
Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Malaysia).186 Similarly, the 15
members of ECOWAS,187 all of which are members of the G77,188 have
each resorted to HI themselves, as shown above, justifying their actions
on humanitarian grounds. Additionally, the African Union (AU), whose
53 members also all belong to the G77, has not only endorsed HI, but
has codified independent HI in its Charter without any mention of need
for SC authorization.189 Furthermore, subsequent to NATO's forceful
intervention, the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group
on Kosovo issued a statement to the SC stating: "in view of the failure
of all diplomatic efforts, due to the intransigence of the Belgrade
authorities, a decisive international action was necessary to prevent
humanitarian catastrophe and further violations of human rights in
Kosovo." 190 Presupposing that this statement reflected the views of the
Organization of Islamic Conference at the time, which seems reasonable
184. Member States, GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
185. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 184 (June 27).
186. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999).
187. Member States, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS),
http://www.ecowas.int/ (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).
188. Member States, GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
189. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, para. h (entered into force July 11,
2000).
190. OIS Letter, supra note 173, at 2 (emphasis added).
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based on the lack of objection to the letter, this represents another 29
states, not counting the 28 that are also members of the AU. 191
Therefore, what "right" the G77 states are actually rejecting is
unclear because at the time of these interventions, the large majority of
these states responded with both active and passive acceptance. 192
These responses speak much louder than subsequent diplomatic
proclamations purporting to reject humanitarian intervention. If these
states truly believed that humanitarian action was manifestly
unlawful, they should have, and likely would have, spoken out against
the action as it was occurring. To provide comparison, in other
situations of aggression, such as when Iraq invaded Kuwait, states have
been quick to complain and call on the SC and UN for action. 193
Moreover, the SC itself has been willing to condemn the inappropriate
use of force swiftly and unambiguously, such as when Uganda invaded
the Democratic Republic of Congo for reasons clearly not amounting to
HI. 194 Finally, when given the opportunity to address the situation in
its totality at the World Summit in 2005, the GA accepted the
"Responsibility to Protect," and refused to unequivocally declare that
independent HI outside of the SC was never allowed. 195 This would
have been the ideal forum in which to make such a proclamation; and
an absence of such a pronouncement speaks loudly to the
impracticability of proclaiming that independent humanitarian
intervention is never acceptable.
So how should these inconsistencies be evaluated? Ultimately,
when adding the actions and statements of various individual states, as
well as the NATO states and EU states, a total of at least 119 states
have supported independent HI is some form or another. 196 And they
191. Member States, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, http://www.oic-oci.
org/member-states.asp.
192. See Declaration of the South Summit, supra note 183.
193. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1229 (5th ed.
2009) (noting the U.N. Security Council's passing of Resolution 660 to condemn the
invasion, and Resolution 661 to place economic sanctions on Iraq); Gulf War, NEW WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gulf War
?oldid=680059 ("Kuwaiti and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the U.N. Security
Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding a
withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August the Arab League passed its own resolution. The
resolution called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against
outside intervention. On 6 August U.N. Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on
Iraq.").
194. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
116, 1 154 (Dec. 19); S.C. Res. 1304, T 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (June 16, 2000) (noting
the "violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo").
195. See World Summit, supra note 5, 138-39.
196. 28 NATO States, 53 African Union States, 28 OIS states (which are not also AU
members), Venezuela, Russia (which has claimed R2P in Georgia), Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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have done so while the situation was unfolding. Obviously, official
diplomatic statements attempting to clarify states' positions on an issue
cannot be ignored when determining whether a state is acting out of a
sense of legal obligation (the requirement for opinio juris). However, to
more clearly flush out the true motives of the acting states, state
practice must be evaluated concurrently with opinio juris. Doing so
more accurately evidences what states really believe is acceptable
under international law. It is all too easy to support an action (or
acquiesce to that action) while it is occurring, and later purport to reject
a similar action likely for fear that any ensuing doctrine would be
abused. However, the possibility of abuse does not mean that action is
unlawful when done correctly. Rather, abusive situations are unlawful;
non-abusive situations are lawful. Self-defense, for example, has been
abused countless times. This has not caused states to claim the right
no longer exists. The same can be said for true humanitarian
intervention.
Even without distinguishing the true actions of "objecting" states to
this extent before, numerous authors have concluded that a customary
right to HI exists. 197  This analysis should serve to bolster their
contentions. Consequently, if brought before the ICJ, states have a
good faith argument that a "right" to independent humanitarian
intervention exists.
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
While there is a good-faith argument that a "right" to independent
humanitarian intervention exists akin to the "right" of self-defense,
there is yet another viable argument available to states enacting true
humanitarian interventions. In the wake of Kosovo, distinguished
international jurists Antonio Cassese and Thomas Franck both came to
the conclusion that HI is not yet legal, but justified.198 The "justified"
conclusion may seem paradoxical at first, raising the question: if HI is
justified, then how would it serve international justice to find the
particular justified intervention unlawful if a country were brought
before the ICJ? In reality, such an outcome would not serve
international justice. Nevertheless, without explicitly posing a possible
remedy, the conclusion of these venerated jurists inadvertently hints at
a viable defense: the state of necessity ("necessity").
Albania, and the 6 states supporting NATO action on the Security Council (Argentina,
Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, and Malaysia).
197. See, e.g., FERNANDO TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 418 (3rd ed. 2005); Greenwood, supra note 59, at 931; Nanda, et al., supra
note 4, at 862-65; Reisman, supra note 20, at 860; Rogers, supra note 4, at 732.
198. Cassese, supra note 28, at 24-25; Franck, supra note 3, at 859.
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Necessity, which is only available in extremely rare situations,
precludes the wrongfulness of state actions that are otherwise
considered technically illegal. 199 The doctrine can be paralleled to
domestic processes that excuse illegal behaviors, despite the lack of an
established and defined defense like duress, self-defense, or insanity.
For example, states almost always allow certain classes of persons to
escape legal liability when acting for the greater good of society, such as
a fire fighter who must destroy personal property to prevent a fire from
spreading, or a police officer who is forced to trespass on private
property to apprehend an armed criminal. Lay citizens can similarly be
exonerated for their illegal acts if necessary to prevent a greater harm,
such as a child stealing a bicycle to escape from a kidnapper, or a
person running a stop sign to get a dying spouse to the hospital. Most
times these defenses are not explicitly defined in statutes, but are
rather applied by judicial bodies in the interests of upholding a clear
means to justice. The notable commonality, as with HI, is the belief
that the unlawful action is necessary to prevent greater harm.
Although "necessity" is not a rule of law strictly speaking, the
doctrine has a long history of acceptance in international law. 2 0 0 It has
been implemented by numerous international tribunals, and also
employed by the ICJ on several occasions, 201 with each coming to the
conclusion that the doctrine holds a central place in international
jurisprudence and can serve to justify otherwise unlawful actions. The
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (DASR) describe the current
customary version of necessity, 2 0 2 demonstrating that necessity does not
invalidate the international obligation concerned; "rather [it] provide[s]
a justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in
question subsists." 203
To escape wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal action, three criteria
must be fulfilled. First, the act must be "the only way for the State to
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril." 2 0 4
With HI, it is fairly simple to conclude that in some circumstances the
use of force will be the only way to stop genocide, ethnic cleansing, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity - the prevention of which is
199. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80; Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 50 (Sept. 25).
200. E.g., DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80; Legal Consequences of Construction of
Wall in Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 140 (July 9);
Gabdikovo, 1997 I.C.J. T 51.
201. See Amin George Forji, Drawing the Right Lessons from ICSID Jurisprudence on
the Doctrine of Necessity, 76 ARBITRATION 44, 49 (2010) (discussing doctrine of necessity's
use in arbitration decisions presented to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes).
202. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80.
203. Id. 2, at 71.
204. Id. art. 25, at 80.
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unquestionably an essential interest of the international community. 205
Second, the state must not have contributed to the situation of
necessity. 206 This would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
but it is clearly conceivable that this element will also usually be
fulfilled in a true humanitarian intervention. Finally, the act must "not
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole." 207 The third element is the most problematic and thus deserves
further analysis.
The two international interests most impacted by HI are state
sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. Both are without
question among the most "essential" interests of all states. However, as
illustrated above, when states fail to protect their own populations from
genocide and other atrocity crimes, they forfeit a part of their
sovereignty and lose the protection of the principle of non-intervention.
Thus, in the case of atrocity crimes, "sovereignty" does not preclude the
necessity doctrine.
The interplay between the necessity doctrine and the use of force is
a more complex situation. In the commentary to the DASR, the
International Law Commission (ILC) contends, "the plea of necessity is
not intended to cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the
primary obligations," using the rules relating to the use of force as a
possible example. 208 Therefore, at first glance necessity could appear
inapplicable to HI. However, when the DASR was drafted, the authors
also specifically addressed the possible applicability of necessity to HI
and were unable to determine whether a state of necessity could be
applicable or not.209 The conclusion at the time was that "the question
of whether measures of forcible humanitarian intervention . . . may be
lawful under modern international law is not covered by article 25."210
In other words, the authors of the DASR did not conclude either way
whether the doctrine of necessity is applicable to HI.
The greatest obstacle to overcome for necessity to work with HI is
the pronouncement of the ICJ that necessity may not be invoked "if the
international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international
205. Id. 19, at 84; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. A/760, Annex, art. 8 (Dec. 3, 1948) (adopted by G.A. Res.
260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948)). For a plea of necessity, the
contribution must be to "sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral."
DASR, supra note 78, 20 at 84; see also Gabeikovo, 1997 I.C.J. 51-52.
206. DASR, supra note 78, art. 25, at 80.
207. Id.
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law." 2 1 1 This poses a problem because the prohibition on the use of
force is commonly referred to as a peremptory or jus cogens norm.
However, it is important to note that there is no consensus among
international jurists (or states) as to the scope of the prohibition. 212 In
fact, distinguished publicists have concluded that even accepting the
undefined proposition that the non-use-of-force is jus cogens, even
characterization as jus cogens does not prohibit international evolution
of the norm's contours. 213 Thus, it is conceivable that exceptions to the
non-use-of-force principle could evolve through custom.
Consequently, if any prohibition on the use of force has attained
definable jus cogens status, it would be appropriately categorized as the
prohibition on the "aggressive" use of force. 214 And as HI is no longer
considered aggression, it is not precluded by jus cogens. A contrary
finding would mean that when acting through Uniting for Peace, the
international community - through the General Assembly - violated
this very peremptory norm. Going further, HI is aimed at halting
atrocity crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity.
These are also considered peremptory norms of international law, thus
pitting two peremptory norms against each other. If a state is violating
its erga omnes obligations by committing atrocity crimes, that state
would logically be precluded (by the unclean hands doctrine, for
example) from claiming that a state cannot use force against it to halt
these atrocities.
In any case, despite the DASR's avoidance of the doctrine's
applicability to HI, because the doctrine of necessity is also a customary
norm,215 its permissible uses as a norm of procedure can also evolve just
as substantive customary norms. Put another way, if there is
widespread belief on the part of states that HI is warranted by
"necessity" in certain circumstances, the doctrine can evolve to cover
this area of international law as well, notwithstanding its association
with the use of force. Consequently, whereas there is sufficient
evidence to find HI lawful (as demonstrated above), there is even
greater evidence showing that HI is accepted as legitimate and
"necessary" in certain extreme circumstances. In fact, HI is accepted to
such a degree that states are willing to accept humanitarian
211. Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 50 (Sept. 25).
212. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 29 (2d ed. 2004).
213. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifteenth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9, art. 37, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963),
reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, 198-99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/163; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (6th ed. 2003).
214. See, e.g., BREAU, supra note 59, at 256; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
215. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 140 (July 9).
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intervention without condemnation. 2 16 Therefore, it can reasonably be
argued that in such circumstances the legal wrongfulness of HI should
also be precluded, even if a court were to find that no "right" to
independent HI exists.
A close examination of an extreme situation demonstrates why
such an argument is desirable. In some situations, the only thing
standing between preventing genocide and standing idly by while a
Rwanda-type situation unfolds is the unwillingness of a P5 member to
give its vote. Following the absolutist argument, then, it is conceivable
that there could be a circumstance in which 191 members of the UN
were in favor of intervention, but because China, for example, vetoed
action, it would be automatically illegal. And upon this finding of
illegality, the intervening states, even if made up of these 191 nations,
could be held liable before the ICJ. This result is obviously absurd and
would be contrary to the very idea of state-developed international law.
Admittedly, such a clear-cut circumstance will never come to fruition.
However, what occurred in the above interventions is not far off-
Security Council action was blocked by virtue of the veto, or threat of
the veto, and with substantial international support, states acted to
uphold the responsibility that the SC failed to uphold. Necessarily
then, there is a gray area that allows for the use of this justification,
even if only on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, the true problem is discerning whether a particular
intervention is legal or justified under the circumstances, not whether
all interventions are per se lawful or unlawful.
WHEN IS INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION EXCUSABLE?
In sum, there are essentially two arguments available to states
that muster the political will to intervene for humanitarian purposes: a
customary "right" to humanitarian intervention or the "necessity" to put
a stop to atrocity crimes, which precludes the wrongfulness of the act.
But are they really different? The distinction is somewhat trivial on a
practical level. Clearly, the two methods vary legally: one accepts as
lawful a certain action (an exception); and the other merely precludes
the wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal action (a justification).
However, with regard to their application to independent HI, they are
essentially the same: (1) the outcome is the same (i.e., a state will or
will not be held legally liable under the doctrine of state responsibility);
(2) the process is the same (i.e., allowable use has emerged through
custom,); and, more importantly, (3) the method of reaching the
216. See supra Section 4; see also, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (1991); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999); Franck, supra note 3, at 858-59; Byers &
Chesterman, supra note 2, at 177.
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outcome is also the same (i.e., the same universally-accepted elements
for a true humanitarian intervention must be fulfilled, as discussed
below).
Despite considerable controversy over whether humanitarian
intervention is ever acceptable, there has been near universal
agreement on the necessary elements for legitimate intervention if it
were to take place. 217 They can be summed up in six categories. First,
the purpose must be to prevent mass atrocities, including genocide,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and rampant war crimes,
which the local government is either committing or unable to stop.
Second, the SC must be unable to uphold its responsibility to maintain
peace and security because of the use or threat of the veto by one of its
permanent members. Third, intervention must be necessary (i.e., all
reasonable peaceful means have been exhausted). Fourth, the action
must be proportionate (the use of force must truly be for humanitarian
purposes and limited in extent and scope stopping those atrocities).
Fifth, the HI must not be opposed by a majority of states. Finally, the
intervention must not pose a greater threat to international peace and
security than the atrocities that it is meant to stop. There is little, if
any, controversy over these elements. 218
The real issue is with timing. Whether it is appropriate to find an
intervention legal or justified requires a case-by-case determination. 2 19
In particular, special attention must be given to whether intervention
would cause (or has caused) greater tensions throughout the world,
thereby threatening international peace and security. Remember, the
underlying rationale for humanitarian intervention in the first place is
the protection of human life. If intervention threatens even greater loss
of life by creating a world war, for example, it would obviously not be
desirable, lawful, or justified. Likewise, if an intervention is not
proportionate and causes greater destruction than it was alleged to
prevent, it will also not be justified. Additionally, the action must be
both necessary and widely supported by the international community.
All of these elements must be sufficiently fulfilled to fall under
either the exception of HI or the doctrine of necessity. However, it is not
possible to fully assess these elements prior to intervention. Thus, in
most cases it will be a necessary evil to fully judge the justifiability of
humanitarian intervention only after the fact. This invariably poses a
problematic risk for states considering independent humanitarian
217. R2P, supra note 5, at 32-37.
218. See, e.g., Statement by the Rep. of the U.K., U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg.
at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999); R2P, supra note 5, at 32-37; Cassese,
supra note 28, at 27. This consensus has emerged through the valuable work of several
independent commissions acting at the bequest of the General Assembly and other
regional organizations. See, e.g., R2P, supra note 5.
219. E.g., World Summit, supra note 5, T 139.
200 VOL. 40:1-3
2012 STATEs DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
intervention, but such is the reality of one of the most difficult doctrines
in international law. Nonetheless, difficulty does not proscribe legality.
And when discussing legal liability, determining whether a state acted
consistently with its international obligations is always an after-the-
fact analysis anyway. The question analyzed herein is not whether
states should intervene, but whether the ICJ could conceivably excuse a
state if one day it did act to put an end to atrocity crimes. The answer
is yes.
LOOKING FORWARD
If a state is brought before the ICJ and alleges HI as a defense, how
the court rules is of no small consequence. In fact, the rationale relied
upon could very well put the entire international community in the
position of having to choose between (1) taking action and testing the
scope of the non-use-of-force principle or (2) remaining inactive and
risking violation of its responsibility to protect targeted civilian
populations. The reason for this stems from prior ICJ jurisprudence.
In the 2007 Genocide opinion, the ICJ recognized that all states
have a legal obligation to take action to prevent genocide. 220 This
obligation arises from Article 1 of the Genocide Convention 221 - a norm
also widely recognized as custom. 2 22 In short, the Court held that the
obligation of states to prevent genocide is both "normative and
compelling," extending beyond the responsibilities of the competent UN
organs:
Even if and when these organs have been called upon, this
does not mean that the States parties to the Convention
are relieved of the obligation to take such action as they
can to prevent genocide from occurring, while respecting
the United Nations Charter and any decisions that may
have been taken by its competent organs. 223
Accordingly, states are instructed that they have an obligation to
employ "all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
genocide so far as possible." 224  When a state does not take "all
measures . . . within its power," then it incurs legal responsibility. 225
The Court addresses several considerations when determining whether
a state should be responsible for failure to prevent genocide - namely
capacity to influence the situation, political links to those responsible
220. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 427 (Feb. 26).
221. See id. T 426.
222. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 721, 744
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
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for genocide, and geographical proximity to the events. However, the
Court also explicitly notes that the required action must be "within the
limits permitted by international law."2 2 6
This brings this discussion to the crux of the matter. In Genocide,
the Court did not address whether outside states could (or should) use
force to protect civilian populations. Indeed, in that case it would have
been improper for the Court to do so. But if the Court were to someday
rule that there is a "right" to humanitarian intervention, this
pronouncement could instantly transform the R2P from an aspirational
doctrine to one potentially requiring forceful actions (at least in regards
to preventing genocide). In other words, because the prohibition on the
use of force is the only norm preventing states from taking forceful
action in the face of genocide, once a right to use force for HI is
recognized, nothing proscribes states from using forceful measures.
And if there is no legal proscription on the action, states could
conceivably be held responsible for not taking "all measures within
their power" to prevent genocide (and possibly other atrocity crimes), 227
including force.
Creating such a legal requirement would admittedly be extremely
confounding. Evaluating issues such as whether using force was
actually within a state's capacity, 2 2 8 whether all states could be
simultaneously held liable for the same failure, and whether states with
greater military capacity or in closer proximity are more liable for the
failure would be exceedingly arduous. Nevertheless, avoiding this legal
predicament is something the ICJ will have to consider when in fact it
is called upon to answer the controversial question of whether
independent HI is ever acceptable in modern international law. In this
vein, because the international community has demonstrated
acceptance of independent HI in rare circumstances, perhaps relying on
the necessity doctrine would be the Court's more prescient option.
226. Id.
227. While the ICJ decision clearly only refers to and applies to genocide as such, the
movement in the international community is towards equating atrocity crimes such as
ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity with genocide - with all
necessitating the same responsibility to protect. Therefore, depending on the change in
custom with regard to these norms, the responsibility to prevent could also conceivably be
applicable to these crimes as well.
228. It should be noted, however, that ability to succeed is not an allowable excuse -
at least under the current rationale of the Genocide opinion. The Court held: "As
indicated above, for a State to be held responsible for breaching its obligation of
prevention, it does not need to be proven that the State concerned definitely had the
power to prevent the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it
manifestly refrained from using them." Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. T 438.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the evolution of humanitarian intervention provides
states with two viable defenses if brought before the International
Court of Justice: (1) the right to humanitarian intervention and (2) the
doctrine of necessity. Because of the marked incongruities in states'
responses to HI, discerning the outcome of this evolution is not easy.
Nevertheless, by giving due weight to the contemporaneous statements
and actions (or inactions) of states at the time interventions have taken
place, rather than being misled by subsequent diplomatic statements
aimed at discouraging abuse of the independent HI doctrine, it is
possible to recognize an opinio juris of states that HI is lawful (or at
least legally justified) when truly taken for humanitarian reasons, when
conducted proportionately to that purpose, and when international
peace is not put in greater peril because of the intervention.
The tension between sovereignty, permissible uses of force, and the
prevention of atrocity crimes is unavoidable. Even so, this evolution
towards independent humanitarian intervention was somewhat
inevitable considering the world's foremost priority of protecting human
life. In fact, the evolution was prophesized at the time of the Charter's
inception by the likes of former ICJ judge Philip C. Jessup. Judge
Jessup concluded that if the SC were unable "to act with the speed
requisite to preserve life," individual states would be justified to act in
lieu of the ineffective "collective measures under the [SC]."229 Indeed,
prior to the inception of the UN Charter, the international community
openly accepted independent HI.2 30 However, upon establishment of
the Charter, states resolved to refrain from the use of force, 231 and to
take collective action - through the UN - to maintain international
peace and security. 232 Notably, states never rejected the idea of HI per
se. Instead, they agreed to the terms of the Charter, believing that the
SC would guide the collective actions of Member States and act "on
their behalf."233 When this ideal failed to materialize, independent HI
reemerged.
Whether states take the next logical step and realize the connection
between this "right" and their "responsibility" to protect beleaguered
populations from atrocity crimes is yet to be seen. As it has always
been, the biggest obstacle to the prevention of mass atrocities is the not
the existence of non-permissive legal doctrines - it is the lack of
political will.
229. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 170 (1948).
230. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338
(1963).
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
232. Id. art. 42.
233. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
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IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
THROUGH THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
JENNIFER MOORE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1945 the United Nations was founded on the audacious notion
that the use of military force - "the scourge of war" - should be
contained at all cost.' Then in 1948 the UN General Assembly
recognized the interconnected web of civil-political rights and socio-
economic rights by adopting the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, inspiring the world community to protect the full spectrum of
rights as the surest path to durable peace and human security. 2 Yet in
the twenty-first century states continue to pursue geopolitical interests
through military interventions, in violation of the UN Charter, and
armed forces continue to target civilians, in violation of humanitarian
law. Moreover, despite the post-Holocaust pledge "never again," crimes
against humanity have continued to proliferate around the globe, from
Cambodia and Argentina in the 1970's, to Bosnia and Sierra Leone in
the 1990's, to Darfur and Sri Lanka in recent years. 3 Finally, states
and international institutions prioritize civil liberties at the expense of
social rights, despite overwhelming evidence that pervasive under-
development and entrenched socio-economic inequality lead inexorably
to armed conflict.
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. U.N. Charter preamble, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
preamble.shtml.
2. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
3. E.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, "Never Again" Promise Broken Again. Again. And Again,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1723, 1723-29 (2006); see also Daisy Sindelar, Post-Holocaust World
Promised 'Never Again'- But Genocide Persists, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (Jan.
26, 2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057096.html; see also JENNIFER MOORE,
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ACTION WITHIN AFRICA 1-2 (Oxford University Press 2012)
(referencing genocides in Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda and Darfur in recent years, as well as
humanitarian emergencies in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Uganda over
the past two decades).
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This essay is a peaceful call to arms based on the understanding
that an essential way to fight the most egregious and widespread
human rights abuses is through a broad-spectrum approach to human
security grounded in the Millennium Development Goals and a new,
non-military, understanding of humanitarian intervention. The
responsibility to protect, often cited as a justification for military force to
stop genocide, crimes against humanity, and other widespread human
rights abuses, is better seen as a commitment by all nations to
strengthen their own social welfare and human rights systems, and for
those nations with more resources to assist those with less to do the
same.
Section A below reviews the United Nations' early emphasis on
constraining the use of military force and promoting human rights in
both civil-political and socio-economic terms. Section B contrasts the
prevailing contemporary responses of the international community to
varying types of human rights abuses. Section C focuses on two
important twenty-first century developments in international law: the
responsibility to protect (R2P) and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). I conclude by arguing that a socio-economic vision of
humanitarian intervention provides the international community with
a vital opportunity to return to first principles regarding the meaning of
human dignity and security.
A. THE UNITED NATIONS IN INFANCY: PREVENTING WAR AND PROTECTING
HUmAN RIGHTS
The Vision of the UN Charter
The Members of the United Nations, in the Preamble to its
Charter, pledge themselves "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, [and] in
the dignity and worth of the human person. . ."4 The prevention of war
and the protection of human rights are fundamental to the form and
function of the United Nations, reflected in the mandate of two of its
primary organs: the Security Council, in its charge to maintain peace
and security; and the Economic and Social Council, in its call to
enhance human security and promote human rights.5
In the realm of war and peace, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state . . ."6 Qualifying this general
4. See U.N. Charter, supra note 1.
5. See id. arts. 39, 62.
6. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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prohibition, Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council
to order or permit the use of military force where necessary "to
maintain or restore international peace and security," and Article 51
recognizes the right to "individual or collective self-defense."7 Thus,
despite the Preamble's recognition of the "scourge of war," the Charter
seems to express a qualified acceptance of the use of force.
In addition to the language of the Charter, a customary norm of
humanitarian intervention has been cited from time to time to justify
military intervention in the name of ending widespread human rights
abuses, as in the late 1970's when Tanzanian troops defeated Idi Amin
in Uganda and Vietnamese forces removed Cambodia's Khmer Rouge
government. Humanitarian intervention was one proffered rationale
for the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003.8 Thus, alongside the
difficulty of legally reconciling a treaty-based general prohibition
against the use of force with a customary basis for exceptional
circumstances in which force is justified, the norm of humanitarian
intervention may be prone to a certain self-serving application by
states.9
Despite the potential for manipulation of the norm, humanitarian
intervention remains a compelling concept, particularly in the face of
crimes against humanity. The United Nations' recent articulation of
the responsibility to protect, discussed below, is a contemporary
interpretation of this long-standing tradition. Yet R2P is short-changed
when conceived as a mere mandate to use force. Its deeper potential
lies in obviating the need for military intervention through the
provision of development assistance that enhances socio-economic
conditions of life throughout the developing world.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In affirming human dignity, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)1o remains the mother lode of modern human rights
instruments. The significance of the UDHR is unquestioned, whether it
is considered to be customary international law, an amplification of the
7. Id. arts. 39, 51.
8. See Ann Clwyd, Iraq is Free at Last: The Evidence of Saddam's Atrocities I
Collected Was Enough to Vindicate Invasion, But It Wasn't Taken Seriously, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/30/iraq.iraql. See
generally President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/12/nationallmain521781.shtml
(President Bush addressed the United Nations laying the foundational justifications for
the 2003 invasion).
9. See JENNIFER MOORE, HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ACTION WITHIN AFRICA 52 ("The
potential corruption of the responsibility to protect in the cynical service of national self-
interest is dramatically illustrated by the US rationalization for launching the Iraq war in
2003 and Russia's characterization of its invasion of South Ossetia in 2008.").
10. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2.
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human rights provisions in the Charter, or the blueprint for a new wave
of international human rights treaties. Chief among its progeny are the
two International Covenants, adopted in 1966; and three regional
human rights treaties, covering Europe, the Americas and Africa,
respectively. The human rights enumerated in the UDHR encompass
basic physical and psychic integrity, as in the rights to life, humane
treatment, equality, and due process; liberty rights, including political
participation and freedom of expression; and welfare rights, spanning
education, health care, and a decent standard of living.I1
A core principle of the Universal Declaration is the
interdependence and inseparability of so-called socio-economic and civil-
political rights. The UDHR Preamble proclaims "the advent of a world
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want . .. as the highest aspiration of the common
people." 12 Despite this integrated vision of human rights, when the
international community sat down to draft treaty language in 1966, it
carved out two separate spheres in the form of two international
covenants, one dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, the
other with civil and political rights.
B. PUTTING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE TEST: REMEDIES FOR CIVIL-
POLITICAL VIOLATIONS AND Socio-EcoNoMIc DEPRIVATIONS
Human rights are too often honored in the breach. All too often,
students of human rights law explore their subject matter through
narratives of human rights violations in countries around the world.
What they quickly learn is that the mechanisms for enforcing the
norms, through prevention and remedial measures, are limited in scope
and impact. Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are mandated to identify
violations, call for reforms, and sometimes impose tort-like reparations,
but such action is not uniformly taken. A common distinction is drawn
between instances of political repression and experiences of social
misery. States are more frequently found liable for denials of civil
liberties than they are called to account for deprivations of social
welfare.
A welfare-centered vision of humanitarian intervention would help
correct the disequilibrium in the implementation of civil-political and
socio-economic human rights. Our first task is to trace the historical
roots of this double standard, originating in the decision to draft two
separate international covenants in the decades following the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949.
11. Id. 1-3, 5-7, 11, 18-19, 21-26.
12. Id. Preamble.
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Repression of Civil Liberties
A variety of human rights treaties have empowered judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies to hear allegations of violations of civil and
political rights. The first to do so was the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),13 which entered into force in
1976. The ICCPR codified a number of peremptory norms of
international law, namely the prohibitions against torture, slavery, and
extra-judicial execution. In addition, the treaty spans a broad spectrum
of civil and political liberties, including due process and fair trial rights,
freedom of movement, privacy, freedom of conscience and religion, free
expression, freedom of assembly, the right to participate in government,
and the equal protection of the law. These norms are also set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Civil and Political
Covenant further recognizes the right of all peoples to self-
determination, and devotes a separate article to the equal rights of men
and women. 14
Article 2 of the ICCPR obligates each state party "to respect and to
ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized . . . without
distinction of any kind." The "respect and ensure" language in the Civil
and Political Covenant implies a relatively high degree of state
obligation encompassing the state's duty to refrain from violations by
its own agents and its responsibility to prevent and punish violations by
non-state actors. The ICCPR also created a Human Rights Committee
(HRC) with limited powers to interpret treaty provisions. States may
sue each other in the HRC, alleging violations of enumerated rights.
Furthermore, for states that have ratified a Protocol to the ICCPR,
individuals may bring claims against their signatory governments for
violations of their rights under the treaty. The HRC communicates its
conclusion to the individual and the state as to whether specific
provisions of the covenant have been violated.' 5
Other treaties that concentrate on civil and political rights are the
African [Banjul] Convention on Human and People's Rights, the
American Convention on Human Rights, and the [European]
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 16 These treaties have created courts and/or commissions of
13. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, 1, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
14. Id. arts. 1, 3.
15. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
5, 1 4, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23
1976).
16. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Banjul Charter]; American
Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
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human rights with jurisdiction to respond to petitions brought by
individuals against their governments, as well as inter-state
complaints. These judicial bodies have the capacity to determine if the
responsible state party has breached a particular human rights norm
and to require that the state make reparations for the harm it
perpetrated, or which occurred under its watch. They may also call on
the state to reform its legal system to prevent such violations from
replicating themselves in the future.17
Deprivations of Social Welfare
In contrast to the consequences when there are violations of civil
and political rights, the available remedies for breaches of economic and
social rights are more limited. Yet despite the more qualified treaty
language regarding state obligations to guarantee socio-economic
rights, compelling legal, moral, and pragmatic arguments support state
responsibility to promote social welfare by guaranteeing decent living
conditions for all.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR)18 was adopted in 1966 alongside the ICCPR, and, like
its companion treaty, entered into force in 1976. The ICESCR
recognizes a broad spectrum of socio-economic rights, including freedom
of choice in employment, fair wages, safe working conditions, collective
bargaining, social security, an adequate standard of living, health care,
and education. These rights are articulated in similar form in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the Economic and
Social Covenant contains two articles that virtually mirror two
provisions of the Civil and Political Covenant: those devoted to the right
of all peoples to self-determination, and the equal rights of men and
women. 19
In contrast to the ICCPR, Article 2 of the Economic and Social
Covenant requires state parties "to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953).
17. Despite their emphasis on civil-political rights, two of the three regional treaties
also cover socio-economic rights to a limited extent. The Banjul Charter has three
provisions relating to the rights to work, health, and education, respectively. Banjul
Charter, supra note 16, arts. 15-17. The American Convention includes one provision by
which parties "undertake to adopt measures ... with a view to achieving progressively . .
the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
Charter of the Organization of American States ... American Convention, supra note
16, art. 26.
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/1law/cescr.htm.
19. Id. arts. 1, 3.
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technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized ...
[which shall] be exercised without discrimination of any kind. . . . "20 In
effect, the ICESCR made the enjoyment of economic and social rights
dependent on state priorities in the allocation of resources or on the
largesse of the international community.
The Economic and Social Covenant did not create a quasi-judicial
body with powers commensurate with those of the Human Rights
Committee created under the Civil and Political Covenant.
Nevertheless, despite important limitations on its mandate, the
ICESCR did constitute a Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights with certain important responsibilities. State parties must
report to the Economic and Social Committee on their progress in
promoting the rights to education, health care, social security, and so
forth. The committee can also issue "general comments" broadly
interpreting certain provisions of the treaty, as it has on a spectrum of
socio-economic rights, including housing, food, education, health, and
water. 21 However, unlike the Human Rights Committee, the Economic
and Social Committee is not mandated to hear inter-state or individual
petitions. It also lacks the power to issue injunctive or remedial relief
when a state is found to have violated treaty provisions, including the
rights to food, affordable health care, free public education, or a decent
standard of living.
Socio-economic human rights violations are as worthy of mandatory
reparations and individual accountability mechanisms as are abuses of
civil and political rights. Socio-economic deprivations are widespread,
and the statistics are especially dramatic when we look at the globe
through a comparative lens. If we consider the countries of the
industrialized world in the aggregate, gross national income (GNI) per
capita averages at nearly $40,000 per year. 22 Yet across the sixty least
developed countries (LDCs) of the United Nations, in contrast, GNI per
capita averages at less than $1,400 per year. Across the industrialized
countries, life expectancy on average is eighty years, but for the LDCs
overall, life expectancy is less than sixty years. In the richest countries
of the world, average time in school is eleven years, whereas in the
poorest countries it is under four years. 23
20. Id. art. 2.
21. See Comments on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Introduction, U.N. Doc
E/1989/22, annex III, at 87 (1989), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
gencommlepintro.htm.
22. See, e.g., GNI Per Capita, PPP (current international $), The World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
23. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS
To HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 152-56 (2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/
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If the indices of underdevelopment, economic inequality, human
insecurity, and material deprivation are not enough to compel the world
community to prioritize socio-economic rights, then perhaps the
correlation between war and poverty will. There are significantly more
wars, particularly civil wars, in poorer countries than there are in
richer countries. Specifically, for the decade between 1997 and 2006,
the probability of armed conflict in the world's most developed countries
was less than two percent. For the same period, the probability of
armed conflict for the least developed countries was nearly 40 percent. 24
Data linking underdevelopment to armed conflict and other
humanitarian emergencies suggest there is a compelling argument for
human rights-based interventions that are constructive rather than
coercive in nature, entailing investments in social infrastructure rather
than military firepower.
C. THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE MILLENNIUM: R2P AND THE MDGS
The responsibility to protect is an emergent principle of state
accountability for massive human rights violations, developed as an
antidote to international paralysis in the face of recurring and enduring
humanitarian tragedies from Bosnia to Rwanda and Darfur. Arguably
more ambitious than humanitarian intervention, which purports to
justify a state's military action to stop abuses in another state, R2P
implies the state's obligation to end such abuses.
"The Responsibility to Protect" was the title of a paper published in
December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, established by the Government of Canada, exploring
a principled basis for "intervention on human protection grounds."25
The Commission's recommendations were cited by then-U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan in his 2005 report to the UN General Assembly
entitled "In Larger Freedom." R2P was endorsed by 150 members of
the General Assembly during the 2005 session. 26 As a source of
international law, the concept is still in the throes of progressive
HDR_2010_ENComplete-reprint.pdf (stating that the specific data for the LDCs is life
expectancy of 57.7 years, years of schooling of 3.7 years, and GNI per capita of $1,393).
24. John Siebert, Addressing Armed Violence in Development Programming, PROJECT
PLOUGHSHARES (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/
addressing-armed-violence-development-programming. The more exact figures are a 1.6
percent probability of armed conflict across the industrialized world and a 38.7 percent
probability for the least developed countries considered in the aggregate. Id.
25. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
ICISS%2OReport.pdf.
26. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 11 138-39, U.N. Doc AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf; see also Neil
MacFarquhar, When to Step In to Stop War Crimes Causes Fissures, N.Y. Times, July 22,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/23nation.htm1.
2012 211
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
development. Annan recommended that the Security Council adopt a
resolution formalizing R2P, but such action has not yet been taken.
In 2009, during the term of Annan's successor Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon, the General Assembly reevaluated the responsibility to
protect, inviting the testimony of Edward Luck, Ban's special advisor on
R2P. Luck recommended a three-stage approach: first, calling upon the
state of origin to fulfill its primary responsibility to protect the people
residing on its territory from massive human rights abuses; second,
encouraging the home state to call on other states for help in the event
it is unable to stop violations on its own; and third, if necessary,
requiring the international community to intervene to provide life-
saving assistance, with military action a last resort.27
During the debate regarding implementation of R2P, several state
representatives and experts challenged the wisdom of the principle,
most notably and eloquently the Assembly President himself, Rev.
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua. D'Escoto cautioned that
R2P was ripe for abuse by powerful countries, and suggested that "R21"
- the right to intervene - was a more candid term of art. 2 8
The potential for corruption of the responsibility to protect in the
cynical service of national self-interest is dramatically illustrated by the
U.S. rationalization for launching the Iraq war in 2003, and Russia's
characterization of its invasion of South Ossetia in 2008. But the
prevailing critique of R2P may obscure two competing and compelling
realities. First, the more long-standing norm of humanitarian
intervention already tolerates military intervention by another state in
extreme human rights emergencies, so the risk of a superpower
overreaching is not a new one. Second, the most challenging aspect of
R2P is not that it permits military intervention, but that it may require
states to provide assistance to states facing humanitarian crises,
including food, shelter, sanitation, and medical care. 29
Envisioning R2P primarily in terms of military engagement is
shortsighted. The untapped potential of the responsibility to protect is
in challenging the developed states to assume a larger responsibility for
redistributing their own considerable economic resources in promoting
and protecting socio-economic rights in the developing world. The
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide a framework for
assessing development priorities and material conditions of life for




29. See JONATHAN MOORE, MORALITY AND INTER-DEPENDENCE 23-25 (1994).
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people in the global South and for channeling the resources of the global
North to respond to those needs.30
The Millennium Development Goals
In 2000, the UN General Assembly convened to grapple with the
stark realities of human insecurity throughout the globe, in the form of
widespread poverty, failures in primary health care, illiteracy,
environmental degradation, and the widening development gap
between rich and poor countries. With a sense of urgency, the General
Assembly sought to establish specific quantitative benchmarks for
improved material conditions of life, particularly for people residing in
the developing world. The fruit of these discussions was the adoption of
the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which set forth specific
goals for the international community to meet by 2015. The eight
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) comprise: (1) reducing extreme
poverty and hunger by one half; (2) achieving universal primary
education; (3) promoting gender equality; (4) cutting child mortality by
two thirds; (5) lowering maternal mortality by three quarters; (6)
fighting HIV/AIDS; (7) strengthening environmental sustainability;
and, (8) building a global partnership for development.31
The Millennium Development Goals are just that: they constitute
soft law. Nevertheless, the Millennium Declaration is a springboard for
the progressive development of stronger protections for socio-economic
human rights. It establishes an aspirational framework from which to
interpret obligations under treaty or customary law. Limited progress
toward realizing the Millennium Development Goals suggests the need
for better enforcement of socio-economic rights, as well as a vision of
humanitarian intervention that focuses on enhancing material and
community well-being rather than the application of military force.
PROGRESS TOWARD THE MDGs
Halving Poverty and Hunger
According to the United Nations' yearly progress report on the
Millennium Development Goals, the international community is on
track to meet the goal of halving the number of people living on less
than $1.25 a day, the marker of extreme poverty. The global poverty
rate, at 46 percent in 1990, was down to 27 percent in 2005, and is
projected to be at or below 15 percent by 2015.32 In Sub-Saharan
30. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 11, 14-15, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2, at 4 (Sept. 18, 2000).
31. Id. J1 19-21.
32. UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2011 6-7
(2011), available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress
2011/11-31339%o20(E)%o20MDG2OReporto202011_Booko20LR.pdf.
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Africa, the poverty rate has also decreased, although less markedly
than the global rate, from 58 percent in 1990, to 51 percent in 2005, and
is projected to hit 36 percent by 2015.33 Not only does Africa lag behind
global trends, but also the gap between the regional and global poverty
rates is widening. Relatively speaking, if projections are accurate, the
Sub-Saharan African poverty rate in 2015 will be over 200 percent of
the overall world poverty rate, whereas in 1990 it was only around 25
percent higher than the global rate. 34
Unlike the global poverty rate, which is steadily decreasing, there
has been a notable lag in progress toward reducing the incidence of
hunger worldwide. In 1990, around 20 percent of world's population
had difficulty meeting their daily nutritional needs. While that
percentage had decreased to 16 percent in 2000, it was still at 16
percent in 2007, and based on UN projections it will not meet the target
level of 10 percent by 2015.35 The lack of a strong correlation between
improvements in the poverty rate and decreases in the hunger rate
suggests a "disconnect" between marginal increases in income and
improved access to food. 36 Food availability and affordability are likely
to further deteriorate given our current global financial crisis, which is
characterized by increasing volatility in the price of staple foodstuffs.
Moreover, food insecurity is regarded as the most important catalyst for
civil strife, more significant even than increasing levels of poverty. 37
Thus, enhancing food security, alongside income generation, is essential
to development assistance and should be at the heart of articulating a
socio-economic vision of humanitarian intervention.
Universal Primary Education
In the developing world as a whole, the percentage of children
completing a full course of primary school increased from 82 percent to
89 percent over the past decade. Despite this progress, universal
primary education is not expected to be attained by 2015, based on
current projections. Nevertheless, the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa
has improved more than any other region, going from 58 percent to 76
percent over the same period. Thus, in contrast to the poverty rate, in
the field of primary education the gap between rich and poor countries
is narrowing, at least from the perspective of Sub-Saharan Africa.38
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. See Per Pinstrup-Andersen & Satoru Shimokawa, Do Poverty and Poor Health
and Nutrition Increase the Risk of Armed Conflict Onset?, 33 FOOD POL'Y 513, 519-20
(2008) (concluding that government policies that improve access to food and health care
enhance stability).
38. THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 16-17.
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For education to have its full impact on enhancing the quality of
life, the pipeline must continue beyond the primary level. Access to
secondary and post-secondary education, particularly for women,
enhances other socio-economic rights and furthers other MDGs, as we
shall see below.
Promoting Gender Equality
The United Nations measures progress toward gender equality
chiefly in terms of gender parity in education, primary through tertiary;
access to income-generating activities; and representation in national
legislatures. Focusing on work, while women's involvement in non-
agricultural employment is increasing, it is not targeted to reach 50
percent by 2015. In 1990, women filled 35 percent of all non-farm-
related jobs, to men's 65 percent, and by 2009 they were up to 40
percent, and by 2015, women are expected to constitute 41 percent of all
non-farm wage-earners. The situation for women in Africa lags behind
global trends but is still improving steadily and at an even higher rate:
in 1990 women were 24 percent of the non-agricultural workforce, in
2009 they were up to 33 percent and in 2015, the figure is projected to
be 36 percent. 39 More progress in women's equal access to employment
will be enhanced by advancements in women's level of education, which
in turn will serve the socio-economic conditions of life for other
members of their families and communities.40
Reducing Child Mortality
The United Nations uses the term "child mortality" to refer to the
death of a child before reaching five years of age. The fourth
Millennium Development Goal is to cut the incidence of child mortality
by two-thirds over a 25-year period. Worldwide deaths of children
under five have already declined by one-third over the past two decades,
from 12.4 million per year in 1990 to 8.1 million in 2009. It is feasible
that child mortality will decrease by the same amount by 2015.41
However, the child mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is twice the
mean for the developing world overall, and the gap between Africa and
the other regions in terms of infant mortality appears to be widening.
In concrete terms, one in eight African children dies before her fifth
birthday, whereas worldwide one in 16 children die before age five. 4 2
Indicators of progress in the struggle to help children survive their
first five years reveal the proverbial glass as half empty and half full.
For example, in four African countries, the national child mortality rate
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 21-22, 26.
41. Id. at 24.
42. Id. at 25.
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has already decreased by 50 percent over the past twenty years. 4 3
However, it is essential that child mortality rates not be viewed in a
vacuum. The improved quality of children's lives requires the overall
enhancement of socio-economic conditions in their families and
communities. Illustrating the interconnected web of human rights
protections, children whose mothers are educated have greater chances
of survival into healthy adulthood, and their future prospects improve
as their mothers attain higher levels of education.44
Lowering Maternal Mortality
The specific millennium development target for women in their
childbearing years is to reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters.
Worldwide, deaths of women during and immediately after childbirth
have been reduced by around 35 percent over the past two decades, still
a far cry from the 75 percent goal. Once again, there are regional
disparities. Nearly nine out of ten women who die in childbirth reside
in Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. 45 Moreover, for most women who
do not survive childbirth, the immediate cause of death is avoidable, as
in cases of hemorrhage, sepsis, or malaria. 46
In yet another illustration of the inter-connections between health
and other attributes of social status, women who die in childbirth are
more likely to have had less schooling, to have given birth to more
children, and to have experienced more gender-based discrimination
than women who survive childbirth.47  The data on women's
reproductive health reinforces the broader lesson that enhancing
women's equality and full participation in community life should be at
the heart of development policy, and a central aspect of welfare-based
humanitarian intervention.
Combating HIV/AIDS and Other Preventable Diseases
The United Nations defines the HIV incidence rate as the number
of people out of 100 who are newly infected with HIV during a given
year. The global number of new cases peaked in 1997, and between
2001 and 2009 dropped by 25 percent, from 0.08 to 0.06, meaning that
in 2009, six people out of ten thousand were newly infected with HIV,
as compared to eight a decade before. In Africa, the HIV incidence rate
in 2009 was 0.4, which is over six times the global rate of new
infections. Nevertheless, Africa's AIDS incidence rate has been
shrinking even faster than the global rate, down from 0.57 in 2001,
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Id. at 26.





signifying a 30 percent decrease in new HIV cases over the past
decade.48
Along with battling HIV/AIDS, the sixth MDG also targets
improved prevention and treatment of other serious diseases such as
tuberculosis and malaria. With regard to malaria, the increased
numbers of children who now sleep under treated bed nets are evidence
of advances in prevention. Properly used bed nets dramatically reduce
malaria transmission by preventing the mosquito carriers from
alighting on the skin of children during the evening hours when the
mosquitoes sting. In Sierra Leone, for example, just two percent of
children were sleeping under mosquito-blocking nets in 2000, and by
2010 the percentage of protected children had increased to 26 percent.
The figures for other African countries are even more dramatic: in
Tanzania, two percent of children protected in 2000 had increased by
2010 to 64 percent of children who were sleeping under bed nets. 49
Strengthening Environmental Sustainability
The MDG relating to the environment is to reverse the loss of
environmental resources, particularly forests and water, and to cut
emissions in greenhouse gases. With respect to woodlands,
deforestation in some regions, particularly in Africa and South America,
is partially offset by afforestation, or the natural expansion of forests,
particularly in Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, the net impact has been
the average yearly loss of 5.2 million hectares of forest throughout the
past decade. Only the rate of deforestation is decreasing, down from a
yearly average of 8.3 million hectares of lost forest over the decade from
1990 to 2000.50
Regarding greenhouse gases, global carbon dioxide emissions
continue to rise, from 21.8 billion metric tons in 1990 to 30.1 billion
metric tons of carbon emissions in 2008, a 38 percent increase. At least
the rate of increased emissions has slowed, from a 2.9 percent increase
from 2006 to 2007, down to a 1.7 percent increase from 2007 to 2008.
However, at least part of this slowdown in increased emissions is
related to the decreased economic activity associated with the current
global financial crisis. 51
Sustainable water usage varies throughout the globe, from plentiful
supplies to extreme depletion, in the case of North Africa and Western
Asia. According to indicators used by the United Nations, if a country
or region withdraws 25 percent or less of its renewable water resources
at a given time, water resources are considered to be abundant.
48. Id. at 36-37.
49. Id. at 43-44.
50. Id. at 48-49.
51. Id. at 49-50.
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Contrastingly, if 60 percent or more water resources are withdrawn, a
situation of scarcity is said to be approaching. Finally, if 75 percent or
more water resources are exploited, sustainable limits have been
exceeded. While most regions of the world still have plenty of surface
water and groundwater for the time being, including South America,
Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, two regions are approaching
scarcity and two have exceeded sustainable bounds. Central Asia
exploits 56 percent of its renewable water resources and Southern Asia
utilizes 58 percent of its supply. Northern Africa is withdrawing 92
percent of its surface water and groundwater and Western Asia is
utilizing a quantity of water that amounts to an astounding 166 percent
of the available supply.52
Global statistics regarding the depletion of environmental
resources are sobering, to say the least. We are moving backwards: the
world's population as a whole is engaging in increasingly unsustainable
patterns of resource exploitation. Humanitarian intervention, often
focused on immediate conditions of violence, repression, and social
misery, should also take into account the long-term impact of the
depletion of our shared global environment. Militaristic interventions
may exacerbate resource wars, whereas a greener vision of
humanitarian intervention can concentrate on alleviating the
competition for scarce resources that fuels armed conflict in the first
place.
Galvanizing a Global Partnership for Development
The eighth and final MDG, the global partnership for development,
encompasses commitments by industrialized countries to provide
economic assistance to developing countries in the form of emergency
aid, longer-term development programs, and debt relief. In essence, the
final MDG is the strategy for funding the MDGs overall. In 2010, net
aid to developing countries by developed countries was nearly 130
billion dollars, which amounted to less than half of one percent of the
combined national incomes of the wealthier countries, or 0.32 percent.
Nevertheless, this was the highest yearly level of combined global
development assistance on record.53
Despite the development assistance record set in 2010, the 130
billion dollars still represented a 19 billion dollar deficit according to
pledges that had been made by eight of the world's wealthiest countries
in 2005 at a development aid summit held that year in Gleneagles,
Scotland. Moreover, the aid gap had a harsher impact on certain
regions of the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, which
in 2010 received fourteen billion dollars less assistance than had been
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 58.
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promised in 2005.54 The recent shortfall in development assistance is
attributed to various sources, including the global financial crisis, and
the fact that a disproportionate amount of African assistance was
pledged by European countries that are among those hardest hit by the
economic recession.
The current MDG donation target challenges each industrialized
country to give 0.7 percent of its national income to development
assistance. While several Nordic states already exceed this benchmark
and nations such as the United Kingdom and Belgium are close to
meeting it, other wealthy countries lag behind. For example, in 2009
the United States gave only 0.2 percent of its national income in aid to
developing countries,55 while devoting nearly 5 percent of its gross
domestic product that same year to military spending.56 At the same
time, the United States is the biggest donor in absolute terms as
opposed to relative terms, giving nearly twenty-nine billion dollars in
development assistance in 2009.57
If developed countries respond to the MDG development assistance
challenge, increasing the proportionate share of their combined national
incomes from 0.32 percent to 0.7 percent, their generosity would double
the yearly allocation of funds, from 130 billion to 260 billion dollars,
devoted to poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, child protection,
health promotion, and environmental sustainability around the world.
Ambitious as that increased sum may appear, 260 billion will not get us
all the way to 2015 and the full implementation of the MDGs. To begin
with, it is very close to the figure, 250 billion dollars, that the World
Health Organization estimates will be necessary for successfully
meeting MDGs in the health sector alone.58
Full implementation of the Millennium Development Goals will
require new and creative financing methods, beyond the scope of this
essay. One example worthy of further analysis is the strategy of social
financing, promoted by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as a means
of stretching the development dollar. Under this approach, anti-
malaria bed nets are purchased through the sale of special bonds and
new schools are constructed on commercial credit, with individual donor
countries serving as guarantors. For Yunus, "[t]he concept of
54. Id. at 58-59.
55. Id. at 59; see also OECD, TABLE 1: NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN
2009 (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/9/44981892.pdf.
56. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE SIPRI MILITARY
EXPENDITURE DATABASE: USA, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4.
57. Development Aid Rose in 2009 and Most Donors will Meet 2010 Targets, OECD
Development Co-operation Directorate (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/document
/11/0,3746,en_2649_34447_449815791 1_1 1,00.html.
58. See Muhammad Yunus, More Health for the Money, Devex (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.devex.com/enlarticles/more-health-for-the-money-3.
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innovative financing is that successful financial instruments in the
private sector are recast to suit development objectives . . .9
CONCLUSION: WHY R2P REQUIRES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
The responsibility to protect is an ambitious project spearheaded by
the United Nations. R2P also represents a vital opportunity for the
world community to transform its understanding of humanitarian
intervention. Rather than a new license to intervene militarily, R2P
challenges and obligates nations to affirm and realize socio-economic
rights in the developing world. Countries coming out of prolonged
armed conflict urgently depend upon socio-economic development to
avoid relapsing into violence and brutality. The Millennium
Development Goals provide a framework for defining and prioritizing
the most essential development needs, as well as a blueprint for
investing and focusing development assistance in individual countries.
Implementing a social welfare vision of R2P through the MDGs will
require innovative fundraising strategies, including the transformation
and channeling of private credit in the public interest.
Improving women's access to food, employment, education, and
reproductive and other health services are at the heart of the
Millennium Development Goals. Such efforts are also crucial in
fighting poverty, protecting children, lessening economic inequality, and
preventing social instability and armed conflict at the global level, and
therefore should be central aspects of the responsibility to protect.60
The Millennium Development Goals are essential benchmarks for
countries at risk of war and repression as well as those struggling to
emerge from armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies. When
states embrace R2P through the MDGs, they commit to a human
security partnership with countries in socio-economic distress in the
pursuit of long-term conflict resolution. For human rights activists, this
human welfare-centered vision of the responsibility to protect is an
essential reminder that social justice and civil liberties are equal pillars
of and partners in the global human rights movement.
59. Id.
60. THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 26.
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REFLECTIONS ON "DEVELOPMENT,"
"DEVELOPING COUNTRIES" AND THE
"PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT" OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
EDWARD KWAKWA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of development is moving to centre stage in
substantive discussions on intellectual property (IP) and international
trade (trade) matters. As part of this trend, developing countries have,
in recent years, become much more active participants in ongoing
discussions and negotiations in the areas of trade and IP. In particular,
there is a growing understanding by countries of the potential of trade
and IP as a tool for development, and thus, the implications of trade
and IP rules on the socio-economic development of countries. Partly as
a result of this trend, the concept of development has also become a
much debated topic in ongoing trade and IP discussions and norm-
making. 1
This article looks at the trend of increasing developing country
participation and the concomitant increase in attention to the concept of
development in trade and IP discussions. It concludes that this trend is
also having an impact on the progressive development of international
trade and IP law.
The article is presented in three parts. Part II briefly describes the
terms "development" and "developing countries," and Part III discusses
the extent to which the concept of development has permeated
discussions and actual norm-making at the World Intellectual Property
* Legal Counsel, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva. The views
expressed here are my personal views and are not necessarily shared by WIPO or by the
United Nations. This article is dedicated to Professor Ved Nanda, a dear friend and
mentor.
1. See THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-3 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) [hereinafter THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA]; WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS 235-36 (1998); Bhagirath Lal Das, Strengthening Developing
Countries in the WTO, THIRD WORLD NETWORK TRADE & DEVELOPMENT SERIES, 1999, at
1-2, 34-35.
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Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 2 while
Part IV presents some final observations.
II. "DEVELOPMENT" AND "DEVELOPING COUNTRIES"
Webster's Dictionary defines development as "the act, process, or
result of developing," or "the state of being developed."3 It is this broad
sense in which the term is used in this article. The concept of
development is receiving increased attention and recognition, and
playing an enhanced role in international law. Discussion in this
article will, however, be limited to its use and impact in the specific and
limited context of discussions and activities at WIPO and WTO.
Development has been on the international relations agenda for
decades. As Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton stated over a decade
ago, development is one of "the central organizing concepts of our
time."4
There are several examples of international organizations (IOs)
that have traditionally dealt with development. These include: the
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank
(IBRD), and the World Health Organization (WHO).5 More recently,
development is playing a much bigger role.
2. WIPO is a Geneva-based Specialized Agency of the United Nations (UN) whose
mandate is to promote the creation, dissemination, use and protection of works of the
human mind for the economic, cultural and social progress of humankind. For a
comprehensive account of the history, mission, structure, and activities of WIPO see
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW
AND USE 3-8 (2nd ed. 2004). The WTO is a permanent negotiating forum whose principal
mandate is trade liberalization within a rules-based system. The five main functions of
the WTO are provided in Article III of the WTO's constituent instrument. See Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto-e.htm.
3. Development, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
development (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
4. Michael Cowen & Robert Shenton, The Invention of Development, in POWER OF
DEVELOPMENT 25 (Jonathan Crush ed., 1995).
5. About FAO, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/about/en/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("FAO's mandate is to raise levels of nutrition, improve
agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations and contribute to the
growth of the world economy."); About IFAD, INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV.,
http://www.ifad.org/governance/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (stating that the
fund was established "to finance agricultural development projects primarily for food
production in the developing countries."); About the IMF: Overview, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/externallabout/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("The
IMF works to foster global growth and economic stability. It provides policy advice and
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In the United Nations, for example, the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), which were adopted in 2000, have become the yardstick
against which progress in any other area is measured, and several other
UN system organizations closely monitor, and strive to help attain the
MDGs. 6
While development has had more of a history, and is easier to
understand in the context of organizations such as the United Nations
and the World Bank, it is a much newer phenomenon in the context of
organizations such as WIPO and the WTO. Also noteworthy is the fact
that development now permeates the activities of other IP institutions
that do not have development within their objectives or mandates. A
prime example of this is manifested in the statement of the President of
the European Patent Organisation (EPO) on the rationale behind
international cooperation in the international patent system. 7
financing to members in economic difficulties and also works with developing nations to
help them achieve macroeconomic stability and reduce poverty."); Background, INT'L
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/0,,contentMDK:21130269-menuPK:3168298-pagePK:6416844
5-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:3046012,00.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("IBRD is part
of the World Bank (IBRD/IDA) that works with middle-income and creditworthy poorer
countries to promote sustainable, equitable and job-creating growth, reduce poverty and
address issues of regional and global importance."); Introducing UNESCO: What We Are,
UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SC. CULTURAL ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/
about-us/who-we-are/introducing-unesco/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("UNESCO's mission
is to contribute to the building of peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable
development and intercultural dialogue through education, the sciences, culture,
communication and information."); UNIDO in Brief, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG.,
http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=7840 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("Its mandate is to
promote and accelerate sustainable industrial development in developing countries and
economics in transition, and work towards improving living conditions in the world's
poorest countries by drawing on its combined global resources and expertise."); The WHO
Agenda, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/agendalen/index.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2012) (discussing how its commitment to "activities aimed at health
development" gives "priority to health outcomes in poor, disadvantaged or vulnerable
groups", and its goal in attaining the "health-related Millennium Development Goals").
6. See MDG Strategies, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www.beta.
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/povertyreduction/focus-areas/focus-mdg-strateg
ies.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012); Millennium Development Goals: About the Goals,
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, http://www.unicef.org /mdg/index-aboutthegoals.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012); Millennium Development Goals, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/millennium-development-indicators (last visited
Feb. 18, 2012); see also United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
7. The European Patent Office (EPO) is an 10 that was established in 1977 to
strengthen cooperation between the states of Europe in respect of the protection of
inventions. A few years ago, however, in a landmark document that proposed the
fundamental features of a new cooperation policy between the EPO and its member
states, the President of the European Patent Office (one of the two main organs of the
EPO) stated in clear terms that cooperation, "seen from a broad perspective, aims to
improve the contribution of the patent system to the innovation capacity and economic
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The concept of development has recently been at the forefront in
intellectual property and trade discussions. In WIPO, for example, the
Member States established what is referred to as the "Development
Agenda" at their 2004 annual meetings.8 As part of this agenda, in
2007, the General Assembly of WIPO adopted 45 (out of over 100)
recommendations aimed at integrating the development dimension in
all WIPO's activities. It established a Committee on Development and
Intellectual Property whose task, among others, was to work on
development-related issues at WIPO.9 The Development Agenda
provides the following, among other things: (1) WIPO technical
assistance must be "development-oriented . . . taking into account the
priorities and special needs of developing countries . . . as well as the
different levels of development of Member States," (2) WIPO must
"further mainstream development considerations into WIPO's
substantive and technical assistance activities and debates, in
accordance with its mandate," and (3) "WIPO's legislative assistance
shall be, inter alia, development-oriented and demand-driven, taking
into account the priorities and the special needs of developing countries.
"10
The Development Agenda was streamlined through WIPO's revised
Program and Budget for the 2008-2009 biennium, and has since been
provided for in all subsequent Program and Budgets." Against this
background, it is instructive to note that the concept of development
itself does not appear anywhere in WIPO's mandate.
development of the member states . . . " See Eur. Patent Office [EPO], Cooperation Policy
within the European Patent Network (EPN), at 2, EPO Doc. CA/124/06 (July 8, 2006),
available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/873CBA351C69871
FC12572430044D703/$File/CA 124_06_en.pdf.
8. World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the
Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27,
2004); WIPO Development Agenda: Background (2004-2007), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agendalbackground.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
9. This part draws heavily on an earlier editorial on a related topic. See generally
Edward Kwakwa, Mainstreaming "Development" in International Organizations, 6 INT'L
ORG. L. REV. 1 (2009). Although the Development Agenda in WIPO is relatively new,
there is already a significant amount of literature on it. See, e.g., Jeremy De Beer,
Defining WIPO's Development Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1-23 (Jeremy De Beer ed., 2009); THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 1; CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2007).
10. The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agendalrecommendations.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
11. World Intell. Prop. Org., Revised Program and Budget for the 2008/09 Biennium,




Development has had an equally prominent role in the WTO. As
Asif Qureshi points out, the Doha Round negotiations under the
auspices of the WTO "had been orchestrated as a 'development round,'
and its agenda was intended to integrate development into the very
'architecture' of the international trading system." 12 By launching the
Doha Development Agenda in 2001, the WTO Members "placed
development issues and the interests of developing countries at the
heart of the WTO's work."13 Indeed, paragraph 19 of the WTO's Doha
Ministerial Declaration mandates WTO's TRIPS Council to "take fully
into account the development dimension." 14
The concept of development plays a key role in other aspects of
WTO's activities. The legal status or the binding nature of various
concepts at the heart of development, such as principles of less-than-full
reciprocity, and special and differential treatment, have been
extensively debated.' 5
As relates to the concept of "developing countries," it is important
to start with certain caveats. It should be pointed out at the outset that
the concept of "developing countries" is not an exact or clearly defined
one in international law, and is even less so in the multilateral trade or
IP context. The term "developing countries" is used with reckless
abandon in discussions in multilateral fora. Too often, the term is
unaccompanied by any explanation of its precise scope or meaning.
While any number of plausible definitions of the term "developing
countries" is conceivable, in this article, the reference is to all countries
except those that are referred to as countries in transition to a market
economy, and those that are generally perceived to belong to the group
of industrialized countries.16
12. Asif H. Qureshi, International Trade for Development: The WTO as a Development
Institution?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 173, 173 (2009). On the general positioning of
developing countries within the WTO system, see generally DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Joel P. Trachtman & Chantal Thomas eds., 2009).
13. Trade Development, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-
e/devel e /devel e.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
14. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, T
19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl e.htm.
15. See, e.g., Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment
Provisions Under WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (George
A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007) (discussing the legal status of special and
differential provisions under the WTO Agreements).
16. The term, for purposes of this article, therefore excludes all industrialized countries,
as well as all the countries in transition to a market economy, most of which were part of the
former Soviet bloc. The term however includes such economically advanced countries as
Singapore, China, and the Republic of Korea.
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The concept of "developing countries" also includes the so-called
"least-developed" countries (LDCs).17 While this may be a somewhat
arbitrary definition, I am unaware of the existence of a more scientific
or precise definition. More importantly, the proposed definition serves
adequately the import of this article.
The developing countries reflect a diverse range of interests and
sometimes differ considerably in their respective positions on various
subjects. While there are areas of significant commonality, their
concerns and interests naturally differ from developing country to
developing country. It is also a truism that some arguments and issues
apply more to certain developing countries than to others. A developing
country such as Ghana may have a completely different set of priorities
than, say, Brazil. Similarly, a net food-importing developing country's
interests will not necessarily be coterminous with those of a developing
net food-exporting country; nor will a developing oil exporting country
pursue the same policies and interests as a developing oil importing
country.
There are certain defined groups or bodies that cut across
developed and developing country interests. The Cairns Group has
among its nineteen members, sixteen developing countries.18 The
17. The fifty countries currently on the list of LDCs are: Afghanistan, Angola,
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS,
STATISTICS DIVISION, WORLD STATISTICS POCKETBOOK 2010: LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, at vii, U.N. Sales No.E.11.XVII.4 (2011), available at http://www.uno
hrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%/20Pocketbook2OlO-%/ 20final.pdf. The most recent country
to join the United Nations, South Sudan, will no doubt be added to the LDC list. The
category of LDCs was officially established in 1971 by the UN General Assembly with the
objective of attracting special international support for this poorest and weakest segment
of the international community. The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). In general, the criteria
used to determine whether a country falls within the category of LDCs include: (i) the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, (ii) a composite index (the Augmented Physical
Quality of Life Index) based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie
intake, combined primary and secondary school enrollment, and adult literacy; and (iii) a
composite index (the Economic Diversification Index) based on the share of
manufacturing in GDP, the share of the labor force in industry, annual per capita
commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD's merchandise export concentration index.
See UN Recognition of the Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE
AND DEV., http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=3618&lang-1 (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
18. The Cairns Group is a group of nineteen agricultural exporting countries,
accounting for over 25 percent of the world's agricultural exports. It is comprised of
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
while traditionally comprised of industrialized countries, now includes
developing countries such as Chile, Mexico and Republic of Korea. 19 It
also includes some countries in transition and/or central European and
Baltic countries, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia. 20 Also noteworthy is the fact that most of the world's poor
live in certain middle-income countries, although those countries may
no longer be perceived as typical developing countries.21
III. THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The Developing Countries in the WTO
Historically, the developing countries have not been as active in the
WTO as their developed country counterparts have been.22 The reasons
include lack of adequate participation and representation at WTO
meetings, and financial constraints (which affect their human,
institutional and infrastructural capacity). 23  Given the extreme
importance of the multilateral trading system and the impact of
decisions made at WTO, the developing countries need to participate
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, and Uruguay. An Introduction, THE CAIRNS GROUP, http://cairnsgroup.org
/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).




21. Andy Sumner & Amanda Glassman, Aid Cuts to Middle-Income Countries Worsen
Global Poverty and Ill-Health, GUARDIAN POVERTY MATTERS BLOG (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jan/02/aid-cuts-
middle-income-countries (arguing that the global distribution of malnutrition may point
to middle-income countries, as do multidimensional measures of poverty and global
disease and death figures).
22. See T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE 3 (1998) (discussing
developing countries and their lack of effective participation and influence in multilateral
trade negotiations until the Tokyo Round).
23. Committee for Development Policy, United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Survey
on the International Support Measures Related to WTO Provisions and Preferential
Market Access for LDC: Responses by Least Developed Countriesl-2, 4 (Apr. 2011),
http://webappsOl.un.org/1deportal/c/documentlibrary/get-file?uuid=024b355f-d56c-47dl-
a5b9-2ec92fO6a6ac&groupd=10136; Transparency, Participation and Legitimacy of the
WTO, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/legit-cn.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2012).
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much more effectively in the WTO. The developing countries could
benefit a lot more by using WTO as a forum to promote their agenda. 24
The WTO is one of very few international organizations whose
constituent instrument specifically provides for decision-making by
consensus. 25 This effectively gives each of the WTO's Members a veto
power, 26 which implies that the developing countries may be much more
powerful at WTO than they are in the UN General Assembly or
Security Council. The process of taking decisions by consensus is in the
interest of developing countries because through consensus, each
individual WTO Member is able to retain a right of veto, thus making
all WTO Members equal in decision-making. 2 7 Even if there were a
vote, it is by no means certain that developing countries would always
vote as a block, given their diverse interests. The point remains that
the veto power that each of the WTO Members has is, in effect,
analogous to that wielded by the five veto powers on the Security
Council.28 In my view, this alone provides a compelling reason why the
developing countries should be more engaged in the WTO.
The WTO brings various benefits to developing countries. For
example, the rule-based nature of the multilateral trading system
arguably creates certainty or fosters predictability. It is also easier and
more beneficial for developing countries to negotiate in a multilateral
forum such as the WTO, and in the context of the whole gamut of
international trade, than on a bilateral basis, often in the context of
more narrow or specific aspects of trade. In the June 2011 issue of
Foreign Affairs, Susan Schwab, former U.S. Trade Representative,
suggested that, given the apparent failure of the Doha Round
negotiations, WTO Members should proceed on a plurilateral basis. 29
The problem with plurilateralism, apart from not being representative
enough, is that it encourages selectivity and exclusivity where like-
minded countries negotiate and agree on rules that best suit their
24. There is no dearth of literature on the relationship between developing countries
and the multilateral trading system. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987); SRINIVASAN, supra note 22; THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds.,
1996); Celso L. N. Amorim, The WTO From the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 95 (2000).
25. Policy Brief 00-2: Decision-Making in the WTO, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L EcoN.
(Mar. 2000), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchlD=63.
26. Id.
27. The WTO... Why it Matters: A Guide for Officials, Legislators, Civil Society and All
Those Interested in International Trade and Global Governance, WORLD TRADE ORG. 21,
66 (Oct. 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/wtomatters _e.pdf
[hereinafter The WTO ... Why it Matters].
28. See U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27; The WTO... Why it Matters, supra note 27.
29. Susan C. Schwab, After Doha: Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We
Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFF. 104-05, 115-16 (2011).
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interests and goals. The danger is that those rules could subsequently
find their way into bilateral agreements between developed and
developing countries, through negotiations in which the developing
countries will, in all likelihood, have less leverage than they would have
had in the multilateral setting. A rule-based multilateral trading
system also reduces the chances of unilateralism or mitigates the effects
of such unilateralism. In theory, the multilateral trade rules within the
WTO framework, while providing developing countries with export
market access, should also protect them from the arbitrary
protection/subsidies of other powerful countries. Integration into the
world trading system should therefore be seen as the key to higher
growth and poverty reduction in the developing countries.
The success of the industrialized countries, and their satisfaction
with the world trading system, is not at issue. This is already a
generally accepted fact. But the real test of the WTO will be not the
success or the happiness of the developed countries with the
multilateral trading system, but rather the extent to which WTO is able
to integrate the developing countries into the multilateral trading
system.
Whereas it is widely believed that the developing countries did not
achieve significant trade benefits in the Uruguay Round, it may be fair
to argue that they had several of their concerns addressed in Doha;3 0 for
example, in the area of IP rules pertaining to more affordable medicines
to combat epidemics, such as HIV-AIDS and tuberculosis. It is
instructive to recall that the only amendment there has been to any
WTO Agreement since the adoption of the Uruguay Round texts in 1994
is the amendment in respect of Article 31(f) of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).31 This
amendment seeks to make permanent a decision on patents and public
health originally adopted in 2003 that was driven by concerns for the
particular health needs of developing countries. 32
30. The ongoing Doha Round was launched in November 2001. It is known as the
Doha Development Round, a decision that was taken "to overcome the reluctance of
developing countries, who were increasingly unhappy about the outcomes of the previous
Uruguay Round, to engage in a new negotiating round " UN-OHRLLS Newsroom
Doha: The Non-"Development" Round, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND SMALL ISLAND
DEVELOPING STATES (Jan. 6, 2012), http:/www.unohrlls.org/en/newsroom/current/?
type=2&article_id=120&print=1.
31. Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 421, 430 (2008).
32. For an explanation of the decision by WTO Members to amend the TRIPs
Agreement Article 31 provision (on compulsory licensing), see generally Press Release,
World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug
Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03-e/pr
350_e.htm.
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Another reason why the developing countries should be more
engaged in the WTO is the benefits they get by virtue of their status
and membership as developing countries. There are several provisions
in the WTO Agreements that speak to the special position of the
developing countries. 33 A significant amount of WTO's work entails
trying to assist the developing countries to more fully integrate into the
multilateral trading system. This effort is based on the tacit
assumption and, indeed, on the explicit assertion that the trade system
is good for the developing countries. For example, the special and
differential treatment provisions are known to be an integral part of the
multilateral trading system. Their general aim is to ensure that the
developing countries "secure a share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." 3 4
But a more effective regime and implementation of the special and
differential treatment provisions could greatly inure to the benefit of
the developing countries, as cogently argued by Edwini Kessie. 3 5
Also noteworthy is the fact that developing countries obtain
technical assistance from the WTO Secretariat. 36  Part of this
assistance entails the provision of legislative advice, including
interpretation and implementation of obligations under the multilateral
33. See Work on Special and Differential Provisions, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/dev-special differential-provisions e.htm
(last visited Feb.19, 2012) (describing the various special and differential treatment
provisions provided to developing countries in order to treat them more favorably than
other WTO Members).
34. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-
wto.pdf.
35. These special and differential treatment provisions have not operated
satisfactorily to date, and it is arguable that they have not brought developing countries
the widely anticipated benefits. Worse yet, as demonstrated by Edwini Kessie, the
provisions are largely of a hortatory and legally non-binding nature. See Edwini Kessie,
Enforceability of the Legal Provisions Relating to Special and Differential Treatment
Under the WTO Agreements, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 955, 974 (2000). See also Kessie,
supra note 15 (showing, among other things, how the special and differential treatment
provisions could be made more beneficial (in their implementation) to developing
countries).
36. According to the WTO, it budgets annually about CHF 30 million for technical
assistance activities. Financing of TRTA, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/teccop-e/financingtrtae.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
The WTO's mandate in respect of technical assistance is provided for in various WTO
Agreements and decisions, and further clarified and enhanced in the 2001 Doha
Ministerial Declaration. It has sometimes been suggested that WTO's trade-related
technical assistance is often aimed at ensuring that developing countries comply with
their obligations under the WTO rules, rather than at helping them to determine what




trading system. 37 This ultimately contributes to advancing the corpus
of international trade law.
In terms of the progressive development of trade law, the
developing countries are engaged in ongoing efforts aimed at infusing
trade agreements, policies and practices with the development
dimension. Two examples will suffice here. The first concerns part of
the Doha mandate issues relating to creating a multilateral register for
wines and spirits, and extending the higher (Article 23 of TRIPs) level
of protection beyond wines and spirits. 38  "The TRIPs Agreement
requires a review of Article 27.3(b) which deals with patentability or
non-patentability of plant and animal inventions, and the protection of
plant varieties."39 This was further broadened by Paragraph 19 of the
2001 Doha Declaration, which requested the WTO's TRIPs Council to
also review the relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions (or folklore). 40
The developing countries in WTO have managed to put
development-related issues at the forefront of most major trade
initiatives, and are actively engaged in discussions aimed at
progressively developing international trade law in respect of such
matters as the scope of protection for geographical indications, and
issues relating to patentability, biological diversity and traditional
knowledge.
The Developing Countries in WIPO
Whereas WTO has 153 Members as of today, WIPO has 185
Member States.41 There are many more developing country members of
37. World Trade Organization, Aid-For-Trade Case Story: WTO's Institute for
Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC) 1, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/35/48413638.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
38. Background and the Current Situation, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/gi-background-e.htm#protection.
39. Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/art27 3b-e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
40. The Doha Declaration Explained, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dda-e/dohaexplained-e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
41. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/the
wto e/whatis eltif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012); Member States, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). Having deposited
its instrument of accession to the WIPO Convention on Dec. 2, 2011, Vanuatu will become
the 185th Member State of WIPO on Mar. 2, 2012. WTO's 153 Members are also likely to
have increased by the time this article is published. In particular, Vanuatu was
authorized by the WTO General Council to ratify its accession package by Dec. 31, 2011,
and thus become the WTO's 154th Member thirty days after depositing an instrument of
ratification to the WTO Agreement. Likewise, the Ministerial Session of WTO from Dec.
15 to 17, 2011 authorized Samoa to accept its accession package by June 15, 2012 and
thus become a WTO Member thirty days after ratifying its accession package; and
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WIPO than there are of the WTO. The arguments provided earlier to
demonstrate the need for the developing countries to be more engaged
in WTO, apply a fortiori to the need for them to engage in WIPO.42
Historically, IP has been more known, discussed and protected in
the developed countries than has been the case in developing countries.
This is also a trend that is now changing. For starters, all the recent
adherents to the WIPO Convention happen to be developing countries. 43
Recent discussions in WIPO have seen more assertive developing
country positions than was the case in the first three decades of the
Organization's existence. A few examples will be given here; in 2004,
the Development Agenda was introduced in WIPO largely as a result of
the efforts by Argentina and Brazil. 44 There has since been established
an informal group of countries known as the "Development Agenda
Group," which takes positions and makes statements on behalf of its
Members on almost every issue that is being debated in various fora in
Montenegro has been given up to Mar. 31, 2012 to do so, while the Russian Federation is
authorized to ratify the terms of its entry within 220 days from Dec. 16, 2011, after which
it will become a fully fledged Member of WTO thirty days after it notifies the ratification
to the WTO. See Accessions News Archive, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english
/news e/archive e/acc arc e.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
42. In respect of technical assistance, WIPO's assistance to Member States is only in
the field of IP, not in the broader WTO trade field. WIPO provides its developing country
Member States with legislative advice in connection with its cooperation for economic
development program, including advice on how best to exploit the flexibility under
international treaties in implementing their obligations. For information relating to
WIPO's advice on flexibilities under the TRIPs Agreement, see generally Advice On
Flexibilities Under The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/ip-
development/enlegislative-assistance/advice trips.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
43. Looking back at accessions to the WIPO Convention since 2000, it is significant
that all but one of the fourteen countries that joined WIPO between 2000 and January
2012 are developing countries. They are, in alphabetical order, and with the year they
joined in brackets: Afghanistan (2005); Antigua and Barbuda (2000); Belize (2000);
Comoros (2005); Djibouti (2002); Dominican Republic (2000); Iran (Islamic Republic of)
(2002); Maldives (2004); Montenegro (2006); Myanmar (2001); Seychelles (2000); Syrian
Arab Republic (2004); Tonga (2001); and Vanuatu (2012). See Contracting Parties, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang-en&treaty-id
=1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). The only country on the list that does not fall within our
definition of developing countries is Montenegro. And as is well known, Montenegro's
declaration of continued application of (or accession to) the WIPO (and other conventions)
was necessitated by the break-up of Serbia and Montenegro, and the confirmation of
Serbia as the continuing State as from June 6, 2006. Treaties and Contracting Parties,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty-id=1951C
(last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
44. On the establishment of the Development Agenda in WIPO, and an elaboration of
its various clusters, see generally Jeremy De Beer, supra note 9; WIPO Development
Agenda, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general
/1015/wipo pub11015.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
VOL. 40:1-3232
REFLECTIONS ON "DEVELOPMENT"
WIPO.45 The effect has been to ensure that issues pertaining to
development are built into all discussions and made part of any
substantive texts that are adopted. This will no doubt be replicated at
future diplomatic conferences convened under the auspices of WIPO to
adopt treaties in any area of IP.
Another example of more assertive developing country positions
can be found in WIPO Member State discussions relating to the draft
substantive patent law treaty ("SPLT"). In 2000, the Member States of
WIPO, through the Standing Committee on Patents ("SCP"), started
discussions on a treaty aimed at harmonizing substantive patent law. 4 6
At several points in the discussions between 2000 and 2004, there was
unanimous agreement on the need to include draft provisions on a
number of issues of direct relevance to the grant of patents.47 Of
particular significance were issues relating to the definition of prior art,
novelty, inventive step or non-obviousness, and industrial applicability
or utility.48 In subsequent meetings, however, some developing
countries asserted the need to include other issues that were directly
relevant to development and developing countries.49 At the June 2005
session of the SCP, Brazil submitted a statement on behalf of a group of
developing country Member States known as "Friends of
Development."50 The statement suggested that the discussions include
not only the earlier agreed issues mentioned above, but also provisions
on the transfer of technology, anti-competitive practices, and the
45. For a sample statement from DAG Member India, see WIPO Gen. Assembly
Report of the Fortieth (20th Ordinary) Session, 1 88, Sept. 26-Oct. 5, 2011, WIPO Doc.
WO/GA/40/19 (2011) [hereinafter WIPO Assembly Report] (stressing that the DAG
"attached great importance to the efforts to develop an effective normative framework for
harmonizing exceptions and limitations to copyright in specific sectors." The DAG viewed
exceptions, exclusions and limitations as an "intrinsic and essential part of the IPRs
framework that brought much needed balance between private interests and larger public
interest in the context of national public policies and development goals."); id. 1 143
(explaining that the DAG "attached great importance to the work of the IGC, as the
protection of GRs, TK and TCEs was a national priority for its members."); id. 58
(stating that "the real essence of the [Development Agenda] lay in bringing about a
conceptual transformation in how Members viewed IP and how they sought to use it for
the betterment of mankind everywhere through appropriate norm-setting, protection,
enforcement and technical assistance.").
46. Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,




50. The "Friends of Development" Group no longer exists, but has been replaced by
the "Development Agenda Group." New WIPO Development Agenda Group Seeks
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safeguarding of public interest flexibility, among others.51 All attempts
to make progress on the negotiations in respect of the SPLT have not
resulted in any agreement on the modalities and scope of the future
work of the SCP.52 This development in respect of the SPLT is a good
example of the new influence of the developing countries in effectively
having a say in issues and outcomes aimed at progressively developing
IP law.
To give yet another example, there exists a WIPO Committee
known as the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). The
IGC has been in existence since 2000, and has been debating issues
relating to how best to protect traditional knowledge, traditional
cultural expressions (or folklore) and genetic resources. 53 For the first
time last year, the IGC agreed to recommend to the WIPO General
Assembly, and that Assembly agreed that the IGC should, in the 2012-
2013 biennium, "expedite its work on text-based negotiations with the
objective of reaching agreement on a text(s) of an international legal
instrument(s) which will ensure the effective protection of GRs, TK and
TCEs." 5 4 The IGC is thus in the process of deliberating on a proposed
Treaty to protect these three non-traditional areas under IP law.5 5 It is
widely expected that the Member States of WIPO may be at the point
where they will convene a diplomatic conference in the next few years
with the express aim of adopting a treaty on traditional knowledge,
traditional cultural expressions and genetic resources. This point has
been reached as a result of the very active and indeed predominant
participation of developing countries in the relevant WIPO processes.56
51. Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. For a primer on traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions and
genetic resources, see Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Folklore, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/tk/en (last visited
Feb. 19, 2012).
54. WIPO Secretariat, Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC),
16(a), WIPO Doc. WO/GA/40/7 (Aug. 12, 2011). The General Assembly also decided that
the IGC should "submit to the 2012 General Assembly the text(s) of an international legal
instrument(s) which will ensure the effective protection of GRs, TK and TCEs. The
General Assembly in 2012 will take stock of and consider the text(s)and progress made
and decide on convening a Diplomatic Conference, and will consider the need for
additional meetings, taking account of the budgetary process." See id. 16(d).
55. Id.
56. See, eg., WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. and Genetic Res.,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Recommendations of the Second Session of Like
Minded Countries Meeting on the Protection of Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge
and Folklore, July 18-22, 2011, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/19/8 (2011), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipogrtkf ic_19/wipo-grtkf ic-19_8.pdf (submission




We have recalled that the developing countries now form the
majority of WIPO and WTO's membership. To be sure, over 75 percent
of WIPO Member States and WTO Members are developing countries.57
This preponderance of developing country members in WIPO and
WTO is a recent development which has been accelerated by the
attainment of independence of several developing countries in the last
few decades.
Whereas developing countries did not have much of a role in the
formation and the initial discussions that took place in both
organizations, they have now become major players as well as
stakeholders in the multilateral IP and trade discussions. There is also
a deeper understanding of the potential of IP and trade as tools for
development, and thus their implications on the socio-economic
development of countries.5 8
There is little doubt that developing countries will continue to swell
the ranks of the WTO and WIPO. There is even less doubt that the
concept of development will correspondingly play a major role in
discussions and negotiations at both institutions.
In terms of developments in substantive IP and trade law,
predictions are more difficult.59 I have no doubt, however, that within
the next decade, the Member States of WIPO will have adopted a
Treaty in the area of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural
Expressions and Genetic Resources. This will be a landmark
development and a paradigm shift in the IP law regime, given the
Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand and Zimbabwe, adopting "a
joint recommendation to advance the work of WIPO to establish an international legal
instrument (or instruments) for the effective protection of genetic resources, traditional
knowledge and folklore.").
57. For the respective lists of WTO Members and WIPO Member States, see Members
and Observers, supra note 41; Members States, supra note 41.
58. Indeed, WIPO has recently included on its website a theme on the importance of
IP for the economic development of nations. Intellectual Property for Development, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
The WTO Agreements also recognize the link between trade and development. See Trade
and Development, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _e/devel-e/
devele.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). It may well be that the growing interest among
developing country members of WTO is partly attributable to the fact that WTO
discussions, unlike discussions in its predecessor organization GATT, now include a wider
range of issues (namely services and IP), thus having greater impact on economic
development. But see STEFAN DE VYLDER, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND WORLD
TRADE 92 (2d ed. 2007) (arguing that many WTO issues "are considerably more difficult,
and more politically controversial, than previous GATT agreements" largely because "[a]
new regime was constructed which affects developing countries to a much greater degree
and which is much more mandatory in nature than was previously the case.").
59. As the famous Yogi Berra quip goes, predictions are hard to make, especially
when they are about the future!
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general reluctance to date to include traditional knowledge, traditional
cultural expressions and genetic resources within the ambit of IP that
needs protection.60 Similarly, it is possible that the Member States of
WIPO will have adopted a treaty that aims to progressively develop
international patent law by including provisions not only on commonly
accepted terms such as grace period, prior art and inventive step, but
also development-related concepts such as transfer of technology, prior
informed consent and benefit sharing. Substantive discussions at WTO
will also likely continue to reflect development-related concerns. In
particular, it is doubtful that any new amendment to any of the WTO
Agreements will be adopted if the particular amendment does not meet
the consent or perceived interests of developing countries. IP and trade
law will continue to be progressively developed along lines that
increasingly take into account the development dimension as well as
the interests and concerns of the developing countries.
These are only predictions that have a bearing on the subject of
development, developing countries and the progressive development of
international law in the trade and IP areas. But there will certainly be
several other developments in the general areas of trade and IP. Those
other developments and predictions need a more extensive elaboration
and much more space than I have in this limited article.
60. In this regard, it is instructive to note that in August 2010, the African Regional
Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) and its Member States adopted the
Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of
Folklore. According to the ARIPO website, when the Protocol enters into force, it
will empower the custodians and holders of traditional knowledge and
expressions of folklore to utilize their knowledge for socio-economic
development and wealth creation. The implementation of the Protocol will
curtail the ongoing misappropriation, bio-piracy and prevent illicit claim of
traditional knowledge-based inventions and patent applications and enable
the ARIPO Office to register traditional knowledge and expressions of
folklore that are trans-boundary and multicultural in nature, the so-called
regional traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore. The Protocol will
furthermore provide a framework for national legislative developments on
the protection of the resources.
ARIPO and Its Member States Adopt a New Protocol on the Protection of Traditional
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I am grateful to my spring 2011 Advanced International Trade Law class for many
excellent research papers, which provided many insights and sources incorporated into
this article, including the papers by Hannah Sandal and Joseph R. Billings, both of the
University of Kansas School of Law Class of 2011, and Sarah R. Schmidt, Class of 2013.
This article assumes familiarity with Parts One and Two of the Trilogy, and my
five prior publications on the Doha Round, at least with the relevant substantive concepts
and events that occurred between the launch of the Round in November 2001 and
negotiations as of July 2009:
1)Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 159-96 (2002), which covers
the launch of the Round in November 2001.
2)Chapters 3 and 4 of the International Trade Law textbook, referenced above,
particularly concepts and terms in the negotiations, and the status of those talks
through the July 2007 Draft Modalities Texts issued by Ambassadors Crawford
Falconer (New Zealand) and Donald Stephenson (Canada), Chairmen of the
Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations, respectively.
3)Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 5-171 (fall/winter 2008), which covers the Round
through the July 2008 collapsed Ministerial meeting.
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I. Synopsis
This article is the third and final part of a trilogy, the argument of
which is that the Doha Round is a failed instrument of counter-
terrorism. The Round, launched in November, 2001, was supposed to
make the world safe for free trade, but not simply to realize net
economic welfare gains from reductions in barriers to cross-border flows
of goods, services, and intellectual property. Rather, the original intent
was to connect those gains to the threat posed by violent extremist
organizations ("VEOs") in the post-9/11 world. The gains were intended
to be channeled, in no small part, to poor, marginalized Muslim
communities that otherwise might be recruitment grounds for VEOs
acting (falsely, to be sure) in the name of "Islam."
As the Doha Round dragged on through the first and now second
decade of the new millennium, the commercial self-interest of World
Trade Organization ("WTO") Members dwarfed their shared political
economic interest. They lost sight of the common good in fighting
poverty, thereby attacking one factor exploited by VEOs. They invented
(post hoc, of course) new reasons for the Round, such as fighting the
global economic slump (as Part One concludes). Their behavior became
a reason in itself as to why implementing the initial vision for the
Round proved difficult, such as the negotiating positions of China (as
Part Two concludes). Plausible or not, all such reasons spelled a
collective failure to follow through on the founding promise of the
Round: drawing a clear link between freer trade, poverty alleviation,
and threat reduction. I
Part One of the trilogy advances this argument in the context of
trade liberalization in agricultural products. Part Two does so in the
context of trade liberalization in industrial products ("non-agricultural
market access," or "NAMA"), and services trade. Part Three makes the
argument in the context of trade remedies, so called "rules" covering
antidumping ("AD"), countervailing duties ("CVD"), and fishing
subsidies. It also does so in the context of trade facilitation, which
refers to customs procedures. As with Parts One and Two, the context
of Part Three is technical. The devil, in the sense of straying from the
initial purpose of the Doha Round, is in the details, in the sense of
lengthy, mind-numbing draft modalities texts. The Texts critically
analyzed here are the December 2008 Draft Rules Text, 2 April 2011
1. See, e.g., World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC NEWS (July 29, 2008, 22:46
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7531099.stm.
2. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM
Agreements, TN/RL/W/236 (Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter, New Draft Consolidated Chair
Texts], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/rulesneg-e/rules_chair-text nov
07_e.pdf.
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Rules Document, 3 December 2009 Draft Trade Facilitation Text,4 and
April 2011 Trade Facilitation Document.5
This Part completes the trilogy with comments on the missing
middle "D" in the Doha Development Agenda ("DDA"). It also charts
out, in a preliminary manner, potential special dispensations in
international trade law for Islamic countries. Consequently, Part Three
concludes where Part One began, and where the Doha Round did, too:
with thoughts about how to link trade liberalization to poverty
alleviation, and thereby reduce vulnerability to Islamist extremism.
These concluding observations, like those of Parts One and Two,
support the trilogy's overall argument that the Round is not about trade
liberalization, poverty alleviation, or reducing threats from VEOs.
II. No REMEDY FOR REMEDIES
Formally entitled the Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements, this 94-page document includes a so-called "Road
Map for Discussion" to help reach agreement on fishing subsidies, as
well as trade remedies against dumping and subsidization. 6 The basic
goal of Doha Round rules negotiations is to "clarify and improve"
disciplines.7 After all, since the WTO was born on 1 January 1995 (and
as of November 2009), Members have launched over 3,500 AD
investigations (with developing countries - particularly Argentina,
3. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter, Agreement on
Implementation of Article V1], available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddae/
chair.../adp-subsidies-e.doc.
4. See Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated Negotiating
Text, TN/TF/W/165 (Dec. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/TF/W165.doc.
5. See Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text
- Revision, TN/TF/W1165/Rev.8 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter, Revised Draft Consolidated
Negotiating Text], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/TF/W165
R8.doc.
6. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, at 1; see also Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, at 1-2; Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the
AD and SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter, Draft Consolidated
Chair Texts] available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/.. .e/ruleschair text nov07_e.doc
(a previous iteration of the text). This Synopsis is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph,
line-by-line comparison of the December 2008 and November 2007 Draft Rules Texts.
7. Rules, BRIEFING NOTES, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/statuse/
rulese.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (posted in connection with the Seventh Ministerial
Conference held in Geneva from 30 November - 2 December 2009). Also within the ambit
of the Rules negotiations is the clarification and improvement of disciplines on regional
trade agreements (RTAs). There are over 400 RTAs, with more than half of world trade
conducted under an RTA. Id. The WTO has yet to pass judgment on any of them as to
whether they meet the requirements of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. The
Doha Agenda, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto
e/whatis e/tif e/dohal-e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
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China, India, and South Africa - accounting for the majority of such
cases) and 202 CVD investigations.8 Chairman Valles conceded up
front there was essentially nothing novel in his "new" Draft. On all
three topics - AD, CVD, and fishing subsidies - the disagreement
among WTO Members was serious, with no obvious prospect of
convergence, and easily sufficient to scupper a successful outcome to the
Round.
What was new, however, was the activism in the December 2008
Draft Rules Text. There was far less of it than in its predecessor.
Rather than proposing specific compromise language, as he had done in
the previous iteration, the Chairman took a bottom-up approach, and
offered such language only on points where Members had reached a
consensus on a solution. Because they had reached so few consensuses,
the new Text was more of an essay with questions and issues than a
legal document.9
Indeed, as to fishing subsidies, Members essentially forced the
Chairman to abandon the proposals he tabled in November 2007 and
return to the proverbial "drawing board." In respect of AD and CVD
remedies, the December 2008 and November 2007 Draft Texts were
nearly identical, except for the unmistakable emphasis in the new Text
on points of disagreement in lieu of proposed language to facilitate
accord. The Chair inserted these points in bold, and put them in square
brackets, at the relevant spots in the WTO Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (Antidumping, or "AD", Agreement) and Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM" Agreement).10 Because
these insertions replaced draft AD and CVD provisions, giving the
documents the sense of reverse momentum, it was ineluctable that the
later Text was less advanced than its predecessor. Moreover,
depending on the perspective of the Member, the reversal was
especially troubling."
8. Rules, supra note 7.
9. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 1.
10. These Agreements are reprinted in a variety of sources, including RAJ BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE - DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT, 339-66, 431-78 (3rd ed. 2008).
11. See, e.g., The Bureau of National Affairs, Direction of WTO Talks "Unacceptable,"
U.S. Steelworkers President Gerard Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 12 (Jan. 1, 2009)
(reporting that United Steelworkers (USW) President Leo W. Gerard and his union
strenuously objected to any re-writing of AD or CVD rules that would weaken America's
trade defenses, such as a prohibition on zeroing, a requirement to separate out causal
factors in determining injury, a mandatory termination of orders under Sunset Reviews, a
ban on disbursing AD duties or CVDs to aggrieved domestic industries, a lesser duty rule,
or a public interest test).
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By April 2011, WTO Members registered little progress in reaching
consensus on rules about AD, CVD, or fishing subsidies. Accordingly, in
his cover note to the April 2011 Rules Document, the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group on Rules said he chose to prepare a revised legal text
on AD, i.e., a new WTO AD Agreement, but not one on CVDs or fishing
subsidies. Regarding the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement, the
Chairman stated:
This should not be understood to mean that I perceive
significant signs of convergence on the major "political"
issues. To the contrary, it is noticeable that the new text
contains the same twelve bracketed issues as the 2008 Chair
text. The 2008 Chair text on anti-dumping does however
contain extensive un-bracketed language on a wide range
of technical but nevertheless important issues, and our
work over the past two plus years has pointed to a few
areas where useful changes to that language might be
warranted. In short, therefore, arguably a new text on
anti-dumping can usefully reflect some limited progress,
and in any event it can serve to give a clear idea of where
things stand. 12
As for CVDs, the Chairman elected to prepare a report instead of a
revised text:
I have chosen to prepare a report rather than a text for
the following reasons. First, as with anti-dumping, there
have been no significant signs of convergence on bracketed
issues as reflected in the 2008 Chair text on subsidies and
countervailing measures. Furthermore, unlike in the area
of anti-dumping the amount of un-bracketed text in the
area of subsidies and countervailing measures is limited,
and some of that language (such as that relating to
regulated pricing and to the role and interpretation of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies) is controversial. And
while on certain more technical issues un-bracketed
language has gained some traction, there are very few
useful changes to be proposed at this point. In the area of
transposition of possible changes in anti-dumping
provisions to their counterpart CVD provisions, insufficient
discussion has occurred to date to allow the identification of
12. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, at 201 (emphasis
added).
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legal language reflecting convergence. Finally, a
significant number of substantive new proposals have been
submitted during the past few months. Due to time
pressure, the Negotiating Group has not yet fully explored
the degree to which any elements of convergence can be
found in respect of these proposals. Thus, I see no
advantage to preparing a new SCM text at this juncture.' 3
Likewise, as for fishing subsidies, the Chairman stated gloomily:
2. After careful consideration of the current state of play ...
I have concluded that I am not now in a position to present
a revised legal text on fisheries subsidies. Rather, the only
option available to me at this juncture for both capturing
such progress as has been made, and more significantly, for
identifying the numerous remaining gaps in Members'
positions, is to present a detailed narrative report.
3. In reaching this conclusion in these difficult
circumstances, I have heard very clearly the main message
from Members to Chairs that for now, any Chair-produced
documents must be of a bottom-up nature. That is,
Members have made plain that they would not welcome
compromise proposals from Chairs that would seek
artificially to bridge the real gaps in positions that remain.
Applying this standard to the fisheries subsidies
negotiations, at present there is too little convergence on
even the technical issues, and indeed virtually none on the
core substantive issues, for there to be anything to put into
a bottom-up, convergence legal text, and there are no
fisheries subsidies disciplines already in existence to which
we could refer or revert. Nor would a text with either a
small range of options, or with all positions and proposals
presented as "options," be feasible. The former would
require me to pick and choose, and thus would not be
bottom-up. The latter would probably be impossible to
produce as one text that was comprehensible. In any case,
such a text would be nothing more than a compilation of
13. Id. (emphasis added); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Negotiations on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Report by the Chairman, 1 2 TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures], available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-elchair.../adpsubsidies e.doc (providing the same
summary).
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proposals, which I consider could only impede movement
toward convergence.
6. After those discussions ended [in 2009, following
issuance of the December 2008 Rules Text], Members
began to submit new proposals. While initially there were
only a few, by late 2010 and to date in 2011 proposals
proliferated . . . . While many of the proposals contain new
ideas and some suggest new approaches on certain issues,
unfortunately in their totality (and with a few exceptions)
these could not be characterized as convergence proposals.
Rather, they generally reflect and elaborate on the already
well-known positions of their proponents. Nor has there
been movement toward convergence over the course of the
debate on the proposals. Thus, in spite of many meetings
since the beginning of the year [2011] - indeed a nearly-
continuous session of the Negotiating Group - and in spite
of the wealth of new proposals, little tangible progress on
the core issues has been made. In short, notwithstanding
intensive work and greater clarity in scoping several
issues, the fisheries subsidies negotiations remain in more
or less the same impasse as at the end of 2008 . . . with
positions if anything hardening since then. 14
Thus, as of April 2011, the textual landscape for Doha Round rules
negotiations was slightly more confusing than it had been in December
2008. On AD, Members had produced a revised AD text, but it looked
like the November 2007 and December 2008 Draft Texts. As for CVD
and fishing subsidies rules, they still were working with the December
2008 Draft Text, but supplemented it with the April 2011 Rules
Document.
A. Twelve AD Fights
In respect of AD, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text highlighted
12 key areas of dispute. So, too, did the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement. They were as follows: 1 5
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies: Report by Chairman, TT 2-3, 6
TN/RLIW/254 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/chair.../
adp-subsidiese.doc (emphasis added); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI, supra note 3, at 1 (providing a similar synopsis).
15. These areas are set out in bold and brackets in the New Draft Consolidated Chair
Texts after the Article, and replace draft proposals set out in the same places in the Draft
Consolidated Chair Texts. These areas also are set out in bold and brackets in the
244 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
*Zeroing (Article 2.4:2 of the AD Agreement)
In December 2008, the Chairman best summarized the impasse:
"Delegations remain profoundly divided on this issue. Positions range
from insistence on a total prohibition of zeroing irrespective of the
comparison methodology used and in respect of all proceedings to a
demand that zeroing be specifically authorized in all contexts."16
Similarly, in April 2011, he observed zeroing:
remains among the most divisive in the anti-dumping
negotiations, and there have been few signs of convergence.
Positions range from insistence on a total prohibition on
zeroing irrespective of the comparison methodology used
and in respect of all proceedings to a demand that zeroing
be specifically authorized in all contexts. Some delegations
however hold more nuanced positions, and there is
openness among some delegations to undertake a technical
examination of this issue in particular contexts, such as for
example the third ("targeted dumping") methodology
provided for in Article 2.4.2.17
Put succinctly, the rest of the world - and that included Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey that
banded together in a group totaling 16 WTO Members called "Friends of
Antidumping Negotiations" ("FANs") - insisted on a ban on zeroing. 18
The assertion was the amount of dumping (positive dumping margins)
should be reduced (offset) by non-dumped sales (negative dumping
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI. See generally RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 871-1045, 1111-78 (3rd ed. 2008)
(for a treatment of AD law).
16. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, art. 2.4.2, chairman's note
("Zeroing").
17. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 2.4.2, chairman's
note ("Zeroing") (emphasis added).
18. Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: Antidumping Critics Argue Latest Report Highlights
Need for Doha Rules Agreement, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 637 (May 14, 2009); Daniel
Pruzin, Dumping, Countervailing Duties: China Urges Ban on Zeroing in Dumping
Investigations as Part of WTO Rules Talks, 23 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 695 (May 4, 2006);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203-04 (Feb. 12, 2009); Rules,
supra note 7. That the U.S. is the only country opposing a ban on zeroing has been widely
reported. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Senior Officials to Address Talks on Rules;
Advocates Call for Progress in Light of Crisis, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1605 (Nov. 26,
2009).
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margins). Without that ban, the deck would remain stacked against
respondent producer-exporters, as dumping margins would be inflated
artificially, and the use of the AD remedy would be abusive.
The FANs spoke from experience, as the United States ("U.S.")
frequently used zeroing when calculating dumping margins against
their exporters. The FANs were successful in causing a major change
in the Draft Text from November 2007. The earlier Text embodied the
American position, permitting Simple Zeroing in original investigations,
and both Simple and Model Zeroing in Administrative and Sunset
Reviews.' 9 Nonetheless, the U.S. adamantly stuck to its position there
would be no successful conclusion to the Doha Round unless Members
agreed to overrule legislatively the string of what it regarded as
erroneous Appellate Body precedents against zeroing.20 Only that
solution, said the U.S., would allow it and other Members to impose an
AD duty on the full amount of dumping - a right they have under
Article 9:3 of the AD Agreement. Consequently, the likelihood that the
FANs and U.S. might agree on a compromise, such as to ban zeroing in
all contexts except targeted dumping, was dim.
* Causation (Article 3:5 of the AD Agreement)
Members could not agree on how to handle three practical
causation questions that arise in virtually every AD case. First, should
it be mandatory to separate and distinguish the allegedly injurious
effects of (1) dumped imports and (2) other factors, so as to avoid
attribution of those effects to dumped imports when, in fact, other
factors might be the cause? Second, to what extent is a quantitative, as
distinct from a qualitative, analysis of non-attribution necessary?
Third, to what degree should the allegedly injurious effects of dumped
imports be weighed against those effects from other factors?
In April 2011, the Chairman summarized the positions among
WTO Members:
Delegations continue to hold widely diverging views on
issues relating to causation of injury. Recent discussions
19. See Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S.
Insists on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203-04 (Feb. 12, 2009).
See BHALA, supra note 15, at 1023-25 (3rd ed. 2008), for the distinction between Simple
and Model Zeroing.
20. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S. Maintains
Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072-73 (July 15, 2010). See RAJ
BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 530-34 (2008), for a tabular summary
of those rulings. See also Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Anti-dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, T 66 WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) (adopted
May 20, 2008).
246 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
have focused on two issues: whether it should be mandatory
to separate and distinguish the effects of dumped imports
and other factors, and the extent to which authorities
should be required to conduct a quantitative (as opposed to
qualitative) analysis of non-attribution. Although there
seems to be a shared view that authorities should carefully
consider the effects of factors other than dumped imports,
and ensure they are not attributed to dumped imports,
there are substantial gaps regarding the degree of precision
that can or should be required. 21
The importance of resolving causation issues cannot be overstated.
Through a series of trade remedy cases over several years, the
Appellate Body had grappled with such issues. As a general principle of
law across legal systems, it is unjust to impose liability against a party
that is blameless. That the Members could not agree on how to
manifest this principle, in light of the WTO jurisprudence that had
emerged, was evidence of how little progress they had made.
* Material retardation (Article 3:8 of the AD Agreement)
Dumping is not actionable unless it causes or threatens to cause
injury, or unless it materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry. How tightly should the term "material retardation" be
defined? When is an industry "established"? The Chairman said in the
April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
There is a broadly expressed view that the provisions
of the Agreement regarding material retardation would
benefit from amplification and clarification, and many
elements of the 2007 Chair text attract broad support.
There are however widely divergent views on the core issue
of when an industry is "in establishment." Most notably,
while some delegations consider that an industry might still
be in establishment even if there was some domestic
production, other delegations consider that once there is any
domestic production an industry is no longer "in
establishment," and in such cases the proper analysis is one
of current injury or threat.22
21. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 3.5, chairman's note
("Causation of Injury") (emphasis added).
22. Agreement on Implementation of Article VY, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 8 (first
emphasis added).
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In other words, some Members argued an industry might still be in
the process of getting established, even if there is a small amount of
domestic production. Other Members said any such production means
the industry is established, and thus the injury analysis must focus on
actual injury or threat thereof.
* Definition of domestic industry (Article 4:1 of the AD Agreement)
What criteria should be used to exclude (1) producers that are
related to exporters or importers, and (2) producers that also are
importers, from the definition of a domestic industry? That definition is
essential in delineating the class of petitioners potentially entitled to
AD relief, as well as determining at the outset whether the petitioners
have standing to bring an AD case. The Chairman explained in April
2011:
There are widely varying views about the need for
criteria governing this exclusion, and about the nature of
any possible criteria. In particular, some delegations
consider that the rules should be precise, reflecting
numerical criteria, and directive in nature. Other
delegations believe that any criteria should not be too
prescriptive, as the assessment must be case by case. Yet
other delegations do not exclude such producers and believe
that no changes to these provisions are necessary. 23
In essence, four issues were at stake.
First, should producers that are related to exporters or importers,
or that are themselves importers, be excluded from the "domestic
industry" that would benefit from an AD remedy? Assuming the
answer is "yes," then, second, what degree of affiliation should trigger
the exclusion? That is, how close can a producer be to an exporter or
importer before that producer is cast out of the universe of petitioners?
Closely connected to the second issue, third, is how the proximity
should be measured? Would precise, numerical criteria, or a loose, case-
by-case analysis be better? Following logically from the third issue,
fourth, how should the measurement criteria be selected? In particular,
which criteria would both protect the sovereignty of Members, and be
less expensive and time-consuming to administer? 24
23. Id. art. 4, para. 1 (emphasis added).
24. See Rossella Brevetti, Dumping, Countervailing Duties: New Revised Draft Doha
Texts Released on Dumping, Subsidies for Further Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 27
(Jan. 1, 2009).
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*Definition of subject product (Article 5:6 of the AD Agreement)
Should a provision be added concerning the product under
consideration - i.e., the good subject to an AD investigation or subject
merchandise - to clarify how that product is defined? The Chairman
stated in the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
While many delegations consider that a provision on
this issue would be useful, concerns have been expressed
that such a provision could have "'vertical" as well as
"horizontal" implications (e.g., with respect to the inclusion
of parts), as well as implications in respect of subsequent
proceedings. These concerns have caused some delegations
to link this issue to the outcome of discussions on anti-
circumvention, while other delegations reject any such
linkage. There are also differences of view regarding, inter
alia, how broadly the product under consideration should
be defined, the role of physical and market characteristics
in determining the product under consideration, and when
and how [the] product under consideration should be
determined. 25
Some Members argued a new provision defining "subject
merchandise" would focus the scope of an investigation, hence the above
reference to linking the issue to anti-circumvention. The U.S. had first-
hand experience with problems of circumvention created by Chinese
producer-exporters subject to AD orders. But, other Members feared a
definition, if too broad, might implicate related products in a vertical
and horizontal sense and thereby bring (for example) parts of a product
into an investigation. That outcome would be unfair to the implicated
producer-exporters. Redolent of the controversies of defining a "like
product" under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), Members also failed to agree on the extent to which
criteria such as physical and market characteristics should be used to
"subject merchandise." 2 6
*Information requests to an affiliated party (Article 6:8 of the AD
Agreement)
Members could not agree on how to treat an interested party in an
AD investigation that has been asked for information. 27 Some Members
25. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 6 (emphasis
added).
26. See id.
27. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 8.
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thought such a party should not be deemed non-cooperative if it fails to
provide data about an affiliate that it does not control. Other Members
thought a deemed exemption would encourage non-cooperation based
on an excessively narrow view of "control." 28
*Public Interest Test (Article 9:1 of the AD Agreement)
The November 2007 Text included a public interest requiring each
WTO Member to have a procedure whereby no AD remedy could be
imposed without taking due account of the views of interested domestic
parties. They include industrial and retail users of the subject
merchandise and domestic-like product, and suppliers of inputs to the
domestic industry. The European Union (EU) backed this proposal.
The U.S. stood in opposition, on the ground these changes would
infringe on the sovereignty of a Member to impose and collect AD duties
in the manner it deems suitable. 29
In the December 2008 Text, the Chairman summarized aptly the
wide gap in positions over these topics:
Participants are sharply divided on the desirability of a
procedure to take account of the representations of
domestic interested parties when deciding whether to
impose a duty. Some consider that such a procedure would
impinge on Members' sovereignty and would be costly and
time-consuming, while others support inclusion of such a
procedure. Issues related to any such procedure include
the extent to which any such procedures should apply in
the context of Article 11 [administrative and sunset]
reviews, whether the ADA's [AD Agreement] requirement
for a judicial review mechanism should apply to decisions
pursuant to any such procedure, and the extent to which
WTO dispute settlement should apply. 30
In April 2011, the Chairman repeated the first two sentences
(above), but modified the third sentence, as follows:
Issues related to any such procedure include the
elements that can or should be taken into account in any
28. Id.
29. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
30. New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, art. 9, para 1.
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public interest proceeding, the extent to which any such
procedures should apply in the context of Article 11
reviews, whether the ADA's requirement for a judicial
review mechanism should apply to decisions pursuant to
any such procedure, and the extent to which WTO dispute
settlement should apply.3'
This modification indicates the disagreement among Members had
widened further. Not only did it include procedures, judicial review,
and dispute settlement, as it had before, but also included the elements
to consider in a public interest hearing. In other words, the Members
could not agree on what "public interest" meant.32
These disagreements pitted the U.S. against the EU and many
other Members. But, they also divided constituencies within many
Members. Predictably, consumer groups championed a public interest
test, and producer groups steadfastly opposed it.
*Lesser Duty Rule (Article 9:1 of the AD Agreement)
Also included in the November 2007 Text was a lesser duty rule.
Such a rule states a WTO Member need only impose an AD duty up to
the level necessary to rectify dumping, which may be less than the full
amount of the dumping margin. The EU backed this rule, as its AD law
contains one. The U.S. stood in opposition, for the same reason it
opposed a public interest test: infringement on the sovereignty of a
Member to impose and collect AD duties in the manner it deems
suitable. 33
In the December 2008 Text, the Chairman summarized aptly the
large gap in positions over the issue:
On lesser duty, many delegations strongly support
inclusion of a mandatory lesser duty rule. Other
delegations oppose the inclusion of such a rule, with one
delegation noting that it was not practically possible to
calculate an injury margin. Among those supporting a
mandatory lesser duty rule, there are varying views about
31. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis
added).
32. Id.
33. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010);
Daniel Pruzin, Dumbing: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists on
Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
2012 251
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the appropriate degree of specificity for any new rules and
the extent to which those rules should prescribe or
prioritize particular approaches to determining the
appropriate level of duty. 34
The situation scarcely had changed by April 2011, with the
Chairman providing a similar summary at that time:
Many delegations strongly support inclusion of a
mandatory lesser duty rule. Other delegations oppose with
equal conviction the inclusion of such a rule, with one
delegation noting that it was not practically possible to
calculate an injury margin. Among those supporting a
mandatory lesser duty rule, there are varying views about
the appropriate degree of specificity for any new rules and
the extent to which those rules should prescribe or
prioritize particular approaches to determining the
appropriate level of duty. Some delegations have indicated
that at a minimum language in the current Agreement
regarding the desirability of applying a lesser duty should
be maintained.35
Here again, the issue pitted not only the U.S. against the EU and
many other Members, but also divided constituencies within many
Members. Predictably, consumer groups championed a lesser duty rule,
and producer groups steadfastly opposed it.
* Anti-circumvention (Article 9:5:3 of the AD Agreement)
Should an express set of rules to deal with circumvention of an
existing AD order be added? Circumvention occurs when a foreign
producer-exporter that is the target of an AD order seeks to evade the
order by shipping (1) subject merchandise in parts or unfinished forms,
(2) a slightly modified version of the merchandise, or (3) components to
a third country, assembling them in the third country, and then sending
them to the importing country that maintains the order. 36 If so, then
what numerical thresholds should be used to find dumping, injury, and
causation? Should anti-circumvention measures apply to all imports of
the product in question from a country, or target only imports from a
34. December 2008 Draft Rules Text, supra note 2, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis added).
35. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis
added).
36. Daniel Pruzin, Dumbing: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists
on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
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specific producer-exporter, i.e., should the measures be country - or
company - specific?
Members disagreed on all these questions. 37 As the Chairman
summarized in the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement:
Delegations disagree as to whether there should be
specific rules on anti-circumvention. Some delegations
consider that the only appropriate reaction to perceived
circumvention is to seek initiation of a new investigation,
while other delegations consider that anti-circumvention is
a reality, and that rules on anti-circumvention are
necessary to achieve some degree of harmonization among
the procedures used by different Members. To the extent
that rules are included, delegations disagree, inter alia,
what types of circumvention should be addressed (with
particular concern expressed regarding the use of anti-
circumvention measures in respect of exports originating in
a third country), whether numerical thresholds are
desirable, whether findings of dumping, injury and
causation should be required and whether anti-
circumvention measures should be company-specific or
country-wide.38
Thus, one group, including the U.S. and EU, argued special
multilateral rules are needed, especially to harmonize the existing
array of national-level rules. They were dismayed at the deletion from
the November 2007 Text of a specific provision that would have allowed
a WTO Member to extend the scope of an AD order if that Member
discovered an exporter covered by the order sought to circumvent it.
Another group, including China, felt victimized by American and
European anti-circumvention measures, and opposed any inclusion in
the Draft Text of anti-circumvention rules. This group said the only
appropriate response to alleged circumvention is to launch a new AD
investigation. 3 9
*Sunset reviews (Article 11:3 of the AD Agreement)
The Members disputed the appropriate criteria for initiating and
conducting a sunset review (that is, a review of an AD order five years
37. See id.
38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 5.3
(emphasis added).
39. See Negotiating Group on Rules, Proposed Provision of Anti-Circumventing,
TN/RL/W/216 (Feb. 12, 2008).
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after its imposition). Members also disagreed sharply on what ought to
happen after a sunset review. In the April 2011 Draft AD Agreement,
the Chairman explained:
Delegations have widely differing views regarding
various aspects of the sunset issue. There is sharp
disagreement as to whether there should be any automatic
termination of measures after a given period of time and, if
so, after how long. On the two extremes of this issue are
those delegations that favour automatic termination after
five years without any possibility of extension and those that
reject the principle of automatic termination altogether.
Other issues dividing delegations include whether there is a
need for additional standards and criteria governing sunset
determinations and, if so, what standards and criteria
would be most appropriate; what rules should apply to the
initiation of sunset reviews, including whether there should
be limitations on ex officio initiation, and proposed
standing and evidentiary thresholds for initiation; and the
timeframes for completion of investigations. 40
In brief, some Members argued an AD remedy must terminate
automatically after five years, with no possibility of extension. Others -
such as the U.S. - rejected automatic termination, and were pleased by
the deletion of a proposal in the November 2007 Text that would have
capped the duration of any AD remedy at 10 years. 41
* Third country dumping (Article 14:4 of the AD Agreement)
Should the rules allowing for investigation and prosecution of a
dumping claim on behalf of a third country (i.e., that dumping in an
importing country is causing injury to a domestic industry not in that
country, but in a third country) be scrapped, or should they be revised
to make them operational (i.e., more user-friendly, and thereby more
practical than as set out in the AD Agreement)? Alternatively, should
the possibility of a third country dumping action be eliminated entirely
from the Agreement? The Chairman stated in the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement:
40. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
41. See generally Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072, 1072 (July 14,
2010); Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: WTO Members React to Revised Rules Text; U.S. Insists
on Including Zeroing Provisions, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 12, 2009).
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Some delegations support new rules that would
eliminate the requirement for Council for Trade in Goods
approval to take anti-dumping action on behalf of a third
country, as in their view the current rules are unworkable.
Other delegations do not rule out such new rules, but
consider that many other issues about how such actions
would be taken would need to be resolved before they could
reach a judgment on the desirability of operationalizing
anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country. Yet other
delegations question whether it is desirable to
operationalize this provision at all, with certain delegations
preferring that the provision be deleted entirely. 42
The three-way split among Members again illustrated the lack of
progress since December 2008. Third-country dumping, while not
insignificant, ought not to have been a vexatious issue. Surely hard
work, coupled with flexibility, could have produced a compromise for
such an action, subject to strict, technical disciplines.
* Special and Differential (S & D) treatment (Article 15 of the AD
Agreement)
On a topic of manifest interest to poor countries in the Islamic
world, there was no consensus among WTO Members as to whether
developing and least developed countries ought to get any preferential
treatment beyond the modest special regard they are supposed to be
accorded under the AD Agreement. In the April 2011 Draft AD
Agreement, the Chairman explained:
The Group has continued to examine issues relating to
special and differential treatment for developing Members,
both as exporters and as users of anti-dumping. While
some delegations advocate flexibilities for the investigating
authorities of developing Members, for example in respect of
initiation of investigations, other delegations are cautious
about such flexibilities, particularly in light of the fact that
many developing Members are now active users of anti-
dumping. Regarding technical assistance, some delegations
propose creation of a trade remedies facility that would
assist smaller and resource restricted developing Members
to develop the capacity to use such remedies. While some
delegations oppose any facility that would assist Members
42. Agreement on Implementation of Article V7, supra note 3, art. 14, para. 4
(emphasis added).
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to use trade remedies, others consider that all Members
have an equal right to use trade remedies in a WTO-
consistent manner.43
So, after a decade of multilateral negotiations ostensibly dedicated
to development, Members could agree neither on whether poor
countries ought to have S & D treatment in respect of AD actions, nor
on whether they should get legal training to handle them.
To close observers of the Doha Round, none of these 12
controversies was a surprise. That is because their origins lay in the
birth of the Round. The U.S. consistently maintained that modifying
AD (or other trade remedy) rules to improve transparency and due
process were acceptable. 44  But, the U.S. cautioned, substantive
modifications to rules were not, as that would exceed the Doha Round
negotiating mandate. The fact the December 2008 Rules Text and April
2011 Draft AD Agreement could highlight controversies, but not suggest
language to resolve them, underscored their severity.
This fact also underscored how the Round drifted from its original
purpose growing out of the September 11 terrorist attacks. AD (and
other trade remedies) can sharply circumscribe the market access of
producer-exporters from developing and least developed countries to
developed country markets. Ensuring an AD investigation is not
abused for protectionist purposes that serve narrow domestic industry
interests in the U.S. or other developed country, but undermine long-
term national security interests in both the petitioner and respondent
countries, is a matter WTO Members ought to have considered. Neither
side gains if jobs and incomes are lost in a poor country because the
merchandise of a producer-exporter in that country is knocked out of an
important export market by an AD duty. The Members also ought to
have considered ways to bolster the technical legal capacity of
developing and least developed countries to bring and defend AD cases.
Neither side gains if those jobs and incomes are lost either because the
poor country was unable to combat bona fide dumping in its own
market, or fight a case effectively when the behaviour of one of its
producer-exporters is challenged abroad.
43. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, art. 15 (emphasis
added).
44. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S.
Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1072 (July 15, 2010).
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B. Five CVD Fights
As for CVDs, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text and April 2011
Rules Document emphasized five critical areas of unresolved
controversy: 45
*Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy (Article 14(c) of the SCM
Agreement)
Should a new provision be added covering government financing of
loss-making institutions?46 The provision would deal with official loan
or loan guarantees provided to institutions that incur long-term
operating losses and also with funding to state-owned enterprises
("SOEs") that are not credit- or equity-worthy. As the Chairman
explained in the April 2011 Rules Document:
This issue originated in a proposal by the European
Union to create a new category of prohibited subsidies
covering the provision by virtue of government action of
financing to a wide range of industries on terms and
conditions inadequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of such financing, where this benefited
exported goods. 47
Some Members argued the addition was needed to discipline trade-
distorting financing schemes, which had proliferated in the fall 2008
with the onset of a global economic recession. Other Members fiercely
opposed any change, because it would discriminate against SOEs. Still
other Members, mindful of the global financial crisis triggered in
September 2008, did not want to constrain their policy space to deal
with prudential measures during a financial crisis. 48
* Export Competitiveness (Article 27:5-6 of the SCM Agreement)
Article 27:5 of the SCM Agreement accelerates the period during
which a developing country must phase out its export subsidies from
eight years (calculated from the date of the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, i.e., 1 January 1995) to just two years, if the country has
45. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3; see RAJ BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 847-51 (2008) (explaining general
treatment of CVD law).
46. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Reports by the
Chairman, 5-8, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dda_e/chair... /adp subsidies_e.doc.
47. Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, para. 5.
48. Id. T 8.
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reached export competitiveness in the subsidized product. 49 Article
27:6 defines "export competitiveness" as a share in world trade of that
product of at least 3.25 percent calculated for two consecutive calendar
years. Egypt, India, Kenya, and Pakistan found two problems with
these rules.50
First, they said they sought to lengthen the period during which
the export competitiveness of a product is determined. 51 They called for
a change to a five-year moving average. By using a moving average
over five-years, aberrational determinations of export competitiveness
due to temporary market fluctuations would be avoided. Second, they
advocated the flexibility to allow for the re-introduction of an export
subsidy to a product that loses its export competitiveness. 5 2 The SCM
Agreement is silent as to whether a subsidy can be reintroduced under
this circumstance.
But, many Members resisted these proposals. 53 Some Members
thought a five-year base period is too long, and queried how to
operationalize the flexibility to reintroduce an export subsidy.5 4 Other
Members opposed any change to the measurement period, and were
skeptical of reintroducing an export subsidy, as it would upset the
balance between minimizing trade-distortive effects of such subsidies on
the one hand, and the need for subsidies in poor countries on the other
hand. 55
* S & D Treatment (Article 27:6 of the SCMAgreement)
The SCM Agreement entitled developing countries to phase out
export subsidies over a longer period of time than developed countries.
It also allowed them to keep these subsidies in respect of a particular
product until they had reached export competitiveness in that product
market (defined as 3.25 percent of world trade in 2 consecutive years).
Members argued over two questions.
First, should the definition of a product that could receive an export
subsidy be refined? Second, should a developing country be free to
restore a subsidy if it loses export competitiveness in a product market,
after having reached competitiveness, and if so, under what criteria and
for how long? In failing to resolve their differences, they again missed
49. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27.5, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14.
50. Id. 27.6; Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13,
9.
51. Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, T 9.
52. Id.
53. Id. 9-11.
54. Id. T 11.
55. Id.
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an opportunity to fashion rules that could be of help to Islamic
countries.
* Export credits and market benchmarks (Annex I, Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies items ()-(k), of the SCM Agreement)
Should export credits continue to be measured in terms of the cost
incurred by the subsidizing government to provide these credits? Or,
should they be gauged by the benefit they confer on a recipient? Some
Members, especially developing countries, said the existing cost-to-
government methodology was both inconsistent with the general
definition of a "subsidy" in Article I of the SCM Agreement, and
disadvantageous to developing countries. 56 As the Chairman explained
in the April 2011 Rules Document:
This issue was first raised in a proposal by Brazil to
amend item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k) of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (Annex I) to reflect a
benefit to recipient basis for identifying prohibited export
subsidies in the forms of export credits and guarantees, in
place of the existing cost to government-based language.
One concern underlying the proposal is that the generally
higher government costs of funds in developing compared
with developed countries means that a cost-to-government
standard for export credits and guarantees will put
developing country exports of capital goods at a structural
disadvantage. If the developing Member provides export
credits at rates covering its cost of funds, the rates will be
systematically higher than those offered by developed
countries using their own cost of funds as the benchmark.
If the developing country were to match the terms offered
by the developed country, it would have to provide credits
at below its own cost of funds, and thus would run afoul of
the prohibition in the first paragraph of item (k). A further
concern behind the proposal is that the cost to government
language of the provision is inconsistent with the
Agreement's general definition of "subsidy."57
In other words, a developing country was at special risk of running
afoul of the rules on prohibited export subsidies and being subject to an
especially high CVD rate, because of the relatively higher cost of funds
in developing versus developed countries. The idea championed by
56. Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, 12.
57. Id.
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Brazil was to account for this reality by measuring export credits and
guarantees based on the benefit to recipients, not the cost to the
government. Yet, other Members opposed this development-friendly
idea as development-unfriendly.58
Opponents argued using the benefit-to-recipient approach would
boost costs for developing country borrowers, because it would reduce
predictability (i.e., increase uncertainty) for government agencies that
grant export credits, and thereby reduce the overall amount of
financing available. 59 In turn, the cost of financing would rise, and
purchasers of financed goods would pay more for those goods. Those
purchasers often are other developing countries, which tend to import
rather than export capital goods, and are helped by such goods financed
with inexpensive export credits. Finally, opponents contended, the cost-
to-government is the internationally accepted standard methodology.
* Export credits and successor undertakings (Annex I, Illustrative
List of Export Subsidies item (k), of the SCM Agreement)
Should changes the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) might make in its Export Credit Arrangement
automatically have effect in the SCM Agreement? The Chairman set
out the problem in the April 2011 Rules Document:
15. This issue originated in the same proposal by Brazil on
export credits [discussed above], which in respect of the
second paragraph of item (k) [of the of the Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies (Annex I) to the SCM Agreement]
proposed that any changes made to the "undertaking"
referred to therein following the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round would need to be adopted by consensus of WTO
Members. For Brazil this is an issue of systemic concern, as
the "undertaking" in question is the Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits, to which only a small
number of WTO Members are parties, and changes to which
are negotiated and approved at the OECD. Via the second
paragraph of item (k), however, that undertaking
establishes a safe harbour from the SCM Agreement's
prohibition for certain export credit practices, and panels
have interpreted the provision's reference to "successor
undertaking" to mean the most recent version of the
Arrangement adopted by its parties. Brazil thus is
concerned that this interpretation means that a small
58. Id. 12, 14.
59. Id. T 14.
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group of countries operating outside the WTO can change
WTO rules applicable to all Members. A number of
delegations, including some parties to the Arrangement,
objected to this proposal, which in their view would be fatal
to the Arrangement. They consider that the Arrangement
works well to discipline export credits, and that the
frequent updating that it requires to remain current with
market developments could easily be blocked at WTO by a
Member for political reasons unrelated to the Arrangement
itself.
17.. . . On the one hand, some delegations consider that
any rules that will be binding on WTO Members must be
adopted by consensus decision of those Members. In this
regard, the clarification was made that only changes to the
"interest rates provisions" of the Arrangement would need
to be submitted to the WTO for approval, as only these
provisions are relevant to the safe harbor in the second
paragraph of item (k). Others, however, remain concerned
over the potential for WTO Members to veto evolutions of the
Arrangement. They note that only a small number of non-
OECD countries actually provide medium- and long-term
export credits, and that these countries often are invited to
participate in negotiations of revisions to the Arrangement.
They consider that the OECD has expertise in the area,
and note its recent outreach initiatives to expand
participation in the Arrangement. In their view, WTO
Members with no interest in export credits should not have
the opportunity to block necessary changes to the
Arrangement, and one institution should not be able to
block the coming into force of agreements reached in another
institution.... .0
In brief, some Members thought changes in the OECD
Arrangement should take effect through the SCM Agreement,
essentially for the sake of efficiency, and because the OECD has
expertise in the field. Others demanded the right to veto, in the WTO
context, any changes made by the OECD, so that the subset of Members
participating in that Arrangement could not change the rules on export
credits for the entire Membership.
60. Id. TT 15, 17 (emphasis added).
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In October 2010, China started a sixth battle over the SCM
Agreement.61 It proposed that the Agreement be amended to include an
Annex with disciplines on the use of "facts available" in CVD
investigations, akin to the Annex in the AD Agreement.
The proposal served China's self-interest: China was stung by the
large number of CVD investigations launched against Chinese exports,
particularly since 2007, when the DOC altered its long-standing policy
against imposing the CVD remedy on imports from non-market
economies ("NMEs"), of which China is one. "Facts available" may come
from a petitioner in a CVD investigation, or sources of information
other than the respondent foreign producer-exporter. An investigating
authority may rely on such facts if the respondent either does not
produce information it requests, or fails to provide useable
information. 62 Many CVD cases brought in the U.S. against Chinese
merchandise have resulted in the imposition of CVDs on the basis of
facts available. 63
So, proposed China, a new Annex to the SCM Agreement ought to
create a safe harbour: an investigating authority must consider the
"reasonable ability of the interested Member [i.e., the exporting country
from which subject merchandise is shipped] or the interested party [i.e.,
the respondent] to supply a response" to a request for information. 64
Critically, the authority, said the proposal, "shall not maintain a
request for the information . . . if presenting the information as
requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden on the
interested Member or the interested party."6 5 On its face, the proposal
was problematic. How could an investigating authority in an importing
country judge the "reasonable ability" of the target foreign country or
respondent, especially given that they have an incentive to claim
disability? Would the standard of "unreasonable extra burden"
engender rounds of litigation at the WTO as to what it means? In brief,
if the Chinese proposal was aimed at combating what it called biased
and abusive CVD investigations, then surely the proposal erred too far
in the other direction, and would impede fact-finding - that is, obstruct
justice - via frivolous claims of disability and burden.
61. See Negotiation on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 13, 1 29-
30; Daniel Pruzin, China Seeks in Doha Talks to Narrow Use of "Facts Available" in CVD
Investigations, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1586 (Oct. 21, 2010).
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C. No Remedy for Small-Scale Muslim Fisherman, Either
As if the aforementioned battles on AD and CVD were not enough
in number or intensity, fishing subsidies were the topic of yet fiercer
conflict. On these subsidies, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text and
April 2011 Rules Document were more disheartening than on AD and
CVD. WTO Members had leapt backwards from where they appeared
to have been in November 2007.
Fishing subsidies are not extraneous to negotiations about trade
remedies. Rather, they concern governmental support in a particular
sector, and thus are squarely within the kind of measure subject to a
classic trade remedy, namely, a CVD. Moreover, their link to poverty is
obvious. "Over two billion people depend on fish as a major source of
protein and income."66 Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Somalia, and
Yemen are among the examples.67 That also is true of non-Muslim
countries with large Muslim coastal communities, including India, the
Philippines, and Thailand. 68 Such countries are not necessarily the
most blameworthy in terms of causing or exacerbating the over-fishing
crisis.
Rather, it is developed countries that have considerable resources
to subsidize large-scale commercial fishing fleets. The long-distance
fishing fleets of the EU and China are not commercially viable, and
survive only because of government subsidies for fuel, other operational
expenses, and vessel construction and maintenance.69 For example,
this support allows foreign fleets to obtain more, bigger, and faster
boats than they otherwise would have.
Even when developed countries seek to cut such subsidies and
provide alternative support to their fisherman to use environmentally
sustainable catch methods, the fishermen do not always behave. In
May 2011, for example, an undercover operation by the EU Fisheries
Commission to crack down on illegal fishing discovered Italian
fishermen use drift nets (which span several kilometres in length) to
catch swordfish and Atlantic bluefin tuna. 70 The tuna, which migrate
66. See Amy Tsui, Members of Congress Ask USTR to Ensure WTO Talks Include End
to Fishery Subsidies, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1167 (July, 14 2011) (quoting a letter
dated 6 July 2011 to U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Ron Kirk from 12 Senators
and 30 Members of the House of Representatives).
67. See Andrew W. Speedy, Animal Source Foods to Improve Micronutrient Nutrition
in Developing Countries: Global Production and Consumption of Animal Source Foods,
133 J. NUTRITION 4048S, 4050S-52S (2003).
68. Id.
69. See Tsui, supra note 66.
70. Guy Dinmore & Eleonora de Sabata, Covert Mission Finds Sicily Skippers Still
Use Drift Nets, FIN. TIMES May 2011, at 21-22 (stating that as a result, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) is likely to impose significant monetary penalties against Italy).
See generally Seth Korman, Note, International Management of a High Seas Fishery:
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to the Mediterranean Sea, along with dolphins, sharks, turtles, and
whales, and some birds, are endangered species, all of which are
ensnared in drift nets.71 Thus, the EU banned drift nets in 2002, and
subsidized its fishermen to desist from their use. The Italian fishermen
pocketed the subsidy, flouted the ban - and Italian authorities,
including the Coast Guard, did nothing. 72 Consider, then, the impact
on the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean - all of
which, save for Israel, are Muslim. Their smaller-scale fishermen
suffer from stock depletion caused by their European counterparts.
Nonetheless, from the American perspective, the link between
disciplines on fish subsidies to promote sustainable development, on the
one hand, and alleviating poverty and susceptibility to Islamist
extremism on the other hand, was lost. In the words of four former U.S.
Trade Representatives (USTRs), William Brock, Carla Hills, Susan
Schwab, and Clayton Yeutter, in an April 2011 letter to President
Barack H. Obama, America viewed the matter as an opportunity to "set
a historic precedent by showing that trade can directly benefit the
environment while promoting jobs, exports, and open markets."73 That
is, at stake for the U.S. was an environmental measure that would not
interfere with market access for American fish exports.
America focused on its commercial and recreational fisheries
interests, which account for over two million jobs in the U.S. 74 For U.S.
policy in the Doha Round, the possibility subsidies by foreign
governments might be at cross-purposes with America's counter-
terrorism efforts was of marginal (if any) importance. Rather, they
mattered because they undermined opportunities for American
exporters in third countries, by putting American fisherman at a
disadvantage. For example, by cutting operating costs of foreign
producers and exporters, they injured American coastal communities.
Even environmental groups, such as Mission Blue, Oceana, and the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) emphasized fishing subsidies "undermine[]
U.S. trade opportunities in potential export markets" by "creating an
uneven playing field and reducing the stocks on which U.S. fishers
depend." 76 In truth, both rationales matter, or should.
Political and Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 697-
748 (2011), for a discussion of some of the pertinent issues relating to fishing subsidies.
71. Dinmore & de Sabata, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Says Success of Fisheries Pact at WTO Would Help Sell
Doha Package, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 768 (May 12, 2011) (emphasis added).
74. See Tsui, supra note 66.
75. Rossella Brevetti, Environmental Groups Ask Obama for Strong Fisheries
Subsidy Pact in WTO, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (May 26, 2011) (paraphrasing a
letter dated 11 May 2011 from these three environmental groups to President Barack H.
Obama).
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Unsurprisingly, by April 2011, the only points on which WTO
Members agreed were incontrovertible facts:
* A global crisis of overcapacity and overfishing exists, with over
85 percent of the world's fisheries being overexploited, fully exploited,
depleted, or in need of recovery, and with 63 percent of fish stocks
around the world requiring rebuilding.76 In April 2011, the Chairman
intoned:
The longstanding blockage in these negotiations exists
in spite of the strong consensus among delegations of all
sizes and levels of development that the state of global
fisheries resources is alarming and getting worse. Indeed
all delegations, when referring to data, rely on the same
statistics - those published by the FAO [United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization] - the latest of which
show that 85 per cent of world fish stocks are either fully-
or over-exploited. All recognize that this is a crisis of
exceptionally serious implications for all humankind, and
particularly for the poor in many countries who are heavily
dependent on fisheries as a source of nutrition and
employment. Nor is there disagreement that developing as
well as developed countries are major participants in global
capture fishing, and that all countries face a common
problem and share responsibility to contribute to finding
solutions, although not necessarily on a uniform basis. 77
* The crisis is due in part to the $30-34 billion annually (as of
2006) governments grant as fishing subsidies, including $20 billion
(equivalent to 20-25 percent of revenues) to increase the capacity of
fleets to fish for longer periods, more intensively, and at further
distances. As the Chairman put it: "most [Members] agree that
subsidies play a major role in contributing to these problems [of
overcapacity and overfishing], and that this is what is behind the
76. See World Trade Organization, Briefing Notes - Rules, available at www.wto.org
/english/tratop-eldda e/status e/rules-e.htm; Amy Tsui, Members of Congress Ask USTR
to Ensure WTO Talks Include End to Fishery Subsidies, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1167
(July 14, 2011) (quoting a letter dated 6 July 2011 to USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk from
12 Senators and 30 Members of the House of Representatives); Jonathan Lynn, Activists
Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2009, 12:50 PM),
www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X920091029.
77. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 12.
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negotiating mandate to strengthen disciplines on fisheries subsidies,
including through a prohibition."78
* Overall, annual fishing subsidies (as of 2010) equal about 20
percent of the value of the world catch of fish. 79
* Seven industrialized countries account for 90 percent of the
subsidies - Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Russia, Taiwan, and the
U.S.80
* Fishing subsidies provided by the EU and Japan have helped
contribute to a worldwide fishing fleet that is about 250 percent larger
than needed to fish at sustainable levels.81 Ominously, Brazil and
China are increasing their subsidies nearly to the level of the
industrialized countries. 82 Over 50 percent of the large vessels that
engage in unsustainable fishing are Chinese, and the Communist Party
supports them with fuel subsidies.83
* The crisis has adverse economic and environmental effects. 84 It
also has impacts on nutrition and health, because over one billion
people rely on fish as the key source of their protein.85
Despite widespread appreciation of these facts, the Members could
not agree on a common strategy to deal with the crisis. Their
disagreement persisted, as the April 2011 Rules Document indicated
essentially no progress had been made from December 2008 through
mid-2011. 86
78. Id.
79. See Rossella Brevetti, Environmental Groups Ask Obama for Strong Fisheries
Subsidy Pact in WTO, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (May 26, 2011).
80. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Rules Chair Admits Little Progress on Sticking Points, Issues
Fisheries Warning, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Dec. 3, 2009).
81. Amy Tsui, USTR Hopes to Use Doha WTO Talks, TPP to Eliminate Fishing
Subsidies, Support Oceans, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1103 (July 22, 2010).
82. Id.
83. See Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Says Success of Fisheries Pact at WTO Would Help
Sell Doha Package, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 768 (May 12, 2011).
84. See December 2008 Draft Rules Text, supra note 2, Annex VIII, T 2; Jonathan
Lynn, Activists Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2009, 12:50
PM), www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X920091029.
85. See Jonathan Lynn, Activists Say Fish Deal Hostage to WTO Deadlock, REUTERS
(Oct. 29, 2009), www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-trade-wto-fish-idUSTRE59S3X92
0091029.
86. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy's Assessment of Doha
Impasse, Says NAMA Not Only Issue, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 724 (May 5, 2011).
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The Members were split three ways:
1) First, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were skeptical of a link
between subsidies and over-fishing.
2) Second, the so-called "Friends of Fish" on the other side -
consisting of Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, New
Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Pakistan, Peru, and the U.S. -
sought stringent disciplines on fisheries subsidies.87
3) Third, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico
demanded exceptions, i.e., S & D treatment that would
allow flexibility to deviate from any such disciplines for
poor countries.88
The desire of the second group for stringent disciplines clashed
head-on with the skepticism of the first group. The demands of the
third group caused consternation among the second group, which feared
exceptions for developing countries would undermine any new
disciplines.
Accordingly, the Members disputed eight key areas:
* Benchmarks?
What metrics should be used to gauge the existence of overcapacity
or overfishing objectively and precisely?
* Judge?
Should individual Members be permitted to self-judge overcapacity
and overfishing?89 Or, should some other party, group, or institution
make those judgments?
87. See World Trade Organization, Briefing Notes - Rules, available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/statuse/rulese.htm. See also Amy Tsui, USTR
Hopes to Use Doha WTO Talks, TPP to Eliminate Fishing Subsidies, Support Oceans, 27
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1103 (July 22, 2010) (quoting Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat -
Oregon), Chairman, Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on International Trade,
Customs, and Global Competitiveness, telling Mark Linscott, Assistant USTR for
Environment and Natural Resources: "Let me just give you something to take back to
Geneva - no fish subsidies agreement, you will have my opposition. Congress in my view
is not going to accept it and all you have to do is look at this Committee to get an idea of
how powerful this issue is.").
88. See Daniel Pruzin, Officials at WTO Cite Mixed Results from Doha
"Brainstorming" Sessions, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1543 (Oct. 14, 2010).
89. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, Annex VIII, 6.
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* Fisheries Management?
Should the core of a deal on fisheries subsidies be obligations about
fisheries management, or a prohibition on subsidies? As the Chairman
explained in April 2011:
91. From the outset of the negotiations, the issue of
fisheries management has figured prominently in the
debates. Some delegations argue that if proper management
is in place, subsidies cannot cause either overcapacity or
over-fishing. Others, however, consider that while fisheries
management is important, it cannot on its own combat the
pressure for overcapacity and overfishing brought to bear by
subsidization. In their view, the global crisis in fish stocks
is ample evidence that fisheries management by itself is
inadequate to control overcapacity and overfishing. In this
regard, the example of the North Atlantic cod industry has
been cited.
92. These differences of view in turn are reflected in
very different proposals as to the role that fisheries
management should play in the disciplines. Delegations
holding the former view consider that fisheries management
should form the core of the new rules, and that the subsidy
disciplines should play the auxiliary role of creating
incentives for Members to adopt strong management
systems. Their proposals thus are to shorten the list of
subsidies to be prohibited, and to make these prohibitions
subject to certain management-related conditions (such as
subsidizing the replacement of retired vessels with vessels
of smaller capacity), and/or to put greater emphasis on
adverse effects provisions, in which the existence and
operation of the fisheries management system would play a
pivotal role in determining whether subsidization had
caused overcapacity and overfishing in a particular
situation.
93. Other delegations, however, maintain that the core
of the disciplines must be a prohibition of certain subsidies,
and that fisheries management should be a conditionality
for making use of exceptions from the prohibition (whether
general exceptions or exceptions under special and
differential treatment). They further consider that while
having fisheries management in place can be a relevant
factor in assessing whether non-prohibited subsidies have
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caused adverse effects to fish stocks, this by itself should
not be sufficient for a successful rebuttal of a claim. 90
In brief, Members could not agree on the basic paradigm for an
agreement - whether it was about resource management or subsidy
prohibition. This disagreement, of course, begged an important
question: what are the key features of "fisheries management" to which
all Members should adhere?91
* Prohibition?
How should the scope of the fishing subsidy prohibition be
delineated? 92 Should the subsidies ban apply to a comprehensive list,
i.e., a broad and strict prohibition, with coverage including a ban on
support for:
1) construction of new fishing vessels;
2) repair and modification of existing vessels;
3) operating costs of vessels and in- or near-port processing
activities;
4) fuel;
5) port and other infrastructure facilities;
6) incomes of fishermen;
7) prices of fish products;
8) destructive fishing practices;
9) overfished fisheries;
10) transfer of fishing or service vessels (from one to another
country);
11) illegal, unreported, and unregulated ("IUU") vessels;
12) transfer of access rights (whereby one country that pays for
fishing access rights in the waters of another country sells
those rights to a third country)?93
Or, should a conditional approach to prohibition be used, allowing
for certain fishing subsidies, such as artisanal (i.e., small scale)
fisheries, natural disaster relief, de minimis support, and barring only
subsidies most harmful to global fishing stocks?94
90. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, 91-93 (emphasis added).
91. See id. 94-95.
92. See id. 11 17-18.
93. See id. f 25-45.
94. See id. IT 20-24; New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 5; see
Pruzin, supra note 88.
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Related to these questions was how to draft a prohibition. Should a
positive list of subsidies, akin to Article 1:1 of the SCM Agreement, be
created, with the scope of prohibited subsidies on the list "modulated by
general exceptions"? 95  Or, would a negative list, identifying only
particular types of subsidies as unlawful, be appropriate?
* Exemptions and S & D Treatment?
For the benefit of poor countries, what specific types of fishing
subsidy programs might be exempt from a prohibition on fishing
subsidies, above and beyond the general exceptions to which any
country could have recourse?96 Accordingly, Members had failed to
agree on the possible exemptions for developing and least developed
countries from any ban on fishing subsidies, as well as on technical
assistance for such countries. 97 As the Chairman stated in April 2011:
... virtually all of the proposals for special and differential
treatment are based on permanent exceptions from various
prohibitions, in various circumstances and subject to
various conditions . . . . That said, there are fundamentally
different visions as to how S&DT [special and differential
treatment] should be structured, what particular
exceptions should be provided in which particular
circumstances, and what conditions should apply to the
different exceptions. 98
Among the possible exemptions were subsidy programs:
1) that contribute only minimally to overcapacity or
overfishing;
2) whose effects could be controlled adequately by a fisheries
management scheme;
3) that focus on small operations, i.e., a "bottom tier" of
activities that relate to artisanal (small-scale) or
subsistence fishing, which would not contribute to
overcapacity or overfishing; 99 or
4) that are important to the economic development of a poor
country. 100
95. Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 10.
96. See generally id. TT 46-83 (describing proposed subsidy exceptions for developing
countries, including a tiered proposal structure).
97. See id. 82 (concerning technical assistance).
98. Id. 46.
99. See id. TT 58-67.
100. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, T 5.
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Members contested the parameters for exemptions, as well as the
exemptions themselves. For example, how should "subsistence" fishing
to be measured? How does it differ from "artisanal" activities? Would
income and price support, funding for port infrastructure, and subsidies
for the construction of small-decked and undecked vessels qualify for an
exemption, because they matter to economic development? 01 In this
respect, fuel subsidies, and support for other operating costs, were a
"very divisive" topiC.102
Should flexibilities for poor countries to derogate from any ban on
fishing subsidies extend to support for activities on the high seas, that
is, beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of those countries?103
This question also provoked heated debate.
Developing countries argues that equity suggested, "yes." Poor
countries "are latecomers to high seas fisheries, and should be able to
use whatever means they deem necessary in order to catch up to the
developed world." 104 International law also suggested, "yes," because,
"all countries have the right to a share of fisheries in international
waters, but. . . the cost advantages of developed Members' fishing fleets
are too great for [developing countries] to overcome without
subsidies." 05 Fairness, too, suggested, "yes." "Developed countries are
responsible for the overfishing of high seas stocks," but now seek to
"impose a standstill on high seas fishing."106 That standstill would hurt
the vulnerable resources, i.e., spawning and juvenile stocks, within the
EEZs of developing countries. Nature, also, counseled for an
affirmative answer: the distinction between EEZs and the high seas is
artificial, because many stocks are highly migratory. 107
Developed countries offered strong rebuttals. First, the high seas
are "the most biologically and politically vulnerable" fishing areas, as
there is no national jurisdiction and thus no mechanism to ensure the
''internationally-shared fisheries resources" are managed
sustainably.108 Second, any fishing activity outside of an EEZ is by
definition "highly industrialized," not subsistence or artisanal, even if a
poor country engages in such activity.109 So, all countries should be
101. See Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, paras. 68-69.
102. Id. para. 73.
103. See id. paras. 75-81.
104. Id. para. 76.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 77.
108. Id. para 79; see also id. para. 81 (describing the problems of enforcing sustainable
conditions for a S & D treatment exception that allows for a subsidy for fishing activities
on the high seas).
109. Id. para. 80.
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subject to the same subsidy disciplines on high seas fishing. Third, a
poor country can protect its spawning and juvenile stocks with a sound
"national fisheries management" program. 110
At the heart of the disagreement lay the fact poor countries
demanded S & D treatment in connection with a problem for which they
are partly to blame. The Chairman indicated as much in April 2011:
47. Among the considerations cited frequently in this
context is the important role of developing countries in
world marine capture production. According to FAO
statistics, six of the top ten fishing nations, and 11 of the top
15, are developing countries, and developing countries
collectively account for about 70 per cent of global capture
production. For many Members, given these facts S&DT
cannot simply be a blanket carve-out from the disciplines for
all developing Members, as in their view this would render
the overall discipline ineffective. A number of developing
Members, while stressing that they do not seek a simple
blanket carve-out, nevertheless consider the absolute
figures to be misleading in that they mask the comparative
efficiency and magnitude of countries' fishing activities,
and thus their relative impacts on global fisheries
resources. They argue instead that the use of catch per
capita, or catch per fisher, as alternative measures, show
that developing countries make less impact on global
resources than do developed countries.
48. Some of the differences in the approaches advanced
by different Members appear to relate to the different
rationales advanced for S&DT in the particular context of
fisheries subsidies disciplines. In this regard, objectives of
S&DT that have been referred to in the discussions and
proposals include: (1) poverty alleviation, i.e., assistance for
vulnerable, disadvantaged populations; (2) development of
the fisheries sector as a source of jobs, income and trade,
both to lift people out of poverty and to create new
opportunities for economic development and linkages;
(3) building up domestic capacity to exploit the fisheries
resources within the national jurisdiction; (4) enhanced
policy flexibility for Members with a small share of global
fish catch, on the grounds that they have at most a
negligible impact on global overcapacity and overfishing;
(5) extending domestic fishing activities beyond coastal
110. Id.
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areas, both into the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] and (in
some cases) into the high seas, to relieve pressure on
coastal fisheries resources, including spawning and
juvenile populations; (6) "catching up" to the developed
world in terms of vessels, technology, scale, and areas of
operation; and (7) exercising rights under international law
to exploit commercially valuable fish stocks in
international waters, the products of which are traded
internationally. All proposals and discussions emphasize
the need for the subsidies to be deployed and the subsidized
activities to be conducted in a sustainable manner,
although like the different approaches to the S&DT
exceptions, the proposed approaches to the accompanying
sustainability conditionalities vary greatly.II'
In other words, there was considerable debate over the guilt of poor
countries, and the theory underlying any S & D differential treatment
they might get. Unsurprisingly, the Members could not agree on the
practical matter of how to calibrate the nature, scale, and geographic
scope of their activities that should be exempt from any disciplines.112
Also unresolved, then, were the precise fisheries management
obligations a poor country would have to implement before having
access to an S & D treatment exception that permitted it to subsidize its
fisheries in some manner. Presumably, these obligations would require
the country to implement "internationally-recognized best practices,
including regular science-based stock assessments."113  And, what
transition rules would apply to developing and least developed
countries, so that they might have more time to phase in their
obligations?114
Finally, whether S & D treatment should be tailored for different
categories of poor countries was in dispute. Members generally agreed
least developed countries ought to get the best of S & D treatment.115
But, they worried that some developing, and even some developed,
countries might behave unscrupulously and try to take advantage of the
exemptions designed for least developed countries. And, they could not
agree on whether distinctions should be made among developing
countries. Obviously, doing so along the lines of the draft agriculture
and NAMA proposals (e.g., with differentiations for net food importing
developing countries ("NFIDCs"), certain recently acceded members
111. Id. 47-48.
112. See id. T 10.
113. Id.
114. See id. 11.
115. See id. 49.
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("RAMs"), and small, vulnerable economies ("SVEs")), or along new
lines (e.g., distinguishing developing countries with a small share of
global wild fish capture) would risk making the fishing subsidy rules
vastly more complex. 116
* Notification?
What scheme should be used for Members to notify one another of
their fisheries subsidies, particularly if they sought to invoke a general
or S & D treatment exception? 117 How much advance notice must a
Member provide?118 To what forum should notice be given - the FAO,
WTO, or some other entity?119 What information would be sufficient to
demonstrate that a Member qualified for an exception? 120
Related to problems of notification were questions of what to do
with information in a notification? Should there be a review of the
practices of the notifying country, and if so, what kind of review should
it be?121 For example, if notification is to the FAO, then should it be
empowered to render a judgment as to the soundness of the fisheries
management system in a poor country, and the entitlement of that
country to invoke an exception? Would this judgment be binding?
Could it be used in a WTO adjudicatory proceeding? Should a non-
notified subsidy be presumed rebuttably to be prohibited?122
* Remedy?
To be meaningful, any discipline on fishing subsidies would have to
have associated with it a remedy for breach.123 Likewise, an unlawful
subsidy would have to be attributed to the subsidizing government, not
the flag of the vessel carrying subsidized fish (otherwise, it would be
easy to circumvent the disciplines).12 4 And, the rule of origin for
fisheries product, used for customs and labeling purposes, would not
affect this attribution. But, what should the legal criteria for the
remedy be?
Should the "traffic light" scheme of the SCM Agreement be used,
whereby certain subsidies are forbidden ("red light") as long as they are
specific, and are presumed irrefutably to cause adverse effects, while
116. See id.
117. See id. IT 11, 97.
118. See id. 99-100.
119. See April 2011 Rules Document, Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies - Report by
the Chairman, TN/RLIW/254, Part III.E IT 101-02 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/chair.. ./adp-subsidies-e.doc.
120. Id. 11, 104.
121. See id. 11, 101-03.
122. Id. 11, 97.
123. See id. TT 11, 84.
124. Id. 11, 84, 90.
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other subsidies are actionable ("yellow light") if they are both specific
and cause adverse effects?125 What sort of "adverse effects" should be
actionable - only those in relation to fish stocks, such as over-capacity
and over-fishing, or any effect on trade?126 What test should be used to
establish a causal link between adverse effects and subsidization?12 7 IS
the mere absence of strong resource management enough to deem such
a link exists, or must more be shown?
As to the remedy, should it be limited to a CVD, as per Article 7:9
of the SCM Agreement?128 Or, should a WTO panel or the Appellate
Body be empowered to fashion a different sort of remedy? Should the
remedy be the same for all types of fish, or should a distinction be made
for highly migratory stocks?129 Should the remedy cover only fish from
the "same stock," or also a "directly competitive product"?130
* Enforcement?
What methods should be used to monitor and survey any exempt
fishing subsidy programs, to ensure the integrity of the prohibition is
not undermined and thus to help prevent overcapacity and
overfishing?131 For instance, should inspectors from the FAO review
whether a poor country is implementing its fisheries management
obligations?132
Thus, Chairman Valles simply put to the Members in his "Road
Map" a long list of questions concerning fundamental issues to
address.13 3 They were back to square one.
These issues were under the negotiating mandate Members
undertook three years before the Draft Text, in the December 2005
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. And, following the Seventh
Ministerial Conference in Geneva in November-December 2009, the
Chairman readily admitted no progress had been made in the year
125. See id. para. 5.
126. Id. para. 87.
127. Id. para. 89.
128. See id.
129. Id. para. 88.
130. Id.
131. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, 17.
132. See Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 14, T 10.
133. See New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts, supra note 2, TT 10-11 (concerning the
prohibition of fishing subsidies), 12-13 (concerning general exemptions from the
prohibition), 14-15 (concerning S & D treatment), 1 16 (concerning general disciplines
on, and actionability of, fishing subsidies), T1 17-20 (concerning fisheries management),
21-22 (concerning transparency), 1 23 (concerning dispute settlement), TT 24-25
(concerning implementation), TT 26-27 (concerning transition rules).
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since he issued his Text (i.e., since December 2008).134 Chairman Valles
elaborated on that depressing conclusion in April 2010. Deciding to
retire from his post as Chairman after six years, and return to
Uruguay, he said the bottom-up approach embodied in the December
2008 Text had been fruitless, and - worse yet - Members had made no
significant progress after eight years of negotiations on bridging
differences on AD or CVD rules. 135 His successor, Ambassador Dennis
Francis of Trinidad and Tobago, wrote in April 2011:
13. . . . . [W]hat then is the problem? Why have these
negotiations been underway for 10 years with little
tangible progress in finding a solution? In my view, it
seems that most (although not all) delegations, rather than
seeking to build convergence by indicating acceptance of the
appropriate level of disciplines (and of the policy changes
that this would imply), to effectively address what is
undeniably a common and rapidly worsening problem,
appear to be focusing principally on maintaining their own
status quo by placing on "others" the main responsibility to
implement solutions, while minimizing the impact of
disciplines on their own activities. Thus in spite of the
nearly universal calls for disciplining subsidies in an
effective way, many delegations in practice seem to elevate
the exceptions above the disciplines. For some developed
Members, a main reason given is that subsidies are
necessary to protect traditional ways of life, vulnerable
coastal communities, and jobs in the fisheries sector. For
many developing Members, a main reason often cited is the
need for policy space to subsidize in order to harness
fisheries as a basis for development, economic growth, and
employment. In the face of the sharp and continuing
declines in the fisheries resources, however, it is hard to see
how such strategies can either protect communities and jobs
or be a source of food security and stable growth over the
long-term.
14. . . . [A] unified, long-term strategic approach to
cooperating to rationalize economic signals - including by
giving priority to collectively reducing the level of capacity-
and effort-enhancing subsidies - can actively promote and
contribute to profitability of global fisheries, with the
134. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Rules Chair Admits Little Progress on Sticking Points,
Issues Fisheries Warning, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Dec. 3, 2009).
135. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chair Cites Absence of Progress in Doha Antidumping,
Subsidies Talks, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 659 (May 6, 2010).
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hugely advantageous additional benefits of economic and
environmental sustainability. . . . [F]isheries are often
compared to the prisoner's dilemma: non-cooperative
pursuit of individual payoffs leads to overfishing, which in
turn imposes economic loss (not to mention negative
environmental effects) on all parties involved. In fact, it is
widely-accepted that the economic benefits lost due to
overfishing are significant - a World Bank Report gives an
estimate of U.S. $50 billion annually, without counting the
out-of-pocket additional costs of subsidies (estimated to be
at least U.S. $16 billion annually). To put these figures in
context, the value of the total global marine fish catch is
around U.S. $90 billion. Like the prisoner's dilemma,
however, fisheries are not a zero-sum game. Successful
subsidy negotiations can help bring about a situation
where profitability and economic and environmental
stability are mutually reinforcing, contributing to
sustainable wealth creation.
15. In order for the negotiations to make significant
progress, I am of the view that negotiators will have to
focus more on these incontrovertible realities no matter
how inconvenient, and less on protecting their short-term
defensive interests. Unless this happens, I do not hold
great prospects for the fisheries subsidies negotiations. 136
A more honest assessment is hard to come by.
III. NOT FACILITATING TRADE
A. Progress through April 2009
By April 2009, it appeared a Doha Round agreement on trade
facilitation (i.e., simplifying customs procedures, which can be a non-
tariff barrier to trade, so as to reduce the transactions costs of trade and
thereby increase trade flows by speeding up procedures for the
clearance and release of merchandise) might be within reach. A June
2010 study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics states
that reducing the costs of moving goods across international borders
could boost global Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") by over $100
136. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, supra note 3, IT 13-15 (emphasis
added).
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billion.1 37  Additionally, the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy,
rightly explained in June 2011:
. . . implementation of the Trade Facilitation measures
discussed in Geneva [i.e., in the Doha Round] could reduce
total trade costs by almost 10 percent ....
.. . For OECD countries it currently takes on average
about four separate documents and clearing the goods in an
average of ten days at an average cost of about $1,100 per
container. By contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa almost
double the number of documents are required and goods
take from 32 days (for exports) to 38 days (for imports) to
clear at an average cost per container of between $2,000
(for exports) and $2,500 (for imports). The overall world
champion at trade facilitation is Singapore, where four
documents are required and goods are cleared in, at most,
five days at an average cost of around $456 per container.
At the other end of the scale are many of the low-income
developing countries, in particular the landlocked
developing countries, whose trade-processing costs can
mushroom as a result of the effort required to move goods
in transit by road or rail through their neighbours to their
nearest international port. According to recent research,
every extra day required to ready goods for import or
export decreases trade by around 4 percent.
Handicapping the world's least competitive producers
and poorest consumers with additional transaction costs of
$1,000 or more for each container of goods that they
manage to export or import is clearly absurd. 138
Indeed, even a one percent improvement in cutting red tape and
streamlining customs procedures, as measured by an index of indicators
for transparency and predictability, can increase trade in industrial
goods by 0.7 percent. 13 9
137. Susan C. Schwab, After Doha, Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We
Should Do About It, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 104, 115 (2011). Ms. Schwab served as USTR from
2006-2009, id. at 104.
138. WTO Trade Facilitation Deal to Reduce Trade Costs and Boost Trade, Lamy,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 24, 2011), http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/sppl-e/
sppll97 e.htm (speech of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy to the World Customs
Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 24 June 2011).
139. Red Tape at Port Costlier than Shipping between Ports: Economists Mull Doha's
Value, 2010 News Items, WORLD TRADE ORG (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.wto.org/
english/news e/newsl0_e/dda_02nov10_e.htm.
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Under the April 2009 Doha Round proposed agreement, developing
countries would be able to implement immediately between 30 and 50
percent of the obligations, with no technical assistance required to do
so. Implementation of the deal, however, would be part of a single
undertaking, meaning the deal was contingent on resolving the
agriculture, NAMA, services, and rules issues. 14 0 The agreement would
deal with three articles of GATT that cover transit, fees and formalities
(i.e., paperwork and documentation), and transparency of regulations -
Articles V, VIII, and X, respectively. Most if not all WTO Members
appreciated their shared interest in trade facilitation, though
developing countries were keen to avoid having heavy obligations
imposed on them, and insisted on technical and financial assistance
from developed countries to meet the burdens of implementing any
trade facilitation obligations. 141
B. Heavily Bracketed April 2011 Draft Trade Facilitation Text
On 14 December 2009, the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation
published a "Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text."142 Containing 16
Articles, it was the first draft accord in the Doha Round on the topic,
but it was replete with bracketed text. On 21 April 2011, the
Negotiating Group published a new version of the Text. Organized into
two Sections, with Section I containing Articles 1-15, and Section II
containing 10 paragraphs on S & D treatment, the April 2011 Draft
Trade Facilitation Text looked very much like the December 2009
predecessor. It, too, was replete with bracketed text. 143
The key highlights of the 37-page April 2011 Draft Text are as
follows:
*Provisions Relating to GATT Article X on Transparency of Trade
Measures
These provisions covered publication and availability of information
in Article 1, prior publication and consultation in Article 2, advance
rulings in Article 3, appeal (i.e., review) procedures in Article 4, and
other measures to enhance impartiality, non-discrimination, and
transparency in Article 5.144
140. See Amy Tsui, Trade Facilitation Agreement Bright Spot in Doha, May be
Finished in Few Months, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 507 (Apr. 16, 2009).
141. See Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO "Deliverables" Deal as Delegations
Take Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1164 (July 14, 2011); DOHA
Development Agenda, Briefing Notes, Trade Facilitation, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/dda-e/status-e/tradfae.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2011).
142. See Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4.
143. See Revised Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 5.
144. Id. arts. 1-5.
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Article 1, Paragraph 1, called for publication of trade measures.
Article 1, Paragraph 1:1 explained such publication should be prompt,
in a non-discriminatory and easily accessible manner that enables all
governments, traders, and interested parties to become acquainted with
the relevant trade measures. The measures at issue concern (inter alia)
import, export, and transit procedures, applied duty rates, fees and
charges, rules on customs classification and valuation, rules of origin,
penalties, appeal procedures, and tariff-rate quotas. Article 1,
Paragraphs 2 and 3 required establishment of an official website and
inquiry points. Publication need only be in the vernacular of the
country at issue, but if practicable, should be in at least one WTO
language (English, French, or Spanish).14 5
Article 2 required an interval between publication and entry into
force and opportunities for interested parties to comment on trade
measures. That interval must be "reasonable," as must be the comment
period, but the precise amount of time is undefined. Also unspecified is
what constitutes an "opportunity" to comment. Indeed, whether the
chance to comment would be mandatory, or provided by a Member "to
the extent practicable," was unresolved.146
Article 3 mandated issuance by governmental authorities of
advance rulings, possibly in a maximum period of 150 days (a drop from
180 days in the December 2009 Text), with clear procedures as to how
an applicant may obtain one.14 7 An applicant could seek an advance
ruling on matters of tariff classification (and, therefore, the applied
duty rate to be imposed), customs valuation, duty drawback, tariff rate
quotas, rules of origin, and fees and charges. 148 Any such ruling must
be valid for a "reasonable" (albeit unspecified) period of time. 14 9
However, no advance ruling would be required if an adjudicatory
decision on the issue were rendered, or the matter was pending before
an adjudicatory or administrative body.150 Advance rulings would not
be precedential, but binding only on the applicant who sought the
ruling and the relevant customs agency.15 1
Article 4 obligated each WTO Member to ensure it allows for
administrative and judicial appeals of customs decisions.152 Appeal
procedures would have to be non-discriminatory, and decisions set out
supporting reasoning.153 But, to what body could an appeal be lodged,
145. See id. art. 1, paras. 1.2, 2.2.
146. Id. art. 2, para. 2.1.
147. Id. art. 3, paras. 1.1, 4.6.
148. See id. art. 3, para. 1.7.
149. See April 2011 Draft Trade Facilitation Text, art. 3, para. 13.
150. See id. art. 3, para. 1:2.
151. Id. art. 3, para. 1.3 ter.
152. Id. art. 4, para. 1.1.
153. Id. art. 4, paras. 1.3-1.5.
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and would that body have to be independent of the customs official or
agency rendering the controversial decision? These crucial questions
were unresolved.15 4
Article 5 prescribed disciplines on the issuance of import alerts (or
rapid alerts) concerning food safety, possible risks to animal or plant
health, and the monitoring of the quality of imported foods. Such alerts
would have to be based on positive evidence that food failed to meet
uniform, objective standards, possibly based on international
references. With multiple alternatives in bracketed text, there was no
consensus among Members as to the precise criteria to trigger issuance
of an alert.155 Article 5 also discussed detention and test procedures
with respect to problematic imported goods.15 6
* Provisions Relating to GATT Article VIII on Fees and Formalities
Connected with Importation and Exportation
These provisions concerned disciplines on fees and charges imposed
on imports and exports in Article 6, and requirements for the release
and clearance of goods, in Article 7. Article 6 required fees and charges
be imposed only for services rendered in connection with importation or
exportation, be limited to the amount of the services rendered, and not
be calculated on an ad valorem basis.15 7 Article 6 also required a WTO
Member to publish its fee schedule and not enforce it until an adequate
time period after publication.15 8 And, it set out limitations on the
imposition of penalties, including that they be proportionate to the
infraction, there be no conflicts of interests associated with their
assessment and collection, that a written decision accompany any
imposition of a penalty, and that the possibility of waiver of the penalty
exist if the infraction is disclosed voluntarily by the breaching party. 159
Article 7 obligated Members to maintain procedures on pre-arrival
processing, i.e., administrative procedures of a customs authority to
examine import documentation submitted by traders prior to the arrival
of goods so as to expedite the clearance and release of goods upon their
arrival, and allow for immediate release. But, Members could not agree
on whether such processing would be an entitlement for all traders or a
privilege only for traders with good compliance records.160 Article 7 also
authorized Members to separate release from final determination and
payment of customs duties and fees, i.e., to allow an importer to obtain
154. See id. art. 4, para. 1.1.
155. See id. art. 5, paras. 1.1-1.5.
156. Id. art. 5, paras. 2.1-3.4.
157. Id. art. 6, paras. 1.1-1.3.
158. Id. art. 6, paras. 1.4-1.5.
159. Id. art. 6, paras. 2.2-2.5.
160. Id. art. 7, para. 1.1.
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its goods before final decisions about the tariff liability have been made
and before importer has paid the tariff. 161
Article 7 discussed risk assessment and analysis in respect of the
potential for non-compliance with customs laws and the need to use risk
management techniques in a way that reduced the number of physical
inspections of goods. 162 Article 7 also discussed post-clearance audits
("PCA"), the establishment and publication of average release and
clearance times, and criteria for obtaining the status of an authorized
trader.163 Finally, Article 7 covered expedited shipments, requiring (or,
possibly, simply encouraging) Members to allow for the expedited
release of goods, at least for merchandise entered through air cargo
facilities. 164 Members could not agree on what "expedited" means -
release within 3, 6, 24, or 48 hours, or a "reasonable period of time"?165
Ominously, the Article 7 obligations concerning risk management
potentially conflict with post 9/11 U.S. customs reforms. Article 7
proposed that risk management, in the form of border controls, should
concentrate on high-risk shipments. But, U.S. law requires that by
2012, 100 percent of all maritime containers bound for America be
scanned overseas.16 6
* Additional Provisions Relating to GATT Article VIII
Articles 8-10 also dealt with formalities relating to importation and
exportation. Article 8 forbids a WTO Member from requiring a consular
transaction, i.e., requiring from a consul of the importing Member in
the territory of the exporting Member a consular invoice or consular
visas for a commercial invoice, certificate of origin, or other shopping
document in connection with importation of a good. 167
Article 9 called for border agency cooperation, that is, coordination
of activities and requirements among customs authorities.168 Article 9,
paragraph 9.1 bis, which Members set in brackets, required Members to
allow goods in transit (i.e., transshipped goods) to be declared as such.
Article 10 called for periodic review of formalities, and obligates
Members to minimize them and the attendant documentation
requirements so they are not "an unnecessary obstacle to trade."169
161. Id. art. 7, para. 2.1.
162. Id. art. 7, paras. 3.1-3.6.
163. Id. art. 7, paras. 4.1-6.6.
164. Id. art. 7, para. 7.1.
165. Id. art. 7, para. 7.2(c).
166. Daniel Pruzin, As Doha Talks Falter, Efforts Get Under Way on Alternative
Approaches to Salvage Gains, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 644, 644 (Apr. 21, 2011).
167. Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1.1.
168. Id. art. 9, paras. 1-3.
169. Id. art. 10, paras. 1.1-2.4.
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Article 10 also called on Members to accept commercially available
information and copies, but whether they must or ought to do so was
not agreed.170 Likewise, Members could not agree on whether they
must consider whether there are "reasonably available" alternative
requirements that fulfill their "legitimate objectives" that are
"significantly less trade restrictive" than their existing rules.171 They
also could not agree on whether Members would have to rely on, or
merely ought to rely on, best practices and international standards
(e.g., as set by the World Customs Organization ("WCO")).1 7 2 Article 10
also calls on Members to establish a single window for the one-time
submission of customs documentation.1 73 Article 10 forbids Members,
to the extent possible, from mandating the use of pre-shipment
inspection (PSI) and from requiring the use of a customs broker. 174
Logically, Article 10 required Members in a customs union (CU) to
use the same border procedures throughout their CU.175 Finally, Article
10 obligated Members to allow for temporary admission of goods,
inward processing (i.e., importing merchandise temporarily into a
customs territory without payment of duty, for manufacturing,
processing, or repair, and then subsequent exportation of finished
merchandise under a different customs regime), and outward
processing (i.e., exporting merchandise temporarily from a customs
territory for manufacturing, processing, or repair abroad and then re-
importing finished merchandise with a full or partial exemption from
duties). 176
* Provisions Relating to GATTArticle Von Freedom of Transit
Article 11 provisions covered freedom of transit. This Article
provided a definition of "traffic in transit," sets out a basic freedom of
transit rule. 177 It obligated WTO Members to provide non-
discriminatory treatment (that is, both national and MFN treatment) to
traffic in transit and ensured they do not apply restrictions on freedom
of transit that would be "a disguised restriction on trade."178
Article 11 also clarified that GATT Article V does not obligate a
Member to build infrastructure to facilitate the transit of goods, or to
170. Id. art. 10, para. 2.4.
171. Id. art. 10, para. 2.1.
172. Id. art. 10, para. 3.1.
173. Id. art. 10, para. 4.1.
174. Id. art. 10, paras. 5.1, 6.1.
175. Id. art. 10, para. 7.1.
176. Id. art. 10, para. 10.
177. Id. art. 11.
178. Id. art. 11, para. 4.
2832012
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
provide access to such infrastructure that it does have unless it opens
those facilities for general use by third parties. 179
Pursuant to GATT Article V, any regulations, formalities, or
charges affecting traffic in transit must not be "more restrictive . . .
than necessary," with the possible additional caveat that they must
"fulfill a legitimate objective." 180 Further, consideration must be given
to "less restrictive" alternative measures, and existing measures must
not be "a disguised restriction on transit traffic." 181 Article 11 also
imposed disciplines on fees, formalities, and documentation
requirements imposed in respect of traffic in transit, including
exemptions from customs duties imposed on imported merchandise as
well as exemptions from compliance with technical standards.182
Advance filing and processing of transit documentation, prior to arrival
and trans-shipment, would be mandatory. 183
Finally, Article 11 also ensured that once transited goods have
undergone the relevant procedures, they must be allowed to exit the
relevant customs territory without delay.18 4 There was a bar on the use
of customs convoys except for high-risk goods.185 There were disciplines
on bonded transport regimes and guarantees, to avoid inland diversion
of goods in transit.186
* Final Provisions
Article 12 concerned customs cooperation among WTO Members.' 8 7
It called for, inter alia, the exchange of information and assistance on
imported and exported merchandise, on traffic in transit, and on
verification of declarations made by traders. But, Members did not
reach consensus on the extent to which some of the proposed rules
would be mandatory versus exhortative.188
Article 13 discussed institutional arrangements, including the
establishment of a WTO Committee on Trade Facilitation.18 9 Article 14
required Members to establish a national Committee on Trade
179. Id. art. 11, para. 1 bis.
180. Id. art. 11, paras. 3, 9.
181. Id. art. 11, paras. 3(b)-(c).
182. Id. art. 11, paras. 7, 10.
183. Id. art. 11, para. 11.
184. Id. art. 11, paras. 12-15.
185. Id. art. 11, para. 17.
186. Id. art. 11, paras. 15-16.
187. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
188. See id. art. 12, paras. 1, 4.
189. See id. art, 13, para. 1.1.
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Facilitation. Its goal is to "facilitate the process of domestic
coordination of trade facilitation matters." 190
Article 15 contained special provisions for small, vulnerable
economies ("SVEs") that are members of a CU or FTA. They may adopt
regional approaches to implementing their trade facilitation
obligations.191 Also, all of the obligations in the Draft Text would be
subject to the exceptions in GATT Articles XX and XXI. 192
* S & D Treatment
Part II of the Draft Text contained transitional provisions for
developing and least developed countries. Paragraph 1 explicitly
acknowledged the differences among these countries, and it stated that
S & D treatment "should extend beyond the granting of traditional
transition periods for implementing commitments" and relate the
"extent and the timing of entering commitments" to "the
implementation capacities of developing and least developed country
Members." 193 None of them would be compelled to make infrastructure
investments beyond their means, and least developed countries would
have only to undertake commitments commensurate with their specific
development, financial, and trade needs, "or their administrative and
institutional capabilities." 19 4  Conversely, developed countries "shall
ensure to provide support and assistance" to poor countries so they
could implement their obligations.195 Absent such funding, or absent
the requisite capacity, poor countries would not have to fulfill their
duties.1 9 6  But, commitment of support and assistance from rich
countries would be "not open ended."1 97
Overall, Paragraph 1 contained bracketed language that is
politically correct, designed not to offend any Member. On the one
hand, it set out general principles that favor poor countries. On the
other hand, it did not guarantee them any specific funding from rich
countries. This equivocation was troubling, because trade facilitation is
rightly touted as a way to help poor countries, whether Islamic or not:
they can participate more effectively in the global trading system
through more efficient customs clearance processes. Market access
gains from tariff and subsidy cuts are not realizable if trade cannot flow
because of cumbersome or corrupt procedures for classification,
190. See id. art, 14, para. 1.1.
191. Id. art. 15, para. 1.1.
192. Id. art. 15, para. 1.3.
193. Id. § II, para. 1.2.
194. Id. § II, paras. 1.2-1.3.
195. Id. § II, para. 1.4.
196. Id. § II, para. 1.4.
197. Id. § II, para. 1.5.
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valuation, and inspection. They also are unrealizable if port and
related infrastructure is parlous. Yet, on providing financial assistance
to poor countries to help them implement trade facilitation
commitments, the Members (in the words of a trade diplomat) had "very
significant and fundamental" differences. 198
Equally troubling was another fact: having stated implementation
periods are not the only type of S & D treatment for poor countries, the
Members, in the rest of Section II, focus on only this type. This
hypocrisy was evident in Paragraphs 2 through 8 of the Draft Text.
They group commitments for developing and least developed countries
on trade facilitation into three categories - A, B, and C - with different
implementation periods for the duties in each category:199
1)Category A commitments would be legally binding upon the
entry into force of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 200
2) Category B commitments would allow for a transitional
period, but that period is undefined, which do not require
any technical assistance or capacity building. 201
3) Category C commitments would require technical
assistance or capacity building, and, therefore, additional
time for implementation, though again the period is
undefined.202
Developing and least developed countries would have the right to
notify to the WTO the commitments they are putting in each Category,
i.e., categorization is self-determined. 2 0 3 Similarly, under Categories B
and C, developing and least developed countries could define for
themselves the implementation period for each self-imposed obligation,
or accept a default time of one year.204 To be sure, Members did not
agree on that default time or on how much time after entry into force of
a Trade Facilitation Agreement a poor country would have to notify the
WTO of its obligations. 205
Flexibilities existed for a developing or least developed country that
faced difficulties implementing obligations in a timely fashion. Upon
198. Quoted in Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Warns Members Not to Get Stuck on
'Deliverables'Package, Says LDCs Priority, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 886 (June 2, 2011).
199. See Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, supra note 4, § II, paras. 2.1-2.3.
200. Id. § II, para. 2.1.
201. Id. § II, para. 2.2.
202. Id. § II, paras. 2.3, 5.3.
203. Id. § II, para. 2.4.
204. Id. § II, para. 4.2(a) (explaining that commitments would take effect at the end of
the expiry of the time period for notifying the WTO about the commitment and its
implementation); see id. art. 8.
205. See id. § II, paras. 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.1 bis.
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notification to the WTO of such difficulties (a so-called "Early Warning
Mechanism"), developed country Members would cooperate to help the
country overcome the difficulties, including via an extension of the
deadline. 206 Possibly, an extension of up to a year would be provided
automatically upon notice. 207 Developing and least developed countries
also would have the option to shift an obligation from one Category to
another, most likely from B to C.208
Further, there were three "Peace Clauses." The first one ensured
WTO Members do not bring legal claims under GATT Article XXIII or
WTO dispute settlement procedures against developing or least
developed countries for a grace period of two years following the entry
into force of a Trade Facilitation Agreement. 209  The second one
immunized developing and least developing countries from suit in
respect of a Category B or C commitment for two years following
implementation of that commitment. 210 However, Members did not
agree on the two year period (after all, it was in bracketed text), nor had
they decided whether a different period should apply in the second
Peace Clause to least developed countries. 211 The third clause, for the
benefit of least developed but not developing countries, barred suit
against such countries for an unspecified number of years as regards
their Category A commitments. 212 In all instances, developed countries
would be obligated to "'exercise due restraint" in bringing up a matter
for consultations, or adjudication, with a developing or least developed
country. 213
Finally, and to be fair to the Draft Text, there was a new dimension
to S & D treatment, one going beyond deferral of implementation
periods. Article 9 said:
[9.1 The provision of technical assistance and capacity
building by developed country Members and relevant
international organizations and other agencies of
cooperation, including the IMF [International Monetary
Fund], OECD, UNCTAD [United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development], WCO and the World Bank, is a
precondition for the acquisition of implementation capacity
206. Id. § II, paras. 4.2(c), 6.1-6.4, 6.1 bis-6.3 bis.
207. Id. § II, para. 6.2.
208. Id. § II, paras. 4.3, 6.1 bis-6.3 bis.
209. Id. § II, para. 7.1.
210. Id. § II, para. 7.2.
211. See id. § II, paras. 7.1-7.2, 7.7.
212. Id. § II, para. 7.6.
213. Id. § II, para. 7.8.
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by developing country and least-developed country
Members in respect of provisions requiring assistance.]
[9.2 In cases where technical assistance and capacity
building is not provided or lacks the requisite effectiveness,
developing country and least-developed country Members
are not bound to implement the provisions notified under
Category C.]214
In other words, unlike any other provision in the GATT-WTO
regime, legal obligations of poor countries are explicitly contingent on
rich countries helping them with the means to fulfill those obligations.
Why flog a poor country for failure to meet its duties when it could not
possibly do so without assistance? Additionally, Article 10 of the Draft
Text obligates developed countries to report to the WTO on the
technical and financial assistance, and capacity building measures, they
provide to poor countries. 215
Unfortunately, the relevant text (quoted above) is bracketed.
Moreover, how exactly a legal claim might be brought under Article
9.19.-2 is unclear. Suppose a developed country accuses a developing or
least developed country of failure to implement a Category C
commitment. The developing or least developed country respondent
counters that the developed country complainant failed to provide the
requisite technical assistance for capacity building, or did not do so
effectively. What evidence must the respondent adduce for this defense
to be successful? An abject failure to provide any help might be
sufficient. But, could the developed country rebut that evidence by
arguing no assistance was needed to implement the particular
obligation at issue, or by contending it provided help but it was wasted
owing to corruption in the government of the respondent? Perhaps the
developed country could argue there is no "hard law" obligation for it to
provide assistance, citing Article 9.3, which states:
9.3 [Developed country Members and developing
country Members in a position to do so] [Members] agree to
facilitate the provision of technical assistance[, financial
assistance] and capacity building to developing country and
least-developed country Members, on mutually agreed
terms and either bilaterally or through the appropriate
international organizations. The objective of such
assistance is to assist developing country and least-
214. Id. § II, paras. 9.1-9.2 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
215. Id. § II, para. 10.1.
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developed country Members to comply with the
Agreement's commitments. 216
To "agree to facilitate" is not the same as a mandate to commit
funds and expertise, and in any event, such agreement is contingent on
the "mutual agreement" of the developing or least developed country.
Moreover, perhaps providing normal budgetary contributions to the
appropriate international organization, such as the World Bank, fulfills
Article 9.3. Certainly, Article 9.4 lays out principles for providing
technical assistance and capacity building, exhorting developed
countries to take account, inter alia, of the development framework of
the recipient, regional integration, and private sector activities. 217 But,
the listed principles are generic, and might easily expand rather than
narrow the grounds for dispute between rich and poor countries.
C. What Should Have Happened
Without doubt, the April 2011 Draft Text on Trade Facilitation
provided considerable detail on the basic GATT Article V, VII, and X
obligations and helps resolve contemporary customs problems. But,
WTO Members failed to reach agreement on a vast array of critical
issues. The Text contained 850 brackets. That is, there were 850 trade
facilitation areas in which the Members, after a decade of negotiations,
had not reached consensus. 218 Complicating matters further was the
fact many brackets were set within other brackets, i.e., the document
had bracketed text within bracketed text.
To some degree, the range and depth of disagreement was puzzling.
Trade facilitation ought to be an area in which free traders and
development champions can reach agreement. Both groups seek
increased trade, and cutting red tape achieves that result. Thus,
assuming agreement could be reached on the bracketed language, the
Draft Text promised to have a significant, positive effect on trade
facilitation. The problem was an agreement was not at hand.
At the same time, helpful as streamlining customs clearance
procedures could be to generating trade, boosting economic growth, and
alleviating poverty in poor countries, and in turn, to rendering poor
people in those countries less susceptible to Islamist or other extremist
ideologies, a caveat should be noted. The poor should not be blamed for
their poverty, if for no other reason than to do so is uncharitable (and
very much un-Christian). That is, some developed country officials
216. Id. § II, para. 9.3 (emphasis added).
217. See id. § II, para. 9.4(a)-(c).
218. See Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy's Assessment of Doha Impasse, Says
NAMA Not Only Issue, supra note 86.
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have the view that if a trade facilitation deal is agreed, then most of the
development-oriented work of the Doha Round is complete, and the
focus of the rest of the Round can be on market access. Rich countries
should not so easily absolve themselves of their responsibilities to poor
countries. Charity aside, they would do well to bear in mind they share
a long-term national security interest in addressing poverty and the
sense of marginalization or oppression felt among some Muslim
communities.
IV. THE MISSING MIDDLE "D" IN THE DDA
A. Why Not .. .?
If the Doha Round is not about true free trade, or aggressive trade
liberalization, then is it about the middle "D" in the acronym DDA?
That is, is the Round about development, specifically about fighting
poverty in the Third World? The question became all the more acute
during the Round. As trade negotiators fiddled with and quibbled over
mind-numbing details, the number of chronically hungry people in the
world rose from 848 million in 2003-2005 to nearly one billion
(specifically, 963 million) in 2008.219 The United Nations Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) of halving world hunger between 1990 and
2015 was further off than ever before. 220
"No" is the response to the above question. Why not, as the U.S.
urges in the first and second trade agenda report of the Obama
Administration (the 2009 Trade Policy Agenda and 2008 Annual
Report, and 2010 Trade Policy Agenda and 2009 Annual Report),221 and
at every other opportunity, demand a correction of the "imbalance" in
the Doha Round negotiations between:
1) a known, calculable value of America's concessions
(including cuts to farm subsidies); and
2) a value of new market access opportunities from other
countries for America's farmers, ranchers, manufacturers,
and service providers, which is unclear because of special
flexibilities, not the least of which is the special safeguard
mechanism ("SSM") for agricultural products? 222
219. Javier Blas, Almost lbn People Now Going Hungry, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.
220. See DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, 296-97 (presenting
an overview of the MDGs).
221. OFF. OF U.S TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 2009 TRADE POL'Y
AGENDA AND 2008 ANN. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM pt. 1, at 3, pt. 2, at 3 (2009); OFF. OF U.S TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE 2010 TRADE POL'Y AGENDA AND 2009 ANN. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE U. S. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM pt. 1, at 4 (2010).
222. See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Endorse Work Plan to Secure Doha
Agreement in 2011, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 2, 2010) (quoting U.S.
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Why not, as the USTR professes, focus on winning for the American
people market-opening concessions from foreign governments, make it
clear that "no deal is better than a bad deal," and declaim that America
Ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke saying, "What is not realistic is the notion that a
few of the world's most powerful trading nations [e.g., Brazil, China, and India] can play
by a set of rules that gives them largely unfettered access to global markets - without
giving appropriate reciprocity in return"); Daniel Pruzin, Deputy USTR Punke Cites
Commitment to Successful Conclusion of Doha Round, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 658
(May 6, 2010) (reporting "[t]he United States has been pinned with the blame for holding
up the Doha talks by some delegations, who say Washington is insisting on additional
market access conditions from some WTO Members - in particular . Brazil, China and
India - without making it clear what it wants and without offering tradeoffs to secure the
concessions," and "U.S. officials for their part insist that the special provisions for
developing countries written into draft negotiating texts on agriculture and industrial
tariffs mean the major emerging markets could secure additional access to the U.S.
market while offering little or any additional market access on their end," thus "the Doha
agreement as spelled out in the draft text[s] stand little chance of securing support either
from the U.S. Congress or the U.S. business community."); Rossella Brevetti,
Administration's 2010 Trade Agenda Warns Against Weak Doha Round Pact, 27 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 290 (Mar. 4, 2010) (laying out the policy of the Obama Administration
on the Doha Round); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO
Ministerial Over Doha Trade Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1604 (Nov. 26, 2009)
(reporting on the confirmation hearing before the Senate Finance Committee of Michael
Punke to be the U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, at which he said "the concessions made by
the U.S. were 'very clear,' but 'what's unclear is what we're going to receive in return."');
Doug Palmer, U.S. Warns "Imbalance" in Doha Talks Needs Fixing, REUTERS, Mar. 2,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/02/us-obama-trade-
idUSTRE5215RU20090302. (quoting from the 2009 Trade Policy Agenda); Joe Kirwin,
Kirk Rejects Complaints About U.S. Position by EU on Doha Talks, DOD's Tanker
Bidding, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 462 (Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting USTR Ambassador Ron
Kirk, in advance of a meeting with new European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht,
that in light of the massive American trade deficit, claims that the U.S. was protectionist
are "laughable," and restating the American position that Brazil, China, and India must
open their markets to U.S. agricultural, manufacturing, and financial services products);
Daniel Pruzin, Officials Downbeat After U.S., India, Brazil Talks in Paris on Doha
Round, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1381 (Oct. 15, 2009) (reporting Brazil and India insisted
the U.S. -start showing its cards," while the U.S. demanded "greater clarity in regards to
the developing country flexibilities," and quoting an unnamed trade diplomat as saying "I
don't think they're [the Doha Round talks among the three countries] going anywhere");
Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Trade Diplomats See Positive Outcome from Summit, but Business
Groups Skeptical, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1311 (Oct. 1, 2009) (paraphrasing Acting U.S.
Ambassador to the WTO, David Shark, that "the United States knows what concessions it
will have to make on agriculture and industrial tariffs under the draft texts now on the
table," and quoting him as saying it is "still not sufficiently clear what the others will be
doing"); Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi 'Breakthrough' Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA
Talks for Sept. 14, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1191 (Sept. 10, 2009); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S.
Says No WTO Deal Possible Until Other Countries Improve Their Offers, 26 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 304 (Mar. 5, 2009). The U.S. is not alone in pushing for greater concessions by
poor countries on market access for goods and services. BusinessEurope urged the EU to
adopt the same stance as the U.S. Daniel Pruzin, Business Group Pushes EU to Press for
Access Gains in Emerging Markets, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1068 (July 15, 2010).
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will not be "shamed" into accepting a Doha Round package that
generates insufficient export opportunities? 223
After all, 95 percent of the world's consumers reside outside the
U.S., so it is keenly in America's economic interest to have free-trade
access to them. Yet, endless flexibilities for developing countries in the
draft Doha Round texts would allow those countries to wall off their
consumers from American products. Looking at the December 2008
Draft NAMA Text, the former USTR, Ambassador Susan Schwab,
complained:
What are the relative roles and responsibilities of
advanced (or developed), emerging, and developing
countries?
For manufactured goods, these proposals would, by the
end of the Doha Round implementation period, allow the
tariffs of most emerging economies, other than China and
South Africa, to remain largely unchanged from those in
place when the Doha Round began. Based on 2008
calculations, this would result in the developed economies'
delivering over three-quarters of the Doha Round's market-
opening results, well beyond their current 53 percent (and
shrinking) share of global GDP.224
Likewise, said Deputy USTR and Ambassador to the WTO, Michael
Punke, in June 2010:
It [the flexibility for developing countries to exclude
tariff lines from agreed-upon formulaic cuts, along with
extended implementation periods, for them] means that
China could shelter its entire automobile sector from any
market opening. It means China could shield broad parts
of its chemical sector from market opening. It means
Brazil could leave in place over a thousand tariff peaks.
It means India ... could avoid making cuts in applied
tariffs on 97 percent of its industrial tariffs. . . . When you
223. Daniel Pruzin, Kirk Says U.S. Will Not be 'Shamed' into Accepting Inadequate
Doha Deal, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1684 (Dec. 10, 2009) (quoting USTR Ambassador
Ron Kirk); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Still Needs More Time to Decide Next Steps in WTO
Trade Talks, Punke Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1529 (Nov. 12, 2009) (reporting on
the confirmation hearings before the Senate Finance Committee of Michael Punke to be
U.S. Ambassador to the WTO).
224. Schwab, supra note 137, at 104, 109-10 (emphasis added).
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think about examples like that, I think it's not surprising
that we don't believe what's currently on the table is
sufficiently ambitious or balanced, particularly when you
contrast that with what's being asked of the U.S. We're
being asked to make cuts to 100 percent of our applied
tariffs. If what's on the table were implemented, the
average U.S. tariff rate would be cut from 3.9 percent to 1.9
percent. If you look at the trade-weighted tariff, the U.S.
would end up with an average tariff of 0.7 percent. 225
Never mind the fact a 3.9 percent duty rate is a nuisance tariff, so a
cut to 1.9 percent makes little economic difference in terms of protective
effect. Never mind also the fact that America accounts for 12 percent of
global trade, down from over one-quarter in the 1980s. 2 26 It is not that
America has become weaker or failed to export more. Rather, from the
perspective of the USTR, it is that the proverbial global economic "pie"
is getting bigger, and - amidst new power relationships in an arguably
multi-polar world economic system - America wants a larger slice.
As Ambassador Punke put it in November 2010:
The central question that remains is whether or not
the emerging economies are ready to step up to a level of
responsibility that's commensurate with their role in the
global economy.227
This refrain was repeated nearly verbatim, and ad nauseum,
evincing just how hardened positions had become. In January 2011,
Ambassador Punke stated:
The central question of the [Doha] Round ... remains
the question of whether emerging economies are prepared
to accept the responsibility that comes along with their
position in the global economy. If they're prepared to accept
that responsibility, we'll have a successful outcome. 228
225. Daniel Pruzin, Punke Says U.S. Frustrated by Talks with Brazil, China, India on
Doha Tariffs, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 973 (July 1, 2010).
226. Len Bracken, WTO Official Describes Doha Round Negotiations as Test for U.S.
Leadership, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 776 (May 27, 2010).
227. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ambassador Punke Cites Importance of Upcoming Talks to
Advance Doha Round, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1914 (Dec. 16, 2010) (emphasis added).
228. Daniel Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 76 (Jan. 20, 2011).
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In July 2011, he intoned:
[F]rankly, if [the] Doha [Round] could be completed by
virtue of throwing a pile of concessions on the table, we
would have had a deal many years ago. [The goal of the
Obama Administration is] not just any deal - but a good
deal [indicative of new global economic realities]. . . .
Wishing this complexity away with empty exhortations - or
calls for unilateral concessions - will not result in
success.229
The position clearly was one of maximizing America's slice in a pie
that was growing because of Brazil, China, India, and other enlarging
markets, not one of ensuring that poor countries with marginalized
Muslim youths got a bigger or fairer slice.
Consistent with this position, Ambassador Punke characterized his
December 2010 meeting with Chinese Commerce Minister Chen
Deming as "somewhat disappointing," as China failed to spell out
detailed tariff cuts it was willing to make, and stuck to its position that
participation in NAMVIA sectoral negotiations must be voluntary. 230
Likewise, the American Ambassador lambasted the new Brazilian
government for raising import duties, indeed, the Common External
Tariff ("CET") of MERCOSUR, from 20 to 35 percent on toys to protect
Brazilian, Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan toy companies from
Chinese producer-exporters. It was a "stick in the eye to Brazil's
trading partners, and it creates a more difficult environment for the
Doha negotiations," said the Ambassador. 231 The new government
picked up where its predecessor left off, as Brazil had raised tariffs in
2009 and 2010 on autos, auto parts, chemicals, electronics, plastics, and
textile and apparel ("T & A") items. The U.S. castigated Brazil for the
large gap between its bound and applied average duty rates - the
"water" in its tariff schedule: 31.4 versus 11.6 percent. 232
Following, or better yet composing the same refrain, issuance of the
April 2011 Documents, eight major American business groups - the
229. Rossella Brevetti, World Bank President Zoellick Blasts U.S. 'Defensive' Position
in Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1203 (July 21, 2011).
230. Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, supra note 228.
231. Id.
232. Timothy C. Brightbill, NTE Identifies Trade Barriers in More than 60 Countries,
as Well as Some Hard Truths About the WTO's Doha Round, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
834 (May 19, 2011) (recounting statistics presented in the twenty-sixth annual National
Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers, published by the USTR on Mar. 30, 2011).
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American Farm Bureau Federation, Business Roundtable, Coalition of
Services Industries, Emergency Committee for Foreign Trade, National
Association of Manufactures ("NAM"), National Foreign Trade Council,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Council for International
Business - intoned in a joint statement that:
A trade round is about opening markets and setting
the rules for world trade for decades so it must address the
reality that all major developed and advanced developing
WTO members that have benefitted from past rounds
enormously have a responsibility to the world trading
system to undertake significant market opening measures .
. . It is clear that this is not happening. 233
In July 2011, the NAM Vice President for International Economic
Affairs, Frank Vargo, intoned that:
[a]bout 70 percent of all the duties on American
manufacturers' exports are assessed by a relatively small
handful of the advanced developing countries. .. And about
70 percent of the duties that the least developed countries
pay are paid to the same countries. 234
The first point relied on a distinction favored among American
protectionists, between better- and worse-off developing countries. The
distinction is dubious because the ostensibly better-off ones, like Brazil
and India, are home to hideously high numbers of desperately poor
people. 235 The second point correctly recounted a long-standing concern
about barriers to trade among poor countries (South - South trade). 236
But, it presumed that least developed countries have much in the way
of industrial products to export, and ignored the infant industry
concerns of many poor country manufacturers.
Manifestly from such comments, the Doha Round was far adrift
from the vision on which it was founded: development, through trade
liberalization, as a counter-terrorism strategy. A decade on, the Round
233. Len Bracken, Eight Industry Groups React to Deadlock on Doha, Back
Administration on Problems, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 728 (May 5, 2011).
234. Len Bracken, Business Representatives Explore Ways to Liberalize Trade as Doha
Round Falters, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Aug. 4, 2011).
235. See CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY LINE,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2011).
236. Bracken, supra note 234.
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was about re-balancing rights and obligations in the world trading
system, namely, fewer rights and more obligations for big developing
countries. American policy no longer linked gains from free trade with
defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Rather, the policy was to compel
Brazil, China, and India to realize they could not have it both ways: (1)
being classified as developing countries and continuing their anti-
American trade policies, and (2) demanding the respect and status of
major powers without shouldering the attendant obligations and
burdens. 237 "Grow up" was the American response.
To be fair, from a commercial perspective, the American response
was justifiable. It was backed by a bevy of data on agriculture. For
example, India has among the highest average bound tariff rates on
agricultural goods in the world (as of December 2009) - 114 percent. 238
Some of India's bound farm tariffs are at 300 percent.239 Since 1991,
when India introduced economic liberalization reforms, it dropped its
average applied agricultural tariffs notably, from 113 percent in that
year to 34 percent in 2007.240 But, 34 percent still is among the highest
average applied rates on farm goods in the world, and India slapped
especially high tariffs on apples, chocolate, cookies, coffee, grapes,
potatoes, and poultry. 241 Small wonder that (as of 2008) American
agricultural exports amount to just six percent of the Indian import
market, and overall, farm imports supply only three percent of Indian
demand. Small wonder, then, why former USTR, Ambassador Susan
Schwab criticized the December 2008 Draft Agriculture text: it "would
allow India to shield close to 90 percent of its current agricultural trade
from tariff cuts . . ."242
Likewise, data on industrial product trade exist to support the
American perspective. For instance, the U.S. grants duty-free treatment
on agricultural and construction machinery, whereas China does not.
Since 2000 (and up through 2009), Chinese exports of this equipment
grew by 45 percent. 243 The U.S. also grants duty-free treatment to
237. See Bradley S. Klapper, With a 'short window,' one more try for deal on world
trade talks- Business- International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-wto.3535749.html.
238. Amy Tsui, Baucus, Grassley Call for Access to Indian Agricultural Market as ITC
Report Released, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1774 (Dec. 24, 2009).
239. Brightbill, supra note 232.
240. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUBL'N NO. 4107, INDIA: EFFECTS OF TARIFFS
AND NONTARIFF MEASURES ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 5-4 (2009), available at
www.usite.gov/publications/332/pub4107.pdf.
241. Brightbill, supra note 232.
242. Schwab, supra note 137, at 104, 110 (criticizing the draft because it would also
"permit China to exclude from the cuts commodities of keen interest to both developing
and developed countries, including corn, cotton, sugar, rice, and wheat.").
243. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Envoy Hears Positive Tone on Doha, But Actual Negotiations
Are Still Missing, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1757 (Nov. 18, 2010).
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medical equipment imports, but China does not. Since 2005 (up
through 2009), Chinese exports of these products doubled. 244 Plainly,
the U.S. said, China was internationally competitive in these markets.
Hence, it should drop its tariff barriers to zero on them. As for India,
since the Doha Round negotiations began in November 2001, it had
reduced its peak industrial tariffs from 35 to 10 percent. 245 Yet, 10
percent was higher than necessary to protect increasingly world-class
Indian exports, and it still maintained high tariffs on autos,
motorcycles, and textiles. 246 America saw a lot of "water" in India's
tariff schedule: an average bound rate of 48.6 percent contrasted with
an average applied rate of 12.9 percent. 247
Further rhetorical questions were the American response to the
question about the middle "D" in "DDA." Why not, as some in Congress
demand, amend American law to require the USTR to stick strictly to
reciprocity, forbidding it to agree to a tariff concession unless it secured
the elimination of foreign tariff and non-tariff barriers? 248 Why not, as
the American business lobby insists, demand a balance among
agriculture, NAMA, and services opportunities, and greater ambition in
all three areas, plus strong trade remedy rules, rather than allow other
WTO Members to focus on the farm sector?249 Why not, as American
agricultural interests intone, obtain commercially meaningful market
access for U.S. farm products, especially in light of the severe
concessions the U.S. is being asked to make in respect of domestic
support and export competition?250 Why not, then, reject any attempt
to reap an "early harvest" of separate agreements on particular issues,
rather than await a comprehensive single undertaking?2 51
244. Id.
245. Nayanima Basu, Officials Lose Hope of Wrapping Up Doha Round by 2010, Bus.
STANDARD (India), Feb. 14 2010, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/officials-
lose-hopewrappingdoha-round-by-20 10/385623/.
246. Brightbill, supra note 232.
247. Id.
248. See Amy Tsui, Brown-Slaughter Bill Would Require USTR to Eliminate Barriers
before Cutting Tariffs, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1386 (Oct. 15, 2009) (reporting that a
legislative proposal - the Reciprocal Market Access Act - was introduced to Congress in
October 2009 that would establish authority to enforce a reciprocal bargain by raising
American tariffs if a foreign government reneged on its promise to cut its tariff or non-
tariff barriers).
249. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Business, Farm Groups Urge Obama to Reassess
Approach to WTO Trade Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 308 (Mar. 5, 2009); Amy Tsui,
NAM Issues Economic Recovery Agenda to Congress Calling for Open Markets, 26 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 314 (Mar. 5, 2009).
250. See Yerkey, U.S. Still Needs More Time, supra note 223.
251. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Nominee Rejects 'Early Harvest' of Agreements in
WTO Trade Negotiations, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 19, 2009).
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B. Because ...
Indubitably, each of these questions is reasonable on the
assumption the paradigm for the Doha Round is reciprocity, not
generosity. From the American perspective, reciprocity is, and should
be, the paradigm. In his first State of the Union Address, in January
2010, President Barack H. Obama made that clear:
[Wie need to export more of our goods. (Applause.)
Because the more products we make and sell to other
countries, the more jobs we support right here in America.
(Applause.) So tonight, we set a new goal: We will double
our exports over the next five years, an increase that will
support two million jobs in America. (Applause.) To help
meet this goal, we're launching a National Export Initiative
that will help farmers and small businesses increase their
exports, and reform export controls consistent with
national security. (Applause.)
We have to seek new markets aggressively, just as our
competitors are. If America sits on the sidelines while
other nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to
create jobs on our shores. (Applause.) But realizing those
benefits also means enforcing those agreements so our
trading partners play by the rules. (Applause.) And that's
why we'll continue to shape a Doha trade agreement that
opens global markets.2 52
Critically, the National Export Initiative ("NEI") calls for doubling
American exports within 5 years. 253 There is no reference in the
President's address to poverty alleviation and its follow-on link to
combating the breeding grounds for Islamist extremism. The Doha
Round was about, or had turned into an exercise about, American
exports and jobs, period. Moreover, the U.S. assertion that it is willing
to offer additional concessions if only developing countries will improve
their market access offers in agricultural, industrial, and services trade
- an assertion made by President Obama at the November 2010 Seoul
G-20 Summit - is dubious. 254 Could the NEI goal of doubling exports be
achieved if America was not mercantilist in its position?
252. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address) (emphasis added).
253. Id.
254. Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Leaders Say Time to Conclude Doha; Obama Prepared to
Take Risks for Approval, 27 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 1755 (Nov. 18, 2010).
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The American argument boils down to an assertion that difficulties
in the Doha Round are due to a standoff.2 5 5 On the one side is the U.S.,
which rightly demands greater market access in developing countries
for its agricultural and industrial products, and its financial services,
and seeks legitimization of its trade remedy methodologies, particularly
zeroing. To some degree, the U.S. is backed by other developed
countries, namely, Australia, which champions better market access for
agricultural and industrial products, and services. Notably, the U.S. is
not joined by the EU, which declared around 2009, and reiterated in
May 2010, that they had reached the limit of what they can offer and
will make no new concessions. 256 In that respect, the EU has succeeded
in painting the U.S. as the "bad guy" in the Round, with nearly
insatiable demands - at least in the minds of some participants and
observers.
On the other side are big emerging countries, particularly Brazil,
China, and India. They wrongly resist these demands, says the U.S.,
and thereby fail to shoulder greater responsibilities in the world trading
system, despite their professed desire to be major players in this
system. Thus, when in November 2009 former Deputy USTR Peter
Allgeier suggested a three-pronged compromise to break the impasse:
1) Brazil, China, and India forgo any exceptions to agreed
upon NAMA tariff cuts and any right to make no cuts on
Special Products;
2) the U.S. abandon its zeroing methodology in calculating
dumping margins; and
3) the EU drop its proposal to extend the higher degree of
protection afforded in TRIPs Article 23 to wine and spirits
to a broad range of other geographically indicated items. 257
The idea was reasonable. But, it was firmly rooted in a paradigm
of reciprocity between rich and poor countries, not generosity of the rich
toward the poor. Unsurprisingly, it went largely unnoticed. The likes
of Brazil, China, and India stuck to the position that the U.S. must back
down from its manifestly excessive demands as well as its failure to
indicate what it would offer if they actually did cough up a few more
concessions.
255. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO Ministerial Over Doha
Trade Talks, supra note 222.
256. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Told to Tone Down Demands If Doha Round Deal to be
Concluded, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 775 (May 27, 2010).
257. Yerkey, U.S. Expected to Come Under Pressure at WTO Ministerial Over Doha
Trade Talks, supra note 222.
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C. Trade Deficits and China
China's position hardened because of Federal Reserve monetary
policy. 25 8 The U.S. was flooding the world with dollars, as evidenced by
the November 2010 Federal Reserve decision to commence a second
round of quantitative easing by buying $600 billion of Treasury
securities. In foreign exchange markets, dollar depreciation was the
consequence of such easing, which in turn meant countries with trade
surpluses were at risk of becoming countries with trade deficits.
For example, the dollar depreciated against the Brazilian real, and
Brazil experienced a $50 billion reversal in its merchandise trade
balance between 2007 and 2010.259 Predictably, Brazil announced in
December 2010 it was unlikely it could make further substantive Doha
Round trade concessions in view of its worsening trade balance. 260 The
15-percentage point increase in the MERCOSUR CET on toy tariffs
(mentioned above) was "due to their [American] own policy of devaluing
[sic] the dollar . . . [and besides,] U.S. products benefit more from the
declining dollar than Brazilian products benefit from the increase in
tariffs," argued Brazil's Ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo. 261
Exacerbating the problem, from the perspective of Brazil, was that
China was the largest source of cheap imports into Brazil - in part
because of the appreciation of the real relative to the Chinese yuan. 2 6 2
In July 2011, Brazil (specifically, its Minister of Finance, Guido
Mantega) not only spoke of "struggles between countries" over foreign
exchange valuations, but also said the global currency was "absolutely
not over." 2 63 True enough, low interest rates in developed countries
258. Daniel Pruzin, Brazilian Official Says U.S. Payment Expected for Further
Concessions in Doha, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1912 (Dec. 16, 2010); see, e.g., Joe Leahy,
Brazil's Soaring Currency Aggravates Problems for Rousseff Administration, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 2-3, 2011, at 1.
259. Pruzin, Brazilian Official Says U.S. Payment Expected for Further Concessions in
Doha, supra note 258.
260. Id. See also Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers Vow to Overcome Differences, Achieve
Doha Breakthrough, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 178 (Feb. 3, 2011) (reporting the new
Brazilian Foreign Minister, Antonio Patriota, stated Brazil had limited room to make
concessions because of the appreciation of the real relative to the dollar).
261. Pruzin, Punke Cites Disappointment with Initial U.S. - China Talks on
Advancing Doha Round, supra note 228.
262. Joe Leahy, Brazil and China Face Increase in Trade Tensions, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 31, 2011, at 1; Joe Leahy, Brazilian Factories Tested by Chinese Imports,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 2011, at 6.
263. Chris Giles & John Paul Rathbone, Currency Wars "Not Over," FIN. TIMES
(London), July 6, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Brazilian interest rates were high because of
tight monetary policy, which it needed to prevent the Brazilian economy from
unsustainably high growth levels and to combat inflation). See also Brazil's Currency
War Wounds, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8, 2011, at 8 (reporting on the effect of currency
appreciation on the Brazilian economy).
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were partly to blame. With Brazil's main policy rate at 12.25 percent
that month, small wonder why financial investors sought to purchase
the real and thereby acquire Brazilian interest-bearing assets. 264
Yet, as a general matter, much reluctance by Brazil, India, and
other emerging markets and developing countries to reducing their
trade barriers through the Doha Round stemmed not from fear of
competition from the U.S., but from China. 26 5  Former USTR,
Ambassador Susan Schwab, explained that "fear of increased imports
from China may be the most unacknowledged reason behind Doha's
continued failures."26 6
The Vice-President of the Council of the Americas/Americas Society
put it well in a speech in March 2011:
It's not just production in Brazil that might be
impinged on by Chinese low-cost production sales, but also
Brazilian markets in Africa.
Now the United States isn't the only country or the
loudest country saying to the Chinese, "you've got to
change the value of your currency."
I can tell you the Chinese don't care about allegations
of human rights abuses. They don't care about labor in the
context of unionization. 2 6 7
Likewise, The Economist observed: [C]ountries like India and
Brazil are now more worried about cheap imports from China than
about imports from the rich world. In essence, they might be more
willing to open their markets to rich countries if doing so did not
simultaneously let in more Chinese goods.268
264. Giles & Rathbone, supra note 263.
265. Schwab, supra note 137, at 108. For example, at the April 2011 BRICS meeting
in Sanya, China, four of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa)
urged the fifth one (China) to import more products from them, and insisted that their
bilateral imbalances (with China) must be reduced. China retorted that its exchange rate
policy was not negotiable. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Developing Countries' Leaders Push
China to Agree to Import More Products, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 647 (Apr. 21, 2011).
266. Schwab, supra note 137, at 108.
267. Amy Tsui, China's Interests in Brazil, Latin America Prompt Concerns About
'Deindustrialization,' 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 572 (Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting a March 28,
2011 speech by Eric Farnsworth to the National Foreign Trade Council).
268. Dead Man Talking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011, at 81 (emphasis added), available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18620814/comments.
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Of course, because of the MFN rule in GATT Article 1:1 and Article
11:1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), doing so
does mean entry of more Chinese goods. And, the Deputy USTR and
Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, summarized perfectly in June
2011:
I've been in many discussions with many different
Members of the WTO, and in our [U.S.'s] urging those other
Members to open their markets in the Doha context, one
thing I frequently hear is those Members telling me there's
no way we're going to open up on an MFN basis because
we're afraid of China . . . . China is an omnipresence in
these negotiations, in whatever room we're in, even if
China doesn't happen to be in the room. 269
In brief, it is not just that some WTO Members fear China. It is
that most of them greatly fear China.
Compounding the dilemma for the likes of Brazil and India are
three facts: the Chinese (1) are willing to invest in the infrastructure
(e.g., ports, roads, and railways) of the countries in which they gain
market access to facilitate their interests in those countries (e.g., using
them as an export platform); (2) typically import their own laborers,
who toil under sub-par labor and environmental standards; and (3) do
not operate under stringent anti-corruption standards. 270 Their model
of investment, then, is quite different from that of western
multinational corporations. That is, argues Farnsworth, the "Chinese
model of investment in the Western Hemisphere is for the mercantilist
purpose of spurring the Chinese economy and supporting the Chinese
communist government." 2 7 1 In brief, what help to Brazil or India would
a NAMA accord be if it helped Chinese more than their own
exporters? 272 The result would be de-industrialization in Brazil and
other Latin American countries, if not India, too.
269. Daniel Pruzin, Experts Say China Exerts Growing Influence, Generates Rising
Tensions in WTO Matters, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1135 (July 7, 2011) (emphasis
added).
270. Tsui, supra note 267.
271. Id.
272. See Len Bracken, Harbinson Sees Three Positive Indicators for Doha Conclusion;
Says U.S., China Key, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 299 (Feb. 24, 2011) (referencing a
statement by Bill Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade Council ("NFTC"),
that China might emerge as a big Doha Round winner on NAMA vis-A-vis Brazil and
India).
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D. Reciprocity and the Two-Track Approach
In May 2009, the above-posed questions prompted the newly
appointed USTR, Ambassador Ron Kirk, to advocate in favor of a
suggestion originating from Canada: negotiate direct, bilateral tariff
concessions on an individual, line-by-line basis first, using the
December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts as reference points for minimum
commitments, and thereafter conclude negotiations on the language of
the Texts themselves. 273 The idea ran counter to how multilateral trade
negotiations, including during those of the Uruguay Round, typically
are conducted: first secure a deal among all countries on modalities;
then enter into bilateral or small-group negotiations on specific tariff
cuts to individual tariff lines. Thus, Nestor Stancanelli, Ambassador to
the WTO from Argentina, remarked: "[p]ushing for bilaterals without
the modalities is crazy [and] [i]t just makes the process more complex
and difficult." 274 The proposed alternative, top-up approach would
allow the U.S. to deal directly with major developing countries like
Brazil, China, and India to ensure America had a clear indication of
what its agricultural and industrial product exporters could expect in
terms of new market access opportunities - before giving its final
judgment on a Doha Round deal.
That way, America could find out precisely how developing
countries intended to use the special rules - the flexibilities - drafted
for them, and thus ascertain what it would get in relation to what it
gave. In turn, the Congress, deeply skeptical of the effects on the
American economy of the Texts, might be more inclined to pass any
subsequent Doha Round deal. For instance, the U.S. could find out
from India exactly what farm products India intended to designate as
"special." Additionally, the U.S. could discern which countries would
participate in sectoral agreements (and the agreements they would
join). After all, said the USTR, an agreement on modalities was
supposed to be not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end,
namely, authentic trade liberalization. Moreover, the skepticism from
Congress was set in the wide context of a global economic recession, and
the President simply did not have fast-track trade negotiating authority
(which had expired on 30 June 2007).
Thus, the USTR had no choice but to propose that during the
remainder of 2009, WTO Members would prepare and circulate draft
schedules of tariff concessions, and in 2010 commence negotiations on
273. Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Cites Need for Two-Thack Approach for Concluding WTO's
Doha Round Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 696 (May 28, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Kirk
Sees Need for New Approach to Doha, Indicates Retreat from Scheduling Proposal, 26 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 632 (May 14, 2009).
274. Daniel Pruzin, WTO 'Stocktaking' Meeting Starts on Pessimistic Note;
Expectations Lowered, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 412 (Mar. 25, 2010).
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tariff lines of keen interest. Those talks could wrap up in 2010, and a
final consensus on the Texts would follow shortly thereafter. For the
USTR, the Texts were too vague to accept, hence waiting for post-
modalities tariff schedules made no sense. To buttress this proposal,
the Obama Administration widened the context and "upped the ante."
What was at stake was nothing short of a new world economic order in
which imbalances in the global economy - not merely those in the Doha
Round texts - needed correcting. President Barack H. Obama bluntly
stated in September 2009, on the eve of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh:
"We can't go back to the era where the Chinese or Germans or other
countries just are selling everything to us, we're taking out a bunch of
credit card debt or home equity loans, but we're not selling anything to
them."275
The statement itself is economically correct. Serious deficits run by
some countries, surpluses by others, and financing from the latter to
the former, is neither healthy nor sustainable in the long run. But, the
statement is irrelevant to the original aim of the Doha Round - namely,
that the Round be a key tool for development to wean countries and
peoples away from radicalism, and integrate them into the global
economy. The statement forgets this aim and establishes post hoc a
new goal for the Round, namely, structural adjustment. From an
American perspective, U.S. insistence on knowing the full value of
concessions developing countries will make, and how they will use their
flexibilities, before signing off on Doha Round texts, is sensible, because
the new American-established goal is to reduce its chronic trade deficit,
and concomitantly reduce the chronic trade surpluses of the likes of
China. But, this insistence translates into an unchanged trade policy:
the strategy of the Obama Administration for the Doha Round, like that
of the preceding Administration, is "no deal without tangible market
access gains in advanced developing countries." 276
As intimated, the obvious answer to this line of argument -
understandable as it may be from an American perspective - is that the
Doha Round never was supposed to produce a perfectly balanced
outcome. The middle "D" meant there would be a preferential option for
the poor. That is why, for instance, India insisted on the right to self-
select farm goods as "special" after modalities were agreed, at the time
each country prepared its Doha Round tariff schedule. 277 That also is
275. Alister Bull, U.S. to Push for New Economic World Order at G20, REUTERS, Sept.
21, 2009, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/09/21/us-
to-push-for-new-economic-world-order-at-g20/.
276. Daniel Pruzin, Continued Stalemate Set to Raise Questions About Future of Doha
Talks, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 83 (Jan. 21, 2010).
277. Pruzin, See Lamy Cites Need for Two-Track Approach for Concluding WTO's
Doha Round Talks, supra note 273.
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why China insisted that self-designation implies a developing country
does not have to publicize the list of goods it plans to shield from
agreed-upon cuts until after consensus has been reached on the overall
modalities Texts. 278 And, that is why South Africa argued it cannot do
more in terms of opening up its market to foreign competition, given
that it made concessions during the Uruguay Round that went far
beyond commitments made of less developed countries, and why it
found the December 2008 Draft Texts on Agriculture and NAMA
unacceptable - namely, they failed to address the "developmental
imbalance" between rich and poor countries. 279
Unfortunately, as the Third World began to take the middle "D"
seriously, claims came from the First World that it was a mistake to use
that middle "D." Doing so was a teaser, falsely raising expectations
among poor countries. "Why give hope to the poor?" was the cold,
sarcastic rhetorical question that hardheaded trade realists whispered
to each other. Thus, Argentina remarked (in respect of the December
2008 NAMA Text), "[i]t's a developed country agenda," because the
focus is on market access issues in which rich countries are
interested.280 Argentina also criticized the U.S. of flip-flopping: early on
in the Round, the U.S. agreed to modalities with flexibilities for
developing countries.
That was not the only answer to the American effort to flip the
order of events and put bilateral tariff schedules before the modalities
texts. First, Switzerland explained that the August 2004 Framework
Agreement contemplated bilateral negotiations on specific tariff
concessions, but only after modalities agreements were finalized. 281
Second, not all developed countries agreed with the U.S. Notably, the
EU opposed the approach suggested by the USTR. Commencing
bilateral negotiations before modalities were agreed could mean a re-
writing, even unraveling, of the December 2008 Texts, i.e., a loss of
years of hard work. 2 8 2 Third, and perhaps most importantly, developing
countries - including the entire G-20, led by Brazil, China, Egypt
(speaking for many African countries), and India - were steadfastly
against it. They suspected the U.S. wanted to engage them in bilateral
278. See Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers Meeting Calls for New Push to Move Doha
Round Before September G-20, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 872 (July 2, 2009).
279. Gary G. Yerkey, Finishing WTO Talks by End of 2010 Very Unlikely,' South
African Minister Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1313 (Oct. 1, 2009) (quoting Rob Davies,
South African Trade Minister, on Sept. 29, 2009).
280. Daniel Pruzin, NAMA Chair Outlines 'Gradual' Approach for Restarting Doha
Industrial Tariff Talks, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 181 (Feb. 5, 2009) (quoting Argentina's
WTO ambassador Alfredo Dumont).
281. Pruzin, Kirk Sees Need for New Approach to Doha, Indicates Retreat from
Scheduling Proposal, supra note 273.
282. See id.
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talks because the U.S. would have greater leverage dealing with them
individually and even could exercise a divide-and-rule strategy. 283
Thus, the USTR had little choice but to beat a hasty retreat, with
one modest consolation. The Director-General, Pascal Lamy, said that
perhaps WTO Members could consider a two-track approach. Under it,
the Members could continue discussions on modalities, while
contemporaneously engaging in bilateral negotiations on cutting farm
tariffs and subsidies, reducing trade barriers to industrial products, and
clarifying the scope of flexibilities for poor countries. That is, the
Members could develop so-called "templates" whereby they would get
data from each other with a view to scheduling draft commitments
based on modalities formulas, and they could work on those modalities
formulas. There was irony in this consolation. Eight years into the
Doha Round, there was no clear consensus, much less unanimity, on
whether to proceed solely with modalities, commence bilaterals and
scheduling, or do both at once. The end-result, which was clear by
September 2009, was to do both at the same time. 2 8 4
This two-track approach is exactly the path some WTO Members
began to tread with the U.S. To be sure, the compromise language at
the July 2009 summit of G-8 leaders (i.e., from Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.) in
L'Aquila, Italy, which also was agreed to by Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Korea Mexico, and South Africa, was a fudge: "[Wie
regard enhancing the transparency and understanding of the [Doha
Round] negotiating results to date as a necessary means to facilitate the
conclusion of an agreement." 285
This language meant the U.S. was entitled to see how poor
countries intended to use their flexibilities under Doha Round texts,
and whether they would join a sectoral agreement, before agreeing to
those texts. Yet, poor countries insisted they would not bargain over
the precise products for which they sought special or sensitive
designation. Self-designation of those products might allow them to tell
the U.S. what they were going to do, as a matter of information, but
gave the U.S. no right of consultation, or negotiation, over what the
products would be, or whether they would join a sectoral agreement.
283. Id.
284. See Chair Consults on 'Energizing' Farm Talks for Coming Months, WTO (Sept.
16, 2009), http;//www.wto.org/English/news-e/agng_16sepO9-e.htm. The progress made
by WTO Members on developing templates is recounted in the April 2011 Agriculture
Document Part II, and on concomitant data-related activities in Part III. That Document
is discussed in Part One of the Trilogy.
285. Daniel Pruzin, G-8-Plus Declaration Sets Stage for Battle Over Developing
Country Flexibilities in Doha, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 950 (July 16, 2009) (quoting a
July 9, 2009 declaration by the G-8 and leaders of other major emerging economies).
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Not surprisingly, given the fuzzy compromise language and
increasingly entrenched positions, the two-track approach met with
mixed results. 286 On the margins of the Seventh WTO Ministerial
Conference in November - December 2009 in Geneva, the U.S. declared
it had "good" bilateral consultations with India. But, China was
unwilling to engage in bilateral talks with the U.S., particularly on
lowering its industrial tariffs on chemicals, electronic goods, and
machinery. China accused the U.S. of behaving in a protectionist
manner and unfairly subsidizing its farmers to the detriment of the
market access interests of Chinese farmers. The Chinese Vice
Agriculture Minister, Niu Dan, said he had no interest in talking with
the U.S. at the Conference, and added rather rudely "I don't have
time." 2 8 7 Brazil revealed the U.S. presented it with a list in early
October of 3,000 industrial tariff lines covering (inter alia) agricultural
and industrial machinery, chemicals, forestry products, medical devices,
and pharmaceuticals, for which the U.S. demanded tariff cuts beyond
the general NAMA formula reductions. 288
The U.S. argued Brazil, as well as China and India, is globally
competitive in these sectors, and thus ought to be willing to make
concessions. Yet, the U.S. neither identified for Brazil precisely how
many lines on which it ought to impose extra cuts, nor indicated the
priority lines. Brazil balked at the demand, complained that the U.S.
failed to state what concessions it would offer in return, and accused the
U.S. of making it as a tactic to delay completion of the Doha Round.
Brazil also reminded the U.S. that it and other developing countries
already had made significant market access concessions, thus the U.S.
had no basis for asking for yet more.289 The U.S. retorted that it should
not have to pre-pay for concessions from developing countries, as it
already had given up so much to arrive at the December 2008 Draft
Agriculture and NAMA texts. This dialectic continued throughout
2010, and into 2011.290
Not surprisingly, by late February 2010, there was widespread
pessimism the Doha Round could conclude in 2010.291 Positions had
286. See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, Bilateral Talks on Possible WTO Deal Will
Continue for Months, USTR Says, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1671 (Dec. 3, 2009).
287. Id. (quoting Niu Dan on Nov. 29, 2009, on the eve of the WTO Ministerial
Conference).
288. Id; Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility
for Doha Impasse, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1507 (Oct. 7, 2010).
289. Pruzin & Yerkey, Bilateral Talks on Possible WTO Deal Will Continue for
Months, USTR Says, supra note 286.
290. Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility for Doha
Impasse, supra note 288.
291. Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Sees Low-Profile 'Stock-Taking' Meeting as Frustration Over
Doha Grows, 27 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 248 (Feb. 25, 2010).
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hardened further, and on some topics, they even appeared to have
widened. Some WTO Members, and the Director-General, Pascal
Lamy, admitted they did not even know how big some of the key gaps
were. 2 9 2  The best choice seemed to be to press ahead with
contemporaneous bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and when
appropriate, pluri-lateral ones. After all, the alternatives were to
declare the Round dead, which no Member wanted openly to do, or to
suspend it indefinitely until the Members had the political will to finish
it. The conventional wisdom was that either alternative would deeply
injure the long-term credibility and even legitimacy of the WTO. In
truth, the world trading community might have appreciated the
honesty and integrity behind the alternatives. By the fall of 2010, it
was manifest that the Round would not finish by the end of 2010, and
probably not by the end of 2011. At the WTO, the U.S. on one side, and
Brazil, China, and India on the other, did little else than trade barbs as
to which side was to blame for the impasse. 293
E. Embarrassingly Protecting Self-Interest
As for the USTR retreat into accepting a two-track approach, it did
not mean the U.S., or developed countries generally, had a newfound
appreciation for the middle "D" in the DDA. The fact is that once
bargaining began in the Doha Round, especially in earnest after the
October 2005 Portman Proposal from the U.S.,294 the major powers
settled into a familiar theme: protecting their interests. They never did
shift away from that theme. Put differently, no satisfactory response
has emerged to the perspective long-held by Kamal Nath, India's
Minister of Commerce and Industry, namely, for India (and other poor
countries), lives are at stake, whereas for America (and other rich
countries), the only issue is commerce. 295 Thus, for example, in the
292. Lamy Calls for March Stocktaking to "Inject Political Energy and Momentum" in
the Negotiations, WTO (Feb. 22-23, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl0
e/tncchair report 22febl0 e.htm.
293. Pruzin, U.S. Trades Charges with China, Others Over Responsibility for Doha
Impasse, supra note 288.
294. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 15, at 77-141 (analyzing this proposal and other proposals at the time in
response to it).
295. Chris Giles, Acrimony Dashes Doha Hopes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0059fl06-f084-11dd-972c-0000779fd2ac.html (paraphrasing
Minister Nath). Following the sweeping victory of the Congress Party in India's general
election in May 2009, and the postelection cabinet reshuffle, Mr. Nath was reassigned as
Minister of Road Transport and Highways. His replacement as Minister of Commerce
and Industry was Anand Sharma. Speculation in the Indian media about the shift was
that Mr. Sharma might prove more diplomatic in trade negotiations than Mr. Nath, given
that Mr. Sharma had experience at the Ministry of External Affairs. Kamal Nath's New
Portfolio Takes Industry by Surprise, INDO ASIAN NEWS SERVICE (May 28, 2009, 11:52
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December 2008 Draft Agriculture Text, the U.S. received much of what
it had sought all along in the Doha Round, including:
* Base periods, which would apply only to the U.S., to
calculate Product-Specific Support in the Amber and Blue
Boxes.
* Relatively deeper cuts that would apply to EU and
Japanese overall trade-distorting domestic support
("OTDS"), and significant reduction commitments that
would apply to Total aggregate measure of support ("AMS")
domestic support in the EU and Japan.
* A broader definition of the "Blue Box" to include counter-
cyclical payments.
* Incorporation by reference into Product-Specific Blue Box
caps of spending limits in the 2002 Farm Bill. 29 6
To be sure, this Text was more than a mere transcription of the
American negotiating position. The Text did not bestow upon the U.S.
all it had sought. The U.S. had opposed, for example, any Product-
Specific limits in the Blue Box. Nonetheless, poor countries hardly
could be pleased.
In light of that middle "D," provisions written explicitly for the U.S.
ought to have proved embarrassing. They were not justified for all rich
countries, which somehow might have made them thinly defensible.
They were just for the richest one. They raised the question why
American farmers ought to get better treatment than their counterparts
in Australia, Canada, the EU, or New Zealand, to which the U.S.
provided no answer other than it had to get what it wanted or there
would be no Doha Round deal. 2 9 7
PM), http://www.india-forums.com/news/business/177246-kamal-nath-new-portfolio-takes-
industry-by-surprise.htm. A different conjecture was Mr. Nath was needed to deal with
India's infamous transportation infrastructure problems. G. Seetharaman, For Infra
Firms, Nath's Just the Man, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (June 4, 2009, 1:29 IST),
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/reportfor-infra-firms-naths-just-the-man_1261748.
296. See Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
agric-e/agchairtxt dec08-a e.pdf.
297. Following the failure to call a Ministerial meeting at year-end 2008, the Financial
Times commented:
The reasons for the stalemate in the Doha talks were much the same as they
have been for years. The U.S. is demanding more access for its farmers and
manufacturers than the big emerging markets are willing to give - and
displaying its own lack of will in confronting domestic constituencies by
reducing those farmers' subsidies in return.
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Even more embarrassing ought to have been the intransigent
American position on cotton. Since at least May 2006, when the World
Bank published a study, the effects of cotton subsidies (and their
possible removal) on poor countries were well known: 298
[The] World Bank study noted that nearly half the
global cotton production occurred in the United States and
China. In 2002, the African and Central Asian countries
that relied heavily on cotton exports had an average per
capita income of less than 80 U.S. cents per day.
Meanwhile, exports from these countries competed with
heavily subsidized U.S. exports in the international
market.
The study found that if cotton subsidies and import
tariffs are eliminated, global prices would rise by an
average 12.9 percent. In addition, production would
decrease by one quarter in the U.S. and by one half in the
EU. As a result, the global share of exports from
developing countries would increase from 52 percent to 72
percent. As to farmers' incomes, removal of cotton market
distortions would lead to a one sixth decline in US farmers'
income and by more than one half in the EU. For sub-
Saharan African farmers, incomes would increase by 30
percent.299
For the U.S. to link its position to moves by China, knowing full
well China's own limited room to maneuver given its concerns about the
Uyghurs in Xinjiang, could lead to only one result: selling short the
needs of the neediest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Alongside cotton, the SSM was possibly the most critical Doha
Round issue, at least in the agricultural negotiations, for poor countries.
Fights over this issue were the proximate cause of the collapse of the
July 2008 Ministerial meeting. The first five days of talks (Monday, 21
July through Friday, 25 July) during that meeting - a meeting
Editorial, The Broken Promise of Doha, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.ft.com
/intl/cms/s/0/14be4348-cba6-1ldd-ba02000077b07658.html#axzzlhfylAE50.
298. See generally Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade
Organization's Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues (World Bank Dev. Research
Grp., Working Paper WPS3918, 2006), available at www-wds.worldbank.org/external
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSPIB/2006/05/05/00001640620060505160536/Rendered
PDF/wps3918.pdf (discussing cotton production, trade and economics in developing
countries).
299. Robert W. Njoroge, ABA Sec. Int'l L., Global Fiscal Crisis: A Moment for the Doha
Round?, III INT'L TRADE COMM. NEWSLETTER no. 1, at 8-10 (2008).
310 VOL. 40:1-3
DEBACLE OF DOHA ROUND COUNTER-TERRORISM
originally planned to end on the sixth day (Saturday, 26 July) -
summed to nothing. The U.S. and EU singled India out for blame for
insisting rich countries make real cuts to their farm subsidies, yet
tolerate protection by poor countries of their infant industries. One
trade official said of then-Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Kamal Nath: "He just sat there and said 'No' for 12 straight hours"
[ending at 3:30 a.m. on Thursday, 24 July]. 300
From the perspective of Minister Nath, there was good reason to
say "No."
Since 1980, the 62-year old celebrity Indian politician had
represented, almost without interruption, in the Lok Sabha (India's
Lower House of Parliament), Chhindwara.o1 That is a poor, rural
district of 1.8 million in the state of Madhya Pradesh, with 60 million
people. The farmers in his district are lucky to have a plot of one-half a
hectare, hence commercial farming on a developed country scale is not
easy to imagine. Soybean planters in Chhindwara are directly harmed
by subsidized American soybeans. 302 Like it or not, Minister Nath
knew subsistence farming in a way few developed country trade
negotiators can appreciate.
In this context, however understandable the American concern was
that poor countries would abuse an SSM if its volume triggers were too
low and thwart access to their markets of American farm products
through higher-than-pre-Doha Round tariffs, the concern of poor
countries was still more important. What the Americans see as a trade
issue the likes of China and India see as a food security issue. No less
an authority than the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, Olivier De Schutter, argues that WTO agricultural accords
wrongly treat food like any other commodity, instead of respecting the
human right to food. International trade has failed to feed the hungry,
and to help poor countries feed themselves. 303
Of the nearly one billion people who are hungry in the world, half
of them are small-scale farmers in these countries. 304 Of this half -
nearly 500 million people - 80 percent are directly engaged in food
production. The other 20 percent are landless laborers or fishermen.
The SSM remedy is essential, argues the Special Rapporteur, "to
300. John W. Miller, Indian Minister Frustrates West at Trade Talks, WALL ST. J. (July
25, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121691447068181327.html (quoting an
unnamed trade official).
301. Alan Beattie, India's Local Hero Evokes Mixed Emotions on World Trade Circuit,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/da83addc-cOdb-1ldd-bOa8-0000
77b07658.html#axzzld4v3jlaj.
302. Id.
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insulate fragile domestic farm markets [in poor countries] from volatile
global prices and import surges." 305 To be sure, food that is traded
internationally accounts for an average of just 15 percent of total world
food output. That statistic might suggest developing and least
developed countries need more trade, not less, in food. But, from their
perspective of food security, they need enhanced capacity to produce
food, and not suffer the vicissitudes of the global marketplace - namely,
price volatility, import surges, and susceptibility to food that is
subsidized and dumped by rich nations.
The long and bloody history of revolutions, both in Asia and the
western world, provides the capstone argument for China, India, and
other developing countries. Rural poverty has catalyzed social and
political upheaval, even whole revolutions. Cases in point are China in
the 19th and early 20th centuries, and France in the late 18th
century.306 Compounding fears of history repeating itself are
dislocations in the export-oriented manufacturing sectors of China and
India. Even before the onset of severe recessionary conditions in late
2008, China alone had 87,000 public order disturbances - in 2005, when
its GDP grew at an annual rate of over 10 percent. 307 In brief, the
position held by most poor countries on the SSM is more than a devilish
technical detail. Fitting squarely within the middle "D" of the DDA, the
SSM implicates a truly grand theme.
As a final point about the middle "D," it is important for developing
countries - especially major ones - to assume responsibility for
fostering a coherent world trade regime in which the poverty-alleviating
effects of trade may be felt. The U.S. points out, rightly, that South-
South trade must increase, i.e., poor countries must lift themselves out
of poverty in part by trading more with each other than they do.308
Likewise, the Financial Times declares that successful conclusion of the
Doha Round requires: development activists giving up the founding
myth of Doha - that western farm subsidies and tariffs, outrageous as
they are, the main obstacle to poor nations' integrating with the global
economy. 30 9
305. Id.
306. See CHRONIC POVERTY RESEARCH CENTER, Understanding Poverty in China, in
CHRONIC POVERTY REPORT 87-88 (2005), available at http://www.chronicpoverty.
org/uploads/publicationfiles/CPR1_chaplO.pdf; The French Revolution, NEW WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/FrenchRevolution (last
visited Nov. 11, 2011).
307. Geoff Dyer, Unmade in China, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/
39a06e68-cbdb- 11dd-ba02-000077b07658.html.
308. See Amy Tsui, USTR Seeks Coherent World trade Regime in WTO, Trade Among
Developing Nations, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 73 (Jan. 15, 2009).
309. Editorial, Life After Doha, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.ft.com
/cms/s/0/f759d08a-69ee-11e0-89db-00144feab49a.html.
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To be sure, calling that proposition "the founding myth" may be an
overstatement. Moreover, the U.S. has its own interests at stake: many
American businesses operate in multiple developing countries, and
would benefit from reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers that inhibit
these businesses from supplying goods (either for captive consumption
or the merchant market) developing country boundaries. That said,
developing countries like Brazil, China, and India shoulder a
responsibility that goes beyond the matter of access of American exports
to their markets. As long as they inhibit real trade flows amongst
themselves and other developing countries, they block the evolution of a
coherent trade regime in which countries at the same and different
levels of development participate. 310
F. The Mexican Plan Spurned
To its credit, on 29 January 2011, Mexico floated a proposal to heal
the schisms in the Doha Round and re-focus efforts on the middle "D."
It was a horizontal plan, as it cut across four sectors: 311
(1) Agriculture
Developed countries would be obligated to make further reductions
in farm subsidies, bringing their cuts closer to what they currently
spend, and would be prohibited from shielding their most profitable
farm products from major tariff cuts. That is, they would have to
reduce OTDS to a level between what the December 2008 draft
modalities text required, on the one hand, and their current actual
spending, on the other hand. Moreover, developed countries would be
required to bind an applied agricultural tariff rate if that rate was
below the level that would result from the tiered-reduction formula cut
required by the draft text. Finally, developed countries could not
designate more than 6 percent of their farm tariff lines as "Sensitive" (a
ceiling Canada and Japan had long-since rejected).312
(2) NA MA
All developing countries would be obliged to participate in at least
two of the fourteen sectoral initiatives. A developed country would have
310. Similarly, the large amount of tariff revenues collected by one developing country
on imports from another developing country bespeaks the reliance of these countries on
customs duties for government revenue. Thus, openness to South - South trade is linked
to reform of domestic tax regimes in poor countries, with a view to enhancing income and
sales tax collection systems. Such reform, in turn, often depends on a serious anti-
corruption campaign, as well as enhanced administrative systems for recording and
keeping track of assets.
311. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Rejects Mexican Initiative to Advance Doha Talks, Insists on
Bilateral Approach, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 214 (Feb. 10, 2011).
312. Id.
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to participate in any sectoral initiative that it sponsored. Both
developing and developed countries could take advantage of a basket
approach, whereby they could make different tariff commitments in
different product sectors. In the first basket, on a certain percentage of
tariff lines (which the Mexican proposal did not spell out), they would
cut tariffs to zero. In the second basket, they would cut tariffs by a
percentage (again, not spelled out) beyond what the Swiss Formula
required. In this basket, developed countries would have to cut tariffs
to a greater extent than developing ones. The third basket would be
available only to developing countries. In it, these countries could put
tariff lines and thereby exempt them from any cuts beyond what the
Swiss Formula required. Every WTO Member could choose what tariff
lines it put in what basket. Developed countries would have 5 years to
make the cuts to tariff rates in each basket, and developing countries
would have 10 years. For both groups of countries, the cuts would be in
equal annual amounts. 313
(3) Services
Both developing and developed countries would be obligated to
convert existing services market liberalization into bound GATS
commitments. They could exempt a set number of services sectors from
this requirement, but they could do so only if they had participated in
the July 2008 signaling conference. Developing countries would be able
to exempt a larger number of sectors than developed ones. 314
(4) Environmental Goods
Both developed and developing countries would have to reduce
tariffs on environmental groups substantially, that is, to a greater
degree than required under the Swiss Formula. Developed countries
would have to cut those tariffs to zero. Developing countries would
have to slash them to a level below what the Swiss Formula would
mandate. The Doha Round negotiating group on trade and
environment would establish a list of "environmental goods," and
developed and developing countries would select goods from that list.
But, developed countries would have to pick more environmental goods
on which to cut tariffs than developing ones.
Within days, on 4 February, the U.S. rejected the plan. 3 15 It
returned to its refrain that the major emerging markets of Brazil,
China, and India must open themselves further to agricultural and
manufactured goods, and services, beyond what they set out in the
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China, or India to participate in the key chemicals and industrial
machinery initiatives. Moreover, said the U.S., the plan was
incomplete. It failed to address the agriculture SSM, industrial non-
tariff barriers ("NTBs"), and AD-CVD disciplines. Bluntly, intoned the
U.S., the American business community and Congress would not
approve the Mexican proposal.316
V. SPECIAL TRADE DISPENSATIONS TO WIN MUSLIM HEARTS AND MINDS
A. Developing Stakeholders
Poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere. That
common sense point is even truer when the poverty is in Muslim
countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia), or among Muslim communities in non-
Muslim countries (e.g., India). The fact is that in the post-9/11 era,
many extremist ideologies are in the name of Islam, although in truth
they are anything but "Islamic"; rather, they are un-Islamic. 317 In brief,
the connection between economic growth, poverty alleviation, and
reduced vulnerability to Islamist extremism is or should be readily
apparent. That is not to say trade, in spurring growth and reducing
poverty, is a panacea for terrorism. Rather, to be a successful counter-
terrorist strategy, trade requires complimentary and salubrious
structures and policies at the domestic level. Reducing corruption and
sound fiscal and monetary policies are examples.
Still, the link between trade and national security is clear enough:
developed countries can help themselves in the long run by helping
Islamic countries and communities integrate broadly and deeply into
the world trading system. Doing so helps provide Muslims with a well-
grounded sense of stake holding in this system. Yet, one of the most
extraordinary features of the December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts is
they say nothing explicitly about the Islamic world. 318 For all the
categories these texts create among WTO Members, one cohort they do
not treat as such is the one made up of Muslim countries. Indeed, that
is true of all the major Doha Round documents.
Consider cotton. From the Uyghur people to many residents of the
Cotton Four countries, the farmers are Muslim. The adjustment costs
to the U.S. and other non-Muslim developed countries of cotton market
access and subsidy concessions might be more than offset by the
economic, political, and national security gains from healthier,
wealthier cotton farmers in western China and Sub-Saharan Africa. 319
316. Id.
317. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI'A) 1359-81 (2011).
318. See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 296.
319. See Nioroge, supra note 299, at 10.
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Similar arguments can be made in other agricultural and industrial
sectors. The Doha Round was launched in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. A key reason for meeting in Doha, and
pushing through the DDA, was to show that evil extremists not only are
un-Islamic, but also are hideously lousy economists. The world - aside
from the extremists - has a shared interest in cross-border commercial
intercourse and therefore in the concomitant necessary conditions of
peace and security. War impedes trade, and as trade declines, so does
job and income growth. These points hold as true for Muslims as for
Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Sikhs, and so on.
To be sure, aside from particular issues arising under the SharT'a
(Islamic Law), such as forbidden products (alcohol, pork, and
pornography), forbidden banking transactions (those that involve rTba,
which loosely translated is interest), and forbidden insurance policies
(those that involve gharar, which means uncertainty), there is no such
thing as "Muslim trade law." That is similarly true of other faiths -
there is no Catholic trade law, for instance, though Catholic countries
may have distinct concerns about certain trade policies and their
implications.
B. Grim Statistics
Nevertheless, Muslim countries are in need of better integration
into the GATT-WTO order. Consider a few stark realities about just the
Arab Muslim world: 320
* The GDP of Arab countries combined is (as of 1999) $531.2,
which is less than that of Spain.
* The total value of non-oil exports from Arab countries is
less than that of Finland. There are 300 million people in
the Arab world and five million people in Finland.
* During the 1990s, the growth rate of exports from Arab
countries was 1.5 percent per year. The average global
growth rate was six percent.
* The export base of Arab countries is not diversified. Oil
and oil-related products account for 70 percent of their
exports.
* Regarding intellectual development, Arab countries lag
behind the rest of the world. The number of books
translated each year into Arabic in the entire Arab Muslim
world is just 20 percent of the number translated into
Greek in Greece. The number of books published per
million people in the Arab Muslim world (whether written
320. Bernard Lewis, Free at Last? The Arab World in the Twenty-First Century, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 77, 81-83 (2009).
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in Arabic, or translated into Arabic) is lower than every
other region of the world, except Sub-Saharan Africa.
* On intellectual property (IP) generation, the Arab countries
also lag behind the rest of the world. Between 1980 and
2000, Israel registered 7,652 patents in the U.S. Korea
registered 16,328 patents in the U.S. In that same 20-year
period, Saudi Arabia led the Arab Muslim world in
registering patents in the U.S. - with a pathetic 171. Egypt
had 77, Kuwait 52, the United Arab Emirates 32, Syria 20,
and Jordan 15. Further, Arab countries have one of the
lowest numbers of research scientists who publish
frequently cited articles.
* Concerning education, the Arab countries again lag behind
the rest of the world. In 2003, China began publishing a list
of the 500 best universities in the world. None of the over
200 Arab universities were on that list, nor do any of them
appear in the subsequent annual rankings. Even when the
in list is narrowed to the Asia-Pacific region (covering the
Middle East), no Arab university is listed.
* In political development, the countries of the Middle East
and North Africa are consistently ranked by Freedom
House as having the lowest freedom rating.
* On women's rights, nowhere in the world is the situation
more dreadful than in Arab countries. Women account for
slightly more than half of the Arab population, but they are
largely absent from economic and political life, and (as is
widely known) from the driver's seat in cars in Saudi
Arabia.
* On overall average standard of living, only Sub-Saharan
Africa has a lower figure than Arab countries.
Depending on the outcome of the Arab Spring, many of these
statistics might improve. In the meantime, contrary to assertions by
Islamic extremists, neither supposedly wicked foreign powers, nor the
legacy of the Crusades or colonialism, are to blame. Arabs are
responsible for themselves and their children.
To be sure, all or some of these statistics may improve after the
Arab Spring, assuming countries newly liberated from their
monstrously corrupt and economically unhelpful autocrats adopt
prudent economic policies. Yet, for now, candidly, these realities are
scary. Left unchanged, they play into the evil hands of extremists.
That is because Arab masses - the street, as it were - are at risk of
developing a sense of exclusion. All faith that domestic politicians and
the global economic regime can help change reality for the better is lost.
The poison of extremism may appear an antidote.
3172012
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C. New Ideas Faithful to the Original Purpose
The obvious inference from the above-listed points is the Doha
Round should have focused in part on boosting trade with and among
Muslim countries. Because it has failed to do so, the perception among
Arab countries, and throughout the Islamic world, that the Round has
failed to address the above-listed challenges is not irrational.
If susceptibility to fanatical ideologies and recruitment by VEOs, on
the one hand, and oppressive economic circumstances (or the perception
thereof), on the other hand, are linked (and they are, as Part One of the
Trilogy argues), then the Doha Round was a strategic opportunity to
forge trade-generating, poverty-alleviating rules. Perhaps it is not too
late to resurrect the Round, restoring it to its original, counter-terrorist
purpose via a package of proposals faithful to that purpose. They might
include the following:
* An accelerated accession of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
and Syria into the WTO;
* Duty-free treatment for all non-oil exports, without
exceptions for T & A and footwear, and for otherwise
sensitive farm products, from all Muslim countries;
* A list of farm and industrial products of potential future
keen export interest to Muslim countries, and demand free
trade on those products;
* A "Muslim Sectoral Agreement," to be followed by all WTO
Members, without exception; or
* Support for fisherman in Muslim countries to enhance their
livelihoods in an environmentally sustainable way;
* A "Muslim Technical Facility," to boost as rapidly as
possible the legal capacity in trade ministries from Morocco
to Malaysia, particularly on trade facilitation issues.
Indubitably, there are other terms of a package oriented to reform
in the Muslim world.
To be sure, elements of a Doha Round deal faithful to the original
purpose of the Round would not change all the grim realities in Islamic
World in the short term. They would not deliver an immediate,
crushing blow against VEOs. But, they would be practically
insignificant, yet symbolically important, steps.
D. The "Islamic" Delineation
To take such steps, important considerations about inclusion would
need to be resolved. Should such a package cover all Islamic countries,
namely, all 57 countries in the Organization of the Islamic Conference
("OIC")? Should it cover only OIC countries that are WTO Members?
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Should it exclude OIC countries with high per capita incomes, like the
Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") states? Should emphasis be on the
Arab Muslim countries? How should Muslim communities in non-OIC
countries, like India or Singapore, be treated? In resolving these
matters, every effort should be toward inclusiveness. After all, the goal
ought to be to win minds and hearts of Muslims - the entire community
(ummah) - regardless of international boundaries. To put the point
more pragmatically, VEOs recruit from that ummah in disregard of
those boundaries, hence a positive, pro-active trade reform agenda
should contest on those same recruitment grounds.
However these questions are resolved, one matter should be
obvious. There is nothing wrong with singling out OIC countries, or a
subset of them. As this Trilogy shows, to a nearly ludicrous extent the
Doha Round draft modalities texts create hair-splitting delineations
among WTO Members, both as sub-groups and individuals. Examples
include net food importing developing countries ("NFIDCs"), RAMs,
SVEs, countries in the Southern African Customs Union ("SACU"), and
Bolivia, as well as - shamefully - rich countries like Canada, Japan,
Norway, and the U.S. To establish these delineations for flexibilities or
S & D treatment but eschew an "Islamic" category is unjustifiable.
Worse yet, it is irresponsible in the post-9/11 climate, given the
persistence (even exacerbation) of global poverty, and continued threats
posed by VEOs acting in the name of "Islam."
There are three possible explanations for the willingness of
Members to countenance the metastasizing of S & D treatment rules to
all such sub-groups and individuals - except Muslim countries. One is
cynical: the Members never intended to help those countries in the first
place. Doing so was just part of the rhetoric surrounding the launch of
the Round, rhetoric necessary to agree on the DDA in the first place.
This explanation is difficult to prove, and smacks of being a "cop out."
The second explanation is atmospheric: WTO Members are too
politically correct to agree on a distinction based on religion, and fear
offending Islamic countries by intimating a link between a particular
religion and terrorism. Why not, then, help Members in all the other
categories (e.g., NFIDCs, RAMs, and SVEs), which then will help
Muslim countries? After all, those countries are scattered among the
non-religiously based categories. This explanation, if true, suggests the
Members are willing to entertain a remarkably roundabout, inefficient
way of helping the ummah. Surely the better approach is to target the
problem, as it were, directly.
The third explanation is realistic: sincere as they were in their
original purpose for the Doha Round, the Members are politically and
economically unable to resist their domestic business constituencies,
which put short-term selfish interest above the long-term common good.
This explanation best fits the facts. Commercial self-interest is
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empirically verifiable lurking throughout the rules championed by
various Members in the negotiating texts.
Unfortunately, led by a French Director-General, Pascal Lamy, for
much of the Doha Round, one who works in a secular international
organization in a Europe that sometimes prides itself as post-religious,
questions about identifying poor, Islamic countries in need of special
trade rules to fight poverty and thereby extremism never were asked.
Mr. Lamy himself has grasped at any reason to justify the Round,
except the most obvious one confronted every day, in dozens of
countries, by brave men and women who serve, for example, in
charitable, non-governmental organizations or in Special Operations
Forces ("SOF") of the military. Preach the virtues of free trade, yes, but
preach the link between free trade, religion, and a better future; Mr.
Lamy would have none of it.
Rather, anointing major developing countries - Brazil, China, and
India - into the elite group of WTO Members that could make or break
a deal in the confines of the Green Room of the WTO Secretariat is as
much of a revolution as the Director-General and Secretariat could
orchestrate, tolerate, or imagine. Islam calls roughly 1.3 billion people,
second only to Christianity, with about 2.2 billion followers. Who in
that Green Room represents the Muslim world? Those three
newcomers? The U.S. and EU, which hold fast to their traditional
Green Room places and remain the final arbiters of any Doha Round
deal?
The anointing of Brazil, China, and India also is part of the
unwinding of the relatively straightforward, Uruguay Round era
distinction among developed, developing, and least developed countries.
It is redolent of the metastasizing of categories among WTO Members.
Yet, if there is to be a new category, then surely that of "Islam" is as, or
more compelling and as, or more consistent with the DDA, than any
other category.
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WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL,
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL APPROACHES
DAVID A. GANTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
After ten years, the Doha Development Round is effectively dead,
at least in its present form, even if no one seems willing to affirm its
passing in so many words for fear of being blamed for its demise.I At
best, "the Doha Rounds seems likely to lapse into an indefinite period of
hibernation - with little idea of when or how the talks could be
wakened." 2 Doha will not likely again be a comprehensive single
undertaking, and it is unlikely that a broadly comprehensive round of
trade negotiations reminiscent of Doha or the Uruguay Round will be
attempted in the foreseeable future. Although some have suggested a
"time out," with resumption only after political leadership changes in
the United States and China, in 2013,3 there is little reason at this
writing, with the inability of the Ministers at the WTO's 8th Ministerial
Meeting in December 2011 to resurrect the Doha Round, 4 to believe
that a few years' delay would make a major breakthrough in the
negotiations possible. While some have suggested that Doha's demise
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and Director, International Trade and Business Law
Program, the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. Copyright© 2011,
David A. Gantz.
1. Alan Beattie, WTO: World waits to move on after Doha, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/al8aeb76-ded3-1leO-a228-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlk
EYD2juG.
2. JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE DOHA DILEMMA: IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 1 (2011) [hereinafter SCHOTT I], available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/schott20110926.pdf.
3. Jeffrey J. Schott, What Should the United States do About Doha?, PB11-8
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.iie.com
/publications/pb/pbl1-08.pdf.
4. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference: Chairman's Concluding
Statement of 17 December 2011, WT[MIN (11)/11 (2011) [hereinafter Schott II], available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/minl1e/minl1 11 e.doc (reaffirming
the Members' commitment to WTO principles but reflecting no progress on the Doha
agenda, or other achievements other than approving membership for Russia, Samoa and
Montenegro).
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threatens the continued existence of the GATT/WTO system, 5 many
more see continued strength in the system as developed over the past
nearly sixty-five years, with its extensive body of rules and a mandatory
dispute settlement system that, despite its flaws, works reasonably
well, and consider it unlikely that the binding rules that have been
negotiated in prior GATT rounds will atrophy. 6 Even with some risks of
backsliding and increasing protectionism many nations, the United
States, the European Union (EU), Japan, Brazil, China, and India,
among others, have far too much to lose to make abandoning the WTO
rules or even departing substantially from them a rational option.
Thus, the WTO system, with its inefficiencies and deficiencies (of which
there are many7), is here to stay.
Over the past twenty-five years, international trade expanded in a
robust manner,. outpacing world population by about 5 percent,
compared to 1 percent from 1870 to 1950.8 Between 1994 and 2006,
world merchandise trade increased each year except for 2001, in
amounts ranging from approximately 10 percent in 1997, 2000, and
2004, to only 3.5 percent in 2002.9 While world trade rules undoubtedly
facilitated this growth, other factors, including trade in components as
a result of just-in-time manufacturing processes and the revolution in
shipping brought about by the containerization phenomenon, as well as
some of the more successful regional trade agreements (RTOs) such as
the EU and NAFTA, also contributed. 10 Perhaps Doha has been a
victim of the success of prior GATT negotiating rounds, because of the
5. Viv Davies, The Future of Doha and the WTO: a CEPR trade seminar, Vox, Apr.
27, 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6431 (stating "Failure of the Doha
Round will create a dangerous situation in the WTO . . ." according to Peter Sutherland).
6. See SANDRA POLASKI, WHAT FUTURE FOR THE WTO? 3 (L'Economie Politique ed.,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace trans., 2007) (arguing that existing WTO
rules will still set trade rules for major players) [hereinafter POLASKI].
7. Various members have complained, inter alia, about alleged US abuse of the
antidumping laws; unfairness of the dispute settlement mechanism for small developing
countries; US and EU agricultural subsidies; major developing country markets
(particularly China, India and Brazil) to imports of both agricultural and manufactured
products from other Members); extraordinarily high tariffs imposed by many countries on
a variety of agricultural and non -agricultural products); insufficiently "special and
differential treatment" of imports from developing countries, particularly the least-
developed countries; and continued tariff and non-tariff restrictions to textile, apparel and
footwear imports from developing country members.
8. See Uri Dadush, The Future of the World Trading System, INT'L EcONOMIC
BULLETIN, July 14, 2010 [hereinafter Dadush], available at http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/2010/07/1 4/future-of-world-trading-system/45b.
9. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 4.
10. MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 272-73 (Princeton University Press 2006).
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extent of liberalization except with regard to agricultural subsidies,
sensitive agricultural goods, and certain manufactured products."
The last several decades have also been a time of fundamental
change to the global trading system. The "Quad" countries (the United
States, EU, Japan, and Canada) no longer dominate the negotiations.
China (since November 2001), Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South
Africa in particular are major players without whose concurrence little
can be accomplished in Geneva.12 This trend will likely continue, as it
is estimated that in twenty years or so, ten of the largest economies will
be what we currently regard as developing countries, and China will
likely be almost every WTO Member's largest trading partner. 13 Peter
Sutherland, the last secretary general of GATT, states bluntly that
because China is the "world's most successful trading nation and will
remain so for a long while . . . China [is] the key player in the World
Trade Organization."14 Less significant change is likely for most other
developing countries, which despite increasing their share of world
trade are likely to remain poor. 15
The Doha process has also been plagued by a confluence of negative
political factors in the United States, the EU, India, and elsewhere.
The expiry of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in the United States in
mid-2007 and divided government since 2010 have made continued
negotiations more difficult, given that most nations are reluctant to
conclude trade agreements with the United States unless they are
assured (as TPA provides) that Congress cannot unilaterally change the
agreement. 16 Elections in India in 2009 likely contributed to the failure
of progress in the negotiations in 2008, as did Brazil's more recent
defensive approach toward rapidly increasing imports from China and
currency appreciation at home. 1' A similar problem has been the
inward focus of those and other developing nations, for which reducing
poverty remains a major focus of government policy and actions.18 If
one adds Japan's on-going political paralysis, the EU's focus on internal
debate about the Eurozone and a stagnant regional economy and
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and China's reluctance to accept
11. SCHOTT I, supra note 2, at 2.
12. IAN F. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32645, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA: THE WTO FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 2 (2005).
13. See Dadush, supra note 8.
14. Peter Sutherland, A Future for the World Trade Organisation?, in JAN TUMLR
POLICY ESSAYS 1, 2 (2010), available at http://www.ecipe.org/publications/jan-tumlir-
policy-essays/a-future-for-the-world-trade-organisation/PDF.
15. Id. at 7.
16. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803-05 (2004).
17. Susan Schwab, After Doha: Why the Negotiations are Doomed and What we
Should do About It, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 104, 111 (2011) [hereinafter Schwab].
18. See Dadush, supra note 8 (arguing that reducing income gaps are much more
important than a free trade offensive).
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the full responsibilities of WTO membership and world economic power
status (likely in part as a result of a coming leadership transition),19
there has arguably been a perfect storm of extreme political caution
among the major players in the negotiations.
If there is reason for cautious optimism post-Doha it is because
there are alternatives to a broad package of new or amended WTO
agreements. These alternatives while less than ideal may nevertheless
provide an impetus for continuing trade liberalization both among
specific countries and in some instances worldwide. Such possibilities
include existing and future "plurilateral" trade agreements (specialized
agreements among willing Members but not the entire membership,
such as the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement and the
Information Technology Agreement), hundreds of regional trade
agreements (RTAs), and various national laws and regulations in the
soon to be 156 member nations of the WTO. 20
I begin in Part II by reviewing briefly the evolution of the world
trading system since 1947, along with the major reasons for Doha's
failure and for the widespread belief that a broad agenda of "single
undertaking" negotiations cannot be recreated in the foreseeable future.
Part III discusses the specific areas in which relatively widespread
international agreement may be reached, including information
technology, trade facilitation, government procurement, services,
fisheries subsidies, and treatment of state owned enterprises (SOEs).
Part IV discusses the historical development, current state and likely
future expansion of RTAs, while Part V addresses the importance of
national, largely unilateral trade liberalization through tariff and non-
tariff barrier reduction such as that which has recently taken place in
Chile and Mexico, and may well be more common, even in the United
States and the EU and even in the agricultural sector.21
When trying to assess the future, I have focused on the relatively
near term, primarily the coming five to ten years. Predictions beyond
that period are fraught with peril in the international trade area as in
most others. I doubt that anyone, and certainly not I, has a crystal ball
that would give an accurate reading forty or even twenty years hence.
Among other constraints are the impossibility of assessing the impact of
unexpected events ranging from a nuclear bomb or other catastrophic
19. Schwab, supra note 17, at 108.
20. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis-e/tif.e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
21. See Agricultural Committees Devising Proposal to cut $23 Billion in Spending,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2011, available at
http://insidetrade.com/201110172379317/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/agriculture-commi
ttees-devising-proposal-to-cut-23-billion-in-spending/menu-id-173.html (last visited Oct.
18, 2011) (discussing plans because of budgetary pressures to reduce agricultural
subsidies).
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attack in a developed country by a terrorist group to economic and
social dislocation resulting from much more rapid climate change than
experts currently anticipate, to a decline in Chinese economic growth on
the one hand or a reversal of the economic decline of Europe and the
United States on the other. 22
As others have pointed out, "the WTO is an integral part of the
world trading system, but it is only one part . . . ."23 There is
insufficient political will to conclude the Doha Round. It remains to be
seen whether, among the willing trading nations, there exists the
necessary political foresight to assure that the process of expanding
world trade through the reduction of trade and non-trade barriers will
continue well into the 21st Century. If such will exists there are tools
other than a major WTO negotiating round to achieve such goals.
II. WORLD TRADE AS OF THE END OF 2011
The GATT 1947, as modified and expanded in eight major
multilateral rounds culminating with the Uruguay Round's Marrakesh
Agreement in April 1994,24 resulted by 2000 (when the Uruguay Round
tariff concessions were fully implemented) in an aggregate reduction of
tariffs imposed by developed countries of approximately 40 percent and
for developing countries of 20 percent compared to pre-Uruguay Round
levels. 25 Beginning with the completion of the Tokyo Round in 1978,
rules relating to a number of non-tariff areas, such as dumping,
subsidies, government procurement, and customs valuation were added
as "codes," albeit on a plurilateral basis. 26
The watershed event for the world trading system was the
completion of seven and a half years of negotiations that resulted in the
Uruguay Round agreements, which became effective for most then-
existing GATT Contracting Parties in 1995.27 The Uruguay Round
constituted a massive expansion of the international system, by adding
to the GATT trade in goods disciplines; trade in services; trade-related
intellectual property; limited coverage of trade-related investment;
coverage of agriculture, textiles, sanitary and phytosanitary measures
22. A game of catch up, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, http://www.economist
.com/node/21528979.
23. Dadush, supra note 8.
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org
/english/docs ellegal-e/legal-e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
25. MARK R. SANDSTROM, JULIA M. CHEUNG & MICHELLE D. LYNCH, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 122-23 (Terrence P. Stewart, ed., 1996).
26. See The Tokyo Round "Codes," WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/ministe/min98_e/slide_e/tokyo.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
27. The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact5 e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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and standards; and a mandatory dispute settlement system. 28
Moreover, disciplines which under the Tokyo Round were optional, such
as those relating to dumping, subsidies, and customs valuation, were no
longer so after the Uruguay Round. Also, discretionary plurilateral
agreements applicable to government procurement, civil aviation, dairy
products, and bovine meat were included in the Uruguay Round
package. 29
While this expansion has proven relatively easy to understand and
implement for developed countries, the additional obligations,
particularly in the areas of intellectual property and services, imposed
enormous burdens on developing nation administrative agencies and
the courts, among others. Even with long grace periods - India and
other least developed WTO members were not required to fully
implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) for ten years after January 1, 1995 (recently extended
to 2013 and likely to be extended further)3 o - the burdens of full
compliance were and are substantial, factors which have clearly
influenced the reluctance of some developing countries to move forward
again under Doha.
The United States and the EU, very unwisely in retrospect, sought
at a WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999 to obtain agreement to
kick off yet another negotiating round. 31 The effort was a miserable
failure going well beyond street demonstrations, in part because the
majority of the Members were still experiencing grave difficulties in
implementing the obligations they had accepted in the Marrakech
Agreement, and neither the United States nor the EU had in the
preliminary sessions shown much willingness to include on the agenda
issues of importance to developing country members, such as alleged
United States abuses of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 32 Perhaps the
most significant result of the Seattle meeting was confirmation that
world trade negotiations would no longer be dominated by the United
28. Id.; see also WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
29. WTO Agreement, supra note 24, Annex 4, available at http://www.wto.org/
englishldocs-ellegal-e/legal-e.htm.
30. See WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 1(c), art. 66, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
31. Press Release: Office of the United States Trade Representative in Washington
D.C., WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist-e/
min99_e/english/press-e/ustr e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
32. David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle:
Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349, 351 (2000)
(discussing the Seattle meeting and the reasons for its failure).
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States, EU, Japan, and Canada but that major developing nations,
particularly Brazil, India, and South Africa, would play a major role. 3 3
The time of initiation of the Doha Round, in November 2011, was
no coincidence. Built-in incentives to initiate the Round came in part
from several of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including the General
Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Agriculture,
because both incorporated in their texts' obligations (beginning in 2000)
to continue expanding the disciplines in those fields. 34 A spirit of unity
briefly following 9/11, the negotiating skills of United States Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick and WTO Secretary General Mike
Moore, and labeling the round the "Doha Development Round" probably
helped bring about the accord, given that many of the developing
country members, after seven years operating under the WTO
agreements, felt that they had not received the benefits they expected
from the package.35 The labeling also reflected reality; developing
members were and are a substantial majority of the WTO Members and
thus could determine in 2001 whether new trade rules would be
attempted.36 In retrospect, the declaration, with fifty-two paragraphs
covering a broad variety of procedural and substantive areas, was
overly optimistic and perhaps naive. 37
From the outset there were signs that the negotiations would be
difficult. The developing world was skeptical about the willingness of
the major developed countries to offer major concessions in such areas
as agricultural subsidies without asking for painful concessions in
return. The "Singapore Issues" of investment, anti-competition rules,
trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement (the
latter shorthand for corruption) were included in the Doha Declaration
but never accepted by a majority of the members, and dropped
completely from the negotiations a few years later. 38
After six or so years of negotiations it became apparent that
disagreements between key developed nations such as the United
States and the EU on the one hand, and the largest developing
33. See China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/china-e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(stating China did not become a member until December 11, 2001).
34. See Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 80-81 (2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/understanding.e.pdf.
35. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND
PRACTICE 61-63 (Lexis Nexis ed., 3d ed., 2008).
36. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 2-3.
37. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0le/mindecl-e.htm.
38. See The Doha Declaration Explained: Relationship between Trade and
Investment, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddael
dohaexplained-e.htm#investment.
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countries, including Brazil, China, and India, had become impossible to
bridge. Nor, by 2007, was there agreement between the United States
and the EU on reduction of agricultural subsidies, while Brazil, on
behalf of the "G20" developing country Members, insisted on
substantial reductions. 39 India, on behalf of the "G33" countries whose
agricultural sectors were dominated by small farmers, sought to shield
20 percent of its agricultural tariffs on "special products." 40
Manufactured goods tariffs have been similarly controversial, with the
United States and the EU seeking such tariffs (non-agricultural market
access or "NAMA") of no more than 10 percent for developed countries
and no more than 15 percent for developing countries. 41 Developed
members believed that better market access for both agricultural and
manufactured exports, and for key services such as those in the
financial and telecommunications areas, were the only means to
securing domestic support for further concessions on agricultural
subsidies and additional tariff reductions. Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, South Africa, and other developing nations adamantly refused.42
The negotiations were also complicated by the fact that despite
common positions in public the developing country members' interests
were hardly monolithic. Not only the United States and the EU would
have benefitted from greater market access for both agricultural and
manufactured goods to these major developing country markets;
smaller and poorer developing countries will suffer economically
(probably much more than the United States and the EU) from China,
Brazil and India's intransigence. 4 3 It was only late in the process that a
few middle-income developing countries such as Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore advocated more
market-opening measures by the dominant developing countries, with
harsh criticism from them the result.44
Also, although the criticism has seldom been articulated by
member governments in public, concerns in such countries as
Argentina, Brazil, and generally MERCOSUR over rapidly increasing
imports from China alone may well have contributed to their own and
other developing members' reluctance to reduce tariffs on a most-
39. CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33144,
WTO DOHA ROUND: THE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2007).
40. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 5.
41. Ian F. Fergusson, The World Trade Organization: The Non-Agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) Negotiations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2
(2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33634 2011011 1.pdf.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Schwab, supra note 17, at 107-08.
44. Id. at 108.
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favored-nation (MFN) basis, 45 as is reflected in a recent series of highly
protectionist, if understandable, actions by those two countries designed
to reduce Chinese imports.46
Ultimately, the divergent interests of developed countries, major
developing countries and the least developed countries could not be
adequately bridged. It seems unlikely that this central impasse can be
resolved in the foreseeable future, or perhaps even in a decade. 47 Add
to this the leadership vacuum among developed nations; the multi-polar
system divide noted above; the developed country view of the new
economic powerhouses as more economic rivals than export
destinations; and the sheer complexities of addressing issues as
services, investment and agricultural subsidies, the probabilities for
future success under the current single-undertaking and consensus-
based WTO system seem slight indeed.48 While the WTO will continue
to play an important role, both in enforcing current international
trading rules and in selected areas where consensus or broad, if not
universal, agreement is possible (Part III, below), the WTO's status as
the focal point for trade liberalization is likely to further erode as it has
for much of the past decade.
III. FUTURE TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN GENEVA
The post-Doha opportunities in Geneva likely include those where a
consensus may be possible, and those where "plurilateral" agreements
among only the willing are legally and politically achievable. Other
broadly-based international measures relating to trade, such as those
implemented regionally and through adoption of model laws, are
discussed in Parts IV and V, below.
A. Areas of Possible Consensus
There appear to be very few areas where broad consensus among
the WTO membership will be achievable in the foreseeable future,
beyond largely tariff-free and quota-free developed market access for
least developed member (LDC) exports, subsidies to industrial fishing
fleets, trade facilitation measures and, somewhat less likely,
elimination of tariffs and tariff barriers for "green" technologies. Under
the WTO Agreement, adoption of new agreements and amendments is
45. See Aaditya Mattoo, Francis Ng & Arvind Subramanin, The Elephant in the
"Green Room" China and the Doha Round, PB11-8, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
ECONOMICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb I1-03.pdf.
46. Keep Out: South America's two biggest economies are imposing heavy-handed
trade restrictions, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, http://www. economist.com/node/
21530136; see also David Haskel, Mercosur Plans to Raise Import Duties to Counter
Avalanche of Predatory Exports,'29 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 25 (Jan. 5, 2012).
47. Dadush, supra note 8 (suggesting that this could take 25 years or more).
48. Id.
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possible in most cases with a vote of two-thirds of the membership. 9
However, in practice the more customary consensus rule has usually
been followed. Consensus does not mean that all members must
support a measure or agreement, but if even one objects strenuously, as
Georgia did earlier with regard to Russia's desired WTO accession
(later resolved with approval of Russia's accession in December 2011),50
all progress is blocked. At the same time, for arrangements that do not
result in tariff reductions, the plurilateral route may be an option (part
B of this section).
1. Trade Barriers for LDCs
Tariff-free, quota-free access could be provided to developed
member markets for most or all manufactured goods from the LDC
members - generally all members with annual per-capita GDPs of
under $1000, with a few possible exceptions such as Vietnam. These
proposals have been under discussion at least since the 2005 Hong
Kong WTO Ministerial meeting, 5' when "developed-country Members,
and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to
do so, agreed to implement duty-free and quota-free market access for
manufactured products originating from LDCs," but have not yet been
implemented (except unilaterally to some extent by the EU).5 2 Support
for the plan is not universal, since discrimination would effectively
occur against lower middle income countries that do not qualify as
LDCs but compete for access in developed country markets with LDCs,
and the practical lines between so-called middle income and lower
middle income developing countries and LDCs may be blurred. This is a
serious problem if the implementation of the plan were to be followed by
a reduction of the availability of benefits now available to all developing
countries under the Generalized System of Preferences and similar
regional programs.5 3 Whether members such as the United States and
the EU would allow expanded access, even for LDCs, for sensitive
49. WTO Agreement, supra note 24, Annex 1(a), art. X, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/docs-e/legal-e/19-adp.pdf (The actual vote under the WTO Agreement, art. X.
Article X(3) also provides in pertinent part that an amendment "shall take effect for the
Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and
thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it").
50. See Daniel Pruzin & Eric J. Lyman, Russian Accession Bid Clears WTO, but
Duma's Ratification Postponed, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2055 (Dec. 22, 2011).
51. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/
minO5_e/finaltexte.htm#ldc (listing the covered goods in para. 47, Annex F).
52. Id.
53. Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D) (2002); See also
Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act ("ATPDEA"), 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2002)
and the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2001).
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products such as textiles and apparel is also problematic, 54 particularly
when the program would be seen by domestic politicians as unilateral,
without any corresponding benefits accruing to developed country
exporters. Should exceptions be incorporated for apparel and footwear
tariff lines, for example, the economic benefits of the plan for LDCs
would be substantially eroded.
2. Industrial Fishing Subsidies
Broad but not unanimous support also exists for ending subsidies
to industrial fishing fleets, primarily on environmental/protection of
species grounds, but also to protect smaller coastal fishing industries.
As outlined by the WTO Secretariat,
The proposed new disciplines on fisheries subsidies as reflected
in the Chairman's first draft text would include a prohibited
category covering, inter alia, subsidies for construction of new
fishing vessels and subsidies for operating costs of fishing.
LDCs would be exempted from the new disciplines, and other
developing Members would have substantial flexibilities,
especially for subsidies to subsistence-type fishing in their
territorial waters. All exceptions to the proposed prohibition
would be conditioned on compliance with certain provisions
related to fisheries management. 55
Discussions have been underway in Geneva since early 2002, with
the major players, apparently relatively near agreement, under
pressure not only from developing country coastal fishing industries but
by environmentally minded NGOs and civil society groups in the United
States, the EU, and other developed nations. However, there appears
to be little reported progress since the end of 2009.56
3. Trade Facilitation
Few members openly oppose so-called "trade facilitation" measures,
reducing the costs of physically moving goods across national borders,
which some experts estimate could increase global GDP by over $100
billion annually.5 7 This increased level of interest reflects in large part
the success of the GATT/WTO system in reducing tariff levels and non-
tariff-barriers since 1947; in many markets trade is likely more
54. See SCHOTT I, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that legislation would be required to
avoid blocking access by such barriers as restrictive rules of origin).
55. Introduction to Fisheries Subsidies in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/rulesneg.e/fish-e/fish intro-e.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2011).
56. Id.
57. Schwab, supra note 17, at 115 (quoting the Peterson Institute).
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restricted by border delays and infrastructure limitations and excessive
regulation than by tariffs. Exports as well as imports would be
facilitated, a factor that for the most part reduces opposition by national
business groups. Since any agreement is likely to be coupled with
strong commitments of financial and technical assistance toward such
"capacity building" in achieving the objectives of the agreement (as has
been the case with some regional trade agreements),58 it is likely to
receive broad support from the developing members who would receive
the assistance.
4. "Green" Technology
As part of the Doha Round the WTO members have been engaged
in negotiations which if successful would eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers for trade in "green" technology products and services. There
has been no agreement to date; the United States, as the major
proponent, has asked WTO members to freeze current tariffs first on
155 then, as a compromise, on 25 "green" tariff lines, but to date Brazil
and India have refused. 59 Of course, under the MFN principle, if the
United States and other proponents were to eliminate tariffs on "green"
goods all other WTO members, including China, would benefit.
Similarly, MFN obligations reduce the option of discriminatory
application of reductions in services market access.60
Despite disagreements and game-playing with the lists of products
to be covered, 61 some have argued that an accord on green technologies
might be possible separately from the Doha package. 62
However, it is difficult not to be skeptical, given that China, as of
early 2010, became the world's largest producer of both wind turbines
and solar panels allegedly through currency manipulation and WTO
illegal subsidies. 63 It seems unlikely under these circumstances that
the United States president (whoever he or she may be as of January
58. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-CAFTA-DR, Aug. 5, 2004, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4000, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-
text (illustrating for example CAFTA-DR Chapter 5, on "customs administration and
trade facilitation" contains a statement in art. 5.12 that "The Parties recognize the
importance of trade capacity building activities in facilitating the implementation of this
Chapter").
59. Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO 'Deliverables' Deal As Delegations Take
Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1164 (Jul. 14, 2011).
60. See WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 2, art. III, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
61. Schott II, supra note 3, at 4.
62. Schwab, supra note 17, at 115.
63. Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31
renew.html.
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2013) and Congress would continue an initiative to facilitate entry of
Chinese green technology goods into the United States without China
making major concessions as well. Even should China agree to open its
markets to foreign products, which it has refused to date, 64 unless the
tariff reductions were accompanied by changes in mandatory transfer of
technology rules in China and agreement not to subsidize production of
such goods, China's acceptance into such an accord seems a total non-
starter. A decision in November 2011 by the United States Department
of Commerce to initiate a countervailing duty investigation of Chinese
solar subsidies makes such an agreement even less likely in the
foreseeable future. 65
B. Agreements among the Willing
With the exceptions noted above, broadly based (but not universally
applicable) progress is more likely to be achieved through plurilateral
agreements comprised only of the members who are willing to accept
the obligations in order to reap the benefits, whether undertaken within
the WTO or separately. As one scholar has observed, "many complex
issues, including services, investment, agricultural subsidies, and the
import of manufactures in developing countries, remain de facto outside
the WTO's reach."6 6 Some of these may be effectively beyond any broad
international accord even on a plurilateral basis, and thus destined only
for treatment in RTAs (since only the latter permits departure from
MFN principles absent a WTO waiver),67 but others seem more
promising.
The practical ability of nations who are WTO members to reduce
tariffs further for a group smaller than the full membership is limited,
in contrast to doing so via a negotiating round in Geneva, because any
such tariff reductions must be offered on a MFN basis, whether or not
the beneficiaries of the reductions are part of the bargain, absent a
waiver from the membership. 68 This "free rider" problem makes such
reductions problematic. Fortunately, if there is adequate political will
there are other possibilities, the most promising of which include
further refinements in the existing GPA and the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA), where negotiations have been taking
place in Geneva for some time. Other possibilities include further
efforts at anti-competition and investment rules - although those are
64. US, China Solar Tensions Threaten to Eclipse Environmental Trade Talks, 15
BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 38 (2011), available at http://ictsd.org/il
news/bridgesweekly/1 17948//.
65. Id.
66. Dadush, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
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likely long term rather than medium term aspirations - and protection
of intellectual property that goes beyond the current TRIPS. 69
1. Expanded Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
After initial discussions at the OECD, government procurement
was included in the Tokyo Round GATT negotiations, resulting in the
conclusion of a Government Procurement Code (GPC). The GPC
entered into force in 1981 and was amended in 1988; at that time it
covered only central government procurement and only goods, not
services. 70 Like the other Uruguay Round Codes it was not mandatory
for GATT Contracting Parties.7 1 The plurilateral Uruguay Round, GPA
became effective January 1, 1996.72 The GPA's membership as of
October 2011 included forty-one nations, including the twenty-seven
members of the European Union.73 New applications for membership
include China, Jordan, the Ukraine, and six others.74
As explained by the WTO, "[t]he GPA is based on the principles of
openness, transparency and non-discrimination, which apply to Parties'
procurement covered by the Agreement, to the benefit of Parties and
their suppliers, goods and services." 75 Government procurement of
goods and services is an important sector in most economies, accounting
for 15-20 percent of GDP. 76 The dream of a GPA that would include
Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (BRICS) is likely some
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/
analytic-index e/trips e.htm.
70. Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc e/gpa-overview-e.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2012); The Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, GATT Doc.
MTN/NTM/211/Rev.2, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1052, available at www.wto.
org/gatt docs/EnglishlSULPDF/91990048.pdf.
71. Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 70.
72. Id.; The Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter GPA].
73. The others include Armenia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea,
Lichtenstein, Aruba (Netherlands), Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese, Taipei and
the United States. Parties and Observers to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop-e/gproc e/memobs_e.htm#parties (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
74. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), Finish Line "Clearly in
Sight" for WTO Govt Procurement Deal: Chair, 15 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. no.
35, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter ICTSD - GPA], available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges
weekly/116637/.
75. The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc-e/gp.gpa-e.htm.
76. ICTSD - GPA, supra note 74, at 2. The WTO secretariat suggests that the value
of an expanded GPA with additional coverage and members would be worth $380-$970
billion worth of trade annually. Id. (referencing a WTO working paper).
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years away, since China is the only one of the five now seeking
membership, and Russia will likely complete the WTO accession
process only in mid-2012. 77
The GPA contains requirements for further negotiations after the
first three years in force and "periodically thereafter"78 and such
negotiations were incorporated into the Doha Round.79 While
provisional agreement on a revised GPA was reached in September
2006 as part of the Doha Round, the negotiations have continued into
December 2011, where agreement was finally reached.80 The
negotiators sought to add more than 200 listed government ministries
and agencies, as well as sub-central entities, to members' annexes that
would be newly subject to the GPA, as well as full coverage of
construction services; 81 over 150 were ultimately agreed upon. 82 Among
the most difficult outstanding issues was EU dissatisfaction with
Japanese and United States proposals on future commitments for
liberalized public procurement and the future GPA work program. 83
The EU has also been pressuring the United States to add more central
government entities to those covered (with twelve added in the new
accord), and to expand United States coverage beyond the current
thirty-seven. 84 This suggests that the GPA discussions will continue
well into the future with expansion of both commitments and
membership. Other changes including updating that would take into
account the increasing use of on-line advertising for tenders and
electronic procurement. In an effort to attract more developing country
members, longer implementation provisions and more individually
tailored accession protocols would be offered. 5 The negotiators also
rejected efforts by some members to withdraw concessions granted in
77. Id.; Ministerial Conference Approves Russia's WTO Membership, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Dec. 16,2011), http://www.wto.org/englishInews-e/ news11 e/acc rus_16dec11_e.htm.
78. GPA, supra note 72, art. XXIV(7).
79. Id.
80. The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 75; Daniel
Pruzin, Negotiators Clinch WTO Procurement Deal; Expanded Access Valued at $80-100
Billion, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2043 (Dec. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin -
Procurement Deal].
81. Nicholas Niggli, Chairman, Comm. On Gov't Procurement, The GPA
Renegotiation: Time to Close the Deal (Oct 18, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/
news-e/newsl e/gpa stat_18oct11 e.doc.
82. Pruzin - Procurement Deal, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Daniel Pruzin, GPA Talks Chair Cites Growing Confidence in WTO Procurement
Deal in December, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1689 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin -
GPA]. The U.S. states that have not permitted any of their procurement to be covered are
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.
85. Id.
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the Uruguay Round,86 and the United States successfully insisted that
the revised GPA be concluded by December 2011, rejecting in October
the idea of no more than an agreement in principle by that date.87
2. Revisions to the Information Technology Agreement
The original ITA was not a part of the Uruguay Round package.
Rather, it was concluded as a plurilateral agreement at the WTO's
Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996.88 The original
number of participants (twenty-nine) has grown to seventy,
representing some 97 percent of world trade in IT products.89 (Brazil
appears to be the only major member that has not become a party.) The
ITA provides for complete elimination of tariffs on IT products, with
some developed country members afforded extended grace periods for
certain products. 90 Since 2010, the WTO's ITA Committee had been
discussing a proposal by the EU for a broad review of the ITA, which
would include negotiations on non-tariff barriers and expand both
product coverage and membership. 91 (The tariff reductions apply under
the MFN principle to all WTO members, whether or not they are party
to the ITA). Because of GATT's MFN clause the tariff reductions under
the ITA apply to all WTO Members. 92
3. Other Plurilateral Agreements Applicable to Trade in Goods
Former United States Trade Representative Schwab has suggested
that the ITA approach might also be applied in a plurilateral agreement
that would cover pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and/or health
care services, with the objective to reduce the costs associated with
delivering health care. 93 In some areas, such as pharmaceuticals, the
major producers include both developed nations, such as the United
States and the EU, and developed Members, such as India, Brazil, and
86. Daniel Pruzin, GPA Chairman Warns of Setback in Government Procurement
Talks, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1923 (Dec. 1, 2011).
87. U.S. Says Revised GPA Must be Fully Concluded by December Ministerial, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE no. 41, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S Oct. 21, 2011.
88. Information Technology Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/inftec e/itaintro e.htm.
89. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Opening Remarks at the WTO Information
Technology Symposium (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
news-e/sppl-e/sppl58_e.htm.
90. Information Technology Agreement, supra note 88.
91. EU Pushes for Review of Information Technology Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news10_e/ita_11nov10_e.htm.
92. Information Technology Agreement, supra note 88.
93. Schwab, supra note 17, at 116.
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Thailand. 94 Whether those interested would be willing to conclude such
agreement or agreements knowing that most of the benefits would
accrue to free riders remains to be seen.
4. Electronic Commerce
The WTO "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" made little
progress as reflected by a cryptic statement in 2001.
As part of the Work Programme, the General Council has engaged
in substantive discussions based on the reports submitted to it by the
subsidiary Councils and Committees as well as on other relevant
considerations. Given the rapid evolution of electronic commerce, many
Members attach importance to further focused deliberations on a
number of the issues raised.95
This is an area in which the WTO has already had considerable
success in reaching a "standstill" understanding not to impose customs
duties on electronic commerce; the longstanding policy has been rolled
over at least until October 2012,96 with further extensions likely.
The issues were addressed more fully in some regional trade
agreements, including many of those concluded by the United States in
recent years. For example, the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement provides inter alia that the parties will not "impose customs
duties, fees, or other charges on or in connection with the importation
or exportation of . .. a digital product fixed on a carrier medium; or a
digital product transmitted electronically."9 7 Other members would
likely consider similar commitments on a reciprocal basis.
5. Investment and Anti-Competition Law
Both investment and competition law as they relate to trade were
included in the Doha Declaration,98 but strong support for negotiations
94. IMAP, PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECH INDUSTRY GLOBAL REPORT 5 (2011),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/Zash/pharmaceuticals-and-biotech-industry-global-
report-2011.
95. World Trade Organization, Introduction of the Report of the General Council:
Statement by Mr. Stuart Harbison, Chairman of the General Council, WT/MIN(01)/14
(Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ministe/minOl
e/wtmin01_14 e.pdf.
96. Continued Doha Disagreements Raise Doubts About Ministerial Declaration, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE no. 40, Oct. 13, 2011.
97. Free Trade Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea,
U.S.-S. Korea, art. 15.3, June 30, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/uploads
/agreements/fta/korus/asset-upload file816_12714.pdf (not yet entered into force).
98. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 37, paras. 20-22 (investment), 23-25
(competition).
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on these two issues has been limited to the EU and Japan. The topics
were dropped from the Doha negotiating agenda in 2004.99
Efforts over more than fifty years, beginning with the Havana
Charter, to conclude broadly based international agreements on
investment and competition law have been notoriously unsuccessful
even among developed nations despite the proliferation of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs),100 and new efforts are no more promising
except perhaps in the long term. The most recent "multilateral
agreement on investment" (MAI), undertaken by the then twenty-five
members of the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the European Commission, would have been open to all interested
nations.101 That effort collapsed in 1998 due to concerns in several
developed nations, particularly France, that the accord would give
foreign investors excessive power to challenge as indirect expropriation
governmental actions protecting the environment and human health,
and undermine state authority for these and other exercises of police
power without incurring liability. 102
Efforts to conclude broad multilateral accords on standards for
anti-competition law have been even less successful. Plans to improve
international cooperation on anti-competition issues began with the
Havana Charter, but the Charter was rejected by the Congress in part
because of the anti-trust provisions.103 Subsequently, no international
agreement has been concluded that "requires cooperation by states in
the identification or prosecution of conduct that violates competition
99. The Doha Declaration Explained: Relationship between Trade and Investment,
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ddae/dohaexplained-e.htm#investment (last visited
Jan. 23, 2012).
100. More than 2760 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 250 free trade
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters had been concluded, with more than 2000 in
force. U.N. CONE. ON TRADE & DEV., PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION II,
at xvii, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20lO8_en.pdf; see also
Americo Beviglia Zampetti & Pierre Sauv4, International Investment, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 211, 215 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0.
Sykes eds., Edward Elgar 2007) (citing 2005 data).
101. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819_1_1_1,00.html
[hereinafter OECD-MAI].
102. See Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033, 145-48 (2000); see also Riyaz Dattu, A
Journey from Havana to Paris: the Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000) (discussing the MAI and
several alternatives). The OECD website simply states tersely that "Negotiations were
discontinued in April 1998 . and they will not be resumed." OECD-MAI, supra note
101.
103. Andrew T. Guzman, International Competition Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 418, 424 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds.,
Edward Elgar 2007).
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laws."104 United States bilateral competition agreements with the EU
and several of the individual members - Australia, Canada, Brazil,
Israel, Japan, and Mexico - are mostly limited to notification and
information sharing.10 5 Occasional, more extensive anti-competition
provisions appear to be limited to certain RTAs, such as the United
States-Singapore FTA competition chapter.1 06
Perhaps a notification and information-sharing agreement along
the lines of those noted above could be concluded with a larger group of
countries, but whether it would improve antitrust enforcement
significantly world-wide is less clear. Longstanding differences in
approach, including the private treble damage actions and injunctions
that are features of United States law 07 and the efforts the United
States makes to apply its anti-trust laws on an extraterritorial basis,10 8
along with differing approaches to mergers and acquisitions between
the United States Department of Justice and the European
Commissionl 09 suggest that any meaningful accord is likely a long way
away.
6. Services
While it is at least conceivable that some sort of services disciplines
could be available to a significant group as a plurilateral agreement,
MFN considerations among others make this difficult.110 While waivers
of MFN requirements are at least theoretically possible under GATS,111
the likelihood of a waiver for the multiple parties to a plurilateral
104. Id. at 425.
105. Id.
106. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., art. 12.2.1, May 6,
2003, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalsingapore/asset-up
load_file708_4036.pdf [hereinafter Singapore FTA]. It requires inter alia that "Each
Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conduct
with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare, and shall take
appropriate action with respect to such conduct."
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2011).
108. See, e.g., AARON XAVIER FELLMUTH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 530-34 (West 2009) (discussing the jurisdictional reach of the U.S.
antitrust laws); Guzmann & Sykes, supra note 100, at 419-22.
109. Guzman & Sykes, supra note 100, at 423.
110. At the eighth Ministerial Meeting in Geneva in December 2011, the Ministers
agreed to a waiver of non-discriminatory treatment so that preferential treatment in
services could be offered by developed and developing countries to least developed
countries. WTO ministers adopt waiver to permit preferential treatment of LDC service
suppliers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.wto.orglenglish/news_e/
news1l1e/serv17dec11 e.htm.
111. Waivers for individual members are contemplated under GATS Article II.2 and
Annex on Article II Exemptions, but they apply primarily upon accession to GATS. See
General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 11.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1869 U.N.T.S 183
[hereinafter GATS].
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services agreement that does not meet the requirements of GATS
Article V "economic integration agreements" seems slight. Rather, it
would seem much more practical to focus on expanding services
disciplines through a regional trade agreement or "economic integration
agreement" (EIA) as authorized under GATS, as discussed in Part IV,
below.
IV. CONTINUED PROLIFERATION OF RTAs
The authority of GATT/WTO members to enter into customs unions
and free trade agreements dates from the original GATT 1947, Article
XXIV. 112 The compromise between the MFN principle and the
perceived need for an exception for regional trade agreements was
designed to deal primarily with the then-existing relationships between
the United Kingdom and the members of the commonwealth (former
colonies).113 The United States was concerned that without some
limitations they would adversely affect United States interests. 1 14 As a
result, Article XXIV was crafted to limit, at least in theory, customs
unions and FTAs to situations in which the agreement covered
"substantially all [ ] trade," achieved their objectives of eliminating
tariffs and most tariff barriers "within a reasonable length of time"
(usually ten years), and did not result in increasing tariffs on imports
from non-members of the customs union or RTA.115 Article XXIV also
incorporated explicit notification and monitoring requirements,
modified on several occasions over the years. 116 Unfortunately, the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and its predecessors
were largely ineffective in assuring that the RTAs actually complied
with the requirements.117 Efforts to further improve the review system
as part of the Doha Round evidenced little progress in a decade.118 In
112. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, at
A66, 55 U.N.T.S 187, at 268 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47_e.pdf.
113. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 576-77 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1969).
114. Id.
115. GATT, supra note 112, arts. XXIV(8), XXIV(5).
116. GATT, supra note 112, art. XXIV(6); Uruguay Round Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161-1163; General Counsel, Transparency Mechanism for Regional
Trade Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 14, 2006).
117. For example, despite the requirement of review of each RTA by the CRTA, "no
examination report has been finalized since 1995 because of lack of consensus." Work of
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regcom-e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
118. Negotiating Group on Rules Chair Ambassador Dennis Francis, on 17 March
2011, "noted the limited progress so far in negotiations on regional trade agreements . . ."
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fairness, the number of RTAs submitted for review has overwhelmed
the review system, and the inability of the Members to agree on such
critical definitions as the meaning of "substantially all trade" has made
a difficult task virtually impossible.
What Professor Jagwash Bhagwati calls the "spaghetti bowl" effect
of proliferation and expansion of RTAs"a has nevertheless been a
relatively recent phenomenon, with the majority negotiated since the
early 1990s. 12 0 As of January 2012, more than 511 customs unions, free
trade areas, and less restricted trade agreements permissible for
developing countries under the 1979 "Enabling Clause" 121 had been
notified to the WTO Secretariat, with another 105 notified under Article
V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.12 2
This "modern" era of RTAs originated in part as a result of a major
change in United States policy toward RTAs beginning in the early to
mid-1980s. 123 The Single Market Initiative adopted in the EU in 1987
had a significant demonstration effect elsewhere in the world, as with
MERCOSUR and the ASEAN FTA.124 The United States, although a
long-term supporter of European integration, grasped the importance of
Europe's enhanced access to relatively low-wage production with the
accession of Ireland (1973), Greece (1979), and Spain and Portugal
(1986)125 and the implications for Europe's competitiveness with the
Western Hemisphere and with Asia. 12 6
The United States was also frustrated from 1982-1985 in its efforts
to bring about a new GATT negotiating round because of indifference
from the internally preoccupied Europeans. United States Trade
Representative William Brock and his colleague in the United States
Government decided to respond to this rebuff by championing FTAs
Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 17, 2011) http://www.wto.org
/english/news e/newslle/rta_17mar11_e.htm.
119. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trading Areas and
Multilateralism - Strangers, Friends, or Foes?, in THE ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 53 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., AEI Press 1996)
[hereinafter Bhagwati & Panagariya - PTAs].
120. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/region-e/regione.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter WTO - RTAs].
121. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 28, 1979), http://www.wto.org/english/
docs ellegal e/enablingl979_e.htm.
122. WTO-RTAs, supra note 120.
123. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC
SYSTEM 4-5 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. 1997).
124. Id.
125. PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO
THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 3 (Kluwer L. Int'l 2nd ed. 1992); WILLIAM A. LOVETT, ALFRED
E. ECKES, JR. & RICHARD L. BRINKMAN, U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY AND THE
WTO 83 (M.E. Sharpe 1999).
126. See LOVETT, ET AL., supra note 125, at 83.
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with Israel and then Canada. The logic then, as today with the WTO's
Doha Round, was that if the preferred global freer trade initiatives
could not move forward, regional trade arrangements could provide a
viable alternative. 127
An enormous volume of literature debates on the pros and cons of
regional trade agreements. 12 8 Bhagwati and some other economists
have decried the expanding numbers of RTAs, terming them (with some
logic) "preferential trade agreements" instead.129 The WTO Secretariat
offers a more nuanced view (perhaps keeping in mind that only
Mongolia among the WTO members is not party to a single RTA):
They [the WTO and RTAs] seem to be contradictory, but often
regional trade agreements can actually support the WTO's
multilateral trading system. Regional agreements have allowed
groups of countries to negotiate rules and commitments that go
beyond what was possible at the time multilaterally. In turn,
some of these rules have paved the way for agreement in the
WTO. Services, intellectual property, environmental standards,
investment and competition policies are all issues that were
raised in regional negotiations and later developed into
agreements or topics of discussion in the WTO. The groupings
that are important for the WTO are those that abolish or reduce
barriers on trade within the group. The WTO agreements
recognize that regional arrangements and closer economic
integration can benefit countries. It also recognizes that under
some circumstances regional trading arrangements could hurt
the trade interests of other countries . . . In particular, the
arrangements should help trade flow more freely among the
countries in the group without barriers being raised on trade
with the outside world. In other words, regional integration
should complement the multilateral trading system and not
threaten it. 130
127. DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 14-15 (Carolina Academic Press
2009) [hereinafter Gantz-RTAs].
128. See generally, JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY (Princeton Univ. Press
2002); ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind
Panagariya eds., Am. Enter. Inst. 1996); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHAEL M. KOSTECKI,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND
(Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2001); RICHARD POMFRET, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS (Clarendon Press 1997); Frankel, supra note 123; Gantz-RTAs,
supra note 127, ch. 2.
129. Bhagwati & Panagariya-PTAs, supra note 119, at 4.
130. Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/beyl-e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
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One factor noted earlier is concern among many WTO members
about increasing imports from China. RTAs provide an obvious solution
to this problem; a member can reduce or eliminate tariffs among
members of and RTA without offering such reduced tariffs to China on
an MFN basis, 131 and likely can find many reasons other than fear of
China to justify a new RTA.
What will happen with RTAs if there is an extended period when
no major negotiations are taking place at the WTO? It seems likely
that there will be two major types of activity, the expansion and
deepening of existing RTAs and the negotiation and conclusion of new
ones, the former driven by the realization that any further expansion of
world trade in the short and medium term will likely be driven by
RTAs. Also, given the lack of interest by many WTO members in
further services marketing opening it seems likely that services RTAs
- perhaps stand-alone, without accompanying market opening in trade
in goods - may interest those members who wish to expand services
trade.
A. Widening and Deepening of Existing RTAs
With the end of the Doha Round as we know it and no prospect of
another comprehensive round in the foreseeable future the members of
some RTAs will see the expansion and improvement of existing
agreements to be of a higher priority that in the past, even though
changes may have been considered desirable before. In this subsection,
I look briefly at four RTAs - the EU, MERCOSUJR, the ASEAN FTA,
and NAFTA - and postulate that three of the four, which have in fact
been subject to modification periodically over their existence to date,
will be expanded again. Still, one cautions that with RTAs, as with the
WTO, the political will to take apparently desirable, sometimes
necessary steps may be lacking with or without the impetus of deadlock
at the WTO, as the history of all four agreements demonstrates.
While this subsection focuses on only a handful of RTAs, many
other countries are actively engaging in RTA negotiations and may be
expected to continue to do so. For example, as of January 2012,
eighteen WTO members have ten or more RTAs in force.132
131. Gantz-RTAs , supra note 127, at 18.
132. List of RTAs in Force by Country/Territory, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://rtais.wto.orgrUI/publicPreDefRepByCountry.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). This
group includes the EU (as a group), Chile, China, Iceland, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
the Ukraine, and the United States.
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1. European Union
After more than fifty-five years, and despite the Eurozone crisis,
the EU remains the world's most successful customs union, having
expanded from the original six members (France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) to twenty-seven by 2007.
133 Tariffs and non-tariff barriers have long been eliminated; most
border controls no longer exist; EU legislation ("regulations" and
"directives") dominates in such areas as international trade regulation,
intellectual property, competition law, and environmental law; and with
some exceptions the EU has achieved free movement of labor and
capital as well as goods and services. 13 4 With the approval of the Treaty
of Lisbon in 2009, at least the seventh major treaty since founding, the
Commission and European Parliament's authority continued to
increase, encompassing, inter alia, foreign investment by the members
in third countries and the equivalent of a foreign minister.135 A true
political union nevertheless remains some years away. Much of the
success of the EU is based on the ability of the members to muster, at
least on some occasions, the political will to engage in a process of
deepening regional integration, albeit not always on linear basis and
not always with the full support of national populations.136
Consequently, the EU, at least until recently, was considered by other
aspirants as a model for other customs unions such as ASEAN and
MERCOSUR. 137
As of early 2012 the EU faces its most serious crisis ever with
Greece unable to pay its debts and questions arising whether Italy,
Portugal, and Spain can remain solvent in light of historically high
133. European Union: Basic Information, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.
ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); See
generally, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, The Euro Area Crisis: Origin, Current Status and
European and US Responses, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and Asia (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/testimony/kirkegaard20111027.pdf.
134. SHEILA PAGE, REGIONALISM AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 97 (Overseas Dev.
Inst. 2000); See Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, 319-34.
135. EU Treaties, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eulirelandlabout-the_
eu/treaties/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); See Trade Topics: Investment,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eultrade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/i
nvestment/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
136. See generally, CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU (Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2007); Henrik Bull, The Constitutional Development of the European
Union, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1, 16 (2007); Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Constitution for the European
Union? A Transatlantic Perspective, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 351 (2005); Thomas
Eilmansberger, IP and Antitrust in the European Union, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 261,
263 (2007); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (Oxford 6th
ed. 2007).
137. FRANKEL, supra note 123, at 4-5.
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interest rates for the sale of government bonds. 38  The Eurozone,
created in 2001 with great fanfare and now encompassing seventeen of
the EU members (with ten, including the United Kingdom, remaining
outside), has chronically suffered from poor fiscal discipline and a
European Central Bank that lacks the necessary powers to step in and
serve beleaguered governments as a lender of last resort, thus providing
them with the liquidity they require to recover from the crisis 139 (for
example, with a Eurobond backed by all members of the Eurozone,
including Germany).
If the EU and the Eurozone survive in their present forms, it seems
almost certain that the treaties will again be supplemented,
presumably with the tougher rules to restrict government spending
deficits and greater European Central Bank and/or community legal
powers to monitor members' national financial policies.140 The
challenges of globalization and financial stability, particularly with the
dual system, may not be sustainable under such circumstances and
could lead to a "downward spiral."141 It is unclear at this writing
whether most of the twenty-seven members - or perhaps the seventeen
Eurozone members - will be able to agree on broad reforms of the EU
accords (a process that could take several years or more to complete) or
will need to restructure the Union to take into account a reduced or
post-Eurozone reality.
The December 2011 plan is for a treaty (technically outside the EU
process) providing for tighter regional oversight of government
spending to be concluded by the seventeen Eurozone members and
many if most of the other ten, with only the United Kingdom
demurring; however, the plan does not effectively address the high
interest rates that threaten the financial viability of Greece, Italy,
Spain, and perhaps other members.142 Inevitably, and regardless of the
survival of the Euro, many further changes in the EU agreements are
almost certain to occur in the coming years.143 These changes like
many others in the history of the EU are taking place largely
independently of developments in Geneva, but the longer the current
138. Eurozone Crisis: A Treasurer's Survival Guide, TREASURY TODAY (DEC. 1, 2011),
http://treasurytoday.com/handbook/eurozone-crisis-a-treasurers-survival-guide#what-will-
the-future-hold-for-the-eurozone.
139. Irene Chapple, How the Euro Became a Broken Dream, CNN.COM (Nov. 4, 2011,
1:26 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/23fbusiness/europe-euro-creation-maastricht-
chapple/index.html.
140. See Wake up, Euro Zone, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 65.
141. Europe and Its Currency: Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2011, at 3-
4.
142. Summit for One, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2012, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/21542450.
143. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, German Vision Prevails as European Leaders
Agree on Fiscal Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at Al.
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crisis continues the less attention the EU nations are likely to pay to
improving the global trading system.
Eventually, additional countries will likely be brought in to the EU,
and perhaps ultimately even to the Eurozone. Croatia is scheduled to
enter the EU in July 2012; Montenegro and perhaps Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Serbia are likely to ultimately meet the criteria for EU
admission more quickly as a result of the lack of action in Geneva and
the understanding that complying with the EU entrance requirements
means a level of modernization of national laws that probably cannot be
achieved any other way. 144 The present membership, in contrast, is
sufficiently preoccupied with the Eurozone crisis and slow economic
growth generally that they may resist further accessions for years. The
current levels of economic and political integration may be increased
again despite popular resistance, but probably not in the short or
medium term.
2. MERCOSUR145
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
represents one of the most ambitious and important regional trade
agreements ever concluded. In the aggregate, MERCOSUR nations
have more than 230 million inhabitants and a gross domestic product of
more than $1.25 trillion. 146 MERCOSUR continues to hold promise in
the longer term - whatever that is - for trade liberalization among
the four Member States and within South America,147 although as of
January 2012 the members are becoming more rather than less
protectionist. 148 The group benefits from common borders, a history of
intra-regional trade, and relative lack of competition among the
144. See The Balkans and Europe: The Pull of Brussels, EcONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2011, at
60 (discussing the various candidates and their prospects for meeting the criteria for
admission); Suzanne Daley & Stephen Castle, As European Union Beckons, Allure Fades
for Weary Croatia, N.Y. TIMES (Electronic Ed.), Jan. 17, 2012.
145. This subsection is based on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 365-66; see also
RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN
CONE (Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Economic Integration as
a Means for Promoting Regional Political Stability: Lessons from the European Union
and MERCOSUR, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187 (2005); John AE Vervaele, Mercosur and
Regional Integration in South America, 54 I.C.L.Q. 387 (2005).
146. EU, Mercosur Trade, available at http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2006/
september/tradoc1 13488.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2008) (2006 data converted to dollars).
147. Comprehensive sources for analysis of MERCOSUJR include RAFAEL A. PORRATA-
DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN CONE (Carolina
Academic Press, 2005); THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, Common Market of the South, LATIN
AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS chs. 408 (Martinius Nijhoff Publ. 2007); and John AE
Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54 I.C.L.Q. 387 (2005);
Inter-American Development Bank, MERCOSUR Report, 2009-10, Mar. 2011.
148. Haskel, Mercosur Plans to Raise Import Duties to Counter Avalanche of Predatory
Export,' supra note 46.
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constituent economies. 149 On paper, MERCOSUR seeks to include the
common market characteristics of labor and capital mobility and
coordination of economic policies. For Brazil, by far the most
economically powerful member, MERCOSUR has political significance,
offering the promise of a closely linked group of economic allies to assist
a world power in offsetting the dominance of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere.1 50
Unfortunately, as is often the case with RTAs, the implementation
of the MERCOSUR agreements lags well behind the formal legal and
institutional framework. The early years, 1992-1999, embodied a
general commitment to gradual economic integration and considerable
progress in eliminating intra-regional customs duties for originating
products, some reduction in non-tariff barriers, and increased coverage
of the common external tariff (CET).151 Since then, MERCOSUR has
fallen behind in timetables and expectations. Institution-building has
languished.15 2 Little progress has been made in establishing the free
movement of persons, services and capital. 153 The development of a
rules-based system with strong institutions and viable dispute
settlement has been an aspiration rather than a reality despite
improvements in the dispute settlement system in recent years, and
both Argentina and Brazil are going their separate ways when dealing
with increasing imports from China. 154 It remains to be seen whether
the members of MERCOSUR will make renewed efforts toward
improving the functioning common market as a result of the demise of
Doha, and ultimately bring about the accession of Venezuela, 15 5 or if the
group will continue to reflect a lack of progress and frequent back-
sliding, thus failing to meet its long-stated goals and objectives.
149. Samuel A. Arieti, The Role of MERCOSUR as a Vehicle for Latin American
Integration, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 761, 764 (2006).
150. See Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1063-64
(2004) (asserting that "the Southern Cone countries are now makers and not simply
takers of international policy, having decided to take their destiny into their own hands").
151. See Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR as an Instrument for Development, 3 NAFTA: L.
& Bus. REV. AM. 53, 53-57 (1997).
152. See Arieti, supra note 149, at 764 (discussing some of the causes, including
reluctance to cede political sovereignty).
153. See John AE Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54
I.C.L.Q. 387, 408 (2005) (discussing the lack of progress in these areas as well as with
recognition by the Parties of general principles of MERCOSUR law).
154. See Ed Taylor, Brazil Increases Excise Tax on Car Imports, Exempts Those With
65% Domestic Content, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1546 (2011) (reporting on measures
taken by Brazil alone to protect domestic manufacturers against Chinese auto imports);
Protectionism in Argentina: Keep Out, ECONOMIST, Sep. 24, 2011, at 47 (reporting on the
use of "non-automatic licensing" and other measures to slow imports).
155. See David Haskel, Venezuela's Admission, Free Trade Talks with EU, Top
Mercosur Leader's Agenda, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Dec. 14, 2011.
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3. ASEANFTA156
ASEAN as now constituted includes a population of around 500
million persons, land area of 4.5 million square kilometers, total trade
of $850 billion (internal and external), and GDP of about $700 billion.157
The group encompasses several of the most dynamic trading nations of
the world (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam) as
well as several of the least open (Laos, Myanmar), along with Brunei,
Cambodia, and Indonesia.158  The wide differences in levels of
development and receptiveness to foreign investment and open markets
among other factors have led to a "least common denominator" effect in
which accords among the now ten members inevitably represent
significant compromise by the bolder, more open member governments.
Moreover, ASEAN Members have historically faced political and
security challenges which discouraged and delayed greater economic
integration, such as border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. 159
ASEAN also suffers from poor infrastructure, including but not limited
to lengthy land travel routes that are served by poor road and railroad
networks. 160
ASEAN and AFTA consist legally of literally dozens of agreements
and declarations, often overlapping and/or in conflict, sometimes un-
ratified after many years. 161 The reluctance on the part of some of the
member governments to make firm commitments and to adopt
functioning and binding legal rules and structures includes a lack of
156. This subsection draws on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 411-12, 432-33. Major
sources for information on ASEAN include ZAKIR HAFEZ, THE DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL
TRADE INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Transnational, 2004); Lay Hong Tan, Will
ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?, 53 I.C.L.Q. 935 (2004);
Paul. J. Davidson, The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic
Cooperation, 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 165 (2004).
157. TEO Chee Hai, Mutual Recognition of Surveying Qualifications Within the
ASEAN, Framework Agreement on Services, INT'L FEDERATION OF SURVEYORS,
http://www.fig.net/pub/jakartalpapers/ps-05/ps_05_3_teo.pdf.
158. Member Countries, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.
asean.org/74.htm.
159. See, e.g., Neil Chatterjee, ASEAN Summit Fails to Resolve Thai-Cambodia
Conflict, REUTERS, May 8, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08
/us-asean-idUSTRE74709V20110508 (reporting on ongoing border skirmishes).
160. Even in 2002, one of the key areas of China-ASEAN cooperation was acceleration
of various multinational rail and highway projects, as well as development of the Mekong
River basin. See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation
Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China Preamble, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/13197.htm [hereinafter ACFTA Framework Agreement].
161. See ASEAN Secretariat, Table of Treaties/Agreements and Ratifications, ASEAN
(last updated May 2011), http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf (listing 205
instruments that not including dozens of ministerial and other declarations). This table
is probably the best available source of the status of ratification of the various ASEAN
and AFTA agreements.
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apparent support for effective dispute resolution. "Framework"
agreements are particularly popular, likely because they allow the
members to announce their intention to conclude arrangements while
accession to more significant and binding obligations is deferred.16 2 The
cautious approach persisted despite China's soaking up the lion's share
of the region's direct foreign investment, continuing credibility
problems with foreign traders and investors over vague and non-
transparent rules that really are not legally binding and in any event
cannot be enforced, and evidence that the market-based approach
increasingly in use elsewhere works better than ASEAN's heavy
reliance on government regulation. 163
Perhaps inevitably, the policies of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and recently Vietnam have emphasized investment in
export-intensive industries and greater integration with global
economies rather than restricted markets and import-substitution
either individually or as part of ASEAN. 164 Many ASEAN Members
have greater interest and see more economic benefit in fostering
expanded trade relations with nations outside Southeast Asia than with
the other members of ASEAN,1 65 although after nearly a decade of
negotiations a free trade agreement between China and the ASEAN
nations went into effect January 1, 2010.166 Still, improvements in the
dispute settlement system (on paper at least) and the ratification of the
Bali Concord II by all ten members within a year may be reason for
very cautious optimism. Will the challenges of competition from China
and from members who are concluding FTAs and bilateral investment
treaties with third countries, augmented by a lack of trade
liberalization in Geneva, encourage the members of ASEAN to move
forward with their regional integration? Or will ASEAN continue to
162. See Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People's Republic of China, Preamble, Jan. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.asean.org/16635.htm.
163. See Hal Hill & Jayant Menon, ASEAN Economic Integration: Features,
Fulfillments, Failures and the Future 5-6 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 69, 2010).
164. See Lay Hong Tan, Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free
Trade Area?, 53 I.C.L.Q. 935, 938 (2004) (discussing early efforts at greater regional
economic cooperation among ASEAN governments to encourage intra-regional trade and
investment).
165. For example, in a book on the EU and ASEAN, the authors effectively suggested
that EU nations might prefer to deal with individual ASEAN nations such as Malaysia
and Singapore rather than as a group. See MARY T. YEUNG, NICHOLAS PERDIKIS &
WILLIAM A. KERR, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE EU AND
ASEAN 134-35 (Edward Elgar, 1999).
166. The China-ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement - Ajar for Business; More Breadth
than Depth, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/15211682.
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muddle along without contributing to market opening either among the
members or with other nations?
4. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 16 7 (United
States, Canada, and Mexico) is the world's largest free trade area,
accounting for over $1 trillion worth of trilateral trade in goods and
services in a region of over 450 million persons with $17 trillion in GDP,
more than any other regional trading bloc except the European
Union. 168 NAFTA provides for elimination of all intra-regional tariffs
and removal of essentially all non-tariff barriers except for those
applicable a few agricultural products. 169 It also incorporates
comprehensive rules for, inter alia, treatment of foreign investment
(including investor-state dispute settlement); government procurement;
trade in services, including financial and transportation services;
customs procedures; technical standards; sanitary and phytosanitary
standards; protection of intellectual property; trade in agriculture,
energy, and basic petrochemicals; temporary immigration entry for
business purposes; appeals of administrative decision; appeals in
antidumping and countervailing duty trade actions; and comprehensive
dispute settlement regarding disagreements among the governments
concerning the application or interpretation of NAFTA provisions and
administrative determinations in unfair trade (dumping, subsidies)
cases. 170
NAFTA differs in two major ways from the EU, MERCOSUR, and
the ASEAN FTA: a) it is an FTA rather than a customs union, with the
three Parties remaining free to set their own MFN tariffs under WTO
rules; and b) with minor exceptions, NAFTA is a single instrument, one
that has not been amended in eighteen years. 171 It is effectively a
167. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. - Can. - Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
168. Office of the United States Trade Representative, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
agreement-nafta.
169. NAFTA, supra note 167, art. 309, Annex 302.2.
170. Useful sources include THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (Judith H. Bello
et al., eds.) (ABA, 1994); THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: BEYOND
NAFTA (Peter Hakin & Robert E. Litan, eds., Brookings, 2002); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER
& JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES (Inst. for Int'l
Economics, 2005).
171. Frederick M. Abbott, The North American Integration Regime and its
Implications for the World Trading System, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA,
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 169, 171 (Joseph H.H. Weiler, ed.
2000); NAFTA, supra note 167.
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"confederation among independent sovereigns, each maintaining
autonomous political decision-making authority within the constraints
defined by agreement." 172 Also, like the EU but unlike MERCOSUR
and ASEAN, NAFTA's internal trade liberalization measures have been
fully implemented in accordance with the schedules agreed upon during
the negotiations. 17 3 The built in mechanism for accelerating tariff
reductions and making rules of origin more flexible has been utilized
but not with regard to "sensitive" goods. United States law provides
authorization for the United States to agree with Canada and Mexico
on periodic modifications of the rules of origin to facilitate achievement
of freer trade, 7 4 and such authority is exercised on a regular basis. 175
Otherwise, major changes in NAFTA have been impossible to
achieve, even though after eighteen years it is obvious that revisions
are desirable (if not urgent) in areas including government procurement
(extending the chapter to state and local entities), rules of origin, and
achieving parity for Mexico with newer United States FTAs. Mexican
politicians beginning with President Vincente Fox in 2000 have
periodically called for a widening and deepening of NAFTA, moving
toward a common market with a common currency and free labor flows
that more closely reflects European integration.1 7 6 Then as now, such
expansion, requiring amendment of the agreement, is politically
unacceptable in the United States (and probably in Mexico today as
well) as President Obama's decision in 2009 to effectively abandon
campaign promises to amend NAFTA demonstrated. 7 7 Still, it is
possible that the United States and Canada may be more willing in the
future to consider such proposals in the absence of negotiations in
Geneva in the longer term, or to do a "backdoor" modernization of
NAFTA through participation by all three NAFTA Parties in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.
172. Id.
173. NAFTA, supra note 167, art. 302, annex 302.2.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 3332(q) (1998).
175. See, e.g., Proclamation by the President to Modify Rules of Origin Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 11, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/2006101 1-11.html.
176. See John M. Nagel, Fox's Calls for Expansion of NAFTA Held Unlikely to Gain
U.S. Approval, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1085 (2000) (suggesting that Mexico requires a
7 percent annual growth rate to create the jobs necessary to keep Mexican workers from
migrating to the United States).
177. See Nacha Cattan & Rossella Brevetti, Mexico Sees Need to Dust Off, Rehabilitate
Aging NAFTA with U.S., Canada, 27 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 93 (2010) (discussing the
lack of pressure to renegotiate NAFTA in both the U.S. and Canada and some of the
changes that have been discussed).
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B. Conclusion of New or Pending RTAs
1. European Union Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)178
While the EU at any given time is negotiating a number of RTAs,
including a potentially significant agreement with Canada in 2011179
and a proposed "WTO Plus" agreement with Russia, 180 this discussion
focuses on EU negotiations with former colonies - the Asian,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, which are most likely to be made
most urgent by the collapse of Doha. The EPAs arise out of a long-term
trade and development policy that pre-dates the European Union and
originates in the colonial era. France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom in particular have sought to maintain close relationships with
their former colonies, although historical links have been replaced by
economic development needs as the most significant (although not only)
justification.181 It was and is a discriminatory policy in which former
colonies in general were afforded more favorable access to the EU
market than the rest of the developing world (including those in Latin
America who obtained their independence from Spain and Portugal
150-200 years ago). 182 The evolution of individual EU Member State
policies was subsumed into the EU beginning in the 1950s; the EC
Treaty includes among the list of EU activities "the association of
overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and
promote jointly economic and social development." 183
Initial efforts to maintain special trade relations with former
colonies, the Yaound6 Conventions with new African states, were
generally reciprocal in nature. Nevertheless the EC Treaty provisions
(although not the Yaound6 Conventions per se) raised consistency
issues under GATT Article XXIV. According to the Working Party,
duties were not to be eliminated on substantially all trade, and there
were also objections to the limited (five year) term of the agreements.
Questions of law were shelved in favor of an informal agreement to
178. This subsection draws on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 346-49.
179. See Peter Menyasz, Free Trade Talks Between Canada, EU Enter Ninth Round of
Negotiations, Fast Says, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1700 (2011) (reporting on what
Canadian authorities have called "our most significant trade initiative since the North
American Free Trade Agreement").
180. EU, Russia Moving Towards 'WTO Plus' Trade Agreement, Eventual FTA, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U. S.-Trade- 12/16/201 1/menu-id-445.html.
181. Lorand Bartels, The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union, 18
EUR. J. INT'L L. 715, 717, 726, 756 (2007). The former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in
Latin America, most of which became independent around 1820, are treated differently.
182. See id., at 715-16.
183. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3(s), Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3.
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GATT consultations should any future problems arise. 184 EU
maintenance of association or economic partnership agreements with
its former colonies, with the less advantageous GSP offered to other
developing countries, continues to complicate EU trade and
development policy to this day.
The Community's trade and development policies in the 1970s and
1980s were primarily non-reciprocal, both in the association agreements
and in implementation of GSP. Fortunately for the EU, legal
challenges under GATT did not occur for some years. 185 In 1975, the
EU concluded the first of what would be a thirty-five year series of still
non-reciprocal agreements with the ACP states, the four Lom6
conventions, and Cotonou Agreements.18 6  The trade cooperation
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement (providing duty-free treatment for
most ACP products entering the EU) were not GATT legal because they
departed from MFN treatment in GATT, Article I without meeting the
requirements of Article XXIV.187
In 2001 the WTO Ministers authorized a waiver for the trade
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement effective through 2007, which
everyone understood would not be renewed.188 Thus, the goal for both
the EU and the ACP states was a series of EPAs that are considered
legal under GATT Article XXIV. The EU decided in consultation with
the ECP states that the trade preference provisions of the Cotonou
Agreement would have to be replaced with new arrangements that
would be GATT-legal, using Cotonou as the "foundation" for such
discussions. 1 8 9 Failing agreement the ACP exports to the EU would, as
of January 1, 2008, benefit only from the Generalized System of
Preferences rather than from the superior preferential access under
Cotonou. 190 The impact of this change on ACP states would not have
been uniform. The least developed developing states, mostly in Africa,
would have had duty-free access to the EU market for "everything but
arms," and thus would not have seen enormous differences in market
184. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 722-29 (discussing the Yaounde Conventions and
the GATT Article XXIV legality questions).
185. See id. at 733, 739.
186. Id. at 733.
187. Id. at 734-36.
188. World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Decision 2001: European
Communities - The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15, 41 I.L.M. 767
(2001).
189. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 716. Non-trade related provisions of Cotonou
remain effective until 2020.
190. Economic Partnership Agreement: Schedule of Negotiations, CARIBBEAN REG'L
NEGOTIATING MACHINERY (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com-
content&view=article&catid=187:rnm-updates-for-2007&id=170:rnm-update-0714 (noting
that without an economic partnership agreement in place by January 1, 2008 the region
would be in a "disadvantageous position").
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access compared to Cotonou. However, for "middle income" Caribbean
states (all except Haiti) and many African nations, the EU GSP
benefits1 91 would have been considerably less favorable than those
available under Cotonou or under a new EPA. 192
For the EU, the focus has shifted toward a greater level of
reciprocity, while continuing the emphasis on development. As EU
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson affirmed in April 2008 (while
defending the EPA negotiations against criticism), "the whole idea of
the EPA is to harness trade in the cause of development, to create
opportunities for trade linked to capacity building and development
cooperation, which offers a much better deal than the old-style tariff
preferences of Cotonou."1 93
The EU's efforts to complete negotiations with all ACP nations by
the end of 2007 were not successful except with respect to the
Caribbean nations. 194 In several situations the EU concluded interim
EPAs (covering only trade in goods), accords which left many details to
be negotiated until later, and/or did not cover services, intellectual
property, or government procurement.195 Still, the ACP nations have
continued to receive "duty free, quota free" (DFQF) access to the EU
market.196 This approach is ending; the EU indicated in September
2011 that as of January 1, 2014, those ACP countries that had not
concluded and ratified an EPA would lose their DFQF access. 197
Possibly, the absence of negotiations in Geneva will assist at least some
ACP nations in completing the EPA negotiations by 2014. It also seems
likely that in the absence of another broad negotiating round in Geneva
the EU and the ACP states will continue to develop the trade
relationships that are the subject of the EPAs.
191. See Generalized System of Preferences 2006-2008, EUROPA (last updated June 22,
2007), http://europa.eulegislation-summaries/external trade/ri1020_en.htm.
192. See id.
193. Mathabo le Roux, Tricky Trade Negotiations Need More Discussion, ALL AFRICA
(Apr. 8, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200804080659.html.
194. See Bruce Zagaris & Elena Papangelopoulou, An Overview of the CARIFORUM-
EC Economic Partnership Agreement, 49 TAx NOTES INT'L 689 (Feb. 25, 2008); Gantz-
RTAs, supra note 127, at 349-59.
195. Luisa Morgantini, EU-ACP Trade - Unequal Partners, Unfair Rules, ALL AFRICA
(Dec. 26, 2007), http://allafrica.comistories/printable/200712260449.html.
196. EC Proposes January 2014 as Deadline for Completion of EPA Process, CTA
AGRITRADE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://agritrade.cta.int/en/layout/set/print/Agriculture/
Topics/EPAs/EC-proposes-January-20 14-as-deadline-for-completion-of-EPA-process.
197. Int'l Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Special Update: European
Commission Puts Renewed Pressure on EPA Negotiations, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS
(Oct. 2011), http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/115406/.
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2. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Other United States
Initiatives
The two-year-old negotiations aimed at a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) agreement (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam) represent the only
major Obama Administration trade initiative (beyond the enactment in
October 2011 of long-stalled Bush era FTAs with Colombia, Panama,
and South Korea).s98 After nine rounds of talks despite some progress
no consensus has been reached on the difficult issues, including some
that have eluded negotiators in Geneva, such as increased protection of
intellectual property ("TRIPS-plus"), investment, competition, and
market access in sensitive goods and services sectors such as certain
industrial goods, agriculture, and textiles. New language to regulate
behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is being proposed by the
United States for the comprehensive FTA, along with the labor and
environmental provisions that are politically required in any United
States FTA.199 Agreement even on the "broad outlines of a final pact"
will not likely be reached for some time, and much hard negotiating
remains. 200
The potential expansion of world trade likely to result from a TPP
with the current nine nation negotiating group is modest, given that the
United States already has free trade agreements in force with four of
the TPP group (Australia, Chile, Peru, and Singapore) and Brunei,
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore are currently parties to the "P4"
FTA with each other. 201 However, many of the negotiators hope that
the TPP could ultimately serve as the foundation for a much broader
Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific; as the Chilean negotiator,
Rodrigo Contreras observed, "[o]ur objectives are to negotiate the
highest quality agreement and set the foundation for an Asia-Pacific
Agreement." 202 For example, should Japan ultimately decide to join the
TPP negotiations or sign on later-preliminary steps to that end began
198. See Rachel Boehm, Obama Signs Robust Trade Package Implementation: TPP
Next for U.S. Trade, 28 INT'L REP. (BNA) 1735 (2011).
199. See U.S. Fixes Future-SOE "Loophole," Sends TPP Partners Proposed Text, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade- 10/21/201 1/menu-id-445.html.
200. See Len Bracken, Marantis Says Trade Deal Votes Validate Consultative
Approach being Used with TPP, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1707 (2011) (quoting Deputy
U.S.T.R. Demetrios Marantis).
201. See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV (last updated Apr. 26, 2011),
http://export.gov/FTA/index.asp; Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations,
AUSTRALIAN GOV'T DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.aulfta/tpp/
index.html.
202. Lucien 0. Chavin, Ninth Round of TPP Talks Concludes in Lima; U.S. Tables
State-Owned Enterprise Proposal, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 31, 2011, at D10.
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in November 2011203 - the economic equation would radically change,
as United States Congressional leaders have cautioned. 204 Similarly,
the addition of Canada and Mexico would also greatly increase the
economic significance of the TPP,205 as well as the negotiating
challenges. Trade expert Gary Horlick, a strong proponent of an
expanded TPP, suggested that such a TPP might be a workable
alternative for the members to the WTO.206 China has indicated that it
might be willing eventually to take part,207 but China's presence would
not likely be welcomed in the United States.
One hopes that the TPP negotiations can be successfully concluded,
although this is not likely to occur before 2013 at the earliest, despite
President Obama's expressed hope for a mid-2012 finalization. 2 08 The
pace of the negotiations has been slow; the United States presidential
election and other political constraintS209 along with the added
complexities of Japanese participation make this an extremely difficult
process. Still, if the agreement is concluded promptly, this, plus the
absence of negotiations in Geneva, might well convince other Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) nations to participate
with the United States. With Japan, Canada, and Mexico incorporated
into the TPP - a further complicating and possibly delaying factor -
203. Japan Gov't Confirms Step Towards TPP Deal Despite Opposition,
ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Nov. 11, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.comlenglish2010/world/2011-
11/11/c_131242055.htm (reporting on the prime minister's decision to enter into
consultations).
204. Congressional Leaders Caution USTR on Possibility of Japan Joining TPP,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://inside
trade.com/201111092381649/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/congressional-leaders-caution-
ustr-on-possibility-of-japan-joining-tpp/menu-id-173.html. The U.S. auto industry likely
would be opposed. U.S. Auto Companies Oppose Japanese Participation in TPP
Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://insidetrade.com/201111112382030/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/us-auto-companie
s-oppose-japanese-participation-in-tpp-negotiations/menu-id- 173.html.
205. Len Bracken, Nine Leaders Agree on Outline for TPP; Canada, Mexico Follow
Japan in Bid to Join, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1858 (Nov. 17, 2011).
206. Davies, supra note 5.
207. Daniel Pruzin & Len Bracken, Official Says China 'Open' to Participation in
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1566 (Sept. 29, 2011).
208. White House Eyes Mid-2012 TPP Deal, Cautious On Prospect of Japan Joining
Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://insidetrade.com/201111142382142/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/white-house-eyes-
mid-20 12-tpp-deal-cautious-on-prospect-of-japan-joining-talks/menu-id- 173.html.
209. These include the President's current lack of trade promotion authority, although
Deputy U.S.T.R. Marantis has argued that extensive consultations between the Obama
Administration and Congress on the TPP have obviated the need at the present time for
TPA. Bracken, supra note 200. Another political constraint overshadowing the TPP
negotiations disappeared in October 2011, when the long-stalled U.S. FTAs with
Colombia, Panama and South Korea were approved. Rachel Boehm, Bilateral
Agreements: Obama Signs Robust Trade Package Implementation; TPP Next for U.S.
Trade, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 24, 2011).
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the agreement would rival the EU among regional trade agreements in
terms of total trade.
3. An EU-United States FTA?
Should there be a political opportunity for true boldness, the
concept of a United States-EU trade agreement may again surface.
The logic of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United
States and the EU, perhaps parallel to the ongoing negotiations (since
2009) of such an agreement between the EU and Canada, 210 is
unassailable given the enormous volume of bilateral trade. 211 The
options range from relatively narrow coverage - perhaps of services,
investment, and competition law - to an agreement that would cover
manufactured goods as well, to a fully comprehensive agreement that
would also address agricultural trade, investment, competition law and
the like. 212
The obstacles are enormous as well, particularly in the GATT
requirement that it apply to "substantially all trade" including
agriculture and the political and economic imperative to apply to major
services sectors. The fact that Canada, a nation of less than 35 million
people with a GDP about 5 percent of that of the United States, 213 may
be able to successfully negotiate such an agreement doesn't mean the
same is true for the United States. Moreover, issues such as
agricultural subsidies, agricultural trade, investment, and competition
have proven daunting for the United States and the EU nations to
address in the past.214  The enormous volume of WTO litigation
210. Peter Menyasz, Bilateral Agreements: Services, Investment Offers Exchanged in
Latest Round of Canada-EU Trade Talks, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1756 (Oct. 27,
2011). EU-Canada trade was C$82.5 billion in 2010.
211. In 2010, U.S. exports to the EU were approximately $240 million worth, while
imports were worth $319 billion, for total trade in goods of $559 million. Trade in Goods
with the European Union, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c0003.html#2010 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
212. See Chamber of Commerce Eyes Expansion of U.S.-EU 'Zero-Tariff' Concept,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2011), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-
US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade- 10/28/201 1/chamber-of-commerce-eyes-expansion-of-us-eu-
zero-tariff-concept/menu-id-7 (discussing various Chamber of Commerce proposals for a
trade deal with the EU).
213. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011: Report for Selected Countries
and Subjects, INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/
weodatalweorept.aspx?sy=2009&ey=2016&scsm=l&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=
156&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=&prl.x=94&
prl.y=17 (last visited Jan. 23, 2012); GDP (Current US $), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
214. See, e.g., the failed negotiations at the OECD of a "multilateral investment
agreement" in the 1990s, supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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between the United States and the EU is also notable. 215 Perhaps the
Doha failure in time will encourage the United States and the EU to
consider an agreement of limited scope that nonetheless would result in
significant trade expansion while still being WTO legal, 216 rather than
insisting on a fully comprehensive FTA. Following a November 2011
EU-United States summit, the EU and the United States committed to
seeking new ways to increase bilateral trade and investment by the end
of 2012,217 possibly including an FTA. 2 18
C. Services RTAs
The objective of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) 2 19 is simple: over time, to assure that the basic disciplines that
have applied to international trade in non-agricultural products for
more than half century - MFN treatment, national treatment,
subsidies, transparency, etc. - are applied to services, with a minimum
of exceptions. 220  GATS provides a series of legal rules governing
market access and MFN and national treatment restrictions. GATS
rules apply to regional and local as well as national governments. 221
Members of the WTO agree through a "positive list" approach to restrict
use of market access and national treatment restrictions; obligations
under GATS, except as noted below, are defined largely by Members'
individual schedules of commitments. National treatment
commitments are limited by each government to the services
specifically designated by that government in its individual annexes. 222
GATS also required the members, beginning in 2000, to enter into
"successive rounds of negotiations . . . with a view to achieving a
progressively higher level of liberalization." 2 2 3 Unfortunately, little
215. Since 1995, the EU had brought 29 WTO actions against the United States, and
the United States had brought 24 actions against the EU or individual members.
Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/dispu-e/dispu-statuse.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
216. For example, a services bilateral agreement need only meet the requirements of
GATS, art. VI, discussed in subsection C, below; agreements on most investment issues
and competition law would be totally outside of WTO scope.
217. EU, U.S. to Explore Deeper Bilateral Economic Ties by End of 2012, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://insidetrade.com1201111
282383334/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/eu-us-to-explore-deeper-bilateral-economic-ties-
by-end-of-2012/menu-id- 173.html.
218. Kirk, Froman Say U.S.-EU FTA on the Table in New Working Group, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://insidetrade.com/201111
302383537/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/kirk-froman-say-us-eu-fta-on-the-table-in-new-
working-group/menu-id- 173.html.
219. GATS, supra note 111, art. I.
220. Id. art. II, art. III.
221. Id. art. I.
222. Id. art. XX.
223. Id. art. XIX, §1.
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progress has been made in the Doha services negotiations, particularly
since 2008.224 Given that the services negotiations have been part of
the Doha Round "single undertaking," the effective abandonment of the
Doha Round means that services liberalization is also abandoned or
indefinitely delayed in Geneva.
Because of the MFN provisions, plurilateral agreements on services
are generally impractical; concessions among a few would automatically
apply to other WTO members, including those who did not participate
in the negotiations or make concessions of their own. However, GATS
Article V contains language similar to that of GATT, Article XXIV:
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from
being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing
trade in services between or among the parties to such an
agreement, provided that such an agreement:
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage, 225 and
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among
the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a),
through:
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures,
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the
basis of a reasonable time-frame . . . .226
Although it is evident from Article V(2) that the Parties
contemplated situations in which trade in services would typically be
part of a broader RTA on goods,227 this is one factor to be considered
rather than an absolute requirement. In other words, a freestanding
services RTA or "economic integration agreement" (EIA) is
permissible. 228  Nor is there a requirement that substantially all
224. See Services: Negotiations State of Play, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/state-of-play-e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011)
(noting with typical understatement that "Progress has been limited since the Signaling
Conference of July 2008).
225. "This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade
affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not
provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply." GATS, supra note 111, art. V
n. 1.
226. Id. art. V, §1.
227. In the WTO's evaluation of the agreement "consideration may be given to the
relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade
liberalization among the countries concerned." Id. art. V, §2.
228. It is the responsibility of the Council for Trade in Services to determine if a
services RTA is consistent with GATS Article V. However, given the unlikelihood that the
Council, like the CRTA, could reach a consensus on the legality or illegality of a services
RTA, the risks are minimal.
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services trade be covered (as with goods in GATT, Article XXIV); rather
only "substantial sectoral coverage is mandated. 229 This GATS Article
V approach for EIAs is clearly far more flexible than a traditional
"plurilateral" agreement which could not avoid the MFN questions.
GATS Article V thus provides a potentially powerful mechanism for
services trade liberalization among those who are willing to liberalize
services market access among a group of WTO Members even if they
are reluctant to open their services markets more broadly. As one
scholar suggested several years ago:
EIAs [economic integrations agreements] may not only revive
negotiations among interested countries, but also offer a
sensible way to account for different levels of Members'
technological and infrastructural development. For example,
India may find an EIA with the U.S., EU, or OCED, whether
concluded cumulatively or individually, accelerating its
development. The same could be said in the case of Brazil. As a
method of distancing service negotiations from negotiations on
agriculture and non-agriculture market access, an EIA could
enable a closer cooperation between the U.S. and EU. An EIA
could also induce trade among the members of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development.230
Services EIA negotiations already are being pursued in a
preliminary fashion by the United States, the EU, and other OECD
members, and the group will hopefully by some developing countries in
the coming months. The focus will be on most of the same issues as at
Geneva, such as market opening, domestic regulation, rules on the use
of emergency safeguards, services subsidies, and possibly rules for least
developed countries. 231  A major objective is to expand individual
country commitments to services market liberalization. 232
V. NATIONAL LAW
Despite much less attention internationally than is the case with
multilateral trade negotiations, a very substantial portion of the
increase in world trade in recent decades has resulted not from
229. GATT, supra note 68, art. XXIV, §1; GATS, supra note 111, art. V, §1.
230. Petra L. Emerson, An Economic Integration Agreement on Services: A Possible
Solution to the Doha Development Round Impasse, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 252, 252-53 (2010).
231. Services Negotiations, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/serv els-negs-e.htm#offers (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (listing the major areas of
negotiations); see WTO Members Brainstorm Services Plurilateral Options, No Decision
Yet, World Trade On-Line, Feb. 24, 2012 (reporting on the continuing discussions).
Government procurement of services is related, but generally addressed along with goods
in the GPA negotiations discussed in Part III(B)(1), above.
232. GATS, supra note 111, art. XIX ("negotiation of specific commitments").
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multilateral or even regional trade agreements, but through unilateral
national actions to lower tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and/or make
international commerce operate more smoothly. Several World Bank
scholars have estimated that during the period 1983-2003, "autonomous
changes in national law were responsible for the overwhelming majority
(roughly 66 percent)" of trade liberalization in developing countries. 233
In this section I consider several important examples of the power and
reach of unilateral action through national legislation alone-the
country-specific actions of Chile and Mexico, the individual actions of
many countries under the 'Washington Consensus" and the use of
uniform law to implement necessary change, such multilateral efforts
at the Organization of American States (OAS) and UNCITRAL to offer
model laws for secured financing.
A. Chile
As the government has explained,
Chile's applied MFN tariff was unilaterally phased down from 11
per cent to six per cent between 1999 and 2003.234 . . . This low and
uniform tariff is a distinctive feature of Chile's trade policy that
makes for more efficient resource allocation by establishing the
basis for non-differential treatment of the various production
sectors, and has also enabled Chile to negotiate preferential
agreements with various countries. 235
Since 2003 Chile has continued to apply the single MFN tariff
rate of 6 percent, with a few exceptions. 236 As the Chilean
Government confirmed in a 2009 WTO report, Chile's trade
policy maintains its objective of improving and ensuring access
for its goods and services to all markets, as well as encouraging
domestic and foreign investment. With a view to liberalizing
the economy, all available channels have been used to give
Chile's trade policy an outward orientation, including unilateral
market opening and multilateral and bilateral trade
negotiations. 237
The advantages of this tariff policy are substantial. First, it has
greatly simplified the classification process for business stakeholders
233. Dadush, supra note 8, at 2 (citing a study by Will Martin and Francis Ng of the
World Bank).
234. Trade Policy Review Body Rep., Trade Policy Review-Report by Chile, 21,
WT/TPR/G/220 (Sept. 2, 2009), available at www.wto.org/englishl/tratop-e/tpr e/g220-
e.doc.
235. Id.
236. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review-Chile, T 10, WT/TPR/S/220 (Sept. 2,
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp320_e.htm.
237. Trade Policy Review Body Rep, supra note 234, 20.
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and the customs service alike, since the tariff rate is the same
regardless of how the goods are classified under the tariff schedules.
Secondly, it greatly reduced the likelihood of customs fraud-an
endemic problem in many developing countries-because an importer
receives no financial advantage by seeking the fraudulent
reclassification of goods to her advantage. 238
B. Mexico Before and After NAFTA
Mexico began liberalizing its economy in 1985 in preparation for
accession to GATT in 1986, and has continued the process (with more
than a few ups and downs and many delays) since that time. 2 3 9 Much of
Mexico's reform legislation was mandated by NAFTA, such as the 1993
Foreign Investment Law. 2 40 However, that law, like many others, was
applied from the outset by Mexico in a non-discriminatory manner to
persons of other nationalities investing in Mexico, and that practice has
not changed in more than eighteen years. In 2011, despite some
continuing complexities in the system, Mexico is considered by the
World Bank to be the easiest place in Latin America to do business and
35th in the world. 241  Mexico's future, perhaps more than most
countries given the enormous comparative advantages it received with
NAFTA, depends today as it did a decade ago more on its ability to
bring about internal reforms than from gains it has reason to expect
from new trade agreements. As the WTO Secretariat observed in 2008:
Since its previous Review in 2002, Mexico has continued with
the gradual and unilateral liberalization of its trade regime. It
has also concluded new free-trade agreements, now conducting
85 per cent of its trade with preferential partners . . . At the
same time, some barriers to MFN trade and foreign investment
limit the access of Mexican consumers and producers to certain
goods and services on more competitive terms. 242
238. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF TRADE 57 (2001); David G. Tarr, On the Design of Tariff






239. Carol Wise, Mexico's Democratic Transition: the Search for New Reform
Coalitions, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 283, 291-92 (2003).
240. Mexico: Foreign Investment Act of 1993, Dec. 27, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 207 (1993).
241. Making the Desert Bloom; Mexico's Economy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 2011, at 59
[hereinafter Economist-Mexico].
242. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review-Mexico, 1, WT/TPR/S/195 (Jan. 7,
2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp295 e.htm.
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Despite significant improvements in recent years, Mexico continues
to suffer in the areas of energy costs, education, tax inequality, legal
system inefficiency, and corruption, among others. 243 Still, particularly
in recent years, Mexico is an example of the power of internal,
unilateral, legislative reforms that could be instructive to other nations.
C. The "Washington Consensus"
The "Washington Consensus" is the term commonly given to the
post-Cold War program urged on the developing world beginning
around 1990.244 The essence of the Washington Consensus was
deregulation, along with a package of liberal economic, legal, and
political reforms that emphasized democracy through free elections.
These changes were to be accompanied by balanced budgets, a smaller
state sector, and privatization of the national economy. 245 Critics have
charged that the program was imposed without regard to individual
country and citizen needS24 6 and others have blamed it (probably
unfairly) for the Argentine financial collapse. 247
However, to the extent that the Washington Consensus stands for
healthy, democratic institutions, less (but not an absence of) regulation,
reduced corruption, and emphasis on internal reforms rather than
outside assistance, it seems very much alive, as the experience of both
Mexico and Chile confirms. 248 The Peruvian economist, Hernando de
Soto, postulated that poor countries could benefit from globalization
only if they reform their regulatory institutions, with the objective of
reducing or eliminating unnecessary barriers to entry for local
entrepreneurs. 249
The George W. Bush Administration created the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which provides financial aid only to
243. See Wise, supra note 239, at 305-10 (discussing Mexico's needs, inter alia, for tax
reform, investment in education and human capital, reform of labor markets and reform
of the tax system, including dependence on oil revenues); Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at
156-57 (discussing the continuing need for internal reforms in Mexico).
244. Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New Institutionalism:
What is the Future of Law and Development, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 539, 542
(2010).
245. Id.
246. John Williamson, Preface: A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 LAW
& Bus. REV. AM. 7, 12-13 (2009).
247. See id. at 13 (contending that the Argentine collapse was caused by a fixed,
chronically overvalued exchange rate and an excessive debt/GDP ratio).
248. Kelley, supra note 244, at 542; Marcos Aurelio Pereira Valadao, Legal and
Institutional Dimensions of Reform: Washington Consensus and Latin America
Integration: MERCOSUR and the Road to Regional Inconsistencies-to Where are We
Going Exactly?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 207, 209 (2009).
249. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 210-11, 227 (2000).
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lower middle income developing countries which bring about certain
internal reforms that are considered vital to sustainable economic
growth and development, including providing legal and financial
support for small and medium-sized businesses and strengthening and
improving government institutions. 2 5 0 Before a country is eligible the
candidate country's performance on various policy indicators is
examined, with those selected being based on policy performance. 251
Those countries that are chosen must "identify their priorities for
achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction." 252 The
MCC requires that individual country proposals be developed in
consultation with civil society and provide consultations with the
countries to help them develop and refine their programs. 253 As
Professor Thomas Kelly observed, funds are not made available by the
MCC until after the country "has demonstrated progress in institution-
building." 254
President Obama, in his first year in office, affirmed his support for
strong institutions rather than "strongmen," in a major speech in
Ghana. 255 As of December 2011, the program continues without major
changes under the Obama Administration. 2 5 6 The selected countries
include Honduras, whose secured financing legislation and registry
were supported by the MCC. 2 5 7
It is impossible to predict in this time of unacceptable budget
deficits whether the United States, the EU and other developed
countries will continue to provide existing levels of foreign assistance
and funding for the international development banks. However, it
seems likely that such assistance will be provided only under conditions
in which the donors believe it will be effective. Consequently,
developing nations which take the steps that are necessary in order to
create improved conditions for economic development, even if there is
less knee-jerk deregulation and more institution-building, are most
likely to prosper.
250. About MCC, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, http://www.mcc.gov/




254. Kelley, supra note 244, at 547.
255. Id. at 540.
256. Press Release: President Obama Requests $1.125 Billion for MCC to Continue
Innovative Approach to Development Assistance, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-021411-presidentoba
marequests.
257. About MCC, supra note 250.
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D. Model Laws: Secured Transactions
Another approach that falls within the gambit of national
legislation is the practice of drafting models laws for adoption by the
states participating in the multilateral organizations, such as the
United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
and the Committee on Private International Law at the Organization of
American States. By definition, such model laws are for the willing; no
members of the drafting organizations are ever required to adopt the
laws, although competitive pressures in neighboring countries, for the
foreign investment dollar, may make such reforms less "voluntary" than
would otherwise be the case. 2 5 8 Versions of the 2002 OAS model
secured transactions laW2 5 9 have been adopted in one form or another
in Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala. 260 Internal deliberations among
government officials, banks and potential borrowers are underway at
this writing in Colombia, Malawi, and Uganda. 261 The successor to the
UNCITRAL working group that was responsible for the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 262 is drafting a new secured
transactions law, one that is likely to have appeal well beyond Latin
America and which is expected to facilitate implementation of the
necessary reforms, facilitating the availability of secured credit for
small and medium-sized business in the developing world. 263
E. Unilateral Reduction of Agricultural Subsidies in the EU and
United States?
Historically, reduction of agricultural subsidies has been one of the
most difficult aspects of international trade negotiations. EU
reluctance to decrease agricultural subsidies almost derailed the
258. GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT AND THE HARMONISATION OF LAW: THE
UNCITRAL EXPERIENCE 177 (2011).
259. Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/cidip-vi-securedtransactions-eng.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
260. Secured Transactions, NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE,
http://natlaw.com/projects/securedtrans.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012); MCC is Increasing
Access to Credit Through a Movable Property Registry in Honduras, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORPORATION (Mar. 28, 2011), www.mcc.gov/.. /press/results-2011002055401-
hondurascredit.pdf.
261. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of 'Investment': ICSID's Travaux and the
Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 264-65, 292 (2010).
262. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.13 (2009)
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-and-
Recs.18-1-10.pdf.
263. This section is based on discussions with Boris Kozolchyk and Marek Dubovec
who have been working with various Latin American and African governments on secured
transactions legislation and the accompanying electronic registry systems since the mid-
1990s. Mr. Dubovec is a member of the UNCITRAL Working Group VI.
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Uruguay Round negotiations in 1992, but the impasse was ultimately
resolved through the "Blair House Accord." 26 4  As noted earlier,
opposition to further reductions in agricultural subsidies contributed
significantly to the demise of the Doha Round. Under such
circumstances it may be considered strange to suggest that either the
United States or the EU would consider reducing their agricultural
subsidies on a unilateral basis. Nevertheless, particularly when one is
considering the longer-term, this may be possible. The reason will
likely have little to do with international trade negotiations per se.
Rather, it will be a result of budgetary constraints and the increasing
importance of environmentally sound farming. The EC, which devoted
almost 44 percent of the EU budget to agricultural support in 2007,265
already has decided to freeze the budget in absolute numbers for seven
years beginning in 2012 at about 36 percent of the total. 2 6 6 The EU
agricultural commissioner noted in October 2011 that "[t]he next
decades will be crucial for laying the foundations of a strong agriculture
sector that can cope with climate change and international competition
while meeting the expectations of the citizen."2 6 7 Continuing financial
pressures on the EU as a result of fiscal crises in Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, and elsewhere may accelerate this trend, despite the
risk that reducing farm supports could further exacerbate economic
problems in some of the EU's more vulnerable economies. 268
The prognosis for reduced farm subsidies in the United States is
much less clear. Financial constraints in the coming years have
increased pressures to reduce agricultural subsidies, 269 either as part of
the ongoing super committee process or through continuing demands to
reduce the budget deficit, including but not limited to actions by a re-
elected or new President and Congress in 2013. However, the strength
of the farm lobby within Congress, and particularly within the United
States Senate, is such that substantial reductions, at least in the short
264. KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READINGS, CASES,
NOTES AND PROBLEMS 15 (2009).
265. European Comm'n Agriculture and Rural Dev., Fact Sheet: Managing the
Agricultural Budget Wisely (2007), 3, http://ec.europa.eulagriculture/fin/clearance/
factsheet-en.pdf.
266. EU farm budget frozen for next seven years and conditioned to 'greening,'
MERCOPRESS (July 1, 2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/07/01/eu-farm-budget-frozen-
for-next-seven-years-and-conditioned-to-greening.
267. Joe Kirwin, EC Proposes Radical Reforms to Agricultural Subsidy Program, 28
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698 (Oct. 20, 2011) (quoting Commissioner Dacian Ciolos).
268. Claire Schaffnit-Chatterjee, Risk Management in Agriculture: Towards Market
Solutions in the EU, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (2010), http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR INTERNETENPROD/PROD0000000000262553.PDF.
269. See Farm Bill Proposals Foresee Elimination or Cuts for Direct Payments, CCPs,
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to medium term, may be elusive. Still, the major United States
subsidies and other protective measures provided to the ethanol
industry, including a tariff of 54 cents per gallon, were allowed by the
United States Congress to expire at the end of 2011.270
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While multilateral trade negotiations may well be the most
economically sound route to the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers for agricultural and manufactured goods and increased market
access for services, among others, in the absence of the political will
among WTO Members to move forward, other options are likely to
become more popular. Most observers would agree that some trade
liberalization is better than no trade liberalization, or increased
protection. The vehicles for "some liberalization" include new or
expanded regional trade agreements, "plurilateral" accords among a
willing sub-group of the WTO memberships, and increased attention as
to how members can increase their own competitiveness and trade
through changes in national laws and policies. 271 None of these are
mutually exclusive. There are risks in all of these alternatives, but the
failure of Doha has given members who seek expanded trade and the
benefits accruing therefrom no other choice.
270. Felicia Sonmez, Lawmakers Call for Repeal of Ethanol Subsidies, WASHINGTON
POST (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/lawmakers-
call-for-repeal-of-ethanol-subsidies/2011/12/12/gIQAVq6KqO blog.html; Robert Pear,
After Three Decades, Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energy-environment/after-three-decades-
federal-tax-credit-for-ethanol-expires.html.
271. Kelley, supra note 244, at 541.
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TED BANKS* AND JOE MURPHY**
INTRODUCTION
It was not so long ago that the concept of international criminal law
was an idea with which lawyers struggled. In 1987, Ved Nanda and M.
Cherif Bassiouni put together what may have been the first one-volume
compendium of information on antitrust, securities, extradition, tax,
and other subjects that made up the developing area of international
criminal law. Today, it is well-accepted that there are certain
standards of behavior that are the norm in practically all nations, and
through national laws and multinational treaties, these principles are
entering the realm of customary international law.
Developments in the area of competition law, or antitrust as it is
known in some countries, have been particularly dramatic. Countries
understand that the encouragement of competition is a key to economic
development, and national laws have been enacted where they did not
exist before, along with enforcement cooperation agreements among
increasing numbers of countries.' Enforcement of criminal antitrust
laws takes place against both individuals and businesses,2 and while it
is clear that there are situations where business entities must be held
responsible for actions of their employees, there are other situations
where the intent of the corporation may be contrary to the actions of the
employee. Throughout the world, in competition law, as well as in other
areas of law, there is a consensus that it is appropriate for companies to
adopt compliance and ethics programs to utilize management
techniques to foster compliance with law. So, as standards of corporate
* Counsel, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Scharf; President, Compliance & Competition
Consultants, LLC; Editor, Corporate Legal Compliance Handbook (Wolters Kluwer, 2011)
** Director of Public Policy, Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics; author, 501
Ideas for Your Compliance and Ethics Program (SCCE; 2008).
1. See Antitrust Division Update, Spring 2011, International Program, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/international-program.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
2. In some jurisdictions, however, particularly those under civil law, corporations
are not subject to criminal law. See, e.g., Nora Gotzmann, Legal Personality of the
Corporation and International Criminal Law: Globalisation, Corporate Human Rights
Abuses and the Rome Statute, 1 QUEENSL. L. STUDENT REV. 37, 38 (2008), available at
http://www.law.uq.edu.aularticles/qlsr/Gotzmann-QLSR.pdf.
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conduct become more universal, they reflect adherence to what is
essentially an international law - the international law of competition.
At the same time, more national authorities recognize that companies
are expected to have compliance programs, and that a bona fide
compliance program reflects a corporate intent not to violate the law,
and therefore should be a positive factor in how authorities treat such
companies, including as a mitigating factor for any penalty that might
be imposed based on the ultra vires act by an employee.
It is well accepted that compliance and ethics programs are an
expected part of corporate activity, and while no program can always
guarantee human behavior, these programs do work to mitigate
violations of law. Indeed, it can be said that it is now a standard for
companies to have compliance programs or at least some elements of
such programs such as codes of conduct. We submit that this growing
recognition of the purpose of compliance and ethics programs has
reached broad-based acceptance and should now be recognized in the
competition law field by the United States and other governments as a
standard of international law.
THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY
Under many legal regimes, a corporation cannot be criminally
punished for the actions of its employees, and until relatively recently
(at least if you consider a century relatively recent), under the common
law, a corporation was viewed as a legal fiction, 3 which could not be
held liable for the criminal conduct of its employees. In the United
States, it was not until 1909, in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad v. United States,4 that the Supreme Court ruled that because
the great majority of business transactions were conducted by
corporations, it was time to abandon the "old and exploded doctrine"
that a corporation was not indictable. 5 The Court reasoned that, as a
matter of public policy, because a corporation could be held civilly
liable, criminal liability should also follow. 6
This concept of corporate liability has been extended to the point
where the business is often held liable for acts of employees even if the
3. "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience when it has no soul to be
damned and no body to be kicked?" SEC v. John Adams Trust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 573,
579 n.6 (D. Mass. 1988) (quoting Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806) in MERVYN A.
KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION (1977)).
4. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
5. Id. at 496.
6. Id. at 493-94.
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company was not aware of the violation,7 prohibited the conduct that
led to the violation,8 or there was no actual benefit to the corporation
through the acts of the employee.9 So even if none of the three
justifications for corporate liability are present, i.e., knowledge, benefit,
or authority, corporate liability for the acts of an employee - in addition
to the liability of the employee - may still be found. A number of
reasons have been given for this approach, but a consistent argument is
that this type of liability will have an in terrorem effect on the
corporation and force the entity to make certain that employees obey
the law.10 As a practical matter, it also reflects the reality that
employees working through a corporation, whether or not their actions
are authorized, can cause harm far beyond the abilities of one person.
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, it is appropriate that the
entity be punished criminally (and pay civil damages).
The usual rule in the United States and other common law
countries is that a corporation is liable for acts of agents and employees
acting within the scope of their employment and, in most cases, with
the intent to benefit the company." This approach derives from the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, which held that a master
is generally liable for the actions of servants, but may escape liability if
the servant acts outside the scope of employment (i.e., takes action for
7. A company may be held liable for acts of employees when the company was under
prior ownership. See, e.g., United States v. Alamo Bank of Texas, 880 F.2d 828, 830 (5th
Cir. 1989).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989). Under
the US Attorneys' Manual the prosecution may, in its discretion, choose not to bring an
action against a corporation based on evidence of due diligence to prevent wrongdoing (the
case of the "rogue employee"). One older case that appears to have allowed a corporation
to escape liability as a matter of law based on due diligence to prevent legal violations is
Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 5-6, 8 (6th Cir. 1946).
9. For example, a corporation may be held liable for sexual harassment under the
"hostile work environment" theory when it fails to take action to stop the inappropriate
behavior of employees. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998). However, if the
corporation was diligent in its efforts to prevent and stop such behavior, even if imperfect,
then it can avoid liability. The same reasoning, we posit, should apply to compliance
efforts in general.
10. For example, in Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.), the Supreme Court of
Canada found a nonprofit organization that took care of abused children liable for sexual
molestation committed by an employee, even though the agency had no knowledge of the
employee's record as a pedophile when he was hired, and the employee was immediately
discharged when his improper conduct became known. The court found that vicarious
liability was appropriate in order to provide compensation to injured parties and to
provide an incentive to employers to make sure that intentional misconduct would not
occur (deterrence of future harm). Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.).
11. United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
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which there is no actual or apparent authority). 12 The concept of
apparent authority, the authority that outsiders would normally
assume the agent to possess judging from his or her position in the
company and the circumstances surrounding previous instances of
conduct, is often the foundation for a finding of corporate liability. 13
Employees are assumed to be acting within the scope of their
employment14 if they are doing acts on the corporation's behalf in the
performance of their general line of work. 15  An agent must be
"performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and
those acts must be motivated - at least in part - by an intent to
benefit the corporation."16 It is not necessary that the acts actually
benefited the corporation, only that they were intended to do so.
The court decisions and statutes that led to these multiple bases for
finding enterprise liability grew up in an era where there was
recognition of the power of the "faceless" corporation and the need to
control its activities. Courts would impute knowledge or intent to the
corporation, even where there was no benefit to the enterprise by the
wrongful acts of the employee and the activities did not benefit the
corporation, although some courts are willing to consider whether the
violation was foreseeable.17  In other situations, liability might be
imputed to a corporate officer or director for failure to exert their
authority to ensure that the corporation (i.e., acting through employees)
did not do wrong.' 8
But it is also an inescapable fact of our human existence that
people are fallible, and that in some cases people will ignore
instructions and do things that they were expressly forbidden to do. By
holding a corporation liable for virtually anything that any employee
does, a situation of strict liability is created that may, in fact, be outside
the scope of many laws that require an intent to violate the law.
12. See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1993).
13. United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984).
14. Activities are deemed to be within the scope of employment when they are "so
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones,
of carrying out the objectives of the employment." Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd. v. Indep.
Ref. Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 502 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
15. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
16. United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
991 (1982).
17. City of Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir.
1992); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 964 F. Supp. 486, 490-91 (D.D.C.
1997).
18. See, e.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Notwithstanding the desire to control the power of the corporation,
there are limits to what it can do. The efforts of the corporation to
control the actions of employees are a valid consideration in
determining whether the corporation should be held liable for the
actions of an employee, as was noted in the instructions to the jury after
the trial of Arthur Andersen in connection with the Enron debacle:
If an agent was acting within the scope of his or her
employment, the fact that the agent's act was illegal, contrary
to the partnership's instructions, or against the partnership's
policies does not relieve the partnership of responsibility for the
agent's acts. A partnership may be held responsible for the acts
its agents performed within the scope of their employment even
though the agent's conduct may be contrary to the partnership's
actual instructions or contrary to the partnership's stated
policies. You may, however, consider the existence of Andersen's
policies and instructions, and the diligence of its efforts to
enforce any such policies and instructions, in determining
whether the firm's agents were acting within the scope of their
employment. 19
The key here is "diligence." Was a compliance program something
that existed only on paper, 20 or were there indicia of sincerity on the
part of the corporation that showed that it legitimately tried to enforce
its policy of compliance? The diligence of the corporation in enforcing
its policy should be a key factor in determining if it is the kind of
program that should entitle the corporation to some measure of
mitigation from legal penalties imposed as a result of the actions of an
employee that disobeyed the policy. 21
19. CORP. LEGAL COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1-6 n.13.1 (Theodore L. Banks & Frederick
Z. Banks eds., 2008) (quoting United States v. Arthur Andersen, Crim. No. H-02-121 (S.D.
Tex. June 5, 2002)) (emphasis added).
20. CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS 13 (1973) (In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 20399
(E.D. Pa. 1960), Judge Ganey stated, "[The antitrust policy] was observed in its breach
rather than in its enforcement. .. I am not naive enough to believe that General Electric
didn't know about [the conspiracy] and it didn't meet with their hearty approbation."
21. Barry J. Lipson, A Survey On the Ins and Outs of Antitrust Compliance, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 525-26 n.15 (jury instruction in United States v. Koppers Co., No. 79-
85 (D. Conn.) (June 12, 1980) ("One of the factors, among others, that you may consider in
determining the intent imputed to Koppers Company through its [managerial] agents or
employees is whether or not that corporation had an antitrust compliance policy. In this
regard, you are instructed that the mere existence of an antitrust compliance policy does
not automatically mean that a corporation did not have the necessary imputed intent. If,
however, you find that Koppers Company acted diligently in the promulgation,
dissemination, and enforcement of an antitrust compliance program in an active good
faith effort to ensure that the employees would abide by the law, you may take this fact
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Competition law imposes certain standards of behavior that are
accepted because of an understanding that society benefits from
competition. Therefore, in most cases, cartels are prohibited, as is
abuse of market power or dominance. There is a recognition in many
areas of law that transparency is beneficial, and thus bribes or secret
rebates are prohibited for their disruptive impact on competition, as
well as their inherent corruptness.
But how do these standards become accepted? It is not sufficient
only to implement national laws and multinational agreements.
Enforcement authorities recognize that there must also be private
action to enforce policies within corporations and to demonstrate that
noncompliance with law will not be tolerated. As will be discussed
below, there are benchmarks of what is an "effective" compliance and
ethics program that have received broad-based acceptance. Standards
of international competition law cannot have their desired impact
without international standards and efforts for compliance. Companies
need to be able to know that what they do to implement compliance
standards does matter so that they will make a diligent effort to
prevent cartel behavior from happening. If a company has taken
serious action to enforce its standards, such as by discharge of
employees who violate the law, 22 this level of corporate compliance,
which is expected by enforcement authorities, should be recognized
when deciding how to treat corporations, including charging and
penalty decisions.
So, there is a combination of factors at work here. Competition law
standards are virtually universal in their acceptance.23 To get those
standards to actually be implemented by corporations, there need to be
corporate compliance and ethics programs in place. Standards of
culpability recognize that factors such as intent, knowledge, and benefit
are relevant to findings of corporate liability. A number of countries do
specifically encourage compliance and ethics programs, including in the
antitrust area. 24  Therefore, this growing, worldwide acceptance,
into account in determining whether or not to impute an agent or employee's intent to the
Koppers Company.").
22. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the jury instruction, "A corporation may be responsible for the acts of its agents done or
made within the scope of its authority, even though the agent's conduct may be contrary
to the corporation's actual instruction or contrary to the corporation's stated policies does
not impose strict liability on the corporation, but instead means that a corporation "may
be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but
that the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining
whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation.").
23. See e.g., SCOTT H. JACOBS, OECD, REGULATORY REFORM IN MEXICO 59 (1999).
24. See infra. Some of the enforcement agencies provide videos to show the folly of
antitrust violations, and to aid in compliance training. See, e.g., NMaMovie, Leniency in
Cartel Cases, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5diFAaJdwel
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combined with universal necessity, has established an international law
not just for antitrust, but for antitrust compliance. The countries that
do not formally recognize the value of bona fide compliance programs as
relevant to corporate liability, perhaps seduced by the possibility of
collecting huge fines from a corporate piggy-bank, are out-of-step with
the reality of what is necessary to truly promote the principles of
competition law.
Perhaps one fundamental difficulty here is that no form of
organizational punishment seems to hit exactly the "right" target when
dealing with large corporations. Punishment of individual employees
alone does not seem fair, because the corporate entity goes unscathed.
Yet punishing the corporation for individual acts that it could not
control also seems unfair. Moreover, for large multinational
corporations, small fines appear meaningless, yet fines large enough to
have an impact cause unavoidable collateral damage to innocent parties
uninvolved in the wrongful acts. For publicly-traded corporations,
managers writing enormous checks for major violations seem merely to
be spending other people's money - the distant shareholders who may
largely constitute innocent, passive investors such as pensioners in any
event. It is a frustrating exercise, meting out punishment to
amorphous entities.
We believe the most effective place to focus attention is how best to
prevent violations within the organization. Preventing the massive
harm that a large corporation can cause is considerably more useful
than figuring out who to punish after the harm is done. The vehicle for
prevention in large organization is the compliance and ethics program.
A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS
Compliance and ethics programs are management systems to
prevent and detect misconduct, i.e., illegal and unethical conduct. The
genesis of these programs is probably in the antitrust field, beginning
with the electrical equipment conspiracies in the 1950s and 60s. 25 The
field grew as other risk areas developed similar needs for internal
corporate efforts, including such areas as environmental compliance,
workplace safety, employment discrimination, and foreign corrupt
payments. However, until 1991 the focus was almost always on
compliance confined to specific risk areas.
(Netherlands); Konkurrensverket, Be the First to Tell - A Film About Leniency (trailer),
YouTUBE (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OE8WmibbaSs&feature=
related (Sweden); European Commission Audiovisual Services, Benefits of Competition
Policy for Consumers (Oct. 20, 2009), http://ec.europa.eulavservices/videolvideoplayer.cfm?
ref-1063248& sitelang=en (EU).
25. See e.g., BANE, supra note 20.
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In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission issued
sentencing guidelines for federal judges to use in criminal cases
involving organizations. 26 While the guidelines imposed tough terms
that resulted in substantial increases in penalties imposed, they also
recognized effective compliance and ethics programs as a significant
mitigation factor. As part of this formula, the Guidelines set out a
standard for such programs based on seven elements. 27  These
standards used an approach aptly described as "structured flexibility," 2 8
setting minimum standards but giving organizations flexibility in the
details of their programs. If a company had such a program and met
certain other conditions, it was to be given a substantial reduction in its
fine.
In 2009, the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation, through its Working Group on Bribery, issued the first
international standard for compliance and ethics programs. 29 In a
document called the Good Practice Guidance, the Working Group
enumerated twelve elements for an anti-bribery program. 30 These
elements, substantially similar to the seven elements in the Sentencing
Guidelines, set out a framework that, for the most part, could be easily
adapted to any type of compliance and ethics program. That the
Sentencing Guidelines and the Good Practice Guidance would be very
similar was a predictable result for a fundamental reason. Compliance
and ethics programs are not some bureaucratic formulation or a
mysterious concoction; rather, they are the application of basic
management principles to accomplish a defined task: prevention and
detection of misconduct. The fact that compliance programs operate
within the organization and form part of the organization's fabric
explain why their ability to prevent harm is so much greater than the
government's. Working within the organization provides the access
necessary to be effective and to interdict misconduct before it comes to
complete fruition. 31
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (1991).
27. Id. § 8A1.2(k).
28. Winthrop M. Swenson & Nolan E. Clark, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Three Keys to Understanding the Credit for Compliance Programs, 1 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 3
(1991).
29. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf.
30. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance
(adopted Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf.
31. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975) (limitations of external forces in reaching
within the corporate entity).
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RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS PROGRAMS
The Sentencing Guidelines model, setting a standard for an
effective program and then providing incentives to companies to adopt
such programs, has developed as a global model. Since 1991,
government agencies in the United States and around the world have
recognized the essential role of compliance and ethics programs, and
government's role in promoting these programs. In the United States,
for example, the U.S. Attorney's Manual advises federal prosecutors to
take into account the existence of an effective program in deciding how
and whether to proceed in prosecuting a company (with the exception
only of antitrust violations). 32 The Department of Justice's Criminal
Division, in settling cases such as Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
prosecutions, has followed the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (and more
recently the OECD Good Practice Guidance) standards in requiring
companies to implement strong programs as part of these settlements. 33
Regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, have held public hearings on the issue of the agency's role
vis-A-vis such programs and issued guidance to industry.3 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in dealing with employment discrimination and
harassment, has recognized the role of compliance programs in
preventing such socially undesirable conduct; in the case of certain
forms of harassment the existence of a compliance program can form
part of the defense,35 and for any form of employment discrimination
compliance efforts can be a defense to punitive damages. 36
Globally, governments concerned with protecting privacy have
followed the compliance program model, calling on companies to have a
designated privacy officer or "data controller" to ensure compliance with
privacy laws. 3 7 Some legal systems have provided that compliance
efforts can serve as a defense, either to corporate liability38 or to
32. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CH. 9-28.800 CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room
/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
33. See e.g., Department's Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CR-367-RJL (D.D.C. 2008).
34. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, 125 FERC 1 61,058, POLICY STATEMENT ON
COMPLIANCE (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.balch.com/files/upload/FERC-
PolicyStmt_onCompOct_16_08.pdf.
35. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, supra note 9; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764-765 (1998) (adopting the same holding as Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton).
36. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546-47 (1999).
37. OECD, PRIVACY ONLINE: OECD GUIDANCE ON POLICY AND PRACTICE, 231-32
(2003).
38. See Bribery Act (Act. No. 23/2010) (U.K.); Ministry of Justice, Consultation on
Guidance About Commercial Organisations Preventing Bribery (Section 9 of the Bribery
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liability for directors under a due diligence defense. Compliance
programs may be specifically acknowledged as factors in reducing
penalties for violations, as the Singapore Competition Commission has
done. 39
Why has this trend developed? The recognition of the importance
of compliance programs addresses a fundamental reality about
organizations; no matter how fond lawyers may be of the legal fiction
that a corporation is a "person," like all fiction it should not be confused
with reality. Corporations are not simply large individuals; they are
complicated collections of individuals, departments, cultures,
motivations, and all the other elements that constitute a society. No
company, and no society in the history of mankind, has been able to
control the conduct of all its members in all their actions. Simply
punishing an organization because one or more of its members does
something wrong makes sense only if it serves to prevent misconduct.
But how does an organization act to prevent misconduct? There is only
one method, and that is the use of management tools to prevent and
detect misconduct, i.e., a compliance and ethics program. If a company
has not made the effort to prevent violations, then punishment serves a
very important and useful social function - driving management to take
the necessary steps. But if a company uses true diligence to prevent
misconduct, then punishment serves no deterrent function, and
becomes only an amoral revenue raising exercise.
THE "ANTITRUST DIVISION"
Logic, experience, and public policy strongly favor development of
effective organizational compliance and ethics programs. However,
there has emerged in the enforcement community a sharp division in
approach. In the U.S. Department of Justice, the Criminal Division,
with responsibility for a broad range of offenses such as fraud and
FCPA violations, is vocal about the importance of such programs, and
specifically cites them as a factor in its enforcement decisions. 40 It also
exacts from violators a requirement that they reform their conduct by
adopting rigorous programs. Even companies that voluntarily disclose
Act 2010), CP 11/10 (Nov. 8, 2010) (U.K.) http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/
bribery-act-guidance-consultation1.pdf. Credit for compliance is also given in Italy. See
e.g., Francesca Chirara Bevilacqua, Corporate Compliance Programs Under Italian Law,
ETHIKOS AND CORP. CONDUCT Q. (Nov./Dec. 2006), http://www.ethikospublication.com/
html/italy.html.
39. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, CCS GUIDELINES ON THE APPROPRIATE
AMOUNT OF PENALTY 1 2.13 (June 2007), available at http://app.ccs.gov.sg/cms/
user documents/main/pdf/CCSGuidelinePenalty_20071033.pdf.
40. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CH. 9-28.800 CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/
usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
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violations must take this step. Similarly, the Department's
Environmental and Natural Resources Division has addressed
compliance and ethics programs as a key factor in prosecutorial
decisions since 1991.41 But the Department's Antitrust Division, in its
enforcement actions against cartel conduct, has created a split in
approaches, taking the position that it will not consider programs.
Moreover, unlike the Criminal Division, even admitted criminal
violators who are accepted into the Antitrust Division's leniency
program, need do absolutely nothing regarding institution of a
program. 42
In fact, in contrast to the approach of the Sentencing Commission,
the Supreme Court in the context of employment discrimination, and
the Criminal and Environmental Divisions in the same Justice
Department, the Antitrust Division dismisses as "failed programs" any
program, no matter how diligent, if it fails to prevent or be the first in
an industry to detect a violation. 43 As one Division spokesperson has
said, "We will not reward a company for a failed compliance program
that neither prevented nor detected the wrongdoing." 44 This split has
been cursorily "explained" as existing because antitrust "goes to the
heart of the business."45 Nothing further is offered to justify this, or
explain why a price-fixing conspiracy in a small subsidiary in Biloxi
goes more to the core of a business while a securities fraud from
headquarters or a bribe paid to a another country's prime minister is
somehow peripheral.
Remarkably, in the global context, this division in approaches has
been exacerbated by the EU Commission, adopting in almost the same
words the position of this one Justice Department Division. 46 On the
41. ENV'T & NATURAL RES. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR (July 1,
1991) http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM 1-2 (Aug. 10, 1993),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.
43. Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Speech at the U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n Nat'l Symposium: Corporate Crime in America (Sept. 18, 1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0456.htm.
44. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Agency Update with the Antitrust Division DAAGs, Speech at
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Mtg. (Mar. 30, 2011).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, Ch. 9-28.400, 9-
28.800 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm ("In addition, the nature of
some crimes, e.g., antitrust violations, may be such that national law enforcement policies
mandate prosecutions of corporations notwithstanding the existence of a compliance
program."). No illustrative examples are provided.
46. Press Release, Speech by Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, Eur. Comm'n for
Competition Policy, Compliance and Competition Policy (Oct. 25, 2010), available at
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other hand both the Antitrust Division and the EU, as well as more
than 50 jurisdictions worldwide, have so-called leniency programs. 47
Under these arrangements, the first company involved in a cartel to
report the violation gets a complete pass from any form of
punishment. 48 Those entering such a leniency program need not have a
program at the time of the violation, nor need they even consider one
going forward. In other words, violators who have not even made a
small effort to prevent violations are richly rewarded; companies that
do try even with extraordinary diligence, however, are punished no
matter how hard they tried. In short, while others in the global
enforcement and regulatory world go to substantial efforts to promote
and recognize compliance and ethics programs, those on the other side
of this "antitrust division" offer companies with even the most diligent
programs no credit when investigating, no credit in the decision to
prosecute, and no credit regarding penalties. Those who win the race to
the prosecutor to report cartel violations face no penalties and are not
required to have the inconvenience of taking at least some compliance
program steps despite admitting to the most destructive types of
competition law violations.
This "antitrust division" exists not only between the Antitrust
Division and EU on the one hand, and enforcement authorities in other
areas of the law, but it also exists within the antitrust enforcement
community itself. While the Antitrust Division and EU scoff at so-
called "failed programs," and do nothing to recognize programs at any
stage of enforcement, other competition law enforcement agencies have
recognized the importance of such programs in a variety of ways. The
importance of compliance programs, in some instances as part of case
settlements, has been recognized in Canada, 49 Norway,50 the UK,51
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/586&format=PDF&
aged=1&anguage=EN&guLanguage=en.
47. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar
Crime: The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf.
48. Id.
49. COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 15 (Sept.
2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Corporate
CompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf/$FILE/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010-
e.pdf.
50. KONKURRANSETILSYNET (NORWEGIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITY), REGULATION ON
THE CALCULATION OF AND LENIENCY FROM ADMINISTRATIVE FINES 3 (Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/Regulation-on-the-calcula
tion-of-and-leniency-from -administrative-fines-.
51. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), How YOUR BUSINESS CAN ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE:
A GUIDE TO ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH COMPETITION LAW: GUIDANCE 6, 1.6 (June
2011), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/ca-and-cartels/competition-awareness
-compliance/oftl341.pdf.
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Singapore, 52 Australia,53 South Africa,54 France,55 Israel,56 India,57 and
by the FTC.58
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS PROMOTE GLOBAL POLICY
OBJECTIVES
Compliance and ethics programs have been found to be key tools in
promoting important public policy objectives. There is no more effective
way to control the conduct of large organizations. They have been
promoted as instruments to achieve important policy objectives
regarding prevention of corruption, fraud, pollution, invasion of privacy,
healthcare fraud, and many other forms of organizational misconduct.
There is no valid policy reason why prevention of cartels should be
treated as a less important policy objective. If policy makers believe
that cartels are serious offenses against the public then they should be
using and recognizing this essential tool to prevent and control them.
Effective compliance and ethics programs historically have not
simply emerged from industry unguided by government. It has
consistently been active government support and promotion that has
made the difference. But those in industry are astute on this point -
government actions and commitment matter and empty rhetoric is
routinely ignored by those in the private sector. If competition law
enforcers do nothing but give speeches and write articles, but offer no
value for such programs, then those in industry are smart enough to
52. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, supra note 39, T 2.13.
53. AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM'N, CORPORATE TRADE
PRACTICES COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS III (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.
acec.gov.aucontent/item.phtml?itemId=717078&nodeld=0de4caOa69fe9ddeO37bf8l391b2c
dab&fn=Corporate%20trade%20practices%20compliance%20programs.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Competition Comm'n v. Pioneer Foods Ltd. 2007 15/CR/FebO7, 33 (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.zalassets/Uploads/Case-Documents/15CR
Feb07%20Pioneer.pdf.
55. COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF FRANCE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 36, available at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/synthese2008-uk.pdf. "The Autorit6 already
encourages compliance programs thanks to commitments that can be made, in the course
of a settlement package. It wishes to speed up the process by taking a more proactive
approach, outside the litigation context. Beneficial to a competitive economy, this
preventive compliance may be an element structuring the company's strategy. The cost of
a program should be viewed against the investment in terms of legal security, image, and
ultimately, trust on the part of clients and consumers."
56. ISRAEL ANTITRUST AUTHORITY, MODEL INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 7 (Nov.
1998), available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il/FilesHPLinks/Internal%/2OCompliance.pdf.
57. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, COMPETITION COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME FOR
ENTERPRISES 26 (June 2008), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/medial
Advocacy/compcompliance-pro.pdf'phpMyAdmin=NMPFRahGKYeum5F74Ppstn7Rfoo.
58. Joseph E. Murphy, An FTC View of Compliance Programs: Good Faith Efforts
Can Mean No Penalties, 4 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 53 (1996).
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focus on actions, not mere words. Corporate resources will not be
directed to activities that bear no fruit.
Moreover, only the government can ensure that corporate programs
are themselves marked by actions and not mere rhetoric. Effective
programs call for tough levels of commitment within companies. When
government makes it clear that effective programs matter and will
result in favorable treatment, then and only then does the government
have the leverage necessary to get industry's attention and cause
companies to upgrade their efforts to be truly effective. On the other
side of the antitrust division, however, both the EU and the DOJ
Antitrust Division have needlessly forfeited their leverage by only
paying lip service to programs.
What is it that makes a company's competition law compliance and
ethics program effective? What is it that governments need to promote
in companies? Full coverage of this topic is beyond the scope of this
article. In fact, both authors of this paper have written entire treatises
on this topic. But here in a nutshell are the types of steps needed to
make a program actually work, and also the types of steps that may be
missing in antitrust programs, at least in jurisdictions on the wrong
side of the antitrust division:
Audits and monitoring. Programs need to be more than talk.
There need to be efforts to actually find out what employees are doing,
and whether they are violating the rules.
An empowered, senior officer-level chief ethics and compliance
officer with sufficient autonomy, empowerment, and resources. If there
is not a strong compliance and ethics officer at the top, the program
may be nothing more than a corporate decoration.
Effective communications. All those acting for the company need to
know the antitrust laws and be convinced to follow them. Boring
lectures by lawyers do not work; effective adult learning techniques do.
Effective communications requires targeting a message to the right
employees, and putting it into a form that will be relevant to the
employees. The shotgun approach is usually not very effective.
Incentives and discipline. Those who break the rules and ignore
the compliance and ethics program need to be held accountable. Those
who manage and supervise them need to be held equally accountable.
The incentive system needs to promote ethical and compliance conduct.
Other management tools. There are many other management tools
needed in a program. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Canadian
Competition Bureau's Guidance bulletin59 show the way. Similarly, the
OECD Working Group on Bribery's twelve step Good Practice Guidance
59. COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, supra note 49.
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provides effective guidance, allowing for only a few differences related
to corruption versus treatment of cartels.
BRIDGING THE "ANTITRUST DIVISION"
How can we move beyond the artificial and dysfunctional division
originated by this one enclave of enforcers in the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division? How can antitrust enforcement
authorities around the world harness the force of compliance and ethics
programs to more effectively prevent cartels? The change would not be
difficult, and there are more than enough good models around the
world.
Enforcement authorities that recognize the importance of
compliance and ethics programs do this through several vehicles. In
the U.S. Department of Justice, outside of the Antitrust Division,
prosecutors take programs into account in making decisions about how
to proceed against companies. Violations deemed less serious, or
mitigated by an existing compliance program, may be pursued with a
civil, rather than a criminal, remedy. In jurisdictions where enforcers
have discretion in how to proceed, they can readily take into account
the diligence of a company's compliance and ethics program.
Another useful tool is the consideration of programs in penalty
decisions. Here the Competition Commission of Singapore provides a
useful model. The Commission spells out key factors it considers in
programs:
2.13 In considering how much mitigating value to be
accorded to the existence of any compliance programme, the
CCS will consider:
* whether there are appropriate compliance policies and
procedures in place;
* whether the programme has been actively implemented;
* whether it has the support of, and is observed by, senior
management;
* whether there is active and ongoing training for employees
at all levels who may be involved in activities that are
touched by competition law; and
* whether the programme is evaluated and reviewed at
regular intervals.60
While there is no specific number provided regarding the weight
given to programs, the important point is that this provision sends the
message that real programs count. In the UK, the OFT has said it will
give up to 10 percent reductions on penalties for effective programs. 61
60. COMPETITION COMM'N OF SINGAPORE, supra note 39.
61. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), supra note 51, at 32, 7.4.
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This self-imposed, artificial limit, which only serves as a
counterproductive restraint on the government's own freedom, is
perhaps understandable given the existence of the environment set by
the EU and the U.S. Antitrust Division.
Enforcement authorities can also require that those who admit
misconduct and enter into agreed-upon arrangements with authorities
must institute effective programs. Unfortunately, in those cases where
the Antitrust Division does this - never for leniency applicants - the
programs have been formalistic measures readily dismissed by
corporate employees as legalistic exercises. None of the experience
developed in the past 20 years appears to have seeped into the
Division's decrees. Most remarkable is that those offenders admitted
into the leniency programs need do nothing at all.
The more justifiable approach, from a policy perspective, is to
require all those entering into consent decrees and especially those
coming into the leniency program, to adopt high-potency programs.
Governments should recognize that the mere act of being first to
disclose a violation does not merit praise and a complete pass from any
responsible action. Companies that commit violations should be
expected to take serious steps to prevent recurrence. In this respect,
someone must be right and someone must be wrong in their approach.
Either the Criminal Division or the Antitrust Division is using an
effective approach. The policy factors behind effective compliance and
ethics programs strongly support the Criminal Division's perspective,
and raise unanswerable questions about the Antitrust Division's
unlimited rewarding of those in the leniency program.
Finally, it is time to end the dysfunctional antitrust division and
bring cartel prevention efforts into line with enforcement of other
important policy objectives. The hostile tone of the Antitrust Division
and the EU, which likely has served to sharply undercut preventive
corporate efforts in competition law compliance, needs to be
reconsidered. Government needs to speak with one voice to promote
effective corporate compliance and ethics efforts. Government, industry,
and the public can only benefit from enhanced corporate efforts to
prevent and detect misconduct, including the scourge of cartels. If the
governments of the world expect to treat competition law as a basic
tenet of international law, governing, as it does, the conduct of local and
multinational corporations, then they must also recognize the need to
accord competition law compliance programs their proper role in
determining enforcement priorities and penalties.
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BEYOND THE DOHA ROUND: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT
FACILITATION IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
YONG-SHIK LEE, PH.D (CANTAB.)*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
aims to advance the development interests of developing countries in
the world trading system,' has not been completed for over a decade
due to the critical differences among the Member States (Members).
While international trade is essentially important for the economic
development of developing countries and the rules for international
trade have significant impacts on developing countries with respect to
their ability to adopt development policies, 2 the current WTO system
does not adequately address the development concerns of developing
countries and the rules fail to facilitate economic development. The
Doha Round was launched with an objective of meeting the
development interests of developing countries, but its progress has been
sluggish, reflecting large gaps in positions on development issues
between developed and developing countries. 3
Even if the current Doha Round is concluded successfully, with its
negotiation agendas and objectiveS4 met in the final negotiations, it
would not be sufficient to fill the regulatory gap in the current WTO
system for development facilitation through international trade, nor
does it address the fundamental problem and imbalance in the current
* Prof. Y.S. Lee is Director and Professorial Fellow of the Law and Development Institute
and the Editor-in-Chief of the Law and Development Review. Professor Lee is the author
of "Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System" (Cambridge University Press,
2006, reprint 2009), "Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis" (Kluwer
Law International, 2003, 2005, 2007), and a co-author and the head editor of "Law and
Development Perspective on International Trade Law" (Cambridge University Press,
2011). Correspondences to the author: (e-mail) wtogeneva@hotmail.com.
1. The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda
e/ddae.htm (last visited Dec. 3 2011). The Doha Round agendas and the main areas of
negotiation include agriculture, non-agriculture market access (NAMA), services,
intellectual property, trade and development, and trade facilitation.
2. YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 4
(2006).
3. Id. at 10.
4. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 1.
384
BEYOND THE DOHA ROUND
organizational structure of the WTO. The negotiation agendas and
mandates of the Doha Round are not sufficient to achieve the reform
that would correct the current problem in the regulatory framework
and in the institutional apparatus of the WTO. The reform will have to
be considered and discussed in a subsequent round.
This paper, based on the author's previous works,5 provides a brief
account of the "development deficit" in the regulatory framework of the
WTO and its organizational apparatus and of the reform proposal to
meet the development needs of developing countries, as mandated by
the WTO Agreement itself.6 , The next section discusses the issues with
the current regulatory framework with a proposal for a set of
development-facilitation provisions, named the Agreement on
Development Facilitation (ADF).7 Section III provides a discussion of
the "development deficit" in the current WTO structure and proposes
organizational reform. Section IV draws conclusions.
5. See generally Yong-Shik Lee, Development and the World Trade Organization:
Proposal for the Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and
Development in the WTO, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 291-319
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009), available at http://www.law.umn.
eduluploads/nI/ON/nlONhzUtTbUj28QsfHdgbw/wto-Lee.pdf; YONG-SHIK LEE, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE 3-32; THE
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT INST., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 105-29 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. eds., 2011); LEE, supra note 2; Yong-Shik Lee,
Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Revisited): Proposals for reform of
WTO Governance, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT 301-
27 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011); Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the
World Trade Organization: A Proposal for the Council for Trade and Development and the
Agreement on Development Facilitation (ADF), 6 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. AND TRADE L. 177
(2006); Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the World Trading System: A Proposal
for Development Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy, 38 J. WORLD
TRADE 935 (2004), available at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=
TRAD2004039&type=toc&num=3&.
6. The Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO Agreement") provides in relevant part, "[r]ecognizing further that there is a need
for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth of international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development. . . ." Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter
Marrakesh Agreement]. The agenda of the current Doha Round ("Doha Development
Agenda" or "DDA") also aims to facilitate economic development of developing countries
through international trade. See supra note 1.
7. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of the regulatory and
organizational gap in the WTO and the points of the proposed reform; thus, those who
seek a more extensive discussion should refer to the author's other work, such as
RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2.
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II. REGULATORY REFORM
A. Current Regulatory Imbalance
The current rules of international trade represented by WTO
disciplines apply to 195 Members of the WTO, thus constituting the
global regulatory regime of international trade.8 Various agreements
and understandings (WTO agreements) concluded in the Uruguay
Round (1986-1994) were added to the rules of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been implemented since 1947
and still remain as the core principles of the international trade law.9
The subsequent WTO agreements reinforce the GATT rules, where
applicable, by providing detailed procedures, provisions, and
implementation mechanisms.
While most of key GATT provisions have been elaborated by more
detailed WTO agreements with implementation mechanisms,10 none of
the GATT's development-facilitation provisions, such as Article XVIII
and Part IV provisions (Articles XXXVI ~ XXXVIII), has been reinforced
by any WTO agreement. Some of the GATT principles, such as
maximum tariff bindings in Article II, restrain the ability of developing
countries to adopt trade-related development policies. The development-
facilitation provisions in the GATT, such as Article XVIII, address this
issue by enabling developing countries to adopt tariff measures beyond
their previous commitments under Article II for development
purposes."
8. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. XIV. Compliance with the WTO legal
disciplines is mandatory for all Members: Members are required to bring their own laws
and practices in compliance with the rules of WTO legal disciplines.
9. See WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/englis/docs-e/
legal-ellegal e.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2011), for the GATTIWTO rules including
Uruguay Round agreements, understandings, and GATT provisions.
10. For instance, GATT Article XIX on Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products has been developed into the Agreement on Safeguards. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 1867 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S 154. GATT Article VI on Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duties has been developed into two separate Agreements:
one on anti-dumping (ADP Agreement) and the other on subsidies and countervailing
measures (SCM Agreement). GATT art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 1867 U.N.T.S.
194; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex lA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADP Agreement]; Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter
SCM Agreement]. For the text of the GATT provisions and agreements, see WTO Legal
Texts, supra note 9.
11. GATT, supra note 10, art. XVIII, para. 2.
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Nonetheless, certain requirements under the GATT's development-
facilitation provisions, including those in Article XVIII and Articles
XXXVI XXXVIII,12 cause difficulties for developing countries to adopt
those measures. Article XVIII allows developing countries, whose
economies only support low standards of living and are in the early
stages of development,' 3 to adopt tariff measures beyond the maximum
tariff bindings to which they are committed under Article II in order to
promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to
raising the general standard of living of its people.14 However,
developing countries are also required to engage in negotiation with the
interested Members and compensation may well be required as a result
of any modification.15 Those negotiations can be lengthy, which may not
allow developing countries to adopt the necessary measures in time, or
may never be concluded successfully with the interested parties.
Developing countries with limited economic resources may not be able
to offer compensation required by the other parties. Article XVIII
allows developing countries to adopt the measure even if negotiation
should not be successful, provided that they offer compensatory
measure at the time of applying the measure, 16 but it is subject to
retaliatory measures by the other interested Members should the WTO
consider the compensation inadequate.' 7
Another set of major development-facilitation provisions of the
GATT, Articles XXXVI XXXVIII,18 lays out an impressive array of
preferential treatments in favor of developing countries. Article XXXVI
addresses the vital role of export earnings in economic development, the
possible authorization of special measures to promote trade and
development, and the need for more favorable and acceptable conditions
of access to world markets for primary products (on which many
developing countries depend).' 9 Article XXXVII elaborates the
commitment of developed country Members' to assist developing
countries with economic development. These commitments include
according high priority to the reduction and elimination of import
barriers to products of particular export interest to developing
Members, refraining from introducing or increasing import barriers to
such products, and according high priority to the reduction and
elimination of policies specifically applicable to primary products wholly
12. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 9, for the text of Article XVIII and Articles
XXXVI-XXXVIII.
13. GATT, supra note 10, art. XVIII, para. 4(a).
14. Id. art. XVIII, para. 7(a).
15. Id.
16. Id. art. XVIII, para. 7(b).
17. Id.
18. WTO Legal Texts, supra note 9.
19. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXXVI, paras. 1-4.
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or mainly produced in developing countries, which hamper the growth
of consumption of those products. 20 Article XXXVIII calls for joint
action and institutional effort by the WTO to assist developing
countries. 21 These provisions, however, are declaratory rather than
obligatory for absence of sanction in the case of violation of those duties.
Article XXXVII also allows developed countries to avoid any of those
obligations by legislating against them. 2 2
Subsequent WTO agreements, while reinforcing other key GATT
provisions, 23 do not address the implementation and enforcement
problems of the development-facilitation provisions in the GATT,
including those of Article XVIII and Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII, leaving
regulatory vacuum in this area. The mainstream neo-classical
economic stance does not support state-led development policies, such
as infant industry promotion policies embodied in Article XVIII,24 but
the policy decision has already been made to allow developing countries
this option when the Article was adopted by the GATT. Thus it would
be only fair and adequate that those development-facilitation provisions
are reinforced by subsequent agreements with detailed implementation
provisions and enforcement mechanisms. The current WTO rules offer
special and differential (S&D) treatment in favor of developing
countries.25 However, it is insufficient for the S&D provisions, which
are scattered throughout WTO agreements, are either temporary or
limited in coverage and extent. 26 The remainder of this section makes
brief proposals for regulatory revisions to amend this development
deficit in WTO legal disciplines. 27
B. Reform Proposal
The development deficit in the regulatory system can be cured by
elaborating and reinforcing the development-facilitation provisions in
the form of a separate WTO agreement, as has been done with other
GATT provisions.28 This agreement can be named, "The Agreement on
20. Id. art. XXXVII, para. 1.
21. Id. art. XXXVIII, para. 2.
22. Id. art. XXXVII, para. 1.
23. See supra note 10.
24. LEE, supra note 2, at 62.
25. 145 S&D provisions are scattered throughout several WTO agreements,
understandings, and GATT articles. Twenty-two are applied exclusively to LDCs. For a
review of the special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions in the WTO, see Note by
Secretariat, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTDIW/77 (Oct. 25, 2000).
26. See LEE, supra note 2, at 40-41, for a detailed account of the limits of the S&D
provisions.
27. See id. ch. 2-6, for more detailed accounts of the proposals.
28. See supra note 10.
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Development Facilitation (ADF)."29 The Agreement may include rules
for new, permanent S&D treatment in the areas that have critical
implications for development such as tariff bindings, subsidies, anti-
dumping, trade-related intellectual property rights, and trade-related
investment measures. 30 The ADF can also provide a coherent
regulatory standard for determination of developing countries to benefit
from regulatory preferences. 31 A separate agreement will function as
exceptional rules to the other WTO agreements and its advantage is to
advance development interests without potentially complex revisions to
the existing agreements.
The maximum tariff binding under GATT Article 1132 has
important ramifications for development. Article II prohibits Members
from raising tariff rates beyond the maximum bindings that they have
agreed in the previous trade round.33 While the requirement provides
essential stability for international trading system, it also restrains the
ability of developing countries to adopt tariff measures beyond the
maximum bindings to promote domestic industries for development
purposes. As mentioned, the GATT has adopted the policy to allow this
measure by the provisions of Article XVIII, but the negotiation and
compensation requirement causes a considerable difficulty for
developing countries. 3 4
Development-Facilitation Tariff (DFT) has been proposed to
address this issue. 35 The DFT scheme enables developing countries to
set the maximum additional tariff rate beyond the tariff binding under
Article 11.36 It assigns a different maximum DFT rate to an individual
developing country on a sliding scale, to be determined in accordance
with its level of economic development measured by relevant economic
indicators such as per-capita gross national income (GNI) figures. 37
29. LEE, supra note 2, at 47.
30. Id. at 47-48.
31. Id. Under the current system, developing country status is self-declaratory and
the absence of a definition for developing country Members seems to create regulatory
ambiguity. See also Fan Cui, Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, 1 L. AND
DEV. REV. 123 (2008).
32. GATT, supra note 10, art. II.
33. Id.
34. See discussion supra Part II.A.
35. LEE, supra note 2, at 66.
36. Id. at 68-70.
37. Id at 68-69. For instance, suppose that the maximum DFT rate is set at 100
percent over the tariff binding and the economic threshold for an eligible developing
country to benefit from a DFT is 15,000 USD per capita GNI. Then any country that has a
higher per-capita income than 15,000 USD will not be eligible for a DFT. Country A with
the per capita GNI of 3,000 USD, which is 20 percent of the threshold income, will be
allowed to apply a DFT of 80 percent (100% x (100% 20%) = 80%). Country B with the
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While negotiation and compensation requirements are not imposed on
developing countries, 38 a series of procedural requirements, such as a
report setting forth rationale for the proposed increase in tariffs, public
hearing, notice, and gradual liberalization and elimination of the DFT
after a set period of time, should reduce the possibility of an abuse. 39
A similar treatment can be considered for subsidies. Government
subsidies are important development tools for developing countries, 40
and the WTO recognizes their importance for economic development. 41
Yet, some of the key trade-related subsidies, such as export subsidies
and import-substitution subsidies, are prohibited by the current WTO
rules. 42 The other kinds of subsidies that affect the trade of other
Members adversely are also "actionable": i.e. subject to trade sanctions
including countervailing measures. 43  As Dani Rodrik has aptly
described, the current trade rules have made "a significant dent in the
ability of developing countries to employ intelligently-designed industrial
policies." 44
Historically, subsidies have played an important role in the
economic development of today's developed countries, 45 and developing
countries should be able to adopt trade-related subsidies without the
fear of retaliatory measures from developed countries. 46 The concept of
the sliding scale, which is used for the DFT, can be applied to subsidies
otherwise prohibited or actionable under the current WTO rule. 4 7
per capita GNI of 12,000 USD, which is 80 percent of the threshold income, will be
allowed to apply a DFT of 20 percent (100% x (100% - 80%) = 20%. Id. at 69.
38. See discussion supra Part II.A. Those requirements are present for the
application of Article XVIII measures.
39. LEE, supra note 2, at 66-67. The Agreement on Safeguards also includes those
procedural requirements. See Agreement on Safeguards supra note 10, arts. 3, 7, 12.
40. LEE, supra note 2, at 52-54.
41. SCM Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27, para. 1.
42. Id. art. 3.
43. Id. arts. 5-7.
44. Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century 34-35 (Sept. 2004)
(unpublished paper prepared for the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization) (on file with Harvard University), available at http://www.hks.harvard
.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/UNIDOSep.pdf.
45. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19-51 (2002). For instance, the United Kingdom provided
extensive export subsidies to textile products in the eighteenth century, id. at 21-22, the
United States offered subsidies to railway companies in the nineteenth century and
invested heavily in research and development of new technologies, id. at 30-31, and
Germany also subsidized a number of industries, including textiles and metals, id. at 33-
34. Other developed countries today, including France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan,
and the East Asian countries (NICs) all provided subsidies to promote their industries, id.
at 35-51.
46. LEE, supra note 2, at 79.
47. See supra notes 42-43.
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"Development-facilitation subsidy" or "DFS" can be considered in favor
of developing countries under certain income thresholds. Under this
scheme, developing countries are allowed to adopt otherwise prohibited
or actionable subsidies in accordance with their per-capita income
status. 48 The procedural requirements, comparable to those for the
DFT, would also be important for the DFS scheme to prevent abuse.
Anti-dumping (AD) is another area in which substantial trade
interests of developing countries are adversely affected. WTO rules
allow Members to adopt AD measures in the form of added tariffs where
they determine that imports are "dumped," i.e. sold at prices below
normal value. 49 The "normal value" is determined by comparison to the
home price or to an export price in a third country where a proper
comparison cannot be made for the market situation or a low sales
volume in the domestic market.50 The normal value can also be
"constructed" based on costs and reasonable profits.5 1 This regulatory
flexibility allows national authorities much latitude with anti-dumping
investigations, making AD measures the most prevalently adopted
trade measures of all. 52 There is little economic rationale for imposing
anti-dumping measures, 53 and particularly cheaper imports from
developing countries have been a major target for AD measures,
undermining the trade and development interests of developing
countries. 54
The determination of "normal value" is inherently arbitrary and
imprecise. For example, there may not be a single home market to
compare, and the complex adjusted average may have to be calculated
to come up with a reference home price.55 Where a comparison should
be made to an export price in a third country, there may not be a single
export price but potentially many substantially different prices. Where
a normal value needs to be constructed, the result can be vastly
different, depending on a specific methodology adopted to calculate
48. LEE, supra note 2, at 79. Since the objective of the DFS is to promote economic
development through export facilitation, it may not be used to support exports from
developing countries whose share in the export market is above certain thresholds and
that are already competitive.
49. ADP Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.
50. Id. arts. 1-2.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. At the end of June, there were as many as 1,379 AD measures in force. WTO
Secretariat, Annual Report 2011, 40 (2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res
_e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anrep11_e.pdf.
53. LEE, supra note 2, at 94.
54. Between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, over three-quarters of the 181 new AD
investigations were targeted to products from developing countries. WTO Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices, REPORT (2010) OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANTI-DUMPING
PRACTICES, Annex C, G/L/935 (Oct. 28, 2010).
55. LEE, supra note 2, at 92.
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costs and average prices, not to mention that the measure of
"reasonable profit" can also vary.56 The national authorities have
almost free hands to determine the existence of dumping and the
dumping margin. Limited reform of the AD Agreement has been
proposed,57 but it is unlikely to remove the inherent arbitrariness from
the AD regime. As Yale economist T. N. Srinivasan has characterized,
AD is indeed the equivalent of "nuclear weapon in the armoury of trade
policy,"58 and the ADF should prohibit AD measures against imports
from developing countries altogether.
Certain trade-related government measures on investment
(TRIMs) are also regulated by WTO rules. TRIMs are important
government development policy tools, thus the rules regulating TRIMs
need to be examined. Provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures5 9 (TRIMs Agreement) prohibit a range of
investment measures that affect international trade.60 Those prohibited
TRIMs include local content requirements (imposing the use of a
certain amount of local inputs in production); import controls (requiring
imports used in local production to be equivalent to a certain proportion
of exports); foreign exchange balancing requirements (requiring the
foreign exchange made available for imports to be a certain proportion
of the value of foreign exchange brought in by the foreign investment
from exports and other sources); and export controls (obligating exports
to be equivalent to a certain proportion of local production). 61
Investment can contribute to economic development significantly
by bringing needed capital, technology, and management expertise to
the host nation, and some of the TRIMS are designed to maximize
investment's contribution to their development agenda. 62 While the
economic utility of TRIMs has been debated and the distorting trade
effect of TRIMs has been underscored, 63 the decision to adopt TRIMs
needs to be vested with developing countries. According to a recent
study, all of today's developed countries also adopted investment
56. Id. at 93.
57. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 1.
58. Int'l Institute for Sustainable Development, Report on the WTO's High-Level
Symposium on Trade and Development (Mar. 17-18, 1999), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/summhl-e.pdf.
59. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 168
[hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
60. The TRIMs Agreement prohibits investment measures that are inconsistent with
Articles III and XI of the GATT, which requires national treatment and the general
elimination of quantitative restrictions, respectively. Id. art. 2; GATT, supra note 10, arts.
III, XI.
61. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 59, annex, TT 1(a)-2(c).
62. LEE, supra note 2, at 114, 117.
63. Id. at 118.
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measures to meet their development objectives during their own
development.64 Reflecting this concern, twelve developing countries
proposed to change the text of the TRIMs Agreement to make
commitments under the agreement optional and not mandatory.65 It
would be indeed fair that today's developing countries should be
accorded the same opportunity to use TRIMs to promote economic
development. The ADF may include provisions to lift the application of
the TRIMs Agreement in favor of developing countries.
The current WTO rules on intellectual property rights (Agreement
on Trade-Related Property Rights66 or TRIPS Agreement) should also
be reconsidered in the context of development. Acquiring advanced
technology and knowledge is important for developing countries to
improve their industries and promote economic development,67 and this
tends to create tension between developing countries whose priority is
to acquire advanced technology and knowledge and developed countries
with an interest to protect them. Assigning proprietary rights to
technology and knowledge domestically through local IPR law and
internationally through conventions68 is an effort to protect them. The
TRIMS Agreement, the most extensive provisions in WTO legal
disciplines, 69 sets out mandatory standards for the protection of several
intellectual property rights (IPRs), including patents, trademarks,
copyrights, designs, and geographical indications, mandates protection
of foreign IPR holders by incorporating other major IPR conventions,
and requires enforcement against IPR violations. 70
While protection of IPRs is a legitimate interest, those extensive
requirements are counterproductive to the development effort of
developing countries whose legal and financial recourses may not be
64. Ha-Joon Chang & Duncan Green, The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do
as we Say, Not as we Did, SOUTH CENTRE, 33 (June 2003), http://www.southcentre.
org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=380&Itemid=67 (follow "click here to
download" hyperlink).
65. World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 11
20-21, WT/GC/1354 (Oct. 11, 1999).
66. Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
67. LEE, supra note 2, at 123.
68. For instance, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2,
1 1, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851, offers protection for foreign
patent holders and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, arts. 1-2, 1, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30, does so for foreign copyright
holders.
69. TRIPS Agreement is composed of 73 Articles in seven parts. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 66.
70. Id. arts. 9-12.
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sufficient for the extensive IPR protection. 7' The ADF should exempt
developing countries from the application of the TRIPS Agreement to
the extent that it imposes legislative requirements on them. This does
not mean that developed countries should give up their IPR interests in
the context of international trade. A better alternative is to develop
another set of rules and elaborate on the relevant provision of GATT
Article XX which allows Members to take measures to protect their IPR
interests, 72 so as to specify applicable measures as well as the
procedural and substantive requirements for the application of the
measures as has been the case with the adoption of the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards which was developed based on GATT Article
XIX. 73
Finally, the ADF may also require quota-free, tariff-free treatment
for imports from least-developed countries (LDCs). Some developed
countries have offered preferential treatment to LDCs. For instance,
the European Union has introduced the "Everything But Arms" (EBA)
initiative, offering duty-free and quota-free treatment to products
currently exported by LDCs. 7 4 Other countries, such as the United
States and Canada, offer similar preferential treatment to LDCs,
although less comprehensive and more limited in scope than the EBA
initiative.75 Considering the dire economic need of LDCs, an EBA-type
71. According to a study, implementing the TRIPS obligations "would require the
least developed countries to invest in buildings, equipment, training, and so forth that
would cost each of them $150 million - for many of the least developed countries this
represents a full year's development budget." J. Michael Finger, The WTO's Special
Burden on Less Developed Countries, 19 CATO J. 425, 435 (2000).
72. GATT Article XX provides in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent theadoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: . . . (d) necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, including those relating to . . the protection of patents, trade
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices ....
GATT, supra note 10, art. XX.
73. The Agreement on Safeguards elaborate on GATT Article XIX and provides a
detailed set of substantive and procedural requirements for the application of a safeguard
measure. See YONG-SHIK LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2007), for a detailed study of safeguard measures.
74. See Paul Brenton, Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World
Trading System: The Current Impact of European Union Preferences Under "Everything
But Arms," 37 J. WORLD TRADE 623, 623-26 (2003), for an initial evaluation of the EBA
initiative.
75. For instance, the United States has implemented the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act, which offers improved access to certain African, but not Asian, LDCs. Id.
at 644-45.
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of duty-free and quota-free treatment needs to be implemented by
developed countries and participating developing countries in the WTO.
A transitional period can be established for the complete removal of
trade barriers to sensitive products.7 6 Members would also have to
ensure that non-tariff measures do not undermine the trade benefit of
these preferences for LDCs. 77
III. WTO GOVERNANCE
A. Case for WTO Council for Trade and Development78
The present organizational structure of the WTO is not adequate to
address the development interests of developing countries at the
highest level. The main body in the WTO which deals with trade and
development issue is the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).
The CTD reports to the General Council and has a mandate to address
certain trade and development issues such as implementation of
preferential provisions for developing countries, guidelines for technical
cooperation, increased participation of developing countries in the
trading system, and LDCs issues. The WTO provides assistance to
developing countries which focuses on capacity-building.79
The organizational status and mandate of the CTD is insufficient to
address fundamental trade and development issues such as finance and
debt relief in the context of trade, technological transfer which is key to
resolve capacity-building issues, and extensive regulatory reform to fill
the development deficit in the present regulatory framework. Those
core issues with ramifications that affect the WTO as a whole must be
addressed at the Council level, which is the highest decision making
body in the WTO organization. The trade and development issues cited
above require long-term attention and intense negotiation efforts at the
highest organizational level. LDC issues, which are now being
76. At the adoption of the EBA initiative, trade liberalization was complete except for
three products: fresh bananas, rice, and sugar, where tariffs were to be gradually reduced
to zero (in 2006 for bananas and 2009 for rice and sugar). Duty-free tariff quotas for rice
and sugar were to be increased annually. Id. at 625.
77. It has been observed that non-tariff measures, as well as stringent rules of origin,
continue to limit exports from LDCs significantly. Stefano Inama, Market Access for
LDCs: Issues to Be Addressed, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 85, 115 (2002). Applications of
administered protection, such as anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, and
safeguards, can also diminish the beneficial effect of preference for LDCs.
78. LEE, supra note 2, ch. 2.3.2.
79. At present WTO assistance to developing countries focuses on capacity-building.
In this area, the WTO Secretariat primarily offers assistance through its Institute for
Training and Technical Cooperation. Assistance includes legal advice to some developing
countries, regular training sessions on trade policy in Geneva, and the organization of
approximately 400 technical cooperation activities annually, compromising both seminars
and workshops in developing countries and courses in Geneva.
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discussed at a subcommittee under the CTD, require attention and
work at a full committee level given the complexity and urgency of the
dire economic conditions of the LDC. This committee on LDCs can be
constituted under the proposed Council for Trade and Development.
The proposed organizational elevation of the CTD to a full Council
is well justified by comparison to the treatment of intellectual property
right issues in the WTO. IPRs have been promoted by a relatively small
number of developed Members within the WTO, but their importance
has been emphasized and recognized by instituting a separate Council
for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights.80  Trade and
development issues are considered essentially important by the
majority of WTO membership, which is comprised of developing
countries. This majority interest should receive the comparable
attention and recognition by the WTO. Setting up a separate Council
for Trade and Development will be an affirmation of such recognition
and will allow trade and development issues to be addressed at the
highest institutional level.
B. Proposed Role of the Council for Trade and Development81
The role of the proposed Council should be set out to meet its
objective to advance the trade and development agenda in the WTO.
Thus the role of the new Council may include promotion of development
agendas and implementation of trade-related development assistance
policies, monitoring development and implementation of trade-related
rules and policies relevant to development interests of developing
countries, and establishment and supervision of subcommittees to
address specific development issues.
As to the implementation of trade-related development assistance
policies, the Council may on a regular basis identify problems and gaps
in the current trading system and practices in facilitating development
and set a trade and development agenda accordingly. This agenda may
be discussed at the Ministerial Conferences and in subsequent trade
negotiations to develop a more development-supportive regulatory
system and trade practices. This would include modifying relevant rules
where necessary. In promoting a trade and development agenda, the
Council may also cooperate with relevant international bodies such as
the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO). Through such cooperation, the trade and development
80. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV.
81. See LEE, supra note 2, ch. 2.3.2; Yong-Shik Lee, World Trade Organization and
Developing Countries, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 109, 109-11 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. eds., 2011).
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agenda set by the WTO would be promoted and coordinated more
effectively and consistently.
In addition, the reform may include a mandatory reporting
requirement for all developed country Members and participating
developing country Members to file a "Trade-Related Development
Assistance Report" (TDAR) on a regular basis. This report would
identify and examine trade practices and activities of an individual
Member that are in compliance with the trade and development agenda
set by the Council, as well as those that are inconsistent with them.
The Council should examine TDARs on a regular basis and consult with
relevant Members to discuss their development assistance activities.
The Council could agree on specific commitments to be fulfilled by the
developed country Members and participating developing country
Members to promote the trade and development agenda, and the
Council may further examine, within a certain time period, whether
these commitments are being met.
The Trade and Development Council could also monitor compliance
with WTO provisions on development assistance, including the existing
S&D provisions, 82 GATT Articles XXXVI XXXVIII, as well as the pro-
development provisions proposed in the preceding section of this
chapter.83 A portion of this monitoring could be incorporated in the
TDAR. A violation of those provisions should be reported to the Council
if it is detrimental to the trade interests of developing country
Members. The Council may subsequently consult with the violating
Member to seek a resolution.
The TDAR could also monitor the commitments of developed
country Members to developing countries under GATT Article
XXXVII.8 4 Compliance with these commitments may require a broader
policy adjustment by the developed country Member, which may
necessitate monitoring by the Council. The Council should publish an
annual report on compliance with the development assistance
provisions and provide monitoring of any systematic compliance failure.
The Council may also include issues of compliance failure in the trade
and development agenda with a prospect of rule modification where
necessary.
Finally, the Council may also establish standing or ad-hoc
committees to address specific issues of trade and development that
require long-term attention, such as technological transfer between
developed and developing country Members. There should be at least
one committee specifically devoted to the problems of LDCs and another
82. See supra note 25.
83. See discussion supra Part II.B.
84. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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to assist with capacity building of developing countries to participate
fully in the trading system and realize its benefits. 85 Greater assistance
should also be provided to developing country Members involved in
costly and time-consuming trade disputes. Consideration should also be
given to whether it would better serve the needs of developing country
Members to assign the function of the existing WTO Advisory Centre to
a committee under the proposed Council for Trade and Development.
In either case, the current WTO Advisory Centre needs to be expanded
so that it can offer assistance to every developing country Member in
need of support with respect to the panel or Appellate Body
proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current regulatory framework for international trade under
the WTO is marked by "development deficit." The Uruguay Round
failed to elaborate and develop any of the development-facilitation
provisions in the GATT, such as Article XVIII and Articles XXXVI
XXXVIII, into a more detailed, enforceable set of rules in WTO
agreements, while it has done so in the other areas. 86 S&D provisions
in the WTO agreements are either temporary or insufficient to meet the
development interests of most developing countries.8 7 While market
access and freer trade is emphasized across the board, exceptions have
been legislated in the areas it does not serve the interests of many
developed countries, such as agriculture. The outcome is the clearly
imbalanced rules in the WTO system, which promotes the trade
interests of developed countries disproportionately, and undermines the
development interests of developing countries.
Also, the organizational structure of the WTO does not adequately
reflect on the interests of developing countries. While the trade
interests of developed countries, such as trade in services and trade-
related intellectual property rights, are regularly addressed at the
highest institutional level, in the Council for Trade in Services and the
Council for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, the comparable
institutional weight has not been accorded to the development interests
of developing countries. There is no Council devoted to the trade and
development issues, only a Committee (CTD) under the General
Council, with an insufficient mandate to address fundamental trade
and development issues, which would require negotiations and
decisions at the highest level. Considering that over three-quarters of
85. The Aid for Trade done by the WTO has been helpful for developing countries in
this regard. See Aid for Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/devel e/a4t e/aid4tradee.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
86. See discussion supra Part II.A.
87. Id.
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the entire WTO membership is developing countries, whose primary
membership interest is economic development through international
trade, the present organizational status of the CTD is not inappropriate
and should be elevated to the full Council level.
Since the inception of the WTO, world trade as a whole has
increased rapidly benefitting developed countries and some select
developing ones.88 However, many developing countries, particularly
least-developed countries, have not taken a fair share of economic
growth through trade.89 The forecited regulatory imbalance and the
inadequate institutional coverage of trade and development issues at
the WTO have contributed to this problem. The Doha Round was
launched to address the development deficit in the system, but its
successful conclusion is not in clear sight. Even if the present Round is
concluded, the development deficit in the WTO regulatory disciplines
and trade practices will not be cured. This chapter has proposed
regulatory and organizational reform to address this issue. It is hoped
that developed countries will join to support the necessary reform with
understanding that the successful development of developing countries
will provide markets for their own exports in future, as some of the
former developing countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and more recently, China, have shown.90 After all, the
proposed regulatory and institutional facilitation of development would
prove to be in the interest of all.
88. For instance, China has substantially increased its trade, particularly after
joining the WTO in 2001.
89. The LDC's share of world trade has declined by more than 40 percent since 1980
to a mere 0.4 percent. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Least
Developed Countries 1999 Report, at 106, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD[LCD/1999 (Jan. 12, 1999).
90. LEE, supra note 2, at 6-9.
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TESTING THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: THE BLOCKING OF
SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP
MATTHEW R. DARDENNE*
It was late Saturday, June 13, 2009 when the rumbling of a stolen
election began moving through the Twittersphere. 1 On June 12th,
many thought the Iranian presidential election between Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi would be close. 2 To the
contrary, Ahmadinejad won a sweeping victory that defied the polls and
was quickly dismissed as a fraud. 3 In reaction, the Iranian people took
to the streets and riots lasted long into the next week. 4
Despite the outrage, few traditional media outlets reported the
story of Iran's growing Green Revolution.5 Instead, the protests were
mostly reported by text, tweets, and through other social media.6
Tehran's authoritarian regime responded by taking down the telephone
* Shareholder, Dardenne and Boyd, Inc. Adjunct Professor, San Joaquin College of
Law, Clovis California. Grateful former student of Ved P. Nanda.
1. Steven Hodson, Twitter, Social Media and the Revolution in Iran, THE INQUISITR,
June 16 2009, available at http://www.inquisitr.com/26311/twitter-social-media-and-the-
revolution-in-iran/.
2. Lee Baker, The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Export Restrictions on Software
and Online Services for American Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 23 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 537, 537-38 (2010) (citing Colin Freeman, Iran Election: 'Unprecedented' Turnout
Boosts Challenge to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 12, 2009, available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran//55 15813/Iran-electionun
precedented-turnout-boosts-challenge-to-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad.html; Peter Goodspeed,
Election Leaves Iran Polarized, NAT'L PosT, June 13, 2009, availble at http://www.nat
ionalpost.com/m/story.html?id=1693833).
3. Id. (citing Glenn Kessler & Jon Cohen, Signs of Fraud Abound, but Not Hard
Evidence, WASH. POST, June 16, 2009, Al, availble at http:// www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/15/AR200906 1 503235.html; Maziar Bahari, 'It's
a Coup d'Etat', NEWSWEEK, June 13, 2009, available at http://www.news
week.com/id/201956; Colin Freeman, Iran Elections: Revolt as Crowds Protest at
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 'Rigged' Victory, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 13, 2009, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/552672 1/Iran-elections-rev
olt-as-crowds-protest-at-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejads-rigged-victory.html).
4. The Washington Times, Editorial, Iran's Twitter Revolution: Witnessing a New
Chapter in the Quest for Freedom, THE WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2009, A20, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution.
5. Hodson, supra note 1.
6. Iran's Twitter Revolution, supra note 4.
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system supporting SMS text messaging and blocking other cellular
networks. Iran's highly computer-literate society, including bloggers
and hackers, fought back, kept channels open and spread the word
about functioning proxy portals.7
The immediacy of the reports was stunning and gripping. Twitter
lists constantly gave updates and provided links to photos and videos,
which acutely demonstrated the developing turmoil.8 Photos and videos
were posted on Twitter and Youtube. The video footage that emerged
was "raw, unedited and dramatic";9 it captured images of "young people
throwing rocks, scenes of burning tires and vehicles, and riot police
delivering savage beatings."'0 Others showed protestors peacefully
shouting "Marg bar dictator!" (Death to the dictator!)11
Ultimately, the scene turned violent as paramilitary Basij and
police rooftop snipers opened fire. Reports of deaths tweeted out, and
within minutes, a gruesome picture circulated of a man lying face-up in
the street, blood covering his face and pooled around his head. Other
photos followed of other people bloodied or dead. Soon there were
reports of nonstop shooting and opposition leaders arrested. A
crackdown was under way.12
While Tehran was not able to completely choke off access to text
and Twitter, its abuse of its citizens coupled with the crackdown on
avenues of organization through social media and telecommunications
brought the short lived Green Revolution to an end. The first digital
revolution was over before it began.
A year before Iran was cracking down on access to Twitter and text
messaging, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, Robert F. Godec, was
providing embarrassing details of the opulent life styles of Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali, the President of Tunisia, and his family to his
superiors in the United States.13 In one of the cables, Ambassador
Godec referred to the Tunisian president and his siblings as "The
Family" and likened them to the mafia who ran Tunisia's economy.14
These cables were part of the tens of thousands of pages leaked to
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See also YouTube videos of Iranian Revolution, IRAN'S GREEN REVOLUTION -
MOVEMENT TOWARDS FREEDOM 2011 IRAN, http://iranianrevolution.wordpress.com (last
visited Jan. 28, 2012).
10. Iran's Twitter Revolution, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Judy Bachrach, WikiHistory: Did the Leaks Inspire the Arab Spring?, WORLD
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2011, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/wiki
history-did-leaks-inspire-arab-spring.
14. Dubai, Wikileaks Might Have Triggered Tunis' Revolution, AL ARABIYA NEWS,
Jan. 15, 2011, available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/15/133592.html.
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Wikileaks that were then disclosed in November 2010 online and to
various media outlets. Ultimately, the cable was read and shared via
Facebook and Twitter 5 throughout Tunisia's significant online
population. 16
Like the stolen election in Iran, these cables acted as digital tinder
ready to be ignited by the rage of an oppressed people. A few weeks
later, the spark was literally lit, igniting a revolution across the Arab
world. Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor, was harassed by a
policewoman for failing to have a license to sell vegetables from his
street cart.17 When local government authorities failed to intervene, he
set himself ablaze outside the governmental compound in a desperate
act of self-immolation.18 His act was caught on film, streamed across
the web, and shared on Facebook and Twitter. Bouazizi's single act of
protest, combined with the leaked documents, fueled an entire
movement across the Arab world. 19
As the revolt blazed across Tunisia, both Egypt and Libya moved
quickly to block access to the internet, social media, and telephone
service. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi's government blocked access to
several internet websites. Access to Facebook was cut as protests
developed in the Libyan capital.20 Libya also cut access to Al Jazeera for
its reporting on the unrest.21
"On January 28, 2011, Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, took the
drastic and unprecedented step of shutting off the Internet for five days
across [Egypt]."22 Mubarak took these steps to stop the coordination of
protestors on Facebook and Twitter. 23  Representatives from both
Facebook and Twitter later confirmed access to their sites was being
15. Bachrach, supra note 13.
16. Id. (statement of Radwan Masmoudi, president for the Center for the Study of
Islam and Democracy) ("Something like two million among ten million people have their
own Facebook account.").




19. Bachrach, supra note 13. See also John Thorne, Bouazizi has become a Tunisian
Protest 'Symbol,' THE NATIONAL, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.thenational.ae/
news/worldwidelbouazizi-has-become-a-tunisian-protest-symbol.
20. Emil Protalinski, Libya Blocks Access to Facebook, Al Jazeera, Others, ZDNET
(Feb. 18, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/libya-blocks-access-to-
facebook-al-jazeera-others/302.
21. Id.
22. Amir Hatem Ali, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New Tools for
Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 185 (2011).
23. Id.
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blocked.24 Like Iran, Egypt also disrupted text messaging and
Blackberry services. 25
As the Arab Revolution spread, several more countries blocked
access to social media sites, internet search engines, and news sites.
Since the Arab Spring, Facebook has been either totally or partially
blocked in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Pakistan. 26 Twitter was partially blocked in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and
Pakistan. YouTube remains completely blocked in Turkey and is
partially blocked in Iran and Pakistan. 2 7 Arab states are not alone;
many other nations block social media including, most notably, China,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Cameroon, and even, to
some extent, Mexico. 2 8
The power of social media during the Arab Revolution should not be
overblown; "digital media didn't oust Hosni Mubarak." 29
"[O]veremphasizing the role of information technology diminishes the
personal risks that individual protesters took in heading out onto the
streets to face tear gas and bullets." 30 At the same time, the role of
social media and the internet at large during the Arab Spring cannot be
denied. Newsweek called the protest in Egypt a "Facebook Revolt." 31
The images of the self-immolation of Bouazizi circulated in "cyberspace
before being broadcast by Middle East media corporation al-Jazeera." 32
24. Elinor Mills, Internet Disruptions Hit Egypt, CNET NEWS (Jan 27, 2011, 5:06
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20029857-245.html.
25. Id.; Hamza Hendawi & Sarah El Deeb, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Egypt Disrupts
Internet Service in Crackdown, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 2, 2011, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-01-28/news/27054360_1_crackdown-cell-phone-service-
muslim-brotherhood.
26. Id. See Social Media Filtering Map, OPENNET INITIATIVE, available at
http://opennet.net/research/map/socialmedia (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). (The OpenNet
Initiative (ONI) is a collaborative partnership of three institutions: the Citizen Lab at the
Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group. Drawing on testing conducted in
2008-2009 as well as media reports collected since 2004, ONI has compiled data from on
the most frequently blocked social media sites around the world. ONI maintains an
interactive map that demonstrates social media sites that have been censored at any




29. Philip N. Howard, The Arab Spring's Cascading Effects, MILLER-MCCUNE, Feb.
23, 2011, available at http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-
arab-spring-28575/#.
30. Id.
31. Mike Giglio, NEWSWEEK, Inside Egypt's Facebook Revolt, THE DAILY BEAST, Jan.
27, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/01/27/inside-egypt-s-
facebook- revolt. html.
32. Erika R. George, Tweeting to Topple Tyranny, Social Media and Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Reply to Anupam Chander, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 23, 24 (2011) (citing
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U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, captured the
potential of social media when she commented "the power of social
networking to channel and champion public sentiment, has been more
evident in the past few weeks than ever before." 33
The effects of blocking social media and other websites raise serious
questions related to the "congenital tension" ever present between the
recognition and enforcement of state sovereignty and the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 34 On the one hand, states
have a sovereign prerogative to protect their territorial integrity and
independence from destabilizing forces like armed intervention,
whether of an external or internal nature, and mass protests that
threaten the life of the nation.35 On the other hand, states also have an
obligation to protect human rights such as the right to hold opinions,
the freedom of expression and speech, the right to receive and transmit
information, the right to hold and transmit ideas of all kinds in writing
and print through any media of a person's choice, and the right to
peaceful assembly.36
Today, this tension is made increasingly more complex by a web of
overlapping international obligations stemming, not only from human
rights law, but also from modern trade and investment regimes: many
developing states blocking access to social media and the internet at
large are members of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and are
often parties to treaties protecting investment as a means to improve
economic conditions and to gain access to the ever expanding global
Tunisia's Revolution: Watching and Waiting, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2011,
11:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/tunisiasrevolution).
33. Howard, supra note 29.
34. FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 3 (3d ed. 2005). See also Muna Ndulo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
and Security and Reconstruction, 44 AKRON L. REV. 769, 773 (recognizing the tension in
the U.N. Charter "between the doctrines of national sovereignty and the protection and
promotion of individual rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the
context of a civil war").
35. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly
Relations Declaration]; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res.
2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter Inadmissibility of
Intervention Declaration] (While the Friendly Relations Declaration, and the
Inadmissibility of Intervention Declaration outlawing aggression apply primarily in the
context of international relations between states, and not intrastate issues, these legal
principles firmly support a state's right to territorial integrity and political independence).
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 1,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR] (providing that a state may suspend rights protected under the ICCPR during
times of declared, publicly declared national emergency threatening life to the nation).
36. ICCPR, arts. 19, 21.
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market place. As a result, when states move to block and censure
material on the internet as an exercise of their sovereign rights, they
not only trample their human rights obligations, but they may also be
in violation of other international obligations created by the
international trade and investment regimes.
As goods, services, telecommunications, and other unrealized
future business ventures move to and develop because of the internet,
and as the internet becomes subject to increasing regulation and
censorship, 37 sophisticated e-commerce business interests will no doubt
turn to the protections afforded by international law to protect their
interests. 38 When business interests, such as social media, overlap with
and touch upon individuals' human rights, trade and investment
protections may actually serve as a collateral method to enforce human
rights obligations. Trends in international e-commerce are already
pointing to this result.
For instance, in 2010 Google shocked the world when, in the face of
China's increased censorship, it ended its nascent presence in China
and began routing Chinese users to its uncensored search engine in
Hong Kong. 39 Essentially the dispute between China and Google arose
when Google discovered a highly sophisticated cyber attack originating
from China on the Gmail email accounts of Chinese human rights
activists.40 In response, Google decided it would no longer censor
Chinese internet searches as required by Chinese law. When
negotiations broke down between China and Google over the dispute,
37. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 26 (compiled list of various countries'
internet regulation and censorship activities by month in 2010).
38. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment
Arbitration: the Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 359-60 (2010)
(noting it is likely that an international investment arbitration involving intellectual
property rights in e-commerce is likely "given the trajectory of the modern economy, in
which foreign investments reflect an increasing concentration of intellectual capital
invested in knowledge goods protected by [intellectual property rights]").
39. Cynthia Liu, Internet Censorship as a Trade Barrier: A Look at the WTO
Consistency of the Great Firewall in the Wake of the China-Google Dispute, 42 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 1199, 1200-01 (2011).
40. Id. (citing Google May Quit China over Cyber-Attacks, MSNBC (Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34831106/. A report issued by iDefense, a
computer security company owned by Verisign, states that thirty-three other companies
were targeted in the attack spanning the Internet, media, finance, technology, and
chemical sectors. Thomas Claburn, Chinese Spy Agency Behind Google Cyber Attack,
Report Claims, INFO. WK. (Jan. 14, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.
com/news/security/attacks/222300848 (claiming Adobe, Internet Web hosting company
Rackspace, Dow Chemical, and Northrop Grumman are some of the companies that were
targeted in these series of coordinated cyber-attacks)).
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Google stunningly announced it would leave China and reroute Chinese
searches through Hong Kong.41
Similarly, "Go Daddy.com, the world's largest domain name
registration company, announced on March 24, 2010 that it would no
longer sell .cn domain names, citing similar fears of hacking and an
unwillingness to continue to comply with stringent government
requirements."4 2 In its announcement, "Go Daddy.com specifically
referenced the heightened requirements for documenting and verifying
the identity of domain name registrants and what it perceived to be
increased threats against individual security as reasons for
discontinuing the offering of new .cn domain names."4 3
Cynthia Liu makes a compelling argument that a case could be
brought through the auspices of the World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") to protect against such censorship. 44 Indeed, the
United States announced in October, 2011, that it would seek detailed
information on the trade impact of Chinese policies that may block U.S.
companies' websites in China under Article III of GATS which allows
member states to request information from another member state on its
measures that affect the operation of GATS.4 5 The European
Parliament has also passed a resolution calling on the European Union
to treat Internet censorship as a trade barrier. 46
While the DSB may provide one form of relief for such conduct, it
does not provide a direct means of enforcement.47 Generally, private
41. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute over
Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/
technology/23google.html.
42. Liu, supra note 39, at 1201 (citing Alexei Alexis & Kathleen E. McLaughlin,
Muted Reaction in China Greets Go Daddy's Departure Announcement, 27 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 503 (Apr. 8, 2010)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1211-33.
45. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, United States Seeks Detailed Information on China's Internet Restrictions
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/
october/united-states-seeks-detailed-information-china% E2 % 80% 99s-i.
46. Brian R. Israel, "Make Money Without Doing Evil?" Caught between Authoritarian
Regulations in Emerging Markets and a Global Law of Human Rights, U.S. ICTS Face a
Twofold Quandary, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 652, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ[LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:184E:0016:0022:EN:PDF
(referring to The EU's Strategy to Deliver Market Access to European Countries 2009 O.J.
(C 184).
47. See Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System,
Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, 2 nn.5 & 6
(2004) available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&
context=1ps-clacp.
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entities can petition their governments to bring a case through the DSB
on an affected industry or corporation's behalf as a matter of diplomatic
protection,48 but as a matter of right, the entity has no ability to bring
the case directly. Also, governments have no obligation to bring the
case on the affected party's behalf. 49
Meanwhile, the protections found in international investment law
always provide for private dispute resolution, and may provide a
powerful method to respond to internet censorship. Notably, the United
States and China are not currently parties to an international
investment arbitration agreement ("IA"), although one is currently
being negotiated.50 However, turning back to the censorship of the
internet during the Arab Revolution, many Arab nations affected by the
Arab Spring, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, and Bahrain,
have entered into HAs with the United States such that organizations
like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google could take action directly
for the blocking of their digital platforms. The provisions of other IIAs
with non-Arab countries blocking social media, such as Vietnam, could
also be invoked. 51
While there are many facets of international investment
arbitration, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate how
jurisdiction could be established against sovereign states for the
suppression of social media and censorship of the internet and to
provide a brief, but not exhaustive, analysis of the claims that could be
brought therefore. Part I of this article introduces the concept of social
media and evaluates the property interests inherent in social media.
Part II then turns to a brief introduction of HAs. Much has been
written concerning investment law over the last decade such that it is
unnecessary to thoroughly reexamine what has already been done. The
bulk of this article is devoted to Part III, which discuses whether social
media, especially those services that originate in the capital exporting
state, meet the definition of an investment under particular investment
treaties. While the definition of an investment under IIAs is generally
broad, modern investment arbitration tribunals have restricted its
applicability. Therefore, from a jurisdictional standpoint, it is essential
that social media and particular internet sites be considered as an
investment; otherwise an arbitration tribunal would lack jurisdiction
rationae materiae to hear the dispute. Part IV briefly illuminates the
claims social media could bring for internet censorship. Ultimately,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sarah Anderson, U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations-Fact Sheet,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/us-china-bilateral investment-treaty-negotiations.
51. See Bilateral Trade Agreement, U.S.-Viet., July 13, 2000, Statement by the
President: Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, 2001 WL 634226.
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more research is needed in this area to fully explore how such claims
are likely to be evaluated. Finally, Part V concludes that social media
and internet based platforms may bring claims that will withstand the
jurisdictional hurdles of international investment law.
Before turning to the dynamics of international investment
arbitration in the context of social media, it should be noted that it has
been more than fifty years since the first modern bilateral investment
agreement entered into force between Germany and Pakistan.52 For the
first forty years of that history, instances of disputes were relatively
rare. But, over the last ten-plus years, as the number of IIAs
proliferated, great growth in the number of the reported cases
occurred.53 The overwhelming majority of reported cases have been
brought by investors of developed nations against developing states for
treatment related to investments in infrastructure and natural
resources. 54 The size and scope of the awards have resulted in many
calling into question the legitimacy of international investment
arbitration55 under the perception that IIAs threaten state sovereignty
and sustainable economic development.56
While there are legitimate concerns about the impact international
investment arbitration has on these issues, the future of international
investment arbitration over the next forty years could be far nobler if
corporations like Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other forms
of new media embrace ideas of corporate social responsibility by using
tools at their disposal to prevent abuses of human rights.5 7 Certainly
there are limits to speech on the internet; most countries use
cybersieves to filter undesirable content.58 Whether it is copyrighted
songs in the United States5 9 or political dissent in the Middle East, the
goal is the same: "Countries differ not in their intent to limit access to
52. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fed. Republic Ger.-Pak.,
Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575.
53. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009).
54. Id. at 446.
55. Franck, supra note 53, at 436-37.
56. Jose E. Alvarez, Book Review, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 382 (2011) (reviewing
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2009)).
57. George, supra note 32, at 35; see also Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2011).
58. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L. J. 377, 379 (2009).
59. Id. See also Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (SOPA allows the
Attorney General to seek injunctions that would compel U.S. search engines and other
sites to block domain names or search results against foreign websites that steal and sell
American innovations, intellectual property, and products. The bill increases criminal
penalties for individuals who traffic in counterfeit medicine and military goods, which put
innocent civilians and American soldiers at risk. And it improves coordination between IP
enforcement agencies in the U.S.).
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material online, but in the content they ban, the precision of their
blocking, and the voice they offer citizens in decision making."60 At
some point though, the threshold is breached; a state's censorship and
blocking of social media and the internet at large infringes on
fundamental freedoms. At that point, international investment
arbitration can be used as a powerful weapon not only to protect the
value of the investment, but also the rights of those whose use of the
medium gave value to the investment in the first place.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL MEDIA
Like other forms of property, economic interests in social media and
other internet platforms stem from a range of rights that likely fall
within the substantive and procedural protections provided by HAs.
These rights range from the value of shares in the entities that own
social media, the myriad property rights now associated with domain
names, the proprietary technological and intellectual property rights
owned by social media, and possibly, although controversially, rights to
the ultimate content of and access to users of social media.
The term "social media" refers to internet-based applications that
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that
enable people to communicate and share resources and information. 61
In essence, social media are forms of electronic communications used for
networking and microblogging, through which users create online
communities and content to share information, ideas, personal
messages, and other material.62
Examples of social media include a wide array of blogs, discussion
forums, chat rooms, and wikis. 63 Prominent social media sites include
Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, and Twitter. 64 Social media can be
accessed by computer, smart and cellular phones, and mobile phone text
messaging (SMS). To some degree, the entire web is one gigantic social
media platform.
60. Bambauer, supra note 58, at 379.
61. Bruce R. Lindsay, Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options, and
Policy Considerations, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE R41987, 1 (Sep. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homeseclR41987.pdf; Andreas Kaplan & Michael
Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media,
BUSINESS HORIZONs 53, 59 (2009).
62. John M. Miller, Is MySpace really My Space? Examining the Discoverability of the
Contents of Social Media Accounts, 30 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 28, 28 (2011) (citing
Merriam Webster Dictionary available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media).
63. Lindsay, supra note 61, at 1.
64. Id.
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The use of social media is an evolving phenomenon. 65 During the
past decade, rapid changes in communication technologies have enabled
people to interact and share information in ways that were non-existent
or commercially unavailable as recently as fifteen years ago. 6 6
The property rights inherent in social media are also evolving. It is
an extreme understatement to say that the shares in the corporations
that developed successful social media platforms are valuable. Forbes
lists Mark Zuckerberg's wealth at $17.5 billion;67 Sergey Brin and Larry
Page, the Google Guys, are worth $12 billion each.68 The lawsuits
underscoring the movie The Social Network, and the interests involved
therein are immense. 69 Because shares in corporations are generally
protected under modern HAs, such economic interests in social media
will generally be protected thereunder.
The intellectual property rights in both domain names of social
media and the proprietary coding that make them function are also
valuable property rights. "A domain name consists of two parts: a top
level domain and a secondary level domain."70 The top level domain is
the domain name's suffix like .com or .org. The secondary level domain
is the remainder of the address, and today often includes the names of
valuable trademarks identifying a corporation's goods or services.
Together, the complete domain name allows a user to link to a specific
computer's IP address by routing the user to the provider of the
content. 71
Domain names are generally considered a valuable intangible
property right 72 or, in rare cases, a tangible property right, 73 both of
65. See Id.
66. Id.
67. Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Mark Zuckerberg, FORBES, http://www.forbes.
com/profile/mark-zuckerberg (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
68. Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Sergey Brin, FORBES, http://www.forbes.
com/lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-people Sergey-BrinD664.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2012); Forbes 400 Richest Americans, Larry Page, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com
1lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-peopleLarry-PageXFXI.html (last visited Jan.
24, 2012).
69. Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU, Inc., No. C 07-01389, 2008 WL
4793665 (N.D.Cal. 2008) affirmed by Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc.,
640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
70. FAQ: Domain Name, available at http://domainwhiz.net/faq-domainname.html.
71. See Jennifer Gong, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International
Treaties, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101, 109 (2011).
72. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that domain
names are intangible property); see also OBG Ltd v. Allan (2007) UKHL 21, 1 A.C. 1, 32
(separate opinion of Lord Hoffman stating "have no difficulty with the proposition that a
domain name may be intangible property, like a copyright or trade mark"); see also 15
U.S.C. §1125(d) (2006) (treating domain names as property subject to in rem proceedings
in the ACPA); Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("Congress may treat a domain name registration as property subject to in rem
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which are generally protectable under HAs. In other instances, domain
names have been considered contractual rights, 74 but this seems to be
the minority view.75 Rather, domain names are generally considered
intangible property because registrants of domain names have the right
to:
a) possess the domain name to the exclusion of others; b) use
the domain name as its 'locator' on the Internet; c) manage the
domain name by designating the registrar; d) enjoy the income
from the domain name; e) dispose of the domain name by sale or
transfer; and f) exclude others from using its domain name.76
Regardless of how they are characterized, domain names have
tremendous value. Corporations have paid millions to acquire domain
names77 and engaged in expensive lawsuits to prevent cybersquatting
and unlawful trading upon their protected marks included within
domain names. Likewise, governments have responded to these actions
jurisdiction if it chooses, without violating the Constitution."); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-
Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Congress clearly intended to treat domain
names as property for purposes of the ACPA's in rem provisions.").
73. Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Technologies, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1285 (D. Utah
2009) (finding that a website is tangible property).
74. Wornow v. Register.Com, Inc., 778 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (App. Div. 2004) (N.Y. statute
making self-renewing contracts unenforceable do not apply to domain name registrations
because a domain name that is "not trademarked or patented is not personal property,
but rather a contract right that cannot exist separate and apart from the services
performed by a register such as defendant."); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc.,
529 S.E.2d 80, 86-87 (2000).
75. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 42-43 (2004); Jeffery A. Maine, Tax Considerations: Domain
Name Acquisitions and Web Site Development, SK102 ALI-ABA 205, 213 (2005) ("Domain
names should not be treated for tax purposes as government licenses or contracts for
services, but instead should be treated as valuable intangible property"); Xuan-Thao N.
Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name
Classification, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 203 (2001) ("decisions in Umbro and Dorer fail
to correctly classify domain names"); see also eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058
(N.D.Ca. 2000); Register.com v. Verio Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that websites should be treated as chattel and thus as property). See Kremen 337
F.3d at 1029 (stating that Network Solutions all but conceded that registrants have
property rights in their domain names); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that Network Solution admits that domain
names are intangible personal property).
76. Beverly A. Berneman, Navigating the Bankruptcy Waters in a Domain Name
Rowboat, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 61, 66 (2003).
77. In 1998, Compaq Computer Corp. paid $3.35 million to AltaVista Technology for
the right to use the "altavista.com." Compaq and Alta Vista Settle Internet Address
Dispute, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at B12; Julia Angwin, San Jose Man Hits Gold-3.3
million web name Compaq pays big for internet address, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July
28, 1998, at Al.
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to ensure consumers have access to their trademarks. '1 Consequently,
domain names will likely be treated as a valuable property right
protected under most HAs.
In addition to the intangible property rights in domain names,
domain names also contain valuable trademark rights, which are
protected under HAs. It is well established that certain domain names
may be registered as trademarks. 79 Like other trademarks, under the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office guidelines for the registration of
domain names as trademarks, "domain names are entitled to the
protection afforded to trademarks if they are arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive, or descriptive, with acquired secondary meaning."80
Trademarks are now almost universally protected by HAs. As a result,
trademarks included in domain names will likely be protected under
HAs as well.
Finally, social media sites routinely require terms of use contracts
that possibly give them an ownership interest in user generated content
("USG"). For instance, while Facebook's terms of use ("TOU") assert
that the user owns any content he or she creates and uploads to the
site, its TOU also states in part, "'[fjor content that is covered by
intellectual property rights, like photos and videos ('IP content'),' the
user grants Facebook a 'nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable,
royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content' that the user posts
'on or in connection with Facebook."' 81  Similarly, the TOU for
Linkedln, a social media platform for business professionals, mandates
users grant "'a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual,
unlimited, assignable, sub-licensable, fully paid up and royalty free
right to [LinkedIn] to copy, prepare derivative works of, improve,
distribute, publish, remove, retain, add, process, analyze, use and
commercialize, in any way now known or in the future discovered, any
information [the user] provide[s]."'82 These unrestricted licenses grant
social media a protected right in UGC. Under international investment
law that protected right is also protected and may, even if
78. 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (2006).
79. Image Online Design, Inc. v. Core Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(stating PTO governs trademark registrations for domain names); US Dep't of Commerce,
Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guide No. 2-99: Marks Composed, in Whole
or in Part, of Domain Names [hereinafter PTO Examination Guide No. 2-99] (explaining
PTO policy of registering domain names as trademarks); see also Vincent-Joel Proulx,
Borrowing from our Common Law Cousins: American and Britsh Influences on the Merger
of Canadian Trademark and Internet Domain Name Laws, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
505, 505-06 (2005).
80. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 75, at 48.
81. G. Ross Allen & Francine D. Ward, Things Aren't Always as they Appear: Who
Really Owns Your User-Generated Content, 3 No. 2 LANDSLIDE 49, 50 (2010) (citing
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com /terms.php).
82. Id. at 51.
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controversially, extend to an interest in access to current and potential
users of social media themselves.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Much has been written concerning the history, development, and
theory of international investment arbitration such that much of it need
not be repeated here.83
The purpose of HAs is simple; HAs safeguard investments made by
qualifying investors in another state from government conduct which
may impinge or otherwise mistreat the value of the investment. 84
While many of the treaties differ in language, they are relatively
uniform: most grant the qualifying investment reciprocal rights, both
procedural and substantive, which may be enforced if the host
government mistreats the investment in a manner prescribed by the
relevant agreement. These agreements generally grant foreign
investors substantive rights, including national and most-favored-
nation ("MFN") treatment, fair and equitable treatment ("FET"), and
protection against expropriation without compensation.85
There are many different forms of HAs. Today there are reportedly
2,700 to 3,000 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), a small number of
regional free trade agreements such as NAFTA86 or ASEAN, 8 7 and
treaties with limited subject matter jurisdiction such as the Energy
Charter Treaty" that allow private dispute resolution.89
Procedurally, an IIA permits private party investors whose
investment has been mistreated to seek direct redress against the host
state through the treaty's dispute resolution mechanism, usually
through the an ad hoc tribunal organized under the auspices of the
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"), the ICSID Additional Facility rules, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
83. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 211-90 (2008); CAMPBELL McLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE &
MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES (2007); see Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 779-81 (2011).
84. Franck, supra note 83, at 779.
85. Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy:
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J.
INT'L L. 57, 62 (Fall 2011).
86. North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
87. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 8, 1967.
88. Energy Charter Treaty (Dec. 1994), text available at http://www.encharter.org/.
89. UNCTAD Investment Instruments Online, available at http://www.unctadxi.org/
templates/docsearch_779.aspx.
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Arbitration Rules, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ("SCC"), or
some other standing arbitration body.
Ordinarily, the individual agreement will provide a specific set of
definitions to determine whether a particular activity or interest will
qualify for the protections of the IIA. If these jurisdictional
prerequisites can be met, and the government conduct falls within the
substantive protections of the IIA, the state will be held internationally
responsible for its wrongful conduct to the qualifying investor.
In the context of the Arab Spring and the blocking of social media,
the United States has entered into IIAs with Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia,
Turkey, and Morocco. 90  Because most social media and internet
locations blocked during the Arab Spring were owned and operated by
U.S. corporations, those corporations would be able to take advantage of
the protections afforded under the IIAs between the United States and
those governments. For the purposes of this article, the jurisdictional
prerequisites and substantive claims related to the blocking and
censuring of internet access shall be predominantly analyzed under the
U.S.-Egypt BIT91 since Egypt was at the center of the Arab Spring and
undisputedly shut down internet access during the heart of the
protests.
Social Media Meets the Jurisdictional Requirements to Bring an
International Investment Claim
In international investment arbitration, three main jurisdictional
prerequisites must be satisfied in no particular order: the tribunal must
have jurisdiction over 1) the parties (ratione personae); 2) the timing of
the dispute (ratione temporis); and 3) the subject matter of the dispute
(ratione materiae).92  These issues are complicated further by
jurisdictional limitations of the dispute settlement apparatus under
which the dispute is brought. For instance, Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention provides:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
90. See id.
91. Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt
concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Egypt
June 27, 1992 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt BIT].
92. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Jurisdiction) ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/3, 1 26-31 (Apr. 22, 2005). But see McLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 10 1 1.23
(noting that the "treaty provisions on nationality may be said to deal with arbitral
jurisdiction over persons (ratione personae); the treaty provisions on investment
prescribe the extent of arbitral jurisdiction over subject-matter (ratione materiae). But,
the treaties themselves proceed simply on the basis of nationality and investment, and
the dividing line between persons and things is not exact.").
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State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally. 9
Consequently, Article 25 provides an additional layer of
jurisdictional hurdles that must be overcome.
In bringing claims against states blocking social media and
internet access, the first two jurisdictional prerequisites are easily met.
First, similar to the law of diplomatic protection, to establish
nationality under the relevant IIA, a U.S. corporation need only
establish it is a corporation under the laws of the state under which it is
incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. 94 While
there exist many methods to challenge nationality, in the case of social
media and internet platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, or
YouTube, U.S. nationality would easily be established because all of
these enterprises held continuous U.S. nationality prior to the Arab
Spring. 95
Likewise, such entities could also establish jurisdiction over the
timing of the dispute. In considering the timing of a dispute and
whether a particular IIA applies, reference must always be had to the
particular IIA96 and whether the IIA was in force or can apply
retroactively to the conduct complained. Generally speaking, if a
relevant IIA is in force at the time the violating conduct took place, the
arbitration panel will have jurisdiction over the timing of the dispute.
The relevant U.S. IIAs involved during the Arab Spring, including the
US-Egypt BIT, were all in force long before the events that occurred
during the Arab Spring came to pass. Consequently, social media and
93. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, art. 25, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
94. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 T 70
(Judgment of Feb. 5) (Second Phase) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction]; see also Tokios
Tokeles v. Ukraine (Jurisdiction) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 205, 220, 38-40 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18 Apr. 29, 2004); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 286 (2001) (stating: "Definitions of corporate nationality in national
legislation or in treaties providing for ICSID's jurisdiction will be controlling for the
determination of whether the nationality requirements of Article 25(2)(b) have been
met.") [hereinafter SCHREUER I].; MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 146, 5.54; Azurix Corp
v. Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction) (2004) 43 I.L.M. 262, 72 (ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12 Dec. 8, 2003).
95. According to the California Secretary of State website, Facebook Inc., Google,
YouTube and Twitter are all Delaware corporations headquarter and registered to do
business in California. See Business Search, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, available
at http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/cbs.aspx.
96. McLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 174, T 6.38.
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internet platforms would easily be able to establish jurisdiction over the
timing of the dispute.
Establishing the final jurisdictional requirement, jurisdiction
ratione materiae, however, is much more problematic and will be
complicated by the choices of the parties to any potential arbitration.
Is the Economic Interest in Social Media an Investment?
In international investment arbitration, the only true jurisdictional
limitation, ratione materiae, is whether the economic activity or
business interest amounts to an "investment" as that term is
understood in international investment law. Thus, to prevail in any
arbitration challenging the blocking of social media during the Arab
Spring, social media and internet platforms must prove that their
economic interest in those platforms amounts to an "investment."
There are many considerations that impact whether an
"investment" has been made including the language of the applicable
IIA, the scope of economic interests the term covers, limitations possibly
imposed by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 97 and territorial
limitations of where the investment can be made. If the economic
interest, here the interest in social media, meets these criteria, then it
will satisfy the jurisdictional requirements ratione materiae to maintain
a claim against the host state.
Economic Interests in Social Media and Internet Platforms meet
the Definition of Investment as Generally Defined in IIAs.
Simply put, social media and internet platforms must meet the
definition of an investment "because only the assets or interests of
investors that fall within its scope are entitled to the protections of the
treaty."98 If, and only if, social media meets this threshold requirement
can social media platforms move forward to their substantive claims.
Almost all IIAs define investment similarly. 99 Under most HAs,
the term is first defined broadly to include "every kind of asset"100 and
97. ICSID Convention, supra note 93, Art. 25(1); see also Fedax N.V. v. Republic of
Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/3 (July 11, 1997); Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, Award
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2 (Mar. 15, 2002).
98. Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in
International Investment Agreements, available at www.iisd.org/pdfl2008/dci-recent-
dev.pdf.
99. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 171, 6.26.
100. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 65 § 1.51 (2009) (citing UK-USSR BIT (now UK-Russia) Art. 1(a)(1989); US-
Argentina BIT, Art. I(1)(a) (1991)); see also U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, Art. I(1)(c).
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then a non-exhaustive list of rights or interests in property follows. 101
Most U.S. treaties protecting investments are broadly defined in this
manner. 102
The tendency of modern investment agreements, especially the
model agreements of capital exporting states, has been to broaden the
scope of the definition of investment to include many economic interests
and activities that were not originally protected under early treaties
and customary international law. 103
Originally, the term investment was confined to foreign direct
investment, meaning capital that flowed from the enterprise of a person
located in one state, to the enterprise of an entity controlled by the laws
of another state. 104 However, the meaning of the term foreign direct
investment, as it was originally understood, gradually grew more
inclusive.10 5 For instance, the protections offered to foreign investors
were expanded in 1938, when Mexico nationalized American oil
companies.106 In response, the United States insisted that the rules
101. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 163, 6.01. While most IIAs are similar, it should
be noted the various activities or interests covered in most IIAs are not always consistent
with one another given the various types of IIAs that exist. See Noah Rubins, The Notion
of 'Investment' in International Investment Arbitration in ARBITRATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 284 (Norbert
Horn & Stefan M. Kroll eds., 2004). Be aware that some IIAs, such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, do not follow this method. Instead, NAFTA sets a forth
a broad, but exhaustive list of covered economic activities that is contrasted by examples
of commercial transactions which do not amount to investments. Id.
102. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT (2004).
103. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 9 (2d ed.
2004).
104. Id. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), foreign direct investment is defined specifically as an "investment involving a
long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy
(direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than of the investor. The direct
investor's purpose is to exert a significant degree of influence on the management of the
enterprise resident in the other economy. FDI involves both the initial transaction
between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. FDI may be undertaken by
individuals, as well as business entities." See also Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
(3d ed. 1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/data oecd/10/16/2090148.pdf ("Foreign
direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity
in one economy ('direct investor') in an entity resident in an economy other than that of
the investor ('direct investment enterprise'). The lasting interest implies the existence of a
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Direct investment involves both
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions
between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.").
105. Malik, supra note 98, at 2.
106. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 397-402 (John H.
Jackson ed., 2002). As is well known, in 1938, in response to Mexico's nationalization of
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related to expropriation and nationalizing upon prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation also be applied to alien's physical property
located in the host state's jurisdiction. 107
Later, in response to the International Court of Justice's decision in
the Barcelona Traction Case,08 modern investment agreements
expanded the term investment to include many forms of intangible
property including leases, mortgages, liens, some classes of loans, and
shares of stock in corporations. 109 After Barcelona Traction, capital
exporting states immediately addressed shareholder protection and
other forms of intangible property in a new wave of international
investment agreements. 110
In addition to these forms of intangible property, capital exporting
states next began to include protection for intellectual property"' and
some forms of government contracts.112 For example, many BITs now
"provide a detailed listing of the types of intellectual property that may
be considered as a form of investment asset, for example, 'copyrights,
patents, utility-model patents, industrial designs, trade-marks, trade-
names, trade and business secrets, technical processes, known-how, and
goodwill."'1
13
To date no decision concerning an intellectual property rights-
centered arbitration has been publicly reported.114 However, arbitration
American oil companies, U.S. Secretary of State Hull argued that compensation for
expropriation should be "prompt, adequate, and effective." Mexico argued that the
American investors should simply receive expropriation compensation on par with
domestic investors according to the laws of the host government (the Calvo doctrine).
Since the 1930s, the United States and other capital exporting countries have incor-
porated the language of Hull's formula into hundreds of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation treaties and more modern BITs. Since then, Hull's formula has become the
standard for modern IIAs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), UNCTAD, available at http://
www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?inttemlD=3164&lang-l. See also OECD BENCH-
MARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (3d ed. 1996), OECD, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf.
107. LOWENFELD, supra note 106, at 397-402.
108. Barcelona Traction, supra note 94, at 7.
109. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 103, at 10-11.
110. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 15 (July 20).
Although the treaty at issue in ELSI was negotiated and concluded long before the
International Court of Justice reached its judgment in Barcelona Traction, it was not
until after that case that many capital exporting states began to renegotiate its previous
treaties protecting foreign investment through more modern bilateral trade and
investment agreements.
111. SORNARAJAH, supra note 103, at 11.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Gibson, supra note 38 at 358 (citing German Model Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment issued by the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Labour, art. 1 (2005), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/
dog-publications/Appendixo201% 20Germano20Modelo20Treaty.pdf).
114. Id. at 359.
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panels have found that the following intangible property rights amount
to investments: (1) an office construction project consisting mainly of
plans and various regulatory approvals; (2) a performance contract to
perform liaison customs duties; 15 (3) a hotel construction and operation
contract; 116 (4) a concession agreement to develop and operate a local
port terminal;" 7 (5) an investment in local securities;" and (6) debt
instruments issued by a sovereign state as broadly defined under
various investment agreements.119 Likewise, claims over rights in
broadcast medial 20 and rights in telecommunication properties121 have
been held to be an investment.
The trend in these cases is to prefer a broad view of the term
investment, at least as that term is defined by the IIA. While a few
tribunals have been reluctant to base decisions on jurisdiction solely on
the language that investment means "every kind of investment,"122
others have relied on similar language.123 Other tribunals have simply
preferred not to read any limiting phrases into the definition of
investment unless the treaty provides one itself.124
More importantly, these cases exercise an explicit deference to the
host state's conscious decision to protect investments covered by the
relevant investment agreement.125  Under this analysis, tribunals
simply look to the relevant IIA's definition of investment, and assess
under the customary rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the
115. Soci6t6 Gen6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, TT 99-111 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
116. Holiday Inns v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, Order taking
note of the discontinuance (Oct. 17, 1978).
117. Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary
Decision on Jurisdiction, §15 (Dec. 8, 1998), 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001).
118. Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, 24.1 (Nov. 27, 2000).
119. Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, 1, 16 (July 11, 1997).
120. Lauder v. Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep. 62, Award (2001) (addressing television
broadcast rights in the Czech Republic); CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v.
Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Rep 121, Partial Award (2001) (addressing television broadcast
rights in the Czech Republic for the same conduct complained of in Lauder); Nagel v.
Czech Republic, 13 ICSID Rep. 33, Award (SCC Case 49/2002 Sept. 9, 2003).
121. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 322
(July 29, 2008).
122. See Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgz Republic, SCC Case 126/2003, Award (Mar. 29, 2005);
Jan de Nul N.V. & Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Jurisdiction (June 16, 2006).
123. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 11
118, 121 (Mar. 21, 2007) (relying on the language "any kind of property").
124. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, supra note 94, at 52.
125. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the
Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 257, 270 (2010).
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Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties ("VCLT")126 whether the
definition of investment in the IIA is broad enough to cover the asset or
enterprise in question. If the economic activity or interest falls within
the class of activities and interests protected as an investment,
jurisdiction under the relevant IIA is appropriate.
Based on this broadening trend, social media and internet
platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, or YouTube would likely
be able to prove that their economic interests in such platforms amount
to an investment under today's modern IIA structure.
Specifically applying U.S. based social media's interests under the
US-Egypt BIT, 127 investment under that agreement "means every kind
of asset owned or controlled" including but not limited to tangible and
intangible property rights, shares, stock, valid intellectual and
industrial rights such as trademarks, permits, and licenses, etc. 128
According to the customary tools of treaty interpretation found in
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, terms such as "every kind of asset,"
"every kind of investment," "intangible property rights," and
"intellectual property rights" are broad enough to include the property
rights included in domain names discussed above. 129
Giving due regard to Article 31, with its emphasis that the terms of
the treaty shall be interpreted (1) in good faith (2) in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty (3) in their
context and (4) in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, it is
highly likely that the terms "every kind of asset" including intangible
property such as intellectual and industrial rights includes interests in
the shares of social media corporations, the value of trademarks
inherent in the domain names of social media, and may even apply to
the UGC that would have been posted on the social media's platforms
had internet service not been interrupted and access to social media
disabled during the protests in Egypt and other Arab nations.
Furthermore, neither treaty excludes interests in domain names or
internet platforms specifically or any other similar enterprise that could
be analogized to such platforms predating the internet. Moreover, the
treaty, as well as those with Turkey and Tunisia, fails to provide any
type of explanatory phrase within the treaty itself, such as the footnotes
now included in the current US Model BIT which limits the types of
interests that may be considered an investment.
Consequently, based on the broad language in the US-Egypt BIT,
as well as other similar IIAs, it is highly likely that the interests in
126. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
127. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, art. I(c).
128. Id. art. I(c)(i)-(vii).
129. VCLT, supra note 126, arts. 31-32.
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social media will amount to an investment as that term is defined in the
US-Egypt BIT, and most likely the US BITs with other Arab nations.
Overcoming Additional Jurisdictional Requirements under ICSID
Despite the broad range of economic interests and activities
protected as an "investment" under the relevant IIA, jurisdiction may
still not be appropriate if it fails to meet the term investment as
understood under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.
As stated above, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that:
the "jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of or in relation to an investment."130  The ICSID
Convention intentionally did not define the term investment. Extensive
research into the travaux prdparatoiresl31 of the ICSID Convention
decidedly demonstrates "[n]o attempt was made to define the term
'investment' given the essential requirement of consent by the parties,
and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known
in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or
would not consider submitting to the Centre."132
As noted by Julian Mortenson, the original drafters of the
Convention sought to limit the types of disputes that could be brought
before ICSID.133 However, the drafters also wanted to ensure that a
wide range of economic interests and activities could be adjudicated by
the Centre. 134  To resolve this impasse, the United Kingdom's
delegation suggested that the ICSID Convention leave the term
investment undefined and add a new subsection to Article 25 which
defined the Centre's jurisdiction. This mechanism established "a
procedure for states to notify other signatories of the categories of
dispute that they would not consider submitting to arbitration."135
This approach provided a broad and open-ended definition of the
term investment that could be limited or expanded by the individual
state members through arbitration agreements, notifications to the
Centre under Article 25(4), and reservations from the Convention.136
130. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965).
131. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 259, 270.
132. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 51 (July 23, 2001). See also Waguih Elie George Siag v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 65 (Apr. 11,
2007).
133. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 280-86.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 290 (citing Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting (Dec. 8,
1964), in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 59, 821-22 (1968)).
136. Id. at 293.
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Based on this broad approach, many arbitration decisions have held
that jurisdiction is nearly a nonjusticiable issue that merges with the
question of party consent. 137 Tribunals following this approach have
approved an extraordinarily wide array of investments including many
of those listed above. 138
Other ICSID tribunals, however, have taken a far more restrictive
approach based on Christoph Schreuer's seminal treatise on the ICSID
Convention in which he listed several factors considered "typical" of
economic interests found to be an investment under previous ICSID
proceedings including:
*"a certain duration" of the enterprise,
*"a certain regularity of profit and return,"
*an "assumption of risk,"
*a "substantial" commitment by the investor, and
*some "significance for the host State's development."139
Since Schreuer's original commentary, tribunals have turned these
factors into a prescriptive set of requirements.14 0 For instance, in
Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, a case involving a highway construction
contract, the tribunal turned Schreuer's factors into a rigid test now
known as the Salini Test.141 In its decision, the tribunal determined the
claimant's contractual rights were not investments under Article 25 of
the ICSID Convention, but were instead mere unenforceable promises.
Since Salini, other tribunals have gone on to reject a totality-of-the-
circumstances balancing of the factors, preferring an objective
fulfillment of each element.14 2
137. Id. at 269 (citing Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, 13.5-
13.6 (Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2006); Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, § 48 (Dec. 8, 1998), 40
I.L.M. 457 (2001)).
138. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 127.
139. SCHREUER I, supra note 94, art. 25, T 122.
140. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 272.
141. Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction,
55-57 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
142. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 273 (citing Helnan Int'l Hotels, A.S. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, 77
(Oct. 17, 2006); Saipem, S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 99
(Mar. 21, 2007); Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Award on Jurisdiction 106(e) ("If any of [the Salini factors] are absent, the tribunal will
hesitate (and probably decline) to make a finding of "investment.")). Mr. Mortenson,
however, has noted that other tribunals have hinted at a more liberal version of Salini.
See Mortenson, supra note 125, at 273 (citing L.E.S.I., S.p.A. v. R6publique alg~rienne
ddmocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Award for Lack of Jurisdiction
(July 12, 2006) Consortium Groupement Lesi-Dipenta v. Republique algdrienne
d~mocratique et populaire), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award for Lack of Jurisdiction
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Schreuer later commented it was "unfortunate" that such practice
had occurred. 143 As Schreuer explained in his second edition to his
commentary, these elements were not meant to establish individual
elements necessary for jurisdiction, but were merely typical of the types
of economic interests brought forth under the ICSID Convention. 144
Nevertheless, as noted by Mortenson, since 2006, seven decisions have
adopted the Salini approach, while two - Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania
and the Malaysian Historical Salvors annulment - rejected it. 145 Other
cases not noted by Mortenson also rejected the Salini test as a set of
prescriptive requirements. 146
As Mortenson notes, certain types of enterprise will likely be
unaffected by the incorporation of Schreuer's factors as a prescriptive
test; 14 7 indeed, Schreuer pulled the factors from those industries that
were often brought before an ICSID body in the first place. But such
rigid jurisdictional requirements will likely continue to affect pure
services contracts, financial interests, and other forms of intangible
property rights such as intellectual property and interests in internet
based platforms.
Nevertheless, interests in social media and other internet platforms
can make a compelling case that they fall within the scope of the so-
called Salini test. But, even if such interests do not meet these rigid
requirements, it is possible to bring the claim outside of ICSID or to
have a hand in the selection of the tribunal itself, such that the
members of the tribunal do not follow the Salini test. Consequently, it
is still possible that interests in social media and other internet
platforms will fall within the jurisdictional prerequisites to bring a
claim for state suppression of internet service and the blocking of social
media.
Remaining Limits on Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae: Territorial
Requirements
A further limitation on jurisdiction ratione materiae may exist if
the IIA limits the subject matter jurisdiction of a tribunal to those cases
(Jan. 10, 2005), 19 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. L.J 426 (2004); and Phoenix Action, Ltd. v.
Czech, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 1 85 (Apr. 15, 2009) (turning Gaillard's
approach into a rebuttable presumption that any economic activity contributes to the
domestic economy).
143. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH, & ANTHONY
SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 133, 171 (2d ed. 2009).
144. Id. 1 172.
145. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 277.
146. See, e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v Republic of Leb. ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, IT 82-84 (Sept. 11, 2009); L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et Astaldi
S.p.A. v. Republique algdrienne d6mocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction, I 72(iv) (Jul. 12, 2006).
147. Mortenson, supra note 125, at 315.
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over an investment that is made within the territory of the host
state.' 'm Few cases have turned on this requirement, focusing instead
on whether an investment has been made as a whole. However, if such
a requirement is necessary or read into the relevant IIA, then it surely
will be raised as an objection to jurisdiction in a case involving social
media because of the internet's nature to be "created" outside of the
host state.
It should be noted at the outset that no such requirement in the
definition of investment exists in the US-Egypt BIT or the U.S.-Turkey
BIT, although each require territoriality in the application of its MFN
and national treatment standards. By contrast, the US-Tunisia BIT
mandates territoriality in the definition of investment. Consequently,
according to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, in any
potential arbitration between a U.S. based social media platform and
Egypt, territoriality is not a necessary requirement.
However, assuming arguendo that territoriality is explicitly or
implicitly required by the relevant IIA, territoriality will not necessarily
deprive a tribunal of jurisdiction merely because the social media
platform is owned, controlled, or originated by U.S. corporations
situated in U.S. territory. Rather, the trend in international
investment arbitration, especially with respect to intangible property,
looks not to the physical location of the property making up the
investment, but rather to where the benefits of the investment flow. 14 9
If the benefits of the investment touch and concern the state with which
a dispute exists, jurisdiction will likely be upheld.
For example, in Fedax N. V. v. Republic of Venezuela,1 50 the tribunal
recognized the existence of an investment in debt instruments acquired
on the secondary market even though those instruments were not held
in the territory of Venezuela. There the tribunal held that it is a
standard feature of financial transactions that the funds involved are
"not physically transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but put at
its disposal elsewhere."5 1 Nevertheless, because the benefits of such
instruments - credit available to Venezuela - were used by Venezuela
148. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 180, 6.59.
149. See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, 41 (Jul. 11, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Objections to Jurisdiction,
90 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 251 (1999) [hereinafter CSOB v.
Slovak Republic]; Soci6t6 Gen6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of the Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, T 125 (Aug. 6, 2003) 8 ICSID Rep.
406 (2005); Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil. ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, 99 -107 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005);
Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 277-79 (Nov.
8, 2010).
150. Fedax, T 41.
151. Id.
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for its various needs, the interest in the promissory notes and other
debt instruments were considered an investment in the territory of
Venezuela. 15 2
Similarly, in both SGS v. Pakistan,153 and SGS v. Philippines,154
the tribunals noted that the pre-shipment customs inspection service
contracts, carried out predominately outside the host country,
amounted to an investment in the territory of Pakistan and the
Philippines because the benefits of those services occurred in the
territory of the host governments. In SGS v. Pakistan, the tribunal
noted that the contract may not meet the "'traditional' notion of an
investment, [but] nevertheless [the contracts] fall within the category of
new investments covered by [the] BIT." 155 Also, the contracts caused an
"injection of funds into the territory of Pakistan for the carrying out of
SGS's engagements under the [service contracts]."156 These attributes
of the economic interests involved amounted to an investment in the
territory of Pakistan.
In SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal went further by explaining the
contract was designed "to provide services, within and outside the
Philippines, with a view to improving and integrating the import
services and associated customs revenue gathering of the
Philippines."15 7 Because those services were rendered for the benefit of
the Philippines, and the customs reports and licenses were issued
directly to the Philippines and not to any outside non-territorial agency,
the tribunal considered that a "substantial and non-severable aspect of
the overall service was provided in the Philippines."158 Together, these
facts qualified the service as one provided in the Philippines.
Likewise, in CSOB v. the Slovak Republic, the tribunal found that
the "'entire process' of economic activity, even though particular aspects
of it were not locally performed" 59 amounted to an investment in the
territory of the Slovak Republic.
Finally, in Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, the tribunal
dismissed the Ukraine's arguments that funds transferred outside the
Ukraine for the benefit of a hotel construction project in the Ukraine
152. Id. 42.
153. SGS Soci6t6 G~ndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of the Pak., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, T 125 (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406
(2005) [hereinafter SGS v. Pak.].
154. SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, IT 99 -107 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518
(2005) [hereinafter SGS v. Phil.].
155. SGS v. Pak., T 126.
156. Id. 136.
157. SGS v. Phil., 101.
158. Id. T 102.
159. Id. 110 (citing CSOB v. Slovak Republic, supra note 149, 1 88).
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did not meet the territoriality requirement of the relevant IIA.160
Rather, because those funds were utilized for the benefit of the Ukraine,
territoriality was met.
Based on this trend, interests in social media may also meet the
territoriality requirements explicitly required or implicitly read into
Arab BITs with the U.S. because the benefit of the investment in social
media is located everywhere, including inside the host government.
Like sophisticated financial transactions, the use and structure of
social media and the internet pay little attention to state boundaries.
Rather, social media and the internet center on the user of the platform
and the manner in which those users facilitate and further online
relationships and share information. With respect to social media
specifically, users create all of the content and provide the value of the
platform from where ever they are, not where the platform exists. This
phenomenon has resulted in a sea change in how we communicate and
see the world such that news, events, business, and all other aspects of
life are no longer solely broadcasted to others but broadcasted by
others, 16 1 resulting in an immense value to the state in which social
media exists.
Consequently, the location of the social media platform is largely
irrelevant, because the benefits of its effects are everywhere, all at once,
both inside and outside the host government. By extending the analysis
of previous cases involving intangible property where territoriality was
met when the state was benefited by the investment, tribunals will be
able to uphold jurisdiction on any potential case involving social media.
No doubt, upholding jurisdiction in this manner will be
controversial. Critics will likely argue that permitting a case to be
brought where an investment was not actually made in the host state
betrays the original purpose of agreements protecting foreign direct
investment. But such criticism fails to realize the nature of and
movement to e-commerce. The investment is not made in any one
national jurisdiction. Like space above, the internet is everywhere, all
around us, and omnipresent. The fact that the internet knows no
national boundaries is what creates its true value. It allows
information to be shared instantly, all at once, everywhere. When
states block the internet they deprive the internet of its value and the
value of the investment made therein.
Another criticism lies in the traditional notion of positivism.
Historically, states, as a function of sovereignty, placed conditions on
160. Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 1I 277-
79 (Nov. 8, 2010).
161. See Scott Monty, Foreword to ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICs: How SOCIAL MEDIA
TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE AND Do BUSINESS, xiv (2011).
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the entry of aliens and their property within its borders. 162 To stoke
investment and improve economic conditions within their borders,
states have given up attributes of their sovereignty by entering IIAs.
Historically, then, to be included within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the IIA, the investment must have been located physically within the
state's borders or targeted to specifically affect interests therein.
Despite the modern trend articulated above, allowing economic
interests in e-commerce to gain access to the state's market simply
because the investment exists online and has collateral benefits for the
state will strip the state of far more sovereignty than it originally
intended. Even in those cases where intangibles were held outside the
state, the overall investment was specifically targeted to the respondent
state. In a general sense, interests in social media are not.
However, with the ever increasing scope of investments protected
within today's modern investment law regime, protections have been
extended far beyond those originally contemplated, and will often be
located outside the host government. Had the state intended to restrict
the scope of investments that may have been protected, the host states
should have included exceptions or restrictions in the relevant IIA.
Moreover, social media platforms often do make actual investments in
the host states to further the reach of their platforms. For instance,
Facebook often hires programmers and staff members overseas to
extend its platforms in new markets.163
Like in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, where the
tribunals considered that having local offices in the host governments
constituted part of the overall investment, 16 4 these activities may
overcome general objections to any arguments based on positivism.
Despite the tension between the scope of investments under IIAs
and between limitations on jurisdiction found in both HAs and Article
25 of the ICSID Convention, international investment law has proven
highly adept at allowing new forms of commerce to be protected under
investment protection. While there are legitimate arguments for not
recognizing new media as an investment in the territory of a host state,
it is highly unlikely such a result will occur given the size, scope, and
growth of e-commerce. Consequently, given the internet's effects on all
states, and modern trends in international investment arbitration, it is
far more likely that investment in social media will meet the
jurisdictional requirements embedded in international investment law.
162. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (7th ed. 2008).
163. See generally Facebook Careers, http://www.facebook.com/careers/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2012) (listing job openings, with many international postings in host countries).
164. See SGS v. Phil., T 104 -08.
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The Substantive Protections in International Investment
Agreements Prevent States from Blocking Websites
Once interests in social media meet these jurisdictional thresholds,
potential claimants must still prove that their interests have been
mistreated under the relevant IIA. IIAs contain a myriad protections
for covered investors. By and large though, most contain three core
protections: (1) the prohibition on expropriation without adequate,
prompt, and effective, compensation; (2) the obligation to afford fair and
equitable treatment; and (3) the obligation to afford similar treatment
as other aliens and nationals.
No attempt is made here to thoroughly exhaust and analyze
whether censorship during the Arab Spring, or by other states such as
China, violated these substantive protections. Such an effort goes
beyond the scope of this article, and would require a significant
discussion of the substantive protections, a detailed analysis of
international responsibility including conditions precluding
wrongfulness during national emergencies, and a comprehensive
examination of the factual situation in each state that blocks social
media.
However, on a cursory review of at least the standards on
expropriation and the obligation to afford fair and equitable treatment,
it is likely that such states have breached the protections afforded in
relevant investment agreements.
Blocking Access to Social Media and the Internet May Amount to
Expropriation
International law has long prohibited nationalizations and
expropriations without adequate, prompt, and effective compensation
(the Hull formula). This standard has long been included in modern
IIAs. 165
The US-Egypt IIA is typical of most expropriation provisions. It
provides:
No investment or any part of an investment of a national or
company of either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by
the other Party or by a subdivision thereof or subjected to
any other measure, direct or indirect, if the effect of such other
measure, or a series of such other measures, would be
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ....
165. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1110, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993); Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Egypt, Art. III(1), Mar. 11, 1986,
available at http://tec.export.gov/Trade Agreements/AllTradeAgreements/exp_002813.
asp.
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Most IIAs, including the US-Egypt BIT, do not provide a definition
of expropriation. However, expropriatory conduct is generally held to
include
not only open, deliberate[,] and acknowledged takings of
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory
transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of
the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host State. 166
An expropriation can take many forms and be both direct and
indirect.167 As can be expected, many tribunals have taken a broad
view of what amounts to an expropriation. 168  Under this view a
government measure that interferes with the use of foreign investors'
property such that they cannot use the property or reap expected
benefits there from amounts to an expropriation. 16 9 Other tribunals
have taken a much more narrow view. 170 In these cases, conduct
considered expropriatory occurs when the regulatory action deprives
the claimant of control of his company, interferes directly in the
internal operations, or displaces the claimant as the controlling
shareholder. 171
In analyzing the Arab Spring, these competing methods would
likely be pitted against each other in any case involving the crackdown
on social media. Balancing the police powers of the state, the
proportionality of the means involved, and other factors will also weigh
heavily on any potential tribunal.
166. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/1, Award, 1
103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
167. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83 at 290-97, 11 8.68 - 8.89.
168. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983); Tippets
v. Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984); Metalclad v. United Mexican States,
107; Waste Mgmt., Inc., v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/3, Award,
IT 143-44 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004).
169. John B. Fowles, Swords into Plowhsares: Softening the Edge of NAFTA's Chapter
11 Regulatory Expropriations Provisions, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 83, 85 (2006).
170. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 281-82 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL 2000);
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 258, 1 96, 100-02 (NAFTA 2000); Feldman v.
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 1 100 (2002); Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44
I.L.M. 1345, 1 23 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 2005).
171. Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory Expropriations under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 245, 248 (2002); Michael G.
Parisi, Moving Towards Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in
International Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 383, 391 (2005).
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Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that under either view, the
economic interest in social media is expropriated when states shut
down internet access and block social media. Under the broad view, the
government measures taken certainly interfered with social media and
internet services' expected property rights and prevented those
interests from receiving the expected benefits inherent therein. Under
the narrow view though, the actions taken by Egypt and other Arab
States did not divest shareholders of their shares, wrest control of any
corporation away from its officers, or even interfere with the
corporation's internal affairs. Then again, even under the narrow view,
blocking access to the domain name may be akin to preventing someone
access to their physical property such that a digital taking has occurred
even under the narrow view.
Whether an expropriation has occurred will also depend heavily on
the facts of the situation. Given the political turmoil in Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya, and other Arab States since 2011, states will certainly argue
their actions were taken in a time of national emergency and invoke
necessity, both as a non-precluded measure, if available under the
relevant IIA, and as a condition precluding the wrongfulness of their
conduct under customary international law. Necessity is available as a
non-precluded measure if the relevant IIA provides necessity as a basis
for not providing the requisite standards of treatment. 1 7 2 Indeed the
US-Egypt BIT contains such a clause in Article X allowing "all
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order. ."173
Under customary international law as reflected under Article 25 of
the Articles of State Responsibility, 1 7 4 necessity "may not be invoked by
a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act . .. unless
the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously
impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole."175
Article 25 also states that "necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if . .. the State has contributed to
the situation of necessity."176
172. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic (Award) ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, TT 226-61 (recognizing that the "state of necessity" exist in international law,
particularly in 245) (2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic (Award)
ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 1 101-09, 121-36 (2005); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine
Republic (Annulment Proceeding) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, IT 159-200 (2010).
173. U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 91, art. X.
174. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovn.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39-41 (Sept.
25).
175. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/83, art.25(l) (Jan. 28, 2002).
176. Id. art. 25(2).
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Whether either condition removes potential liability for the
blocking of internet access during the Arab Spring will depend heavily
on the facts of each state's conduct, and the manner in which such
conditions are interpreted under traditional methods of
interpretation. 177 Nevertheless, depending on the specific tribunal's
view, it is highly possible that certain forms of internet censorship
during the Arab Spring and in other states amount to an expropriation
of the investment in social media and other internet platforms.
Denying Access to Social Media and the Internet Likely Violates
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
Most HAs require the host government treat an investment in
accordance with the fair and equitable treatment ("FET") standard.
FET is a fixed standard that applies a level of treatment owed to foreign
investors regardless of how a host state treats its own nationals. 178
While most HAs outright require FET, the US-Egypt BIT merely
requires that the "treatment, protection and security of investments
shall never be less than that required by international law and national
legislation." Such language likely means that Egypt only applies the
minimum standard of treatment ("MST") found in customary
international law. Typically, the MST requires foreign nations to treat
aliens and their property in a manner that would avoid "an outrage, [ ]
bad faith, [some] willful neglect of duty, or [ ] an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency." 1 79
Since the decision in Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of
America,180 it has been discussed whether the MST has evolved beyond
the Neer standard to include some of the substantive protections
afforded by the FET standard. 181 Based on Glamis, it is likely that the
MST is still a floor, below FET; whether the reaches of that floor have
shifted higher is another issue.
However, if a claim is brought under some other IIA protecting the
fair and equitable treatment of investments, then the state suppression
of internet access and the blocking of social media may violate the FET
standard dependent on the facts of the suppression.
177. See generally Javier Garcia Olmedo, The Balance between NPM Clauses and
Investors Protection under Bits: The Enron Annulment Decision, 16 No. 1 INT. B. Ass'N
ARB. NEWS 178 (2011).
178. Margaret Clare Ryan, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States and the Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard, 56 McGILL L.J. 919, 927 (2011).
179. Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (1926).
180. Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of America, Award, 48 ILM 1039 (June 8 2009).
181. See Ryan, supra note 178, at 928; see also Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada
48 ILM 1038 (2010).
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Cases involving the FET standard fall into two broad categories: (1)
the treatment of investors in the courts of the host government; and (2)
administrative or executive decision making. In the case of the Arab
Spring, the actions to shut down internet activity and block social
media fall within the second category.
The majority of cases involving FET in the context of
administrative decision-making have been concerned with the licensure
of investments, or a fundamental change in the law affecting the
investment climate. 182 In determining whether the FET standard has
been breached, tribunals often evaluate these issues according to the
legitimate expectations of the investor and whether the investor's
property rights have been afforded due process.18 3
In Tecmed, the tribunal considered that the FET standard, in light
of the good faith principle established by international law, required
host governments to provide investments "treatment that does not
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment[,]"1 8 4 including the host State (1) "to
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may
know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations[;]"1 85 (2) to act consistently, without
arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the
State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments
as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities; 86
(3) to "use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor
or the investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to
such instruments[;]"1 87 and (4) "not to deprive the investor of its
investment without the required compensation."188
The tribunal continued:
[F]ailure by the host State to comply with such pattern of
conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its investments
affects the investor's ability to measure the treatment and
182. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83 at 233-34 7.99.
183. Id.; See also Occidental Exploration and Production Co v. Republic of Ecuador
(Award) UNCITRAL (2004); T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican
States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M 133, 173 (2004).
184. T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
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protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether
the actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable
treatment principle.189
The FET standard also requires the host government to provide
due-process in its decision making. Where states engage in a process of
discrimination, lack of transparency, use of powers for improper
purposes, inconsistently, for purposes of coercion and harassment, or in
bad faith, due process is denied to the investor.190
Each of these considerations applies in some manner to the Arab
Spring, and how access to the internet and to social media was blocked
during the protests. While these actions must again be taken in context
with the state's need to respond to the emergency presented by the
protests and demonstrations, there is a strong case that the states
violated the substantive rights to FET held by digital platforms.
CONCLUSIONS
Social media's power to organize and speak is undeniable. During
the protests in Cairo, one activist powerfully tweeted: "We use Facebook
to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the
world[.]"'191 When we look back at the Arab Spring and its
consequences, perhaps we will be able to add that Facebook, Google,
Twitter, and YouTube used the power of investment law to defend the
right to protest, coordinate, and tell the world.
Bringing claims on behalf of social media and other internet
platforms will be filled with procedural and substantive pitfalls. But,
based on current trends in international investment arbitration, it is
highly likely that such platforms will meet the jurisdictional challenges
that will ultimately be raised by those states blocking access to social
media and the internet at large.
If social media and internet platforms can successfully hurdle those
jurisdictional bars, and ultimately prove their substantive claims,
international investment law can be used as a powerful tool, by
powerful corporations, to uphold and enhance the human rights of
oppressed peoples.
Between November 1989, as the Berlin Wall began to tumble, and
December 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union, the world watched in
amazement how economic and political liberalization lifted the Iron
Curtain.192 At the fall of the Soviet Union, three persons, the President,
189. Id.
190. MCLACHLAN, supra note 83, at 239 T 7.115.
191. Howard, supra note 29.
192. See Moran R. Davis, How Central Asia was Won: A Revival of the "the Great
Game" 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417, 418 (2011) citing JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE
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the Pope, and the Prime Minister - Ronald Reagan, John Paul II, and
Margaret Thatcher - were praised for their roles above all others in
lifting the Iron Curtain. 193  Today, there exists a digital curtain
shrouding totalitarian and oppressive regimes preventing peoples' basic
human liberties: freedom of speech, assembly, thought, expression, and
assembly. Private actors have tools that did not truly exist at the
collapse of the Soviet Union to affect such sweeping change. Today they
do. Facebook, Google, and Twitter have the power, and the means, to
challenge those who would oppress and prevent the establishment of
self-government.
Such would be a welcome development. Recent scholarship on the
intersection of human rights and international investment law tends to
bemoan international investment law's impact on human rights. 194
However, the issue of internet censorship and the blocking of social
media presents a new opportunity to demonstrate how international
investment law can be used to defend and increase access to human
rights, albeit in a nontraditional method.
COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 273-41 (2005) (analyzing the significant themes permeating
the Cold War); PAUL KENGOR, THE CRUSADER: RONALD REAGAN AND THE FALL OF
COMMUNISM 288-91 (2006) (detailing President Ronald Reagan's personal role in
subverting the Soviet system of government); DON OBERDORFER, FROM THE COLD WAR TO
A NEW ERA 245-48 (1998) (narrating the Cold War from 1983-1992); PETER SCHWEIZER,
REAGAN's WAR: THE EPIC STORY OF His FORTY-YEAR STRUGGLE AND FINAL TRIUMPH OVER
COMMUNISM 279 (2002) (summarizing and analyzing the fall of the USSR and the
associated repercussions).
193. See JOHN O'SULLIVAN, THE PRESIDENT, THE POPE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER:
THREE WHO CHANGED THE WORLD (2006) (profiling President Ronald Reagan, British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Pope John Paul II and their roles in the fall of
the Soviet Union).
194. See Megan Wells, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human
Rights, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 483, 484 (2010); Marc Jacob, Inst. for Dev. & Peace,
International Investment Agreements and Human Rights 24 (2011), available at
http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international-investment-agreements and_
human rights.pdf; Valentian S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment,
Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law, 42 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 797, 800-01 (2011); Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a
Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights Issues into International Investment Agreements
49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 670, 672 (2011).
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THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
MoIZ A. SHIRAZI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of corruption is a continuing one in legal literature and is the
premise of many laws, regulations, and international norms, such as the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") Anti-Bribery Convention, the UK Bribery Act, the United
Nations anti-corruption rules, as well as local anti-corruption laws and regulations.
All of these measures aim to deter corrupt practices and encourage, and often
require, multinational corporations to implement policies and procedures to not
only monitor the behavior of employees, but also the actions of third parties,
including, but not limited to, business partners, suppliers, and potential acquisition
targets. These laws and regulations are often backed by strong enforcement
mechanisms that can lead to severe fines and punishment for multinational
corporations and individuals engaging in, or failing to identify and prevent corrupt
practices.
While most, if not all, developed countries have adopted these international
norms and have well established cultures of enforcement, the countries designated
as emerging and frontier markets have only recently started to tackle the issue of
corruption. For these markets, it is vitally important to get ahead of the corruption
issue as not tackling corruption can come at a high economic price. As these
countries compete for international trade opportunities, they should assign a high
priority to combating corruption, as a high perception of corruption is strongly
correlated with low levels of international trade. As shown in this article, a
significant reduction in the perception of corruption for certain countries can have
as much, if not more, of an impact on international trade as favorable labor laws,
tax rates, and capital (currency) control measures.
In this article, we affirm the link between perceptions of corruption and
perceptions regarding ease of doing business. Having established this link, we
conduct a comparative analysis of the countries considered to be emerging or
frontier markets based on perceptions of corruption and ease of trading across
borders, as well as an analysis of actual levels of international trade per capita for
each market. Based on the takeaways from this comparison, we identify the
* The author would like to thank Victoria Makarova for her valuable contributions to this
article. Moiz A. Shirazi is Director of Economics, Baker & McKenzie Consulting LLC,
Chicago, IL.
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countries that could have the most to gain from combating corruption and quantify
the possible impact on international trade levels from improvements in the
perception of corruption.
II. CORRELATION BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND EASE OF TRADE
In general, corruption, or the perception of corruption, is highly correlated
with perceptions regarding difficulty of trade. Figure 1 below illustrates this point
by comparing the ranking of 178 countries based on Transparency International's
("TI") Corruption Perception Index ("CPI")' for 2010 to the ranking of the same
countries based on the ease of Trading Across Borders as reported in the Ease of
Doing Business Index2 for 2010 as published by the World Bank. A higher number
on TI's CPI equates to a lower perception of corruption. Singapore has the highest
value of 9.3 (perceived as least corrupt) and Afghanistan has the lowest value of
1.4 (perceived as the most corrupt). A higher number on the Trading Across
Borders category of the Ease of Doing Business Index translates to a worse
perception in regards to the ease of conducting international trade, meaning that
countries with the highest value are considered to be the least business friendly
jurisdictions for international trade. Based on 2010 data, Singapore has the lowest
value and is considered to be the most business friendly and Afghanistan has the
highest value and is considered the most difficult place to conduct international
trade.
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Correlation coethaeotfor knear fit = 0.70
Figure 1. Trade Difficulty vs. CPI
1. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of the
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite
index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out
by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. The CPI reflects views from around the world,
including those of experts who are living in the countries evaluated. The greater the CPI number, the
lower the perception of corruption. This is not an absolute ranking: that is, multiple countries may have
the same CPI ranking assigned to them. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL 2-3 2010, http://www.transparency.org/content/download/55725/8903 10.
2. The Ease of Doing Business Index ranks economies from I to 183 based on 9 factors: starting
a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors,
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. The lower the number,
the greater the ease of doing business. This is a ranking; each country is assigned a unique integer
value. Doing Business 2011, DOING BusiNESS (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.doingbusiness.org/
-/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB l l-FullReport.pdf.
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As TI's CPI is one of many indices that aim to provide cross-country
indicators of levels of corruption, we also present a comparison of the World
Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators ("WGI") to the Trading Across Borders
data in figure 2.3 Both comparisons show a strong correlation between perception
of corruption and ease of conducting international trade, a correlation of 0.70 based
on TI's CPI and 0.73 for WGI, respectively. This is not surprising as the barriers
to international trade, principally, administrative red tape and heavy bureaucratic
organizations, frequently go hand in hand with corruption.
"Trade Difficulty vs WGI-Corruption"
200
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Correlation coefficient for linear trend = -0.73
Figure 2. Trade Difficulty vs. WGI Corruption Index
III. ECONOMIC COST OF CORRUPTION - EMERGING MARKETS
Having established that perceptions of corruption and perceptions around
ease of conducting international trade generally move in a parallel manner based
on the correlation coefficients of -0.70 and -0.73 from figures 1 and 2, we now turn
to evaluating the specific impact of corruption on international trade. In order to
isolate the impact of corruption on international trade, we need to identify markets
where there has been or is expected to be movement both in terms of perceptions
of corruption and levels of international trade. The developed markets are
generally not useful in this regard as their perception of corruption is relatively low
and their ranking on TI's CPI is generally stable from year to year.4 Fluctuations
3. WGI is similar to TI's CPI in that it attempts to aggregate data across multiples sources. The
key difference is that WGI attempts to consider corruption in both the public and private sectors while
TI's CPI deals specifically with corruption in the public sector. Similar to TI's CPI, the higher the WGI
number, the greater the perception of corruption. Doing Business 2011, supra note 2; Daniel
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Worldwide Governance Indicators, THE WORLD BANK,
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) (Follow the "click here"
link for the full data set in Excel).
4. This is not meant to be an absolute statement as there are certain developed countries like Italy
and Greece that could be perceived as having a higher perception of corruption than most other
developed countries. For purposes of this analysis, we focused on the emerging and frontier markets
specifically. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, supra note 1. See generally Press Release,
Transparency International, Persistently high corruption in low-income countries amounts to an
"ongoing humanitarian disaster" (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.transparency.org/newsroom
/latest news/press releases/2008/2008_09_23_cpi 2008 en.
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in levels of international trade for developed markets are likely more the result of
economic policy changes, tax regimes, and changes in the perceived corruption
levels of current or future trading partners. The emerging and frontier markets, on
the other hand, have higher perceptions of corruption and are competing against
each other for international trade opportunities. These markets provide the best
opportunity to identify and isolate the impact of corruption on international trade.
Brazil, Russia, India, and China, otherwise known as "BRIC", have long
been considered as emerging markets, but there are other countries such as South
Africa, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Poland, among others, that are
also experiencing rapid economic growth.s There are also a number of countries
that are considered to be the next wave of emerging markets, commonly referred to
as frontier markets.6 As there is no single definition of emerging or frontier market,
we considered the list of emerging and frontier markets as listed by various
sources, including The Economist, the World Bank, Morgan Stanley Capital
International, and Goldman Sachs' list of next 11 frontier markets.7 Based on this
review, we identified a total of 30 countries for this analysis as shown in figure 3
below. This is an appropriate sample as it includes countries that cover all
geographic regions and are at different stages of development.
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Figure 3. Emerging and Frontier Markets - Trade Difficulty vs. CPI
5. Emerging Markets: Beyond the Big Four, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 26, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_52/b3965450.htm.
6. The Emerging Emerging Markets, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.
economist.com/node/17493411.
7. Doing Business 2008: Large Emerging Markets Reforming Fast; Egypt the Top Reformer,
Eastern Europe Overtakes East Asia on Ease of Doing Business, THE WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/WRCBMGZlRO (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); MSCI Emerging Markets Indices,
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL, http://www.msci.com/products/indices/country
andregional/em/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); MSCI Frontier Markets Indices, MORGAN STANLEY
CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL, http://www.msci.com/products/indices/countryand regional/fm/ (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011); The Emerging Emerging Markets, supra note 6; The Next 11, GOLDMAN SACHS,
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/gsam/advisors/products/growth-markets/nl1/index.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011).
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The top left hand corner of figure 3 shows the countries that potentially
could benefit the most from improvements in their perception of corruption,
including Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Kenya. These countries are
among the worst with respect to perception of corruption among the thirty
emerging and frontier markets and also among the worst with respect to perception
of ease of conducting international trade. There are also a number of countries,
including Indonesia, Egypt, and Thailand that rank relatively high in terms of ease
of conducting international trade, despite having a high perception of corruption.
Then there are countries that could have been expected to rank higher in ease of
conducting international trade given their relative CPI score, including South
Africa and Brazil, among others. The takeaway from all this is that corruption is
not the only factor impacting international trade. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the relatively low correlation coefficient of 0.44 between trade
difficulty and CPI for the thirty countries shown in figure 3. Governmental
policies regarding tariffs, corporate tax rates, and capital control, as well as
geographic location, labor costs, and transportation infrastructure, all play major
roles as well. Before trying to identify and isolate the specific impact of corruption
on international trade, we need to acknowledge these other factors and identify the
markets where improvements in the perception of corruption is likely to have the
greatest economic impact.
For example, a close examination of the Ease of Doing Business Index data
for Brazil for 2010 as reported by the World Bank reveals that while Brazil is
ranked 114 as far as ease of trading across borders, it is ranked 152 on the paying
taxes category.8 This suggests that perhaps the single item that would have the
greatest impact on Brazil's Ease of Doing Business Index ranking would be
reforms to Brazil's overly complex tax system. A similar analysis of this data for
South Africa shows that while South Africa is ranked 34 as far as Ease of Doing
Business, it is ranked 149 in terms of trading across borders. South Africa's CPI
rating of 4.5 suggests that corruption may not be driving this relatively poor
ranking. According to the World Bank's description of the factors considered for
the trading across borders category, better training of customs staff and investment
in transportation and logistics infrastructure could have a positive impact on South
Africa's ranking in the ease of trading across borders category. In summary, while
both Brazil and South Africa have issues to consider in order to improve their
rankings for the Ease of Doing Business Index and the trading across borders
category, corruption may not be the primary issue for these countries.
There is also a group of countries at the bottom left hand corner for figure 3,
including Bangladesh, Pakistan, among others, where corruption is clearly just one
of many issues that need to be dealt with in order to attract international trade
opportunities, including changes to the legal system to implement and enforce
intellectual property laws, investment in infrastructure, business friendly tax
regimes, and enforcement of business contracts. Some researchers have even
suggested that corruption in certain markets serves as a lubricant for international
trade as it makes up for the low quality of government agencies and poorly trained
8. Doing Business 2011, supra note 2, at 152.
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government officials.9 This is not to say that such countries could not benefit from
implementing anti-corruption measures and improving the quality of their
government organizations and officials. They simply need to focus on other areas
first.
The aforementioned observations indicating that corruption is not the only
factor impacting international trade are valuable as we compare the 2010
international trade per capita, defined as the sum of imports and exports divided by
the 2010 population, to the TI CPI values for each of the thirty countries as shown
in figure 4.10 We note that oil and gas imports and exports were excluded from
this analysis as we tried to isolate the discretionary forms of international trade.
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Figure 4. 2010 International Trade per Capita vs. CPI
At first glance, the data in figure 4 does not seem particularly enlightening as
there are many outliers that would be expected to have either much lower or much
higher levels of international trade per capita based only on their TI CPI value. On
closer examination of the data, taking into account the other factors impacting
international trade, such as geographic location, tax regimes, and relative labor
costs, we can start to see relevant clusters of data. In figure 4 we highlight some of
the relevant clusters. Of these clusters, the two that are the most useful are the
Eastern European cluster (in blue) and the Middle East cluster (in green). In
looking at the two groups of Eastern European countries with Russia, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan in one group (Group A) and Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Poland in
another (Group B), we see a significant difference in the level of international trade
per capita and TI CPI values between the two groups. The correlation coefficient
9. CHRISTIAN WILLEM JOHAN BOGMANS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 72-75 (2011), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=1 14694.
10. International Trade per Capita data is based on total imports and exports for 2010 divided by
2010 population as reported by the World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog#Tables.
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between international trade per capita and CPI is 0.90 for the seven countries in
Group A and B. The countries in Group A and Group B were all part of the former
Soviet Union, have similar corporate tax rates, labor costs, and are generally
similar in terms of transportation infrastructure." While there are certainly some
differences amongst the group of countries, the perceived level of corruption is a
key difference between the two groups.
The comparison of the Group A countries to the Group B countries is
particularly insightful as it allows us to potentially quantify the economic cost of
corruption for the Group A countries with reference to the results of the Group B
countries. Table 1 displays the predicted level of international trade per capita for
the Group A countries based on a TI CPI value of 5.3, equal to that of Poland.
Poland was selected as the appropriate benchmark as it has the highest population
of the Group B countries and is also the largest in terms of land mass, making it the
most comparable to the relatively more populated and geographically large Group
A countries.
Table 1. Estimated Economic Cost of Corruption - Eastern Europel 2
Country (2010 Trading TI International Population International Adjusted
Figures) Across CPI Trade (USD Trade per International
Borders Millions) Capita (USD) Trade (L1SD)
Bulgaria 108 3.6 45,969 7,543,325 6,094
Croatia 98 4.1 31,856 4,424,161 7,200
Kazakhstan 181 2.9 49,141 16,316,050 3,012 91,662
Poland 49 5.3 329,548 38,187,488 8,630
Russian 162 2.1 365,473 141,750,000 2,578 857,792
Federation
Ukraine 139 2.4 112,171 45,870,700 2,445 283,681
Hungary 21 3.1 182,371 81,121,077 18,221
The findings of the analysis suggest that Russia's level of international trade
could be nearly $860 billion higher, more than two times current 2010 levels, if
there was a dramatic change in Russia's perception of corruption equal to that of
Poland (a movement from 2.1 to 5.3 on TI's CPI). This potential impact for
Ukraine could be over $280 billion and Kazakhstan over $90 billion.
As Russia is often compared to other members of BRIC, namely Brazil,
India, and China, we compare Russia's level of international trade for 2010 to
these countries (see table 2). We also show this comparison based on a corruption-
adjusted international trade figure from table 1. Based on 2010 data, Russia had a
total level of non-oil and gas related international trade of $365 billion, the lowest
level of international trade among BRIC.13 With the corruption adjusted value of
over $1.2 trillion, Russia could be well ahead of Brazil and about half of India's
$2.5 trillion in international trade for 2010.
11. See generally Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) Data
Portal, THE WORLD BANK, http://beeps.prognoz.com/beeps/Home.ashx (last visited Nov. 7, 2011)
(providing analysis of corporate tax rates, labor costs, and transportation infrastructure for former
Soviet Union states).
12. International Trade per Capita data is based on total imports and exports for 2010 divided by
2010 population as reported by the World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog#Tables.
13. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2. Estimated Economic Cost of Corruption for Russia
Country Trading TI CPI International Population Russia Adjusted
(2010 Figures) Across 2010 Trade (USD International
Borders Millions) Trade - USD
Millions
Brazil 114 3.7 399,379 194,949,470
China 50 3.5 2,972,960 1,338,299,512
India 100 3-3 2,490,489 1,170,938,000
Russia 162 2.1 365,473 141,750,000 1,223,265
Federation
Similar results can be obtained by examining the cluster of Middle Eastern
countries (in green) in figure 4. Egypt, although similar to Jordan and Turkey in
many regards, has a significantly lower level of international trade per capita. As
shown in table 3, Egypt's level of international trade could be over $200 billion
higher than actual 2010 levels if Egypt's perception of corruption improved to
levels consistent with Jordan and Turkey (from TI's CPI of 3.1 to 4.4).
Table 3. Estimated Economic Cost of Corruption for Egypt
Country Trading TI CPI International Population Adjusted
(2010 Figures) Across 2010 Trade International
Borders (USD Millions) Trade - USD
Millions
Egypt, Arab Rep. 21 3.1 79,361 81,121,077 217,220
Jordan 77 4.7 22,108 6,047,000
Turkey 76 4.4 299,520 72,752,325
We note that the figures noted for Russia and Egypt may not be entirely
explained by differences in perception of corruption as there may be other
factors/limitations that lead to differences in the level of international trade for the
various markets. The analysis here attempts to identify comparisons where
corruption is one of the most important factors influencing the differences in
international trade levels per capita. The numbers shown in tables 2 and 3 should
be best viewed as hypothetical outcomes that each market can achieve if it includes
combating corruption among its top priorities, along with other policies that work
to attract international trade opportunities.
IV. OTHER METHODS TO ESTIMATE THE ECONOMIC COST OF CORRUPTION
The findings of this analysis are based primarily on a qualitative comparison
and analysis of the thirty countries considered to be emerging or frontier markets.
We have not performed a statistical analysis by means of regression or other
methods to quantify the impact of corruption on international trade. There are
other researchers, including research conducted by Global Financial Integrity
(GFI), a Washington, DC-based think tank, that have attempted to perform such
analyses and have found similarly dramatic results as shown in this article. 14
14. Dev Kar & Karly Curcio, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries 2000-2009,
Global Financial Integrity, Jan. 2011, available at http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents
/reports/IFF20 1 0/gfi iff update report-web.pdf.
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In examining the economic cost of corruption, some researchers have drawn
the analogy between payment of a bribe to payment of a tax.' 5 The premise being,
as an investor, if one knows that they have to pay a tariff on imports of 10 percent
and also knows that they will have to pay bribes to customs officials of 10 percent
to get products through possible lengthy and costly delays at the port, the investor
would not distinguish between these two payments of the tariff and bribe and a
single payment of the 20 percent tariff. If the amount of the bribe is known, and
assuming all other factors are the same, a risk neutral investor would be indifferent
between investing in a country with a 20 percent tariff and a country that had a 10
percent tariff and 10 percent bribe requirement. In reality, the amount and timing
of the bribe is rarely known and this uncertainty would require a much lower tariff
rate than 10 percent to convince the investor to invest.' 6 This analogy between
corruption as a form of taxation is useful, however, as it can help to quantify the
economic impact of corruption, something that has rarely been quantified, based
on the economic impact of taxation, something which has been studied and
evaluated on a much greater scale.
Research by Shang-Jin Wei based on a statistical analysis of TI's CPI index,
country tax rates, capital control policies, foreign direct investment levels, and
accounting for other variables such as GDP levels and other government policies,
concluded that a drop of 1.0 points on the TI CPI index would have an equivalent
impact on foreign direct investment as a 4.69 percent increase in the corporate tax
rate.' 7 While the research focused on foreign direct investment, international trade
would be expected to be similarly impacted. Based on the TI CPI index figures for
2010, the findings of this research would suggest than an increase in the corruption
level from that of Singapore to Russia would have an equivalent impact on foreign
direct investment as a 33.8 percent increase in the corporate tax rate. Given
Russia's 2011 average corporate tax rate of 20.0 percent,' 8 the implied tax rate
given Russia's perceived level of corruption would be a whopping 53.8 percent,
compared to Singapore's tax rate of 17.0 percent. These findings may be helpful
in explaining why Russia, with a relatively low corporate tax rate, has a much
lower level of international trade as compared to other BRIC countries, namely
China, India, and Brazil. Similarly, an increase in the corruption level from that of
Singapore to Egypt would have an equivalent impact on foreign direct investment
as a 29.1 percent increase in the corporate tax rate. Given Egypt's 2011 average
corporate tax rate of 20.0 percent,' 9 the implied tax rate given Egypt's perceived
level of corruption would be 49.1 percent. These findings are also consistent with
15. Shang-Jin Wei, Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the Burden of Taxes and
Capital Controls?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 73, 74-76, 78
(James R. Hines, Jr. ed., 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0720.pdf.
16. The potential impact of fines and damage to reputation cannot be measured, and therefore,
would also negatively impact investment.
17. Wei, supra note 15, at 74-76, 78.
18. Russia Highlights, DELOiTTE (2011), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%/20
Assets/Documents/Tax/Intl%2OTax%20and%20Business%20Guides/201 1/dtt tax highlight 2011 Rus
sia.pdf.
19. Egypt Highlights, DELOITTE (2011), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%/
20Assets/Documents/Tax/Intl%20Tax%20and%20Business%20Guides/201 1/dttl taxhighligh_2011 E
gypt.pdf.
2012 443
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the analysis presented in tables 2 and 3 as perceived tax rates that are 33.8 percent
and 29.1 percent higher than actual tax rates are likely to lead to significantly
lower international trade levels than would otherwise be expected.
V. WHAT STEPS CAN RUSSIA TAKE?
Our research and the research performed by others indicate that the
perception of Russia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world comes at a
potentially steep economic price. 20 The good news is that this perception can be
reversed. Singapore is perhaps the most dramatic example of this as it was
considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world early in the twentieth
century and is now considered the least corrupt country in the world according to
both TI's CPI and the World Bank's WGI. Russia does not have to go so far back
in history as Singapore to find a role model, it has only to look at a fellow member
of BRIC, China.
Although neither Russia nor China has a low perception of corruption based
on TI's CPI, there is a large difference between the two countries according to the
Trading Across Borders rankings as shown in figures 1 and 2. Russia is close to
the predicted level for ease of international trade, as shown by the trend lines in the
figures, while China's ranking as a trading partner is significantly better than what
the data would predict. Based on China's TI's CPI value of 3.5, China could be
number 115 in the Trading Across Borders ranking.2' Instead, China is ranked
number 50, 65 notches higher than predicted.22 Russia, on the other hand, is 2.1 on
TI's CPI and 162nd on the Trading Across Borders ranking.23 Russia could be
number 145th based on the predicted results. 24 Why does China do so much better
than Russia on its perception as a trading partner than Russia? What can Russia
learn from China in greatly improving its image as a reliable trading partner?
To answer these questions, we examine the nine factors that go into the Ease
of Doing Business Index. The following government services are particularly
relevant from a corruption perception standpoint: obtaining of business and
construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors,
paying taxes, trading across borders (customs), enforcing contracts, and closing a
business. Put differently, corruption in these areas is likely to have the greatest
impact on the Ease of Doing Business Index ranking. Table 4 provides a
comparison of China and Russia across these nine factors.
20. Kar & Curcio, supra note 14; Fred Weir, Russia corruption costs $318 billion - one-third of
GDP, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 23, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global
-News/2009/1123/russia-corruption-costs-318-billion-one-third-of-gdp.
21. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, supra note 1, at 3; Doing Business 2011, supra note 2, at
156.
22. Doing Business 2011, supra note 2, at 156.
23. Id. at 189.
24. Id.
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Table 4. Ease of Doing Business: Russia-China Comparison
(2010 Data frong the World Bank)25  China Russia
Ease of Doing Business Rank (Composite
Ranking) 79 123
Starting a Business 151 108
Dealing with Construction Permits 181 182
Registering Property 38 51
Getting Credit 65 89
Protecting Investors 93 93
Paying Taxes 114 105
Trading Across Borders 50 162
Enforcing Contracts 15 18
Closing a Business 68 103
Table 4 shows that, while the two countries are generally similar across most
categories, one significant difference relates to the Trading Across Borders
category. As noted, China ranks at number 50 while Russia is at number 162. This
category relates specifically to government agencies and policies dealing with
international trade, including import tariff regimes, customs organizations, port
authorities, and transportation companies. An explanation of the discrepancy in the
levels of international trade for these markets may be explained through further
analysis of the rules and organizations for each country as they relate to these
agencies.
The average tariff for China was 9.8 percent in 2010, but this figure has
come down gradually from close to 15 percent in 2000.26 Furthermore, China
implemented specific measures to improve and modernize its customs agencies
and to combat corruption in its customs agencies leading up to and after its entry
into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Over the last ten years, China has
tried to build a culture of enforcement and has prosecuted a number of high-level
cases involving senior customs officials. These measures may have contributed to
a significant improvement in the perception of China as a reliable trading partner
from number 100 in 2004 to number 50 in 2011.
In order to specifically target the relatively low levels of international trade,
Russia can learn from China's experience and implement a long-term policy with
respect to tariffs so as to reduce the uncertainty associated with the Russian tariff
regime. Specifically, Russia can invest in improving the quality of its customs
25. Id. at 156, 189.
26. Isola Oluwabusuyi, Doing Business with China: Is China Keeping its Legal WTO
Obligations?, 3 J. OF INT'L ECON. AND FIN. 88, 89 (2011) available at http://www.academic
joumals.org/jeif/PDF/pdf%202Ol 1/February/Oluwabusuy.pdf; Thomas Rumbaugh & Nicolas Blancher,
China: International Trade and WTO Accession 18 (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/36, Mar. 2004)
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0436.pdf.
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officials and of the customs organization overall. The customs officials need to be
evaluated on a series of metrics that are aligned with Russia's objectives for
international trade. Of these metrics, reductions in waiting time at the border
needs to be a high priority as the combination of bad institutions, low quality of
customs officials, and unpredictable waiting times at the border all work to stifle
international trade. Significant improvements in these areas may lead to an
improved perception of corruption for Russia and could reduce the impact of the
perception of corruption on international trade.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis of emerging and frontier markets presented here, there
is clearly a correlation between the perception of corruption and levels of
international trade. Countries that are ranked high in perception of corruption are
generally also perceived as the most difficult countries in terms of ease of
international trade. While perception of corruption is not the only relevant factor
impacting international trade, for certain countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Egypt,
a significant reduction in the perception of corruption may have as much, if not
more, of an impact on international trade as favorable labor laws, tax rates, and
capital (currency) control measures.
446 VOL. 40:1-3




The international community has developed several different types
of legal regimes to govern natural resources. In general terms, these
include:
* according states exclusive permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, a system associated with territoriality;
* sharing resources, as in the cases of international rivers and
migratory species;
* recognizing common property rights, as in the case of the
high seas, where no one user has exclusive rights to
resources and no one can exclude others from exploiting
them, but capturing resources results in exclusive property
rights; and
* recognizing property as the common heritage of mankind -
or, to use a more contemporary phrase, the common
heritage of humankind (CH) - whereby all manage
resources and share in the rewards of exploiting them, even
if they are not able to participate in that exploitation.
In this essay I reflect on what has happened to the CH principle,
which underlies the last of these regimes. Several exemplary studies
have examined the evolution and content of the CH principle.'
* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author
thanks Professors Richard Finkmoore and Matt Schaefer for their helpful comments on a
draft of this essay.
1. See, e.g., KEMAL BAsLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY § 2.1.10 (2003); R.P. Anand, Common
Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Idea, 37 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Elisabeth
Mann Borgese, The Common Heritage of Mankind: From Non-living to Living Resources
and Beyond, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1313 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds.,
2002); Jan Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some
Aspects), in 162 RECUEIL DES COURS 249, 294-300 (1979); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, The
Common Heritage of Mankind in the Present Law of the Sea, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE
SHIGERU ODA 1363 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002); Erik Franckx, The International
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Although I comment on the evolution of the principle, I also focus on
recent developments affecting its implementation and its possible
future.
Part II of this essay discusses what the CH principle means in
international law. This discussion involves three questions: To what
situations does the principle apply? What are its components or
elements? And what is its legal status? Parts III and IV suggest that
"context" is essential to understanding the CH principle, or indeed any
principle of international law. Part III places the CH principle, which
was promoted especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s, in historical
context. Part IV notes that the CH principle has been incorporated in
some treaties. The most notable of these is Part XI of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("LOS Convention"), 2 as
revised by its associated 1994 Implementation Agreement, 3 concerning
seabed mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. An additional
development has accompanied the translation from principle to detailed
rule in the law of the sea: the practice of states and international legal
institutions has reinforced aspects of the CH seabed mining regime.
Finally, Part V of this essay evaluates the current status and
significance of the CH principle or concept. What, if anything, remains
of it?
Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of Mankind: The Need for States to Establish
the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf, 25 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 543 (2010);
L.F.E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of "The Common Heritage of Mankind,"
10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 69 (1983); Edward Guntrip, The Common Heritage of Mankind:
An Adequate Regime for Managing the Deep Seabed?, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 376 (2003);
Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986); Alexandre-Charles Kiss, La Notion de
Patrimoine Commun de l'Humanitd, in 175 RECUEIL DES COURS 99 (1982); Bradley
Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in
International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983); R. St. J. Macdonald, The
Common Heritage of Mankind, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG:
FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 153 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995); Arvid Pardo
& Carl Q. Christol, The Common Interest: Tension Between the Whole and the Parts, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 643 (R. St. J. Macdonald &
Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); Rildiger Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, www.mpepil.com (updated
Nov. 2009; last visited Dec. 10, 2010); Rildiger Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 312 (1983). These sources cite much additional commentary.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
3. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, adopted July 28, 1994, 1836
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Part XI Implementation Agreement].
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II. THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE
We can explore the meaning of any principle by considering three
questions. First, to what events or situations does it apply? That is,
with respect to the CH principle, what sorts of property or resources fall
within the scope of the principle? Second, what are the elements or
components of the principle, the features that give it content? And
third, what is its legal status? When we ask these questions about the
CH principle we discover that its meaning is less than clear, despite
several decades of use of the principle in international law.
The first question is perhaps the easiest to answer. States and
commentators have promoted the CH principle as applying particularly
to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and to natural
resources found there. One early influential document was the
Declaration of Principles, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1970.4 Paragraph 1 of this Declaration provides that "[t]he sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind."5 Article
136 of the widely adopted 1982 LOS Convention explicitly provides that
"[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind";6 the
Convention defines the "Area" as "the seabed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,"7 and
"resources" are limited to "solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in
situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic
nodules."8 Article 11 of the 1979 Moon Treaty, now in force for thirteen
states (albeit none of the space powers), explicitly incorporates the CH
principle.9 The principle has also been discussed in connection with
Antarctica,10 and some commentators have advocated applying the
4. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 24 (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration
of Principles].
5. Id. 1.
6. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
7. Id. art. 1(1)(1).
8. Id. art. 133(a).
9. 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies art. 11, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
10. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.2 (1983), 38th Sess., 1st Comm., Summary Record
of the 42nd Mtg. (comments of Mr. Abidin of Malaysia, urging that the "common heritage
approach . be considered in a future international design for Antarctica"). In 2005
Malaysia abandoned its efforts to promote more global and U.N. involvement in Antarctic
matters. See Marie Jacobsson, The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and Environmental
Issues - Future Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 1 (Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds.,
2007).
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principle to other common space resources, including geostationary
orbit and high seas fisheries." In 1995 Malta invoked the CH principle
in proposing that the U.N. Trusteeship Council be transformed "from a
guardian of dependent territories to a body that acts as guardian and
trustee of the global commons and the common concerns in the interest
of present and future generations,"1 2 a proposal directed at conserving
the international environment.
Commentators and international organizations have also proposed
that a range of other, non-common space resources that are essential to
humans and of widely shared interest should be governed under a CH
regime. Such resources include, for example, rain forests, genetic
resources (even when found within national boundaries), cultural
heritage, and food. 13 However, the idea of applying the CH principle to
resources within the territorial jurisdiction of states has proved
controversial, and the principle has gained traction only with respect to
some common space resources, particularly deep seabed minerals in the
Area.14
Second, what are the elements of the CH principle? Features often
associated with it include:
* a prohibition of acquisition of, or exercise of sovereignty
over, the area or resources in question;
* the vesting of rights to the resources in question in
humankind as a whole;
* reservation of the area in question for peaceful purposes;
* protection of the natural environment;
* an equitable sharing of benefits associated with the
exploitation of the resources in question, paying particular
11. See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 1, at 145-64.
12. Letter from the Permanent Rep. of Malta to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General (June 2, 1995), U.N. Doc. A/50/142, at 3 (June 16, 1995).
13. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
552 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing FAO Conf. Res. 5189 (1989), an Agreed Interpretation of the
International Undertaking, recognizing plant genetic resources as "a common heritage of
mankind to be preserved, and to be freely available for use, for the benefit of present and
future generations"); Borgese, supra note 1, at 1313-34; Kiss, supra note 1, at 164-96.
14. The International Law Association's influential 2002 New Delhi Declaration of
Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development categorized "the
proper management of climate system, biological diversity and fauna and flora of the
Earth" as "the common concern of humankind," while grouping "[t]he resources of outer
space and celestial bodies and of the sea-bed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction" as "the common heritage of humankind." ILA New Delhi
Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development,
Annex 1.3, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTIETH CONFERENCE 22, 26 (2002)
[hereinafter ILA New Delhi Declaration] (emphasis added).
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attention to the interests and needs of developing states;
and
* governance via a common management regime.
The first two of these features relate to the juridical status of the
area in question. The first - prohibition on sovereignty - is not unique
to a CH regime: for example, it has long been accepted that no state
may exercise sovereignty over the high seas. The notion that rights
vest in humankind as a whole does, however, radically diverge from the
concept of high seas freedoms, which permits individual acquisition of
fish or other resources.
The next three features concern the utilization of the area and
resources in question. Some formulations of the CH principle explicitly
provide that protection of the environment entails a sharing of burdens
as well as benefits,15 and note that such protection involves an
obligation to take into account the interests of future generations.16
Because non-peaceful uses of an area could destroy its resources, the
peaceful purposes prong may also encompass concern with future
generations. The equitable sharing of benefits, implying distributive
justice, is the most novel and most controversial feature of the CH
principle. This element may imply a sharing or broadening of the base
of knowledge about resources. It also encompasses sharing the material
benefits or proceeds derived from exploiting resources. Opposition to
this benefit-sharing feature, as well as to the prohibition on
sovereignty, help explain why the CH principle has not been applied to
rain forests or other resources located within national territory.1 7
The last feature, governance through a common management
system, reflects the view that "humankind" as a whole is responsible for
managing the area or resource in question. The CH principle
anticipates the creation of appropriate institutional machinery or other
cooperative arrangements to implement such governance.
Although I assert that these features are "often associated" with
the CH principle, each of them has been subject to much debate. States
and commentators disagree about several components of the CH
principle. A few examples provide a sense of the discourse:
Juridical Status. The United States has historically argued that
the CH principle is simply another verbal formulation of a freedoms
regime, under which no country has sovereignty over a common space
but may acquire exclusive property rights in its resources.18 Professor
15. BASLAR, supra note 1, at 99-103.
16. Id. at 103-05, 174; Joyner, supra note 1, at 195.
17. NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
18. See Goldie, supra note 1, at 80-81.
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Christopher Joyner argues that "vesting of rights in all of humankind"
is an element only of a radical form of the CH principle.19 Many
commentators, however, regard humankind's rights to the resources as
an essential characteristic of the CH principle.
Utilization: Peaceful Purposes. The International Law Association,
in its 1986 Seoul Declaration concerning the CH principle, does not list
"peaceful purposes" among the utilization features of a common
heritage regime. 20 Commentators have noted that "peaceful purposes"
could stand apart from the CH concept as a separate principle. 21
Utilization: Environmental Protection. The existence and
formulation of an environmental protection element of the CH principle
have been disputed. Professor R. St. J. McDonald does not consider
environmental protection an element. He finds that environmental
preservation is linked to "an obligation to leave a particular area in as
good a condition as the present generation received it," and believes
that "obligations on intergenerational rights and on environmental and
natural preservation" must await "a more mature" formulation of the
CH principle. 22 By contrast, Judge Riidiger Wolfrum finds that "the
interests of future generations have to be respected in making use of
the international commons," approaches environmental protection
through the lens of sustainable development, and considers "the concept
of sustainable development [to be] one of the important elements of the
common heritage principle." 23 However, Professor Duncan French
questions whether the concept of sustainable development applies to
common spaces, noting that "the generic idea of 'development' . . . has
generally been conceptually restricted to areas within a State's
territory, or at least its jurisdiction" and that Agenda 21 did not
mention the deep seabed when discussing sustainable development.24
Utilization: Benefit Sharing. Commentators dispute whether the
equitable sharing of benefits under the CH principle requires
19. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192-93.
20. See Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order § 7, in INT'L LAW
Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 8 (1987) [hereinafter ILA Seoul
Declaration].
21. BASLAR, supra note 1, at 106-07.
22. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 155.
23. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, T 22-23; see BASLAR,
supra note 1, at 103.
24. Duncan French, From the Depths: Rich Pickings of Principles of Sustainable
Development and General International Law on the Ocean Floor - the Seabed Disputes
Chamber's 2011 Advisory Opinion, 26 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 525, 535 (2011).
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preferential treatment for developing states. According to Wolfrum, de
facto equal participation "derives from the common heritage concept,
placing all States . .. on the same footing and accordingly benefitting all
States," but preferential treatment "favours only developing countries
and has its roots in the development aid philosophy."25 Joyner, arguing
that the CH principle includes the idea that "any economic benefits
derived from" efforts in a common space "would be shared
internationally,"2 6 also finds that giving a preference to developing
countries is an ideological gloss accepted only in some formulations of
the principle. 27
Common Management. If a common management or other
cooperative decision-making arrangement has not actually been
established, the question arises how a country should act in accordance
with the CH principle. Wolfrum concludes that each state must then
"decide how to ensure that activities subject to the principle are carried
out for the benefit of all mankind." To this end, each state retains
discretion "whether to attempt to achieve this objective by refraining
from unilateral, in favour of joint, activities, by seeking cooperation on a
bilateral or multilateral basis, or by distributing revenues or
information."2 8 However, the possibility that a state could comply with
the CH principle by unilaterally "distributing revenues or information"
raises questions about whether common management is an essential
element of the CH concept. For some, a procedural element of the CH
principle, requiring that exploration and exploitation of resources must
be managed under treaty-based mechanisms, may be more
controversial than a substantive requirement of some sort of sharing of
benefits.
Other Possible Elements. Joyner stresses that scientific research
"would be freely and openly permissible" under a CH regime, with
research results made available to those interested in them.29 This
assertion is consistent with the notion that the CH principle requires
25. Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at 323.
26. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192.
27. See id. at 192-93.
28. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, 25 (emphasis
added). See Tullio Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal
Framework for All Activities in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION 309, 313 (Davor Vidas ed., 2010) (suggesting
that each state operating under a CH principle has the obligation, even absent
institutional direction, to ensure that knowledge resulting from marine scientific research
be disseminated). For discussion of the possible roles of states and international
institutions in managing different CH regimes, see Kiss, supra note 1, at 240-42.
29. Joyner, supra note 1, at 192.
2012 453
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sharing benefits,30 but most commentators do not specifically include
scientific research as one of the features characterizing how a CH
resource or area must be utilized. Professor Kemal Baslar would add
the explicit requirement that "only those natural and cultural resources
which globally affect the survival and welfare of mankind can be
exploited, conserved or protected under the common heritage regime." 3 1
Others suggest that the "common concern" concept, important in
international environmental law, is distinct from and weaker than the
CH principle, not incorporating other elements of the CH principle. 32
In sum, one source of indeterminacy in articulating the CH
principle is disagreement about which elements comprise the CH
principle and how each should be formulated.
In addition, some words commonly associated with the CH
principle are themselves unclear. For example, what is meant by
"[hu]mankind"? Does this word encompass future generations? Does it
suggest that the CH principle embodies a type of human right? Or does
it include, along with states, only peoples and territories that are not
yet capable of self-governance? How broad is the definition of
"benefits"? Do the words "peaceful purposes" connote complete
demilitarization or simply limit uses of force to those that have been
recognized as legal in other contexts? The law is to some degree
inevitably indeterminate, 3 3 but typical formulations of the CH principle
on their face leave significant questions about its meaning.
The reason why the features I set out above are often associated
with the CH principle becomes clearer when we consider the context in
which the principle developed (outlined in Part III). These features also
may be found (albeit some of them in qualified form) in one part of the
treaty that implements the CH principle in the most detail, namely
Part XI of the LOS Convention as modified by the 1994 Implementation
Agreement. The terms of the LOS Convention and the Implementation
Agreement limit the indeterminacy of the CH principle as developed in
that treaty regime.
Finally, consider the third question: What is the legal status of the
CH principle? Where the CH principle has been included in a treaty
that has entered into force, states parties are of course bound by the
principle in the form incorporated in the treaty. Assertions about a
more universal legal status for the CH principle have varied widely.
30. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 98.
31. Id. at 110.
32. Id. at 287-96; NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
33. See John E. Noyes, Interpreting the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Defining
Its Terms, in DEFINITIONS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982
CONVENTION 45 (George K. Walker ed., 2012) (discussing treaty interpretation and
indeterminacy).
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Some have argued that it sets out a fundamental and non-derogable
norm, constituting a jus cogens obligation.3 4 This assertion historically
seems linked to political efforts to promote the CH principle in the LOS
Convention, but today must raise eyebrows, especially outside that
context. Some have concluded that the principle has attained the
status of customary international law. The International Law
Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration, for example, provides that "[t]he
concept of the common heritage of mankind as a general legal principle
has entered into the corpus of public international law."35 Writing in
2009, Wolfrum also finds that "[t]he common heritage principle, as far
as the use of common spaces is concerned, is a part of customary
international law," constituting "a distinct basic principle providing
general . . . legal obligations with respect to the utilization of areas
beyond national jurisdiction."36  Others have found too bold the
assertion that the CH principle is established in customary
international law. For example, Joyner (although writing before the
1994 Implementation Agreement and the ensuing widespread
acceptance of the LOS Convention) concludes that the CH principle is
too indeterminate and too lacking in accompanying state practice and
opinio juris to have gained acceptance in customary international law.3 7
Even if one were to conclude that the principle today rises to the level of
customary international law, one would have to be open to the
possibility that some states may have persistently objected to applying
the principle in particular settings.
If not a principle of international law, the CH principle is left to the
realm of political or moral concept or non-binding soft law. Professors
Ved Nanda and George Pring accurately but cautiously report that the
CH concept "has received very favorable support from many expert
34. See, e.g., 14 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
OFFICIAL RECORDS 16 ( 52, 58), 37 (1 93), 42 (T 6), 71 ( 145), 75 (1 6), U.N. Sales No.
E.82.V.2 (1980) (statements of representatives of India, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina,
Iran, Jamaica, and Niger); see also BASLAR, supra note 1, at 365-67; Degan, supra note 1,
at 1373-74. For purposes of the LOS Convention, the CH principle is accorded special
prominence. The Convention provides that "States Parties agree that there shall be no
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth
in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof."
LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 311(6).
35. ILA Seoul Declaration, supra note 20, § 7.1; ILA New Delhi Declaration, supra
note 14, pmbl., at 24 (reaffirming the Seoul Declaration in 2002).
36. Wolfrum, The Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, 1 25. See supra note
14 and accompanying text.
37. Joyner, supra note 1, at 197-99; accord Report of the Committee on Legal Aspects
of a New International Economic Order, in INT'L LAw ASSN, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE 409, 469 (1987) [hereinafter ILA NIEO Report] (comments of Prof. D.H.N.
Johnson, remarking that "the concept of the common heritage of mankind ... is not yet a
principle of international law, let alone a basic one").
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commentators" and refrain from giving an opinion on its exact legal
status.3 8
With respect to one arena - the mineral resources of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction - a decision maker could well
find that the CH principle represents customary international law. The
near-universal acceptance of the LOS Convention and the 1994
Implementation Agreement, 39 along with the practice of states and
international organizations concerning deep seabed minerals, 40 provide
evidence supporting customary international law status. However, the
exact content of such a norm is debatable: does it track the particulars
of the widely accepted 1994 Implementation Agreement 4' or instead
reflect more general standards?42
In sum, we are left with significant questions about the scope of
application of the CH principle, and especially about its elements and
legal status. Any decision maker faced with applying the CH principle
to a legal dispute would have considerable discretion in interpreting its
meaning and status. As discussed in Part IV, the LOS Convention
added some determinacy to the meaning of the CH principle for
purposes of that treaty. We may also obtain some clues about the
meaning and lasting influence of the CH principle - or any principle -
by paying attention to the context in which it developed. Part III
explores some of the important context related to the CH principle.
III. HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL CONTEXTS
The standard story of the CH principle begins with the undoubtedly
influential August 1967 speech of Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta to
the U.N. General Assembly. In that speech, Pardo asserted that "[t]he
seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and
should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive
benefit of mankind as a whole." 43 More generally, Pardo also espoused
38. NANDA & PRING, supra note 1, § 2.1.10, at 35.
39. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs,
Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and
the Related Agreements as at 03 June 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference
files/chronological lists-of-ratifications.htm#The%/20United%/2ONations%/2OConvention%
20on%20the% 2OLaw%20f%2Othe%2OSea (last visited Dec. 10, 2011) (listingl62 parties
to the LOS Convention and 141 parties to the Part XI Implementation Agreement).
40. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
41. See Louis B. Sohn, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 696 (1994).
42. See Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at
333-37.
43. Quoted in Brownlie, supra note 1, at 294; see U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm. 22d Sess.,
1515th mtg., at 1-15, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967); U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm.,
22d Sess., 1516th mtg., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1516 (Nov. 1, 1967). Although Pardo's
invocation of the CH principle gained traction, work undertaken some forty years earlier
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an international oceans management regime responsible for a wide
range of oceans activities.44 Others articulated the CH principle in the
late 1960s as well. The World Peace Through Law Conference adopted
a resolution in July 1967 directed primarily at deep seabed resources,
but referring to "the high seas" as "the common heritage of all
mankind." 45 In a June 1967 speech, Ambassador Aldo A. Cocca of
Argentina, during deliberations of the U.N. Outer Space Committee,
argued that "the international community has endowed [a] new subject
of international law - mankind - with the vast [ ] common property" of
outer space. 46 Invocation of the CH principle in legal and political
forums coincided with proposals to exploit common space resources.
The perception that technology allowed, or might soon allow, the
exploitation of previously unobtainable common space resources, in
short, gave rise to proposals for new legal regimes to manage them.
The proposed CH regimes differed from regimes treating common
spaces as res communis, open to all, or res nullius, subject to occupation
and sovereignty.
Although these expressions of the CH principle were undoubtedly
important in pushing it onto the world political and legal stage, they
provide an overly narrow view of how and why the principle developed.
With any principle, it is important to try to identify its core underlying
values. When political formulations of a principle are linked to
longstanding values and traditions, the principle is more likely to
resonate with people and gain acceptance. A thorough investigation of
the values associated with the CH principle could fill at least a book,
but I note here a few pertinent points. The CH principle's antecedents
include the legal public trust doctrine and precepts of Roman law
applicable to common space resources. 47 A complete story of the origins
of the principle would also note its religious and natural law
in the League of Nations concerning living resources of the oceans had included similar
references. The League's Assembly appointed a Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law, which considered, inter alia, "[w]hether it is possible to
establish by way of international agreement rules regarding the exploitation of the
products of the sea." League of Nations Comm. of Experts for the Progressive Codification
of Int'l Law, Questionnaire No. 7 adopted by the Committee at its Second Session, held in
January 1926: Exploitation of the Products of the Sea, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. SPECIAL SUPP.
230, 230 (1926). The Rapporteur, Jose Le6n Suirez of Argentina, examined living
resources, finding that "[t]he riches of the sea, and especially the immense wealth of the
Antarctic region, are the patrimony of the whole human race." Jose Le6n Sudrez, Report
on the Exploitation of the Products of the Sea, in id. Annex 231, 236. See 1 PATRICIA
BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 109-13 (1985).
44. See Louis B. Sohn, Managing the Law of the Sea: Ambassador Pardo's Forgotten
Second Idea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 289-91 (1997).
45. Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 1, at 315.
46. U.N. Legal Subcomm. of the U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outerspace,
75th mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.75 (Nov. 13, 1967).
47. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 65-68.
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underpinnings. For example, all religious traditions emphasize the
promotion of peace and the resolution of disputes without recourse to
violence.48  All religious traditions emphasize the importance of
generosity, of sharing wealth with the poor and unfortunate, even if
they have not "earned" that wealth. 49 Furthermore, Judeo-Christian,
Islamic, and Buddhist traditions support the notion of human
stewardship of the earth, with responsibilities for future generations. 50
It is, admittedly, a large step from the view that individuals have
certain moral responsibilities to the view that nation-states should
embrace them with respect to non-citizens. Nonetheless, the ideals of
peaceful resolution of disputes, sharing with the poor, and stewardship
of the earth for future generations persuaded religious leaders to
endorse the CH principle.5 1 Furthermore, the perceived benefits of the
principle for individuals have led some commentators to regard it as a
human rights principle. 52
A consideration of context reveals, then, two important
underpinnings of the CH principle. In general, aspects of the principle
coincide with long-held values. Second, political leaders articulated the
principle at a time in history when it was important to develop legal
guidance concerning common space resources.
The context in which the CH principle developed also helps explain
why its scope of application, content, and legal status have remained so
disputed. 53 No one global forum arrived at consensus on the meaning of
48. See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, HOPE FOR A GLOBAL ETHIC 145-49 (2005).
49. The Old Testament of the Bible calls on property owners to leave a portion of
their lands' production to "the alien, the orphan, and the widow." Deuteronomy 24: 19-21;
id. 15:7-8; Leviticus 19:10; Proverbs 25:21. In the New Testament, Jesus called on people
to share material wealth with the less fortunate (and to cultivate a rightness of spirit).
Matthew 5:42; Luke 18:22. The Koran describes "true piety" or "righteousness" as
encompassing the giving "of one's substance, however cherished, to kinsmen, and
orphans, the needy, the traveler, beggars.' Koran 2:177. The Bhagavad Gita, Buddhist
scriptures, Confucius's Analects, and Bahd'i readings also extol the virtues of generosity
and help for the needy. See LEPARD, supra note 48, at 45-49, 86-87.
50. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 13-20.
51. See id. at 14-20; Borgese, supra note 1, at 1321-26.
52. See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 318-34; see also Ved P. Nanda, The Right to
Development: An Appraisal, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 41 (Ved P.
Nanda et al. eds., 1993) (reviewing individual human rights and collective aspects of the
right to development).
53. The U.N. General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of Principles, supra note 4,
focused only on deep seabed mineral resources, and its compromise language has been the
subject of much interpretive debate. See, e.g., Goldie, supra note 1, at 69-105. The
International Law Association, the world's foremost international non-governmental
organization devoted to the study and development of international law, adopted its Seoul
Declaration, supra note 20, two decades after the CH principle was articulated in various
forums on the law of the sea, outer space, and Antarctica; did so in an effort to promote
the "progressive development" of international law; and arrived at conclusions that were
immediately questioned. See ILA NIEO Report, supra note 37, at 411, 414-16, 469.
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this general concept early in its development. Much of the development
of the CH principle has been left to commentators who, as we saw in
Part II, often disagree about the principle's legal status and elements.
The indeterminacy surrounding the CH principle relates to the
political context of 1960s and 1970s. Debates over the CH principle
reflected deep-seated political tensions between Western developed
states and the Third World. In particular, developed and developing
states disagreed about whether rights to common space resources
should vest in all of humankind (rather than in whoever captured the
resource) and about whether benefits should be equitably distributed,
taking particular account of the needs developing states.5 '
Formulations of the CH principle that strongly emphasized the vesting
of rights in all of humankind and the distribution of benefits to
developing states were linked to the New International Economic Order
("NIEO") movement. In line with that movement, many developing
states criticized what they saw as Western economic exploitation.55 For
those states, the traditional law of the sea, based on high seas freedoms,
embodied such exploitation. Only developed states had the economic
wherewithal to send factory ships to fish freely off the coasts of
developing states, depleting coastal fisheries. Only maritime powers
had navies that could sail near the shores of developing states or
through their straits, posing security and environmental risks. The CH
principle as applied to deep seabed minerals - a principle incorporating
shared access to those common space resources, common management
responsibilities, and equitable distribution of benefits - was an antidote
to developed state privileges under the traditional law of the sea. In
Pardo's words:
We wanted dignity for poor countries and an end to
humiliating financial hand-outs, by giving even the poorest
54. In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, some Western leaders did in general terms
assert the need to respect the interests of all humanity in common spaces. For example,
in 1966 U.S. President Lyndon Johnson declared, "[w]e must insure that the deep seas
and the ocean bottom are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings." President Lyndon
Johnson, Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship, The
"Oceanographer," in 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 930, 931 (1966); see EDWARD WENK,
JR., THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 212-13, 258 (1972). Four years later, President Richard
Nixon issued a statement referring to deep seabed mineral resources as "the common
heritage of mankind," proposing "the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used
for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries," and calling for "international machinery" to "authorize and regulate
exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins." President
Richard Nixon, Statement About United States Oceans Policy (May 23, 1970), reprinted in
2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS 751-52 (S. Houston Lay et al.
eds., 1973). These U.S. statements did not, however, fully embrace all aspects of the CH
principle.
55. See Larschan & Brennan, supra note 1, at 306-12.
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members of the international community the opportunity to
obtain access to marine technology at a tolerable cost and to
participate on a basis of equality in the management and
development of very significant resources.
Finally, we wanted radically to change the traditional law of
the sea which, we believed, reflected the interests of only a few
members of the international community. It certainly was not
in harmony with the ever more urgent need of cooperation in
addressing world problems, and for environmental sensitivity
and sustainable cooperative development of world resources. In
short, we wanted the common heritage principle to replace
freedom of the seas as the foundation of international law of the
sea. 56
If it proved impossible to extend the CH principle to all ocean
spaces, its application to deep seabed mineral resources could, in
Pardo's view, partially counterbalance navigational and other privileges
accorded maritime powers. The political tension between NIEO
proponents and Western leaders who resisted restrictions on free
enterprise and were skeptical of international bureaucracy shaped how
the CH concept was implemented in Part XI of the LOS Convention.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE IN TREATY LAW
Legal principles have value even if left in general terms. Indeed, it
is not always desirable to convert broad principles into more concrete or
determinate rules. Principles of international law57 may fill gaps in
rules and provide decision makers with a guiding mindset - a reminder
of basic objectives of the law - when they interpret or apply rules.
Principles, when applied in good faith, also allow for, in David Caron's
words, "diversity within convergence."5 8 That is, they may accord
different states discretion to pursue a common objective in different
ways, in line with particular domestic political and legal arrangements.
56. Arvid Pardo, The Origins of the 1967 Malta Initiative, 9 INT'L INSIGHTS 66, 69
(1993). Pardo also acknowledged that Malta had certain selfish concerns at stake:
Government officials hoped that the initiative would bolster Malta's political standing
with other states, especially in the Mediterranean, and that Malta might become the
headquarters of a significant international institution. Id.
57. I refer to broad principles embodied in treaties and customary international law,
as well as to "general principles of law" derived from analogies to municipal law
principles.
58. See David D. Caron, Contemporary International Law Issues in the Asia Pacific:
The Importance and Challenge of the Difference Between Principles and Rules in
International Law 13, 2011 International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional
Conference on Contemporary International Law Issues in the Asia Pacific: Opportunities
and Challenges, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2011, available at http://works.bepress.com/david
caron/118.
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A legal principle need not be incorporated in treaty law in order to have
significance. Indeed, even as soft law, political concept, or "emerging
customary international law," a principle may be used to influence
debates and shape legal developments.
However, the CH principle itself points towards its eventual
incorporation and elaboration in treaty rules. If there is to be "common
management" or at least some cooperative decision-making structure
concerning common space resources - one commonly listed element of
the CH principle - the managers must know the governing procedures.
If natural resources or other benefits are to be shared equitably, it will
be helpful to learn exactly what is to be shared and how distribution is
to take place. The uncertainty about elements of the CH principle,
noted in Part II, may suggest the desirability of more determinate
language to guide states and other actors operating under the principle.
To this end, the U.N. General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of Principles
concerning deep seabed mineral resources provided that "an
international regime . . . including appropriate international machinery
to give effect to [the Declaration's] provisions shall be established by an
international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon." 59
The International Law Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration indicated
that the CH principle was "to be specified by internationally agreed
regimes." 60
Indeed, a few treaties have incorporated the CH principle. The
Moon Treaty explicitly does so, 6 1 and also sets out in general terms
several elements commonly associated with the principle. Along with
these elements - no acquisition of sovereignty over the moon or its
resources, equal access for parties to the use and exploration of the
moon, a peaceful purposes provision, and the requirement to carry out
exploration of the moon "for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development" 62 - the Moon Treaty commits its parties "to undertake to
establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible." 63 However, Part XI of the
LOS Convention, which provides that "[t]he Area and its resources are
the common heritage of mankind,"64 along with the 1994
Implementation Agreement, which reaffirms the CH character of the
Area and its resources, 65 are the only international agreements that
59. Declaration of Principles, supra note 4, 1 9.
60. ILA Seoul Declaration, supra note 20, 7.1.
61. Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11(1).
62. Id. arts. 2, 4, 11.
63. Id. art. 11(5).
64. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
65. Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
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have as yet developed detailed rules and procedures to implement the
CH principle. 66
The LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime for
deep seabed mining has been analyzed in depth elsewhere.67 For
present purposes, two general points deserve emphasis. First,
negotiating compromises resulted in a regime that, broadly, leaves
states operating through the International Seabed Authority ("ISA" or
"Authority") to represent humankind, but, in its details, does not fully
reflect several elements commonly associated with the CH principle.
Second, the practice of states and international institutions has
reinforced at least some CH features of the LOS Convention/1994
Implementation Agreement deep seabed mining regime.
The 1982 Convention itself reflected compromises related to the CH
principle. In negotiating the Convention, the political tensions noted in
Part III of this essay were evident. First, the deep seabed mining
regime in Part XI of the LOS Convention formed part of a "package
deal." Many developed states did not truly embrace the CH principle,
but were willing to accept its application to the Area and its minerals as
part of a package, the price for assurances in the LOS Convention of
expanded navigational rights and limits on coastal state jurisdiction.
Second, Part XI in its original form did not fully incorporate the version
of the CH principle advocated by Pardo and many developing states.
For example, Part XI established a so-called parallel system, whereby
national or private companies could exploit seabed resources in one of a
pair of mining sites; the Enterprise, which is the mining arm of the ISA,
or a developing state could mine only the second site.68 This parallel
66. The CH principle has been discussed in conjunction with other treaties, but it is
debatable whether they implement the principle. Some features of the Antarctic Treaty
system, e.g., reserving the continent for peaceful purposes, protecting the environment,
and sharing the results of scientific research, reflect elements of the CH principle.
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72. However, other features
appear incompatible with the CH principle, notably claims to sovereignty, a ban on
mineral exploitation (rather than exploitation with equitable distribution), and
management by only some parties to the Antarctic Treaty (rather than global common
management). See BASLAR, supra note 1, at 243-76; Guntrip, supra note 1, at 404-05. A
few other treaties also contain language that broadly echoes the CH principle. See
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage pmbl., Nov. 16,
1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 240 (referring to cultural and natural heritage sites as "the heritage
of all the nations of the world"); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
pmbl., Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (referring to outer space as the "province of all
mankind"). These treaties do not elaborate a detailed regime for common management or
for equitable distribution of benefits.
67. For an introduction to the deep seabed mining regime, see LOUIs B. SOHN,
KRISTEN GUSTAFSON JURAS, JOHN E. NOYES & ERIK FRANCKX, LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 339-45, 351-60 (2010).
68. See LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex III, arts. 3, 8-9.
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system undercut the equitable distribution or resource-sharing aim of
the CH principle with respect to a significant portion of seabed
resources. 69 Overall, the meaning of the CH principle, which is not
defined in Article 136 of the LOS Convention, was linked to particular
treaty provisions. According to the influential Virginia Commentary,
the meaning of "'common heritage of mankind' . . . for the purposes of
the Convention can be derived from other provisions of Part XI."'0
The 1994 Implementation Agreement reflected a changing global
political situation. Developed states refused to accept the LOS
Convention because they opposed its deep seabed mining provisions; the
United States under the Reagan administration was the most vocal
opponent of those provisions. Developing states agreed to changes that
benefited developed states and incorporated market-oriented features
into Part XI. Many developing states were, by the end of the twentieth
century, less enamored of NIEO precepts than they had been a few
decades earlier, and the Preamble to the 1994 Part XI Implementation
Agreement explicitly "note[s] the political and economic changes,
including market-oriented approaches, affecting the implementation of
Part XI."1 States agreed on changes necessary to persuade developed
states to accept the LOS Convention just months before it was due to
enter into force in November 1994. These changes are set out in the
Implementation Agreement and its Annex, which are "interpreted and
69. However, other LOS Convention provisions - e.g., requiring the transfer of
technology to developing states, obligating mining companies to pay significant fees to
assist with the Authority's expenses, and requiring parties to the Convention to fund the
mining activities of the Enterprise or provide it with technology - could have a
redistributional effect. See id. Annex III, arts. 5(1), 13, Annex IV, art. 11(3).
70. 6 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY I
136.8(a) (Satya N. Nandan ed., 2002) (emphasis added). The Commentary then
summarizes some of the relevant provisions of Part XI, section 2 of the LOS Convention:
[N]o state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over the
Area (article 137(1)); rights to the resources of the Area are vested in
humankind as a whole and may not be alienated (article 137(2)); activities in
the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of humankind as a whole,
"irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether coastal or land-
locked" (article 140(1)); financial and other economic benefits derived from
activities in the Area are to be shared equitably (article 140(2)); the Area is
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and can be used by all States
without discrimination (article 141); and States have a responsibility to
protect the marine environment from harmful effects that may be caused by
activities in the Area (article 145). In addition, the principle of the common
heritage of mankind requires that the interests and needs of developing
States, and especially the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
among them, be taken into particular consideration in the conduct of all
activities undertaken in the Area (e.g., articles 140(1), 143(3)(b), 144 and
148).
Id.
71. Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.
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applied together" with Part XI of the LOS Convention "as a single
instrument."72
The Implementation Agreement differed significantly from Pardo's
original vision of a CH regime. Some provisions, for example, affect the
goal of equitable distribution of benefits: provisions for the mandatory
transfer of technology to developing states "shall not apply";73 the
Enterprise is to operate through joint ventures in accordance with
"sound commercial principles," and the requirement that States Parties
fund the Enterprise "shall not apply";74 any state on the Authority's
Finance Committee, which would include the United States should it
become a party to the LOS Convention, could block financial
distributions.7 5 Other changes call into question whether the Authority
is to be operated under a true common management system: any one of
four chambers of states, each composed of states with similar
characteristics (including a chamber of developed states), may block
actions of the Authority's Council;76 LOS Convention provisions for a
Review Conference that might have resulted in amendments to Part XI
binding on parties even without their consent "shall not apply."77 One
commentator has concluded that the 1994 Implementation Agreement
pays "mere lip-service to [the CH] principle" and that the Agreement
and its Annex "have destroyed [the principle's] substance as defined in
the 1970 Declaration [of Principles]." 8 The U.S. view was that "the
common heritage principle fully comports with private economic
activity in accordance with market principles." 79
Despite these assessments, however, traditional elements of the
CH principle remain in place. As a formal matter, the 1994
Implementation Agreement did not change basic features of the CH
concept set out in the LOS Convention's Part XI, section 2 - e.g., the
prohibition on sovereign claims, the basic provision concerning the
72. Id. art. 2(1). Provisions of the Implementation Agreement prevail "[i]n the event
of any inconsistency" between the Agreement and Part XI of the LOS Convention. Id.
73. Id. Annex § 5.
74. Id. Annex § 2.
75. See id. Annex § 9(3), (7)-(8).
76. Id. Annex § 3(9)(a), (15)-(16).
77. Id. Annex § 4.
78. Degan, supra note 1, at 1374; accord Anand, supra note 1, at 16-18.
79. United States: President's Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S.
Senate with Commentary, 34 I.L.M. 1393, 1429 (1995). For an excellent overview of the
Part XI Agreement, see Bernard H. Oxman, Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement
on the Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994). Professor Oxman concludes that "[t]he 1994 Agreement
substantially accommodates the objections of the United States and other industrial
states to the deep seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention." Id. at 695;
see also Anand, supra note 1, at 16-17 ("The international community bent backwards to
make sure that Washington was satisfied and got all it wanted and more.").
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equitable sharing of benefits, the peaceful purposes provision, and the
requirement to protect the marine environment.80 Furthermore, states
and the ISA have reinforced aspects of the CH principle.81 By operating
continuously under the LOS Convention/1994 Implementation
Agreement, states and the ISA have, for example, emphasized that the
Area is not subject to claims of sovereignty. The Authority's mining
codes and contracts with miners mandate protections for the marine
environment, one component of a CH regime. 82 The CH notion of
sharing benefits is reflected in Authority-sponsored marine scientific
research concerning the Area, the results of which are widely
distributed.83
In practice, no state is actively pursuing any alternative deep
seabed mining regime. Although the U.S. Code still provides for a
registration mechanism for U.S. nationals involved with deep seabed
mining initiatives, 84 U.S. companies have essentially abandoned any
such initiatives.85  Activity is taking place only under the LOS
Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime. Parties to the
LOS Convention apply to the ISA, on their own behalf or by sponsoring
their nationals, in order to undertake mineral exploration, prospecting,
and eventually exploitation, and miners enter into contracts with the
Authority for those purposes. 86 The possibility of a competing deep
seabed regime appears extremely remote, and any such regime would
surely be condemned as inconsistent with international law.87 The LOS
Convention/Part XI Implementation Agreement regime has become the
"only game in town."
80. See Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 3, pmbl.; LOS Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 136-49; supra note 70.
81. In applying the core elements of the CH principle as set out in the LOS
Convention, the Authority is called on to take into account not only the interests of States
Parties but of all states. LOS Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
82. See Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed
Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic
Sulphides in the Area, ISBA 16/A/12 (May 7, 2010); Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the
Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting
and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, ISBA/6/A/18 (Oct. 4, 2000).
83. See Int'l Seabed Auth., http://www.isa.org.jmlen/scientific (last visited Jan. 17,
2012); Satya Nandan, Administering the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, in THE
LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 75, 91-92 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2006).
84. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73 (2011).
85. See SOHN ET AL., supra note 67, at 360.
86. For an overview of the Authority's activities, see Int'l Seabed Auth., Report of the
Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4,
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/17/A/2 (June 13, 2011).
87. E.g., L.D.M. Nelson, The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime, 10 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 189, 202 (1995) (concluding that widespread acceptance of the 1994
Implementation Agreement means the position that "deep seabed mining is a freedom of
the high seas" is "no longer tenable").
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Another institutional actor has also significantly reinforced the CH
underpinnings of the Part XI/Implementation Agreement regime. In
May 2010, in response to a request by Nauru, the ISA's Assembly asked
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea ("SBC" or "Chamber") to issue an advisory opinion on three
questions concerning, to quote the name of the case, "Responsibilities
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect
to Activities in the Area." 88 In the resulting unanimous opinion, which
the Authority's Council and Assembly in turn noted with appreciation,89
the SBC discussed several emerging aspects of the principle of
sustainable development, including them within the parameters of
sponsoring states' obligation of due diligence; these aspects have a
bearing on how duties of environmental protection concerning the Area
are to be carried out.90 The Chamber also explicitly highlighted aspects
of the CH principle as set forth in the deep seabed treaty regime. The
Chamber reiterated that the LOS Convention sought to 'contribute to
the realization of a just and equitable international economic order
which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole
and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing
countries, whether coastal or landlocked,"' concluding that various
Convention articles "require effective implementation with a view to
enabling the developing States to participate in deep seabed mining on
an equal footing with developed States."91 The "role of the sponsoring
State," the SBC found, "is to contribute to the common interest of all
States in the proper implementation of the principle of the common
88. According to Article 191 of the LOS Convention, the SBC "shall give advisory
opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities." LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 191. More particularly,
the three questions concerned: 1) the content of the obligations and responsibilities of
sponsoring states under the Part XI LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement
regime; 2) the extent of liability of sponsoring states should a sponsored entity fail to
comply with its undertakings; and 3) the measures a sponsoring state must take to fulfill
its responsibilities under the LOS Convention. Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17,
Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 455, 1 1 (2011) (Seabed Disputes Chamber of
the Int'l Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 2011).
89. Int'l Seabed Auth., Statement of the President of the Council of the International
Seabed Authority on the Work of the Council During the Seventeenth Session 8,
ISBA/17/C/21* (July 21, 2011); Int'l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the
International Seabed Authority Relating to the Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on Matters Relating to the
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area 2, ISBA/17/A/9 (July 25, 2011).
90. According to some commentators, the concept of sustainable development
underpins the environmental protection aspects of the CH principle. See Responsibilities
and Obligations 117-20, 136-37; see also French, supra note 24, at 538-44.
91. Responsibilities and Obligations 163 (quoting LOS Convention, supra note 2,
pmbl).
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heritage of mankind."92 The Chamber also determined that "obligations
relating to preservation of the environment . . . in the Area" have an
".erga omnes character," suggesting that the obligations are applicable to
all humankind. 93
The advisory opinion also highlighted compliance mechanisms that
could help specify rights under this erga omnes notion. The SBC
suggested that the Authority itself - by virtue of its implied powers
under Article 157(2), for the LOS Convention itself is silent on the point
- may make a claim for compensation for "damage to the Area and its
resources constituting the common heritage of mankind, and damage to
the marine environment."9 4 Furthermore, "[e]ach State Party may also
be entitled to claim compensation" for breach of these erga omnes
obligations. 95 Other actors that could make claims include "entities
engaged in deep seabed mining, other users of the sea, and coastal
States."96 These claims need not be relegated to diplomatic protests.
Article 187 of the LOS Convention, concerning the jurisdiction of the
SBC in contentious cases, provides one avenue of recourse for States
Parties, the Authority, or contractors with respect to breaches by
sponsoring states. The SBC's opinion reinforces the notion that the
Area and its resources are part of the common heritage of humankind.97
Although the ISA may challenge actions of sponsoring states that
violate CH requirements in the Area, it lacks the authority to challenge
coastal states' maritime boundaries that affect the size of the Area. The
Area is bounded by coastal states' continental shelves, and in many
regions the outer limits of the shelf extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines. Coastal states themselves set the outer limits of their
continental shelves, the general criteria for which are specified in
Article 76 of the LOS Convention. Coastal states with outer limits
beyond 200 miles from baselines also must submit data to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ("CLCS"), a
technical body established by the Convention, and limits established
"on the basis of' CLCS recommendations "shall be final and binding."98
Although outer limits lines affect the extent of the Area and hence
where the CH principle applies, Article 187 limits the jurisdiction of the
SBC in contentious cases to disputes involving "activities in the Area";
this limitation precludes the Authority from challenging the legality of
92. Id. 1 226.
93. Id. 1 180.
94. Id. J 179-80.
95. Id. 1 180.
96. Id. 1 179.
97. For discussions of the SBC's advisory opinion, see David Freestone, International
Decision, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 755 (2011); French, supra note 24, at 544-46.
98. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 76(8). For a brief overview of Article 76 and
the CLCS process, see SOHN ET AL., supra note 67, at 306-17.
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continental shelf outer limits set by a coastal state. 99 In addition, the
ISA's Council or Assembly probably could not request an advisory
opinion from the SBC on the legality of the location of an outer limits
line. 00 The potential thus exists for coastal states to assert "creeping
jurisdiction" against the Area, 101 and the international community has
not provided effective legal mechanisms to challenge such
encroachment. Despite this limitation, however, the international
institutional mechanisms governing deep seabed mining can, as noted
above, help to reinforce precepts of the CH principle established in the
LOS Convention/1994 Implementation Agreement regime.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE
What lies ahead for the CH principle? It is useful to break this
inquiry into more specific questions. First, what of the principle's
application in the treaty regime governing deep seabed mining? Treaty
provisions, such as those in the LOS Convention/1994 Implementation
Agreement, may cure much of the indeterminacy associated with the
principle and create specific CH regimes. Widespread acceptance of a
treaty may also bolster support for the CH principle as a norm of
customary international law. As discussed in Part IV of this essay, the
LOS Convention/Implementation Agreement regime - our only example
of a widely accepted treaty regime specifically incorporating the CH
principle - appears stable, despite the United States not being a party.
Indeed, the practice of states and international institutions operating
under this regime reinforces the CH principle as applied to deep seabed
mining.
Second, does the CH principle, as set out in Article 136 of the LOS
Convention, apply to non-mineral activities on the seabed beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction? Article 136, after all, applies to "the
Area" as well as to its mineral "resources." Some have argued that such
features of the Area as deep-sea hydrothermal vents (and perhaps their
living resources, prized for biotechnology) are subject to the CH
principle.102 Others contend that such resources are instead governed
99. See John E. Noyes, Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings and the Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1211, 1239-40 (2009). The LOS Convention
defines "activities in the Area" as "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area," and "resources" in the Area are in turn defined in terms of mineral
resources. LOS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1(1)(3), 133(a).
100. See Noyes, supra note 99, at 1256-58.
101. Franckx, supra note 1, at 566-67.
102. See Alex G. Oude-Elferink, The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of
Application of the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High Seas, 22 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 143, 174-75 (2007).
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under other legal regimes, including the high seas freedom of fishing. 103
The ISA is not authorized directly to regulate deep-sea vents, for its
mandate is limited to particular functions concerning mineral
"Cresources" and mining-related "activities in the Area." 104 It seems
quite possible that in trying to fashion a legal regime applicable to
living resources at deep-sea vents, political tensions similar to those
attending the negotiation of the deep seabed mining regime may
surface. Any generally accepted regime for managing issues arising in
the Area other than seabed mining must await an agreement, the
details of which appear unlikely to reflect the CH principle in any
"pure," Pardo-esque form, if at all. 105
Third, what of the CH principle's future with respect to areas other
than the deep seabed? What can it contribute to other common space
regimes? Here again, political opposition to the redistribution and
common management prongs of the CH principle persists. It may well
be difficult to incorporate the redistribution element of the principle,
which links to NIEO goals, into any generally accepted global legal
mechanisms. Although the Moon Treaty explicitly references the CH
principle, widespread acceptance of a more detailed international legal
regime governing the moon and its resources could depend on
jettisoning or redefining the CH principle.
None of this is to say that all the values underlying the CH
principle have become unimportant. Its core values surface in other
declarations and legal principles. Some elements of the CH principle -
for example, reserving the area in question for peaceful purposes -
restate values found in the U.N. Charter, other basic international law
documents, and moral and religious traditions. The environmental
protection component of the CH principle is now reflected in many
principles of international environmental law, often under the rubric of
sustainable development. The work and structures of regional fisheries
management organizations suggest international policy makers
recognize that common management mechanisms, or at least some type
of cooperative arrangements, are necessary to conserve and manage
common space living resources. In short, many values associated with
the CH principle continue to find expression, sometimes in modified
form, in other international law principles and arrangements.
The controversial equitable redistribution or benefit-sharing
element of the CH principle may, however, be too closely linked to the
103. See Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law
Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 563, 632-36 (2001).
104. See Oxman, supra note 79, at 688-89.
105. For discussion of one possible regulatory model, see Scovazzi, supra note 28, at
314-15.
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NIEO movement to gain acceptance in new treaties or general
international law. This element of the CH principle is in large measure
a product of the political climate of the 1960s and 1970s.106 However,
benefit sharing reflects, broadly, a concern with development and the
needs of developing states that continues to be recognized in many
international law and soft law instruments. For example, the concept
of common but differentiated responsibilities has been incorporated in
some treaties, reflecting the concern that many developing states
require additional time or resources in order to contribute on the same
basis as developed states to amelioriating international environmental
or common space problems.107 Similar sentiments underlie the
numerous international efforts at capacity building. Although capacity
building and common but differentiated responsibilities concern
developed states' obligations, they also reflect the needs of developing
states. Many policy makers may argue that redistributing the proceeds
of resource exploitation is not the best way to further development in
Third World states. But many also recognize that it is difficult to
achieve a stable and just world without such development, and they
search for alternative modalities toward that end. Ved Nanda has
written wisely that the underpinnings of an asserted right to
development include "enhanc[ing] the human condition, recogniz[ing]
basic needs, and foster[ing] participatory and sustainable
development."1 0 8 Even if the world is unwilling to embrace direct
wealth redistribution, as Pardo envisioned in his formulation of the CH
principle, the goal of development remains to be addressed through
other mechanisms.
In sum, the CH principle incorporates several norms that have
been recognized elsewhere, including reserving an area for peaceful
purposes, environmental protection or sustainable development, and
cooperation in the management of common space resources. The most
controversial aspect of the CH principle, involving the equitable sharing
of benefits, may not survive in new contexts. But other principles,
international instruments, and international arrangements have
recognized the development needs of people in developing states.
International lawyers and policy makers are of course concerned
about much more than the abstract meaning of principles and the
identification of their underlying values. They also engage with process
who decides, in what forum, about interpreting and applying
principles and rules - and with compliance mechanisms. The fully
106. See Franckx, supra note 1, at 566 n.139.
107. See Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental Law:
The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (2000).
108. Nanda, supra note 52, at 42; see also Ved P. Nanda, The Right to Development
under International Law-Challenges Ahead, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 431 (1985).
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operational deep seabed mining regime of the LOS Convention/1994
Implementation Agreement provides one example of international
dispute settlement processes and compliance-enhancing mechanisms
addressing common space and international environmental issues.
Observers may well evaluate this regime in terms of its real-world
contributions to sensible environmental protections, the fostering of
marine scientific research, and the avoidance of conflicts in exploring
for and exploiting deep seabed minerals. The fact that the deep seabed
mining regime formally embodies the CH principle may prove less
significant than the regime's concrete achievements concerning various
specific goals that the world recognizes as essential.
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREAS-PROTECTING THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT IN THE TERRITORIAL SEAS AND
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES
JON M. VAN DYKE AND SHERRY P. BRODER*
REMARKS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR VED P. NANDA
It is a great honor and privilege to be able to make these remarks
about our dear friend and colleague, Professor Ved P. Nanda, an out-
standing, prolific and renowned international law scholar, teacher, and
mentor. Professor Nanda is a passionate supporter of human rights, ad-
vocate of international environmental law, proponent of sustainable de-
velopment, and major contributor to the development of modern inter-
national law. Professor Nanda has espoused the application of the rule
of law to international armed conflicts and consistently promoted global
peace. He has international respect as an author of leading treatises,
books and articles on international law and as an exceptional teacher
and mentor. He has won many honors and awards.
Ved and his wife Katharine are wonderful friends and colleagues
and we have known them and collaborated with them for decades. We
have adored their daughter Anjali Nanda since she was a child. Anjali
recently worked for Sherry at the law office and lived with us in Ha-
waii. She was very devoted to Sherry's human rights cases. Another
project was on black carbon and international environmental law. An-
jali later developed her own hypothesis on black carbon and produced
an excellent article further analyzing this type of air pollution focusing
on India, which was published by the Denver Journal of International
* The late Professor Jon Van Dyke was Professor of Law and Carlsmith Ball Facul-
ty Scholar at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
[Professor Nanda comments: Professor Van Dyke's untimely death deprived the Ved Nan-
da Center for International and Comparative Law of his wise counsel, guidance and sup-
port, and his passionate commitment to justice. Jon and I enjoyed many years of collabo-
ration on teaching and other projects around the world. I miss him dearly.] Sherry Broder
(Van Dyke) is a civil litigation attorney and Adjunct Professor at the William S. Richard-
son School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. She and Professor Van Dyke together
taught International Law and International Human Rights in many settings and worked
tirelessly on issues involving international law, human rights and the rights of indigenous
peoples.
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Law and Policy. We are very pleased to see that she is now Editor in
Chief of this publication.
In Hawaii we call our very closest friends "calabash family" which
means they are family. Ved, Katharine and Anjali are our calabash
family. We think of the many special times together: sitting at a caf6 in
Shimla drinking tea, walking on the Champs-Elysees and in the 6th Ar-
rondissement, teaching together and collaborating on international en-
vironmental law issues and human rights, enjoying the warmth and
beauty of Hawaii, attending a Ved Nanda Center for International and
Comparative Law Conference in Denver, and many other things. To-
gether Ved, Katharine and Anjali have a rare generosity of spirit and
ethical approach to all matters in life and an unwavering commitment
to social justice issues and making the world a better place. They have
our profound respect, admiration, and affection.
In honor of Ved's contributions to international environmental law
and human rights, we have examined the establishment of designated
areas in the ocean that restrict global shipping, and especially Particu-
larly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs), recognized by the International Mar-
itime Organization (IMO). Guidelines for identification and establish-
ment of PSSAs have been developing in the last 25 years. PSSAs
provide one way to correct the imbalance favoring freedom of navigation
over the interests of the coastal state to provide some protection to an
area of its marine environment. Designation of a PSSA by the IMO at
the request of a coastal state can be a powerful tool for protecting envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas in the territorial seas and Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones (EEZs), for placing some limits on the freedom of naviga-
tion and imposing higher standards for the protection of the
environment than is allowed under existing treaties and conventions.
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREAS-PROTECTING THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT IN THE TERRITORIAL SEAS AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONES
The oceans cover approximately 71 percent of the Earth's surface
and hold approximately 90 percent of the planet's living biomass. Ocean
ecosystems support all life on the planet. They provide oxygen and food,
manage vast amounts of human pollutants, buffer the weather and reg-
ulate global temperature. The oceans are divided into several principal
oceans and smaller seas. Because it is the principal component of
Earth's hydrosphere, the world ocean is integral to all known life, forms
part of the carbon cycle, and influences climate and weather patterns.
Large ships have negative impacts on marine environment, wildlife
and habitats through accidental spills of oil or the deliberate, opera-
tional discharge of wastes, chemical residues and ballast water as well
as the use of anti-fouling paints, and noise. It has been long recognized
that large vessels do threaten the marine environment by acci-
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dents, physical damage and standard operational practices. There can
be severe physical damage to coral reefs. The bunker fuel, a heavy fuel
oil the shipping industry utilizes to run its engines, poses the greatest
threat to the marine environment. Shipping companies favor such low-
grade fuel because it is cheap. But it is extremely viscous, almost like
sludge, and needs to be heated before injected into engines. The texture
and viscosity of the bunker fuel makes it more ecologically dangerous
and more difficult to clean up.
In creating the EEZ, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) gave coastal states significantly greater control than
they had previously enjoyed over the waters adjacent to their territorial
seas. UNCLOS also made coastal states responsible for protecting ma-
rine resources in their EEZs through national legislation and regula-
tion.1 Despite giving coastal states increased control and responsibility
over their EEZs, the EEZ compromise continues to favor the freedom of
navigation over coastal state jurisdiction. UNCLOS's requirement that
coastal states have "due regard" for the freedom of navigation sharply
constrains their ability to impose and enforce environmental efforts.
Since the ratification of UNCLOS, international shipping has in-
creased dramatically while the global marine environment has degrad-
ed rapidly. With the expansion of maritime trade and the growth in the
size of fleets, risks for the marine environment have increased. The bal-
ance UNCLOS struck in favor of the freedom of navigation is no longer
equitable. Coastal states have difficulty in protecting their marine envi-
ronment from the dangers and hazards presented by global shipping.
UNCLOS protects navigational freedom by placing heavy constraints on
coastal states' jurisdiction in their EEZs. In so doing, the Convention
curtails the ability of coastal states to implement and enforce measures
protecting marine resources.
1. The Law of the Sea Convention identifies categories of areas that may require
greater environmental protection, due to rare or fragile ecosystems. Article 211(6)(a) pro-
vides:
Where the [general] international rules and standards . . are inadequate to
meet special circumstances and coastal States have reasonable grounds for
believing that a particular, clearly defined area of their respective exclusive
economic zones is an area where the adoption of special mandatory measures
for the prevention of pollution from vessels is required for recognized tech-
nical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions, as
well as its utilization or the protection of its resources and the particular
character of its traffic, the coastal States, after appropriate consultations
through the competent international organization with any other States con-
cerned, may, for that area, direct a communication to that organization,
submitting scientific and technical evidence in support and information on
necessary reception facilities.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1183 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereafter UNCLOS], Part XII, art. 211(6)(a).
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UNCLOS limits coastal state environmental efforts in order to pro-
tect the freedom of navigation by providing coastal states with few op-
tions for imposing protective measures even in navigationally challeng-
ing or ecologically sensitive areas. Article 211(6)(a) provides that where
an area in an EEZ is particularly navigationally challenging or ecologi-
cally sensitive, a coastal state may "direct a communication" to "a com-
petent international organization" (which has been generally interpret-
ed to refer to the IMO) to permit the adoption of coastal state
regulations in that area that are more stringent than international
ones. This article provides coastal states with few effective options,
however, because subsection (6)(c) mandates that requested restrictions
cannot include "design, construction, manning or equipment standards
other than generally accepted international rules and standards."
The IMO is the primary international organization that sets mari-
time rules and standards. 2 A coastal state's jurisdiction over vessels in
transit through its exclusive economic zone is overall limited to enforc-
ing generally accepted international rules and standards designed for
the protection or preservation of the marine environment. The IMO has
developed rules to authorize coastal states to impose protective
measures that restrict the freedom of navigation in ecologically sensi-
tive marine areas. If a coastal state believes international standards are
inadequate to protect a clearly defined area of particular ecological sen-
sitivity within its EEZ, it may apply to the IMO for authorization to
adopt special mandatory measures for prevention of vessel pollution
within the area. Those measures, if approved by the IMO, may exceed
international standards.
The IMO through its Marine Environment and Protection Commit-
tee (MEPC) began its study of the issue of PSSAs in response to resolu-
tion 9 of the 1978 International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollu-
tion Prevention concerning the protection of such sea areas. Resolution
9 recognized IMO authority to adopt regulations to protect the marine
environment, to prevent marine pollution and waste from ships by iden-
2. The London Convention was replaced by the 1996 Protocol. The Protocol provides
a more restrictive approach and prohibits all waste dumping except for materials listed in
Annex 1, such as dredged materials, sewage sludge, fish processing wastes, oil and gas
installations and organic materials of natural origin. Most importantly, in implementing
the Protocol, the Parties must apply a precautionary approach and take appropriate pre-
ventative measures when there is reason to believe that matter introduced into the marine
environment is likely to cause harm, even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a
causal relation between inputs and their effects. See Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403
[hereinafter London Convention]; 1996 London Protocol to the Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 8, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
1 [hereinafter 1996 Protocol], Annex 1 (1997).
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tifying special areas of protection. This authority enhanced the already
existing designation of special areas in the 1973 MARPOL Convention.3
In 1987, the IMO adopted Resolution 619(15), which recommended
the use of pilots for several high-risk ship transports seeking passage
through the Torres Strait, the Great North East Channel, inner route of
GBR, and Hydrographers' Passage. 4
In 1990, the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), which had long been con-
sidered an area of ecological, social, cultural, economic, and scientific
importance, was recognized as the first PSSA. The IMO approved com-
pulsory pilotage, backed by criminal penalties, which are not permitted
under other international conventions. Australia was eager to protect a
particularly vulnerable part of the GBR, between Mackay (Island) and
the Tropic of Capricorn. The area of the Reef covered by the PSSA "ex-
tends 2,300 kilometres along the east coast of Queensland and covers
an area of 346,000 square kilometres," passing through both Australia's
territorial sea and its EEZ.5 The Torres Strait was not part of the Great
Barrier Reef Region PSSA initially, but the IMO extended the Reef
PSSA to the Torres Strait in 2005. The area is also a Marine Protected
Area under Australian domestic law and a Special Area under the In-
ternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.6
In 1991, the IMO passed IMO Assembly Resolution 720(17),
establishing "guidelines for designating and identify-
ing Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs)."7 PSSAs are "areas with
ecological, socio-economic, or scientific' importance." The IMO estab-
lished that it can designate areas as PSSAs not only in states' territori-
al seas but also in their EEZs. However, these initial criteria and
standards were too strict and the procedures too arduous and complex.
In 1997, the archipelago of Sabana-Camagiley was recognized as a
PSSA as requested by Cuba and it was the only PSSA recognized on the
basis of the original Resolution 720(17) criteria.8 The marine and
3. Agustin Blanco-Bazdn, The IMO Guidelines on Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas
(PSSAs): Their Possible Application to the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 20
MARINE POLIcY 343, 344 (1996).
4. IMO, Assembly, Use of Pilotage Services in the Torres Strait and Great Barrier
Reef Area, Resolution A.619(15) (Nov. 19, 1987).
5. IMO, MEPC, Identification of the Great Barrier Reef Region as a Particularly
Sensitive Area, Annex, IMO Marine Env't Prot. Comm. Res. 44 (30) (Nov. 16, 1990) (set-
ting forth a geographical description of the Great Barrier Reef Region).
6. Australia Government, Australian Maritime Safety Authority [AMSA], The
Torres Strait Particularly Sensitive Sea Area, available at http://www.amsa.gov.aul
Marine EnvironmentProtection/Torres_ Strait (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
7. IMO, Assembly, Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas and the Identifi-
cation of Particularly Sensitive Areas, Resolution A. 720 (17) (Nov. 6, 1991).
8. IMO, MEPC, Identification of the Archipelago of Sabana-Camaghey as a Particu-
larly Sensitive Sea Area, Resolution MEPC.74(40) (Sept. 25, 1997).
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coastal ecosystems of this archipelago have been described as "almost
pristine."9
There were IMO amendments to the procedures in Resolution
720(17) to make the process more workable. In 1999 Resolution
885(21)10 was adopted and in 2001 Resolution 927(22) was adopted
making further clarifying changes.I' In 2005, additional revisions to the
guidelines for identification and designation of PSSAs were approved. 12
A PSSA is defined as "an area that needs special protection through
action by IMO because of significance for recognized ecological, socio-
economic or scientific reasons and because it may be vulnerable to be
damaged by international shipping activities." However, a PSSA does
not include any explicit prescribed protective mechanisms, but an appli-
cation to the IMO for PSSA designation needs to be accompanied by
specific proposed Associated Protective Measures (APM).13
Section 6 of the Guidelines refers to the spectrum of Associated
Protective Measures approved or adopted by IMO to prevent, reduce, or
eliminate the threat or identified vulnerability. There can be special
discharge standards within PSSAs (other than by means of designation
as a "special area" under MARPOL 73/7814) and "other measures aimed
at protecting specific sea areas against environmental damage from
ships, provided that they have an identified legal basis." When an area
is designated as a PSSA, a coastal state can ask the IMO for permission
to issue requirements for vessels and these requirements can and do
impose restrictions on the freedom of the seas and passage in the PSSA.
Applications for designation of a PSSA normally include a proposal for
at least one measure to protect the area from shipping.
9. Pedro M. Alcolado, et al., Cayo Coco, Sabana-Camagriey Archipelago, Cuba,
UNESCO, CSI Website, available at http://www.unesco.org/csi/pub/papers/alcolado.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
10. IMO, Assembly, Procedures for the Identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas and the Adoption of Associated Protective measures and Amendments to the Guide-
lines Contained in Resolution A.720(17), Resolution A. 885(21) (Nov. 25, 1999).
11. IMO, Assembly, Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas Under MARPOL
73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas, Resolution A.927 (22) (Nov. 19, 2002) (Assembly Adoption of both Guidelines for
the Designation of Special Areas under MARPOL and Guidelines for the Identification
and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas).
12. IMO, Assembly, Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Par-
ticularly Sensitive Sea Areas, Resolution A. 982 (Dec. 1, 2005).
13. Id.
14. The MARPOL Convention also includes express provisions for designating certain
waters as "special areas," which may be subject to more stringent discharge requirements,
including, where appropriate, a complete ban on discharges that would otherwise be per-
mitted under the convention's annexes. The IMO Marine Environment Protection Com-
mittee is the approval body for "special area" designations. Approval is conditioned on the
availability of adequate reception facilities for the wastes. See, e.g., MARPOL, Annex I,
regs. 1(10) (definition of "special area"), 15.B, 34.
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Associated protective measures can include a wide range of actions,
but they are limited to actions within the purview of IMO, and must re-
late to international shipping activities. Specific associated protective
measures can be used to control the maritime activities in that area,
such as compulsory pilotage programs, separated shipping, traffic lanes,
areas to be avoided, reporting requirements, no anchor zones, strict ap-
plication of discharge and equipment requirements for ships, and in-
stallation of vessel traffic services (VTS). The PSSA Guidelines explicit-
ly state that associated protective measures may include:
1. any measure that is already available under an existing IMO in-
strument; or is to be adopted by the IMO; and
2. any measure that does not yet exist which is described as the
"development and adoption of other measures aimed at protect-
ing specific sea areas against environmental damage from ships,
provided that they have an identified legal basis."15
Allowing for these "other measures" permits the petitioning coastal
states to seek measures beyond those already identified or approved.
To be identified as a PSSA, a proposed area must meet at least one
of the ecological, socio-economic or scientific criteria listed in section 4
of the Guidelines, Annex I. The 2005 Guidelines have amended some of
the criteria and added others to incorporate developing principles con-
tained in recent international instruments such as the Biodiversity
Convention. The earlier guidelines' original ecological criteria concen-
trated on the significance of the sea area for its uniqueness, dependen-
cy, representativeness, diversity, productivity, naturalness, integrity or
vulnerability. In the 2005 Guidelines, the uniqueness criteria have been
expanded to include the concept of rare ecosystems or habitats. The di-
versity criteria incorporate genetic diversity as well as the earlier
standards of species diversity and highly varied ecosystems, habitats, or
communities. Three new criteria have been added: critical habitat;
spawning and breeding grounds, and biogeographic importance.
The required link to risk from international shipping activities is
now emphasized through a section detailing data required to be submit-
ted. This includes: vessel traffic characteristics in the area (operational
factors, vessel types, traffic characteristics and harmful substances car-
ried); and natural factors (hydrographic, meteorological and oceano-
graphic). The guidelines also suggest providing information on evidence
of damage from international shipping activities, history of groundings,
collisions or spills in the area and their consequences, foreseeable cir-
cumstances under which significant damage might occur, stresses from
other environmental sources, and measures already in effect and their
actual or anticipated beneficial impact.
15. IMO, supra note 13.
478 VOL. 40:1-3
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREAS
These data requirements could present problems for countries with
limited technical capacities or financial capabilities and the IMO recog-
nizes that. Thus the guidelines provide: "IMO should, in assessing ap-
plications for designation of PSSAs and their associated protective
measures, take into account the technical and financial resources avail-
able to developing Member Governments and those with economies in
transition."
The IMO language reflects the language of Article 211(6)(a) of
UNCLOS, 16 but the PSSA designation goes one step further: it allows
the IMO to impose measures to be taken in all maritime zones of a
coastal state, including measures that affect design, construction, man-
ning, or equipment standards.17 The creation of the PSSA mechanism
was an important and significant step forward in expanding coastal
states' ability to protect marine resources, as it allows the imposition of
new restrictive measures in sensitive areas of EEZs.
All IMO member governments are obligated to ensure ships flying
their flag comply with the APMs for that area. To give an area the sta-
tus of a PSSA, is potentially a very important designation for the pro-
tection of that area. It gives coastal states the right to enact national
legislation to implement the Associated Protective Measures.
Some States may prefer to adopt an international con-
vention or include a new protocol to an existing Conven-
tion. The reason is that the guidelines do not have a bind-
ing force . . . . Guidelines which are widely accepted and
voluntarily put into force may lead to more positive and
significant results than a treaty which is not ratified and
applied or is ratified and applied by only a few States. 18
In 2002, Prestige, a single-hulled container ship carrying 77,000
metric tons of two different grades of heavy fuel, split in half and sank,
releasing over 20 million US gallons (76,000 m) of oil into the sea. The
Prestige catastrophe seriously threatened coastal areas of Portugal,
Spain, France and Belgium. In spring 2003, the European Union (EU)
banned large, single-hulled tankers carrying heavy grade oil from com-
ing into any European ports and the French National Assembly unani-
mously enacted a law asserting the right to intercept ships that release
polluting ballast waters as far as ninety miles from its Mediterranean
coast, and also imposed stricter controls on transient oil tankers. The
EU, through those member states together with the UK and Ireland,
submitted a proposal to the MEPC asking for the designation of West-
16. UNCLOS, supra note 1.
17. IMO, supra note 13.
18. Nihan Unli, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: Past Present and Future, IMO Pub-
lication (2007), http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?dataid=17988&filename=
Particularly.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
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ern European Waters as a PSSA and making those waters completely
off-limits for single-hulled oil tankers and other cargo vessels transport-
ing dangerous cargoes. The proposal covered a vast area from the Shet-
land Islands north of Scotland to the southern Portuguese-Spanish bor-
der in the respective states' EEZ and territorial seas. The original text
contained a ban of single hull tankers over 600 dead weight tonnage
carrying heavy grades of oil, feature which was withdrawn by the pro-
ponents of the proposal during the deliberations at the 49th session of
the MEPC.19
The Western European Waters proposal created concerns about its
potential for interfering with freedom of navigation especially since it
was such a large sea area and traditionally a very busy shipping traffic
area. The Western European Waters does not comprise a single coher-
ent ecosystem and its environment was not known to be notably vul-
nerable. However, despite these concerns and objections, the Western
European Waters PSSA was designated by the IMO on 15 October
2004.20 "This sequence of events, initiated by five maritime countries to
protect their own coastal resources, is a significant example of the 'state
practice' of restricting navigational freedom in order to protect the re-
sources of the EEZ." 2 1 The earlier IMO guidelines for application to
designate a PSSA were complicated and difficult to satisfy. Between
1991 and 2002, only two PSSAs were recognized. But with the new
guidelines adopted in 2005, there was increased activity by coastal na-
tions to protect their marine environments from international shipping.
By 2012, fourteen PSSAs had been approved by the IMO. They in-
clude the Great Barrier Reef, Australia (1990); Sabana-Camagiiey Ar-
chipelago, Cuba (1997); sea area around Malpelo Island, Colombia
(2002); marine area around the Florida Keys, United States (2002);
Wadden Sea, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands (2002); Paracas
National Reserve, Peru (2003); Western European Waters, Belgium,
France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom (2004);
Torres Strait as an extension to Great Barrier Reef, Australia and Pa-
pua New Guinea (2005), Canary Islands, Spain (2005); Galapagos Ar-
chipelago, Ecuador (2005); the Baltic Sea area, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (2005); North-
West Hawaiian Islands, Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monu-
ment, United States (2008); Strait of Bonifacio, France and Italy (2011),
Saba Bank (Caribbean Island of Saba) (2011), and The Netherlands
19. Markus Detjen, The Western European PSSA-Testing a unique international
concept to protect imperiled marine ecosystems, 30 MARINE POLICY 442-53 (2006).
20. IMO, MEPC, Designation of the Western European Waters as a Particularly Sen-
sitive Sea Area, Resolution MEPC, 121 (52) (Oct. 15, 2004).
21. Jon M. Van Dyke, Canada's Authority To Prohibit LNG Vessels From Passing
Through Head Harbor Passage To U.S. Ports, 14 OCEAN & COAsTAL L.J. 45, 64 (2008).
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(approved in principle in July 2011 and to be formally designated by
MEPC 64 in Oct 2012).
The definition and coverage of PSSAs has been expanded to better
protect the marine environment and to readjust the imbalance between
the freedom of navigation and the interests of the coastal state. This is
consistent with the precautionary approach and the polluter pays prin-
ciple. The number of PSSAs is growing. The expanse of ocean space that
can be included in a PSSA is large. Important new protective measures
have been adopted and can be instituted at any time. There are meth-
ods for enforcement. IMO member states are obliged to ensure that the
ships flying their flag conform to the PSSA authorized associate protec-
tive measures. Coastal states may adopt national legislation and regu-
lations to implement the PSSA APMs. PSSAs constitute a recognition
and acceptance of local priorities by international interests. With the
recent designation of the Bonifacio Strait, the potential jurisdiction of
PSSAs has been extended and straits are now part of the regime of
PSSAs. PSSAs have international legitimacy and respect and the PSSA
regime has now evolved to the point of being international customary
law. The next step is to apply the PSSA regime to include "areas with
'ecological, socio-economic, or scientific' importance" in the High Seas
beyond national jurisdiction.
4812012
THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
GEORGE (ROCK) PRING* AND CATHERINE (KITTY) PRING**
A new form of environmental governance - the specialized
environmental court or tribunal (ECT) - is emerging as a dynamic
alternative to the general courts for providing better access to
environmental justice in the 21st century. The University of Denver
Sturm College of Law's Environmental Courts and Tribunals Study is
conducting the first global comparative analysis of this new
phenomenon.' Hundreds of ECTs have been established around the
world in just the last decade, and, based on the DU study, we predict
that ECTs will be the dominant dispute resolution models for
environmental risks and crises in the decades to come.
The people and nations of the world are increasingly facing three
interconnected environmental risks in the 21st century, with
consequent multiple threats to the health of humans and the planet.
Those risks are continued degradation of fresh and salt water, air, and
soil and the ecosystems dependent on them; the impacts of current and
impending climate change; and widespread economic collapse. These
risks and how they are managed directly impact the ability of people
and nations individually and collectively to achieve sustainable
development and a viable future for life on earth. The challenges are no
longer confined to countries, regions, or locales in one part of the world,
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but are truly global in scope and impact the populations of every
continent. Events perceived to be in one arena generate ripple effects
which result in reduction or increase in the severity of impacts in the
other two areas.
Efforts to manage these related risks are being made now at every
level of government through the development of principles, policy,
legislation, regulations, treaties, agreements, and new governance
institutions. Since the 1970s, environmental laws have been adopted at
the city, state, national, and international levels. As many as 80
nations' constitutions now include a right to a healthy environment as a
human right, and hundreds of new international environmental legal
authorities have been adopted. 2 New precepts have emerged - such as
sustainable development, no-transboundary-harm, precautionary,
polluter-pays, environmental justice, equitable utilization of resources,
and other principles. 3 These and other precepts like climate change
mitigation and adaptation are slowly being incorporated into a new
generation of international, national, and local laws.
Today, the major difficulty is not filling the books with more
environmental laws. Instead, the challenge is ensuring effective
enforcement and compliance with the laws already adopted - and this
can only be done through improved environmental governance and
access to justice. The rapid growth of serious environmental problems,
coupled with increasing public awareness and reaction, has generated
global demands for new forms of governance to adjudicate and enforce
solutions to environmental problems, from the smallest local issues to
the largest global ones. The result has been an explosion of specialized
ECTs and a parallel explosion in environmental litigation.
For the DU Study, we define ECTs as "judicial or administrative
bodies of government empowered to specialize in resolving
environmental, natural resources, land use development, and related
disputes."4 Environmental courts (ECs) refer to bodies within the
judicial branch of government, and environmental tribunals (ETs) are
those within the executive or administrative branch. They include free-
standing ECs and ETs, formal and informal panels of judges within a
court of general jurisdiction ("green benches" or "green lists"),
individual judges within generalist courts who have training and
expertise in environmental law and to whom environmental cases are
assigned formally or informally, and ETs housed within another
government body such as the environmental agency.
2. See GREENING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 10.
3. See VED P. NANDA & GEORGE (ROCK) PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 17-62 (2003), also see the updated Ch. 2 in the new 2d edition
(forthcoming 2012).
4. GREENING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
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At the start of 2012, some 465 ECTs are known to exist or to be
authorized in 46 countries, over 70 percent of which were created since
2005. Some of the newest examples include eleven administrative
courts in Thailand,5 four additional ECs in Brazil, 6 and nearly 100 ECs
in 15 provinces in China.7 Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010
that requires Parliament to "establish courts with the status of the
High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to . . . the
environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land."8 Also in
2010, England created its first ET, and India's Parliament passed a
"National Green Tribunal" bill in part to counteract the activist "Green
Benches" of its Supreme Court.9 In 2011, Pakistan added three new
environmental tribunals, and South Africa announced it would re-
establish an environmental court in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape. 10
Other countries, including Ecuador, Bolivia, Vanuatu, Dubai, Abu
Dhabi, Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait considered establishing an ECT in
2011.
ECTs can be found on every inhabited continent; in civil law,
common law, and other legal systems; in jurisdictions from the largest
(China, India, Canada, Brazil) to the smallest (Trinidad and Tobago,
the City of Memphis, Tennessee); and in both wealthy developed and
impoverished developing nations. Interestingly, the nations which have
most aggressively embraced ECTs as a mechanism for improving
environmental governance are China, Brazil, and developing nations,
not the highly developed USA or countries of the EU. Historically,
Australia and New Zealand have been leaders in ECT creation, but
today ECTs are spreading in Asia (examples include China, India,
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand), Africa (South Africa,
Kenya, Sudan), Europe (Belgium, England, Finland, Hungary, Sweden),
South America (Brazil, Bolivia, Guyana), Central America (Costa Rica),
5. Administrative Courts Launch New Environmental Case Divisions, BANGKOK
POST (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/news/250008/admini
strative-courts-launch-new-environmental-case-divisions.
6. Interview with Vladimir Passos de Frietas, former Chief Judge of Federal Court
of Appeal, 4th District, Brazil, and Professor of Environmental Law.
7. Zhang Minchun & Zhang Bao, Specialized Environmental Courts in China: Status
Quo, Challenges and Responses, 30 J. OF ENERGY & NAT. REs. L., No. 3 (forthcoming 2012) (at Ist
page of article).
8. CONSTITUTION, art. 162(2)(b) (2010) (Kenya).
9. Richard Macrory, Environmental Courts and Tribunals in England and Wales - A
Tentative New Dawn, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION 61 (2010), available at http://www.courts
.state.ny.us/court-innovation/Winter-2010/jciMacrory.pdf; Sandeep Dikshit, Parliament
Approves "Green Benches" Bill, HINDU (May 6, 2010), http://www.hindu.com/2010
/05/06/stories/2010050661222000.htm.
10. B.P. Sonjica, South Africa Environmental Affairs Minister, Speech on the Department of
Environmental Affairs' 2010/11 Financial Year Budget Vote, available at http://www.pmg.
org.za/briefing/20100416-environmental-affairs-ministers-budget-speech.
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and North America (Vermont USA, Ontario, British Columbia)." The
United States is not a leader in the ECT field; it has one impressive
state EC (Vermont), a number of local (city, county) ECs, and several
in-house ETs at the national level, such as the US Environmental
Protection Agency's Environmental Review Board and the US
Department of the Interior's Board of Land Appeals. 12
The pressure for creation of ECTs as a new form of environmental
governance comes from both environmental advocates and
business/development interests, the DU Study found, and it comes in
response to any of eight major problems with courts of general
jurisdiction:
1. Delayed Justice:
The first problem, not surprisingly, is the long delays that can
occur in general courts. General court dockets in many countries are
overloaded, and it may take years for a filed case to be heard. In 2011,
when Thailand established new environmental divisions in all 11
administrative courts across the country, more than 1,300 "green cases"
were already on file. 13  For citizens, public interest groups, and
advocates, delays can mean health or environmental damage that is
irreversible. For developers, time is money, and delays are costly. All
sides share an interest in speedy resolution of complex environmental
issues. An ECT can set cases for a speedy hearing because the court or
tribunal has a single legal jurisdiction, defined by law. The ECT
jurisdiction usually includes many different specific laws, such as those
affecting air, water, land, human health, biodiversity, public land
protection.14 However, all can be integrated under the environmental
and/or land use umbrella for purposes of non-fragmented problem
solving and decision-making.
2. Access to Justice:
A second problem with general courts is that they frequently
present more than a temporal delay. People's access to justice can be
thwarted by complicated filing procedures, lack of knowledge about
courts, limited understanding about the issue and how to challenge it,
substantial physical distance between the location of the controversy
and the location of the court, minimal to no institutionalized procedures
for public participation, narrow court standing requirements, and other
11. See GREENING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 106-09.
12. See id. at 108-09.
13. Plenty On Agenda For New 'Green Court' Division, THE NATION (Thai.) (Aug. 3,
2011), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/08/03/national/Plenty-on-agenda-for-new-
green-court-division-30161823.html.
14. GREENING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 26-28.
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barriers.' 5 ECTs around the world are charged with overcoming these
barriers, opening the courthouse doors to a wider public, and assisting
rather than blocking those with complaints.
3. Technical expertise:
Lack of scientific and technical expertise limits the competence of
the general jurisdiction court, which generally must rely on the
testimony of the parties' expert witnesses for information (the so-called
"battle of the experts"). 16 Most general court judges (and juries) do not
have the expertise to evaluate expert testimony or to predict probable
outcomes, a crucial gap given the complex issues that can arise in
environmental cases. Lack of technical competence or interest may
even result in a judge's unwillingness to set a complicated case for
hearing. Interviewees in the Philippines informed us that some judges
there pushed environmental cases to the bottom of their dockets
repeatedly, prior to the establishment of local ECTs and intensive
judicial training in 2009.
4. Legal Expertise:
Not only do courts of general jurisdiction lack ready access to
reliable scientific and technical expertise on the bench, but many judges
have never studied environmental law or had any specific training in it.
As national environmental laws have become increasingly complex and
interrelated, generalist judges are handicapped by lack of specific
knowledge of and experience with environmental law.
5. Expense:
Financial costs in general courts - including filing fees, attorney
fees, expert witness fees, lost employment, potential adverse costs
awards, retaliatory lawsuits, and other financial barriers - are
crippling for citizens and environmental advocacy organizations, as well
as for defendants. In addition, the so-called British Rule of "costs follow
the event" (that is, "loser pays winner's costs") remains the rule in
many countries. This rule, where even a litigant with a real grievance
can be forced to pay huge sums, clearly discourages the filing of
legitimate cases since the ultimate outcome and costs are unknowable
at filing.17 Environmental organizations are forced to pick and choose
clients and issues with great risk-aversion, leaving many legitimate
complaints unfiled and unresolved. There are instances in Australia
where non-profits have actually been forced to file for bankruptcy
15. See id. at 14-16.
16. Id. at 55-60.
17. Id. at 51-52.
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following a costly legal environmental battle in which they had a
legitimate case that was however dismissed on a technicality.
6. ADR:
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is not an integral part of most
general jurisdiction courts. 18 (One exception is family courts dealing
with divorce and child custody issues.) Often the use of ADR, managed
by a trained neutral third-party, can help litigants arrive at a
successful resolution to a conflict which was not envisioned by the judge
or prescribed by law. The use of court-integrated ADR methods can
also help reduce costs, speed decisions, and achieve true "win-win"
results - for the parties, the court, the environment, and the economy.
7. Case-management:
Streamlined case-management and special rules of procedure for
environmental cases are not possible in a general court, which typically
cannot employ different rules for different types of cases. ECTs around
the world have maximized the use of a number of special case
management tools and procedures, resulting in a more efficient and
effective decision-making process. Many ECTs actually employ a case-
manager to assist parties and to carefully track public notice, time
limits, hearing dates, and even to conduct court-annexed ADR. 19
8. Enforcement / Remedies:
General court enforcement tools and remedies are typically limited
to those formalized in law or court rules. Preliminary injunctions,
creative sentencing, community service and fines directed to
environmental projects rather than the general fund, restorative
justice, and other less traditional enforcement tools may be more
effective at resolving environmental issues than traditional civil or
criminal outcomes. Creative sentencing is a hallmark of effective ECTs.
At the international level as well, these problems have led to calls
for the creation of a specialized international ECT. Such a body could
provide a forum to adjudicate global issues, such as transboundary
pollution and climate change, which now transcend national court
jurisdictions, much as the International Criminal Court now does.
Several international environmental forums currently exist, but are
hampered by limited jurisdiction, unwillingness of states to bring issues
to an international arbiter, lack of binding international environmental
law, and limited enforcement powers. Existing multinational forums
which could develop ECT divisions could include the International
Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the European
18. Id. at 61.
19. Id. at 76-79.
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Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, the NAFTA
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, international financial
institutions like the World Bank, international river basin commissions,
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The latter is the
closest to an international ECT, but has resolved only 20 cases in its 15
years of existence.
Based on nearly five years of in-depth research on specialized ECTs
around the world with the DU ECT Study, the authors predict that the
ECT explosion will continue into the 21st century at all levels of
government, including the international. The increase in the number of
ECTs is predicated on findings that well-designed specialized
adjudication bodies have the capacity to resolve environmental and
climate change litigation independently, holistically, more cheaply,
competently, rapidly, consistently, and justly, incorporating the key
principles of sustainable development. They also have the potential to
effectively mitigate all eight barriers to effective environmental
governance and access to justice found in general courts.
The key characteristics of ECTs that allow effective and efficient
adjudication of environmental and climate change suits include:
* Fast-tracking of environmental litigation
* Integrated jurisdiction over relevant laws
* Expertise of decision makers
* Ability to manage scientific and technical expert evidence
* Expanded standing for plaintiffs
* Adoption of flexible rules of procedure
* Consistency in decisions
* Ability to employ a problem-solving approach to
adjudication, including extensive use of various ADR
methods
Each of these characteristics, when incorporated in a specialized
ECT, can facilitate access to environmental justice and can
incrementally contribute to environmental protection, climate change
mitigation and adaptation, and sustainable development.
The progress of ECT development follows a reasonably consistent
six-step pattern regardless of country. (1) First, the environmental
impacts of non-sustainable development and population growth begin
impacting the environment in major ways. (2) Second, civil society and
advocacy groups become aware of these environmental impacts and
demand laws and institutions to prevent and/or mitigate the
environmental damage. (3) Third, laws are passed, which may or may
not be adequate, but are not rigorously enforced. (4) Fourth, public
dissatisfaction with the laws or their enforcement prompts litigation in
the general courts. (5) Fifth, the general courts then disappoint these
advocates by not having the expertise, patience, will, or incorruptibility
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to adjudicate environmental cases in a way that is - to quote the
memorably succinct mandate of one Australian state's court procedure
law - "just, quick, and cheap." 20 Cases may take decades to hear, cost
the parties immense sums, expose complainants to monetary liability or
intimidation or worse, result in dismissal on technical grounds, and/or
produce inconsistent decisions. (6) Sixth, this dissatisfaction with the
general courts, from both plaintiffs and defendants, leads to a public
debate over new options and the emergence of visionary leaders who
believe that a well-designed ECT can address the issues.
The visionary leadership to create or improve an ECT can come
from within the judicial branch, from the executive or legislature, or
from civil society advocates. Often the leadership comes from an
individual who has "switched hats" from one sector to another and by
doing so has gained power to change the system. One such example is
Justice Brian Preston, Chief Judge of the State of New South Wales,
Australia, Land and Environment Court, who was a lawyer for the
Environmental Defenders' Office (EDO), a leading environmental NGO
in Australia, before being appointed to the bench and who has
spearheaded many cutting-edge innovations in that EC. 2 1
The pressure to create an international environmental court is
following a similar six-step path. It is being driven by the need for
effective global adjudication of environmental conflicts to foster
sustainable development, control climate change, and respond to
transnational environmental impacts. These issues are multinational
in scope and need a multinational adjudication forum.
Much of the public debate about ECTs takes place in international
forums designed to share experience and expertise and build judicial
capacity. Conferences were convened by various international
organizations during 2010, 2011, and 2012 to bring members of the
judiciary, executive, and legislative branches, non-governmental
organizations, and academics together to develop options for
international environmental problem-solving. These included symposia
sponsored by the UN Environment Programme, the Asian Development
Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union
Forum of Judges for the Environment, and the Association of European
Administrative Judges for the Environment. In 2010, a new
International Judicial Institute for Environmental Adjudication was
created with the support of Pace Law School in White Plains, New
York, which subsequently held a major international conference of
judges, government officials, and academics, and published an issue of
20. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1) (Austl.).
21. The Australian Centre for Environmental Law, THE AUSTRALIAN NAT'L UNIV.,
http://law.anu.edu.au/acel/staff.asp.
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the Journal of Court Innovation dedicated to "the Role of the
Environmental Judiciary." 22
The agenda for the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20) includes a call for the creation of a World
Environment Organization similar to the World Trade Organization.
On the eve of Rio+20, UNEP will sponsor a World Congress on Justice,
Governance and Law for Environmental Sustainability for judges,
attorneys-general, prosecutors, and other justice officials. 2 3  It is
expected to outline future rule of law and governance actions required
to enhance sustainable development in the 21st century. Bolivia's
proposal to Rio+20 specifically states "an International Tribunal of
Environmental and Climate Justice must be established to judge and
sanction crimes against nature that transcend national borders,
violating the rights of nature and affecting Humanity." 24 Whether or
not there will be sufficient will amongst the delegates to agree on an
international adjudication forum remains to be seen.
In conclusion, based on the authors' research and evaluation,
specialized ECTs can be a better forum for the adjudication of
environmental, land use, and climate change issues than courts or
tribunals of general jurisdiction. Calls for the establishment of ECTs
are occurring today at local, national, and international levels, based on
their demonstrated ability to deal more efficiently and effectively with
the very complex, multiscalar geographic, political, and temporal nature
of the environmental harm caused by non-sustainable development and
anthropogenic climate change.
Although the creation of an ECT or any new governance institution
does not necessarily guarantee a better outcome in terms of sustainable
development or climate change, the improvements in efficiency,
competence, and transparency afforded by an ECT can result in greater
access to environmental justice. Even if ECTs are not a magic bullet for
the world's environmental problems, they can have positive effects on
governmental regulatory decision-making, corporate behavior, and
public appreciation of the problems by fostering interaction across
levels of government and engaging disagreement about the ways in
which various actors should be taking action. 25 The experienced EC
22. Juanita Bing Newton & Michelle S. Simon, A Word from the Executive Editors, 3
J. CT. INNOVATION i-ii (2010), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/court-
innovation/Winter-2010/JCIWinterl0a.pdf.
23. World Congress on Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental
Sustainability, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/dec/worldcongress/concept.asp.
24. State of Bolivia, Proposal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for the United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) (Oct. 31, 2011), 1 35,
http://www.uncsd20l2.org/rio2O/content/documents/454Submission%/20Plurinational%/ 20
State%20of%2OBoliviao2ORio2O0%20PDF.pdf.
25. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change
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judge Brian Preston reminds us that "the status of the judicature and
its institutional habit of public, reasoned decision-making may result in
its response having meaningful effects, including a catalytic effect on
the legislature and executive to take their own action to mitigate or
adapt to climate change." 26
To contribute positively to environmental governance, ECTs are
dependent on commitment to the rule of law, principles of sustainable
development, and enforceable laws at the local, state, national, and
international level. The special attributes of well-designed and well-
run ECTs can be marshaled to play a very important supporting role in
achieving viable solutions. The indications are that the rising interest
in and explosion of ECTs at all levels of governance will escalate in the
coming decades, with a consequent improvement in access to justice and
environmental governance nationally and internationally.
Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 3 (2010), available at http://iospress.metapress.coml
content/23746166q74620p2/fulltext.pdf.
26. Brian J. Preston, Climate Change in the Courts, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 15, 53
(2010).
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THE ROLE OF BROWNFIELDS
INTRODUCTION
Traditional zoning is a form of land use planning that focuses on
separating and segregating land according to residential, commercial,
industrial, or agricultural uses. Such zoning often divides uses from
each other, so that more intense uses are not located next to less
intense uses.1 For example, only residential uses may be allowed in
residential districts, both residential and commercial uses may be
allowed in commercial districts, and residential, commercial, and
industrial uses may be allowed in industrial districts. 2  These
exclusionary zoning practices help to avoid the kinds of problems that
arise when industrial factories are located beside residential units.
However, the segregation of uses created by traditional zoning has
brought about ecological concerns, and a belief that those kinds of
separated land use patterns are not consistent with resource
sustainability and the integration with socio-economic classes. 3
Sustainable development focuses on the wise use and conservation
of resources to fulfill present and future needs. Unfortunately,
traditional exclusionary zoning often prevents land from being put to its
most efficient use. When local patterns emphasizing a non-integrated,
use-separated approach to land development dominate growth
management and regional planning programs, resource and energy
consumption are accelerated and infrastructure costs are increased.4
Excluded development and prohibited uses are forced to relocate further
from the urban core, resulting in suburban sprawl.5 Along with sprawl
comes environmental harms, increased traffic, more fuel consumption,
racial ghettos, and a disconnect between work and home. Low density,
automobile-dependent regional sprawl is, in the long run,
unsustainable. 6
1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 654 (3rd ed. 2010).
2. Often, further distinctions are made within each type of use area. Some
municipalities and local governments have enacted elaborate plans to manage growth, as
well as location of development. The goals of traditional zoning include the protection of
the environment, the promotion of low-density development, and the preservation of the
character of the community. Id. at 654-55.
3. See JULIE CAMPOLI, & ALEX S. MAcLEAN, VISUALIZING DENSITY 2-12 (2007).
4. See Edward H. Ziegler, The Case for Megapolitan Growth Management in the 21st
Century: Regional Urban Planning and Sustainable Development in the United States, 41
URB. LAW. 147, 158 (2009).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 164-67, 172; see also Jane E. Brody, Communities Learn the Good Life Can
Be a Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at D7 (discussing that, ironically, the "successful"
development of expanded metropolitan and vehicle-dependent environments has fostered
obesity, poor health, social isolation, excessive stress, depression, and become a leading
cause of death and disability).
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In light of a global economic downturn and a shortage of housing,
many communities around the world are rethinking the future growth
of metropolitan regions. Instead of creating land use regimes that bring
about traditional segregated uses and spatially divided development
patterns, urban zoning and planning can instead be deployed to
promote resource sustainability by permitting and encouraging
integrated uses. There is a growing awareness of the importance of
coordinated, but diversified, urban planning policy at the metropolitan
level.7 "Mixite," or mixed use development, is a land use planning
concept that focuses on creating urban core areas where people are not
functionally separated from what they do; rather, these spaces are
where the inhabitants can live, work, shop, and play, all without daily
use of an automobile.
Urban planning that promotes mixed-use development is one
antidote to the ills of traditional zoning. It reduces the spread of
scattered development and minimizes automobile dependency.8 Higher
density and functionally mixed urban spaces can be designed to reduce
environmental impacts, consume fewer resources and energy, integrate
social and economic classes, and provide for more economical and
efficient infrastructure and public services, such as public transit.
Mixite can accommodate a wide mix of housing types, social uses and
amenities, and socio-economic classes.
The implementation of mixite themed planning requires urban
space that is largely free of pre-existing uses. Such spaces exist in the
form of brownfields, greenfields, greyfields, and redfields. 9 Brownfields
seem particularly suited to urban redevelopment. In the United
Kingdom, "brownfield" land is generally defined as land that has the
potential to be redeveloped, but that has been adversely affected by the
prior uses of the land and surrounding land.10 The land may also be
contaminated." These sites are derelict or underused, mainly located
in developed urban areas, and require intervention before they can be
put to beneficial use.12  In the United States, the Environmental
Protection Agency defines brownfields as "abandoned, idled, or under
used industrial and commercial sites where expansion or
7. See id. at 173. See also Christopher B. Leinberger, Op-Ed., The Death of the
Fringe Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A17.
8. Id. at 182.
9. See Jonathan Lerner, Code Green, Turning Failed Commercial Properties into
Park Networks Could Put People to Work, Raise Real Estate Values and Promote Wise
Redevelopment, MILLER-MCCUNE, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 16, available at http://www.miller-
mccune.com/business-economics/turning-failed-commercial-properties-into-parks-26410/#.
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redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination that can add cost, time or uncertainty to a
redevelopment project." 13 In both the United Kingdom and the United
States, brownfield land is the result of economic factors that discourage
development, create an inability to attract investment for
redevelopment, and reflect market failure. However, when they are
cleaned up, brownfields do supply a "space" where new mixed-use
redevelopments can emerge.
Such spaces can also arise when there are greenfields, greyfields,
and redfields. "Greenfields" are uncontaminated, rural, or suburban
sites that are being considered for development. 14 "Greyfields" generally
include moribund shopping centers and vast, empty parking lots. 15
"Redfields" consist of underperforming, financially underwater, and
foreclosed commercial real estate, and can include brownfields and
greyfields. 16 Although greyfields and redfields supply space, these
types of sites can present unique challenges in terms of being suitable
locations for urban redevelopment. Greenfields, greyfields, and redfields
that are not located in developed urban areas - such as failed
subdivisions or vacant retail strips - may be better suited for parks and
conservation areas, as opposed to dense urban cores.17 Mixed-use
spaces seem most likely to arise in locations that previously had been
considered brownfield sites.18
This article will consider how, in both the United Kingdom and the
United States, brownfields are increasingly being transformed into sites
where much needed, and more sustainable, integrated mixed-uses can
emerge. Part I addresses the barriers to and benefits of brownfield
development. Part II discusses the differing ways in which the United
Kingdom and the United States have responded to the need for
brownfield development. Part III analyzes the varying degrees of
13. JOHN S. APPLEGATE, JAN G. LAITOS, JEFFREY M. GABA, & NOAH M. SACHS, THE
REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 615 (2d ed. 2011); EPA,
REVITALIZING SOUTHEASTERN COMMUNITIES: A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT, available at
http://epa.gov/region4/brownfieldstoolkit/brownfields/brownfieldsbackground.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT]. There are an
estimated 500,000 to 1 million brownfields in the United States. Id.
14. See James Murray-White, Greenfield Sites, SUSTAINABLE BUILD (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.sustainablebuild.co.uk/GreenfieldSites.html; see also APPLEGATE ET AL., supra
note 13 (discussing the proposition that, to avoid potential liability under CERCLA in the
United States, developers often prefer to develop greenfields over brownfields). In the
UK, the amount of land available for development is split between greenfield and
brownfield sites. Murray-White, supra.
15. Lerner, supra note 9, at 16.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also Murray-White, supra note 14 (discussing potential negative effects on
greenfield sites and surrounding areas when the sites are used for building development).
18. See Lerner, supra note 9, at 16.
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success each country has experienced in actually creating mixed-use
spaces from brownfield sites. The article concludes with three case
studies of mixed-use development sites in the United States, where
each has experienced differing degrees of success in implementing
mixite.
I. BARRIERS TO AND BENEFITS OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT
Brownfield development can be economically practical only if the
financial benefits of reclamation outweigh the physical and financial
costs of preparing the land for reuse. The economic rationale behind
the financial feasibility of such development depends on several factors,
including governmental regulations imposed on development, which
either inhibit or encourage mixite, the overall marketability of the
reclaimed site, and the physical characteristics of the land.19 Each of
these factors must be taken into account when assessing the viability of
brownfield development for mixed-use. 20
A. Regulatory, Financial, and Physical Barriers
to Brownfield Development
Governmental regulations and policies may inadvertently impede
brownfield development. 21  Hazardous waste rules and other
environmental laws often impose stringent liability and strict clean-up
standards on those seeking to transform these otherwise useless sites
into mixite locations. 22  Such laws may discourage brownfield
development.23 Planning applications for differing uses can be time
consuming, and progress can be further slowed due to a lack of
certainty and predictability regarding applicable waste remediation
19. See CHARLES BARTSCH, GETTING STARTED WITH BROWNFIELDS -- KEY ISSUES AND
OPPORTUNITIES: WHAT COMMUNITIES NEED TO KNOW 2, 9-11 (2006),
http://www.stateinnovation.org/ResearchlTransportation,-Infrastructure,-Smart-Growth/
Brownfield-Development/nemwi-2006.aspx. For a detailed discussion on brownfields
redevelopment practice, see TODD S. DAVIS & ScoTT A. SHERMAN, BROWNFIELDS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (3rd ed. 2010).
20. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the obstacles to development of brownfields).
21. Tracy A. Hudak, Addressing Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment: An Analysis
of CERCLA and the Voluntary Cleanup Programs of Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan 6
(Apr. 19, 2002) (unpublished Major Paper, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University) (on file with Digital Library Archives, Virginia Tech); Gray, supra note 10; see
also INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
MANUAL 40 ("The potential liability attached to brownfield sites can be a significant
barrier to the reuse of these properties.").
22. Hudak, supra note 21, at 6-8.
23. Id. at 6-7. For example, the EPA and some states require an initial evaluation of
each contaminated site, which may force parties to begin a clean-up before they have a
complete understanding of the costs associated with development. Id. at 7.
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policies and regulations. 24 Time requirements and associated costs for
obtaining project consent from government officials can make
development less desirable. Receipt of government funding can actually
reduce the likelihood of success in some situations by imposing
conditions that remove the flexibility of the project's scope or
timescale. 25 Additional impediments to development may stem from
public opposition, licensing mandates, and legislative requirements. 26
Unfavorable market conditions can also affect the feasibility of
brownfield development. The cost of buying land at fair market value
can cause financial problems, as can a general lack of demand for
mixed-use housing or commercial buildings. Preparatory costs may be
high for contaminated brownfield sites because the myriad of costs are
difficult to assess before development commences; the cleanup and
development of these sites may be considered risky investments. In a
hostile or down-market environment, the risk of subsequent liability for
environmental harms can deter prospective developers. Many site
owners may not thereby be able to acquire affordable financing. 27
The environmental conditions of brownfield land can significantly
affect the financial practicality of development. The history of any
particular brownfield may include one primary use, or many prior uses,
ranging from being a major industrial site to being a location where
there were many local dry cleaning businesses or gas stations. 28 One of
the first steps in any brownfield development project is to therefore
perform an environmental assessment of the site. 29 This assessment in
itself can be expensive, but it is necessary to do in order to minimize the
inherent risks and uncertainties associated with transforming
brownfield sites into usable space. 30 Other physical factors, such as
size, location, and topography, must also be taken into account. 3' For
24. See id. at 11-12, 51-53. For example, in 29 Flatbush Ave. Assocs., LLC v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, No. 21827/09 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1108, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011), the Supreme Court of New York found that the Department of
Environmental Conservation improperly applied the "complication of development" test
when it denied a contaminated site's application for inclusion in the brownfields cleanup
program. The Department did not consider underutilization of the site, blight of the
surrounding area, or the owner's inability to obtain financing without the program.
25. See id. at 12-14.
26. The development plan for the Gates Rubber factory, discussed in Part II of this
Article, faced opposition by a group of community activists who demanded that the
developers agree to invest in area neighborhoods. Mark P. Couch, Invest in Area, Group
Urges Gates Redevelopers, DENV. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, at C3.
27. BARTSCH, supra note 19, at 3.
28. APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13.
29. H. WADE VANLANDIGHAM, THE STORMSTOWN GROUP, & PETER B. MEYER, PUBLIC
STRATEGIES FOR COST-EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 12 (2002).
30. Id.
31. See Hudak, supra note 21.
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example, a lack of access to local roads can impact the foreseeable costs
and likely long-term benefits of development.32
Environmental contamination of the land by extremely toxic
substances is a common and potentially serious impediment to
brownfield development. As Charles Bartsch reports in his discussion
of the problems posed by contamination of brownfield sites in the
United States:
The actual number of underused or abandoned industrial
complexes is difficult to tally, but the problem is significant and
pervasive. Some experts have suggested that nearly 1 million sites
nationwide - ranging from obsolete manufacturing complexes to
abandoned corner gas stations - show evidence of at least some
contamination which could trigger regulatory concerns and ultimately
inhibit their owners from selling the site, securing financing, or
proceeding with reuse. This situation has posed a major challenge for
localities seeking to revitalize distressed neighborhoods and attract new
investment to sites with prior uses. 33
Contaminated brownfield land can include both surface terrain and
underground resources; the degree of contamination may range from
slightly affected to severely contaminated. Contamination is usually
caused by one dominant use or multiple prior uses of the land. If the
former, there are typically one to two environmental contaminants that
must be removed; if the latter, there may be multiple different toxic
pollutants that need to be remediated. Before any mixite development
can begin, an environmental analysis of the soil, groundwater, and
surface water should be performed by an environmental consultant to
ensure that appropriate steps are taken to reduce risks and liabilities. 34
Environmental contamination not only poses cleanup problems and
costs associated with remediation and waste removal, but it can also
significantly extend the amount of time required for eventual
development. 3 Sometimes, brownfield developers may attempt to
procure payment for the clean up of the site from the parties
responsible for the contamination. 36 However, responsible parties may
be insolvent, bankrupt, dissolved, or impossible to find. 3 7 In the United
States, the federal hazardous waste cleanup law, CERCLA, encourages
parties subject to waste-removal liability to seek contribution from
potentially responsible parties. 38
32. See id.
33. BARTSCH, supra note 19, at 2.
34. Gray, supra note 10.
35. See VANLANDIGHAM ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
36. See APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 616.
37. Id. at 629.
38. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (2002); APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 511.
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B. Challenges to Communities Where Brownfields are Left
Undeveloped
When the costs associated with brownfield reclamation are difficult
to estimate, development of these sites for mixed-use can pose
considerable risks for investors. Uncertainties regarding contamination
and liability may deter developers from investing in otherwise
beneficial and profitable future brownfield development projects.39 The
result is more than an urban eyesore. Brownfield sites that are not
transformed into useful sites and that remain undeveloped can
themselves pose problems for the communities in which they are
located. Contamination of brownfield soil and water may pose health
and environmental risks to the surrounding population. 40 Lost jobs and
a diminished tax base are often the result of the visual blight and
depressed property values associated with these neglected and
abandoned brownfields.41  Perhaps the most significant costs to
communities where undeveloped brownfield sites are located come from
the unrealized benefits of revitalization, and the opportunity costs of
lands not yet changed into productive components of the local economy.
C. Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment
The restoration of brownfields is a worthy goal, because the
cleanup and reuse of these areas often result in numerous
environmental, economic, and community benefits.4 2  When
contaminated brownfields are cleaned up, the contamination no longer
threatens the health of the surrounding people and environment. 43
Additional environmental and community benefits of reclamation
include the ability to reuse existing infrastructure, the lessened need to
build on undeveloped land, and the reduced continued degradation and
contamination of the natural environment. 44  Old industrial and
commercial buildings in urban areas can provide prime locations for
offices, small businesses, and residential units. The architectural
history and character of these sites can become an anchor for distinctive
redevelopment efforts. 45  In communities that lack large spaces of
empty land, building on brownfields can reduce the pressure to develop
and pay for greenfields.
39. EPA, REGIONAL BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT PILOT: SIoux FALLS, SD (May 1997),
http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/POOON78.pdf [hereinafter REGIONAL BROWNFIELDS
ASSESSMENT PILOT].
40. A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT, supra note 13.
41. See REGIONAL BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENT PILOT, supra note 39.
42. A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT, supra note 13.
43. Id.
44. EPA, Grant Proposal Guide FAQ, 44, www.epa.govlbrownfields/proposalguides
/FY11_FAQs.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Grant Proposal Guide FAQ].
45. BARTSCH, supra note 19, at 2.
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When there are economic downturns, communities experience a
surplus of vacant urban property. Although cities may ultimately
benefit from developing these vacant lots, efforts to rebuild are often
forestalled by reduced demands and limited funds. Although
immediate development may not be a feasible option, community
organizations have expressed a growing desire to see these derelict lots
be put to beneficial use in other ways. 46
Urban agriculture is one common theme that has emerged. Urban
agriculture combats the detrimental impact that abandoned land can
have on a community. For example, there are more than 400
community gardens and farms operating throughout the city of Detroit,
Michigan. Although Detroit's zoning ordinance does not recognize
agriculture as a permitted use, for now, the city has chosen not to
enforce its existing zoning laws because it recognizes urban agriculture
as a beneficial use of vacant land that may otherwise result in blighted
blocks and high maintenance costs. 47 Urban agriculture offers a myriad
of benefits to urban residents, including bringing fresh produce to
inner-city neighborhoods, building a sense of community, and creating
environmental benefits, such as saving fuel and reducing air
pollution. 48
United States cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, Youngstown, and
others that have experienced extensive population decline are focusing
on economic development in key areas and the transformation of
blighted areas or brownfields to innovative green uses. 49 Cleveland,
Ohio envisions "a city with densely-built mixed-use walkable
neighborhoods connected by greenways and contemplated by urban
gardens and open space amenities."50 It is unlikely that all of the
surplus land in Cleveland can be reused for real estate development in
the foreseeable future. But Cleveland and other cities with similar
problems have embraced the use of vacant land as a green resource to
enhance a sense of community, grow crops for residents, mitigate urban
runoff, and remediate soil contamination. Some of the challenges to
making productive use of vacant land include gaining legal control over
the property, addressing tax delinquency, and researching clouded
title. 51
46. Kristin Choo, Plowing Over, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2011, at 43, 46 (2011).
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id. at 46.
49. Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Green Uses: The New Renewal, PLAN. & ENVTL. L.,
May 2011, at 3.
50. Id. at 4 (citing presentation of Robert N. Brown, Cleveland City Planning
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Reclaimed brownfields also create new space - previously
unavailable urban land that now can be planned for mixed-use. Not
only can these areas contribute to sustainability by increasing
population density in cities that reduce the atmospheric emissions of
driving to work, they may also permit energy efficient residential
layouts and commercial building. In addition, a mixed-use site may
stimulate new forms of economic and social growth. 52 Development of
brownfield sites in desirable locations can put this prime real estate
back to beneficial use, thereby increasing the local tax base and job
market. 53 These mixite areas can emerge with local directives in mind,
such as job training, childcare provision, affordable housing, transport,
education, and greenspace leisure. 54
II. BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENTS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
Many of the problems associated with brownfield development can
be overcome with education, resources, and public and private
partnerships. 55 In the case of brownfields, both the United Kingdom
and the United States have responded to the potential of their
development in similar, yet differing ways. Each provides lessons for
how a community might identify and redeem brownfield sites so as to
make them ready for a mixed-use redevelopment.
A. Responses of the Government and the Private Sector in
the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom recognizes the development of brownfield
sites as a way to benefit the economy and the environment, and to
relieve pressure on the creation of greenfield sites. The Office of the
52. The EPA has reported that, as of September 2011, 72,250 jobs have been
leveraged through its Brownfields Program. The Brownfields Program has found that
redeveloped brownfield sites have resulted in a 32 to 57 percent reduction in vehicle miles
traveled associated with these sites, as well as a reduction in air pollution emissions. An
EPA study of redeveloped brownfields shows that the value of surrounding residential
property increased between 2 and 3 percent upon reclamation of nearby brownfields. The
studies also show that cleaning up a brownfield can increase nearby property values by
$0.5 to $1.5 million. EPA, The EPA Brownfields Program Produces Widespread
Environmental and Economic Benefits (Sept. 2011), http://epa.gov/brownfields/
overview/Brownfields-Benefits-postcard-pdf.
53. See A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT, supra note 13; Grant Proposal Guide FAQ, supra
note 44, at 43-44.
54. See Mike Raco & Steven Henderson, Sustainable Urban Planning and the
Brownfield Development Process in the United Kingdom: Lessons from the Thames
Gateway, 11 Loc. ENV'T 499, 509 (2006), available at http://www.tandfonline.
com/doilfull/10.1080/13549830600853098#preview.
55. A BROWNFIELDS TOOLKIT, supra note 13.
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Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) controls brownfield policy in England,
and it is advised by English Partnerships.56 Local authorities work
with regional planning agencies to promote regeneration of their
respective areas. The policies governing brownfield development have
evolved in the past several years through a series of key policy
statements and an independent task force.57 Wales and Scotland have
similar arrangements.5 8 Government policy in the United Kingdom
focuses on redeveloping brownfield sites primarily for the creation of
new housing, although appropriate uses may vary with the
circumstances.5 9 Local authorities, however, frequently encourage a
more mixed-use scheme as a response that can perhaps offer the most
economic and social benefits. 60
The United Kingdom supports sustainable communities as places
where people want to "live and work now and in the future."61 The
inclusion of affordable housing as a part of mixite themed planning is a
way to address housing shortages and to develop mixed communities
that are more efficient and sustainable. Brownfield development sites
that include sufficient, desegregated affordable housing ensure social
sustainability by fostering interaction between different social classes,
attracting higher levels of social services, and creating additional
employment opportunities. 62 Residential use of land within an urban
infrastructure also minimizes homelessness and reduces the impact of
high shelter costs. 63
In response to pressure for housing development, the ODPM has
published several Public Service Agreement aims and objectives. In
February of 1998, it released an Agreement setting forth a national goal
to have 60 percent of all new development take place on brownfield sites
56. EUGRIS: Portal for Soil and Water Management in Europe, Policy and
Regulation:- United Kingdom Brownfields, http://www.eugris.infolPolicy.asp?e=457&Ca=1




59. EUGRIS: Portal for Soil and Water Management in Europe, Further Description:-
United Kingdom Brownfields, http://www.eugris.info/FurtherDescription.asp?e=457&
Ca=1&Cy=1&T=Brownfields (last visited Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Further Description:-
United Kingdom Brownfield].
60. Id.
61. See Juli Ponce, Affordable Housing as Urban Infrastructure, 42-4/43-1, THE
URBAN LAWYER 223, 230 (2010/2011) (citing Social Infrastructure, ATLAS,
http://www.atlasplanning.com/page/topic/index.cfm?coArticleTopic-articleld=47&coSitena
vigation-articleld=47).
62. Id. at 236-37.
63. Id. at 241.
502 VOL. 40:1-3
THE ROLE OF BROWNFIELDS
by 2008.64 This designation was intended to relieve pressure on
greenfield sites, which were the next logical location for mixed-use
development, in order to preserve the countryside. 65  That year,
England created a National Land Use Database (NLUD) that has since
been working to identify previously developed land that might be
suitable for redevelopment. 6 6  In the United Kingdom, sites often
become unexpectedly available for redevelopment when their previous
use comes to an end.67 The Homes & Communities Agency (HCA) of
England manages the NLUD database of land and buildings, and
updates the list annually. 68  The HCA has stated, "Developing
[b]rownfield land for housing, industrial, commercial, and leisure use
protects [g]reenfield areas and contributes to community well-being by
tackling visual and economic issues." 69
The HCA works with other organizations and groups to foster local
investment planning for housing and urban regeneration. 70 Its key
partners include local authorities, central government agencies,
housing associations, private sector builders, developers and
contractors, lenders and investors, and voluntary and community
sectors.71  It also works with regional development agencies and
professional and industry bodies such as the Local Government
Association (LGA) and the Department for Communities and Local
Government. The HCA has reached an agreement with the LGA under
which the central government will set national policy backed by funding
64. Brownfield Development, POLITICS.Co.UK (June 29, 2010), http://www.politics.co.
uk/briefings-guides/issue-briefs/housing- and-planning/brownfielddevelopment$366654.htm;
Policy and Regulation:- United Kingdom, supra note 56.
65. Further Description:- United Kingdom Brownfields, supra note 59.
66. Id. England had previously performed several surveys to identify "derelict land,"
but the land included in this category is incongruent with the notion of brownfield land.
Id.
67. Further Description:- United Kingdom Brownfields, supra note 59. Spatial
planners in the United Kingdom refer to these sites as "windfall" sites. Id.
68. Home & Communities Agency, National Land Use Database, http://www.homes
andcommunities.co.uk/NLUD (last updated Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter National Land
Use Database].
69. Brownfield Development, supra note 64. The HCA classifies brownfield land into
five main subdivisions: previously developed land now vacant, vacant buildings, derelict
land and buildings, previously developed land or buildings currently in use and allocated
in local plan or with planning permission, and previously developed land or buildings
currently in use with redevelopment potential, but no planning allocation or permission.
National Land Use Database, supra note 68.
70. Home & Communities Agency, Land Supply, http://www.homesandcommunities.
co.uk/ourwork/1and-supply (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
71. Home & Communities Agency, Our Partners, http://www.homesandcommunities.
co.uk/keypartners (last updated Mar. 9, 2011).
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for brownfield sites, and the HCA will serve to connect these national
priorities with local directives.72
Some sources of public funding for brownfield development are
available through the ODPM, the Scottish Executive, and the Welsh
Assembly, but most funding comes from the private sector. 73 Despite
national and local public support, regeneration projects in the United
Kingdom are in large part led by the private sector, and public bodies
are generally not directly involved with brownfield reclamation. 74 As a
result, private developers must be convinced that the long-term
economic payoffs make it worth the cost of reclamation and the
investment in a mixite site.
B. United States Response to Brownfields and Their
Development
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
cooperates with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
to support urban sustainable development projects.75 In 2009, these
entities formed a Partnership for Sustainable Communities to ensure
that federal action does not subsidize sprawl. 76 The Partnership aims
to support efficient and sustainable development of brownfields.
However, it is the EPA that has played a leading role in the promotion
of sustainable brownfield development sites for more than two decades.
In the early 1990s, the EPA developed a Brownfields Program
designed to "empower states, communities, and other stakeholders in
economic redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to
prevent, assess, safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields." 77
72. See Homes & Communities Agency; HCA-LGA Agreement, http://www.homesand
communities.co.uk/hca-lga-agreement (last updated Apr. 11, 2011) (discussing the Central
Local Agreement on Housing and Regeneration).
73. Further Description:- United Kingdom Brownfields, supra note 59.
74. Id. This focus on the private sector may be the result of several factors, including
the fact that most of the brownfield sites are already privately owned, the demand for the
land in the areas, and conscious political choice by the national government. Id.
75. EPA, Partnership for Sustainable Communities: Brownfields Pilots (Feb. 2010)
(hereinafter Partnership for Sustainable Communities: Brownfields Pilots),
http://www.epa.gov/nscep/index.html (search publications for "560F10002"; then follow
"Partnership for Sustainable Communities: Brownfields Pilots" hyperlink).
76. Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, DOT Secretary Ray
LaHood and HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan Announce Interagency Partnership for
Sustainable Communities, Partnership sets forth 6 'livability principles' to coordinate
policy (June 16, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/F500561FBB8D
5AO8852575D700501350.
77. EPA, Brownfields Program Activities Under the Recovery Act, http://www.epa.
gov/brownfields/eparecovery/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Brownfield
Program Activities Under the Recovery Act]; EPA, Introduction to Brownfields,
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The Brownfields Program uses cooperative agreements to provide
funding to pay for brownfield redevelopment projects.78 Direct funding
that is made available through the EPA's Brownfields Program includes
assessment grants, revolving loan fund grants, job training grants, and
cleanup grants. The EPA also provides other opportunities for funding,
as well as technical information regarding the financing of brownfield
matters.79  In 1997, the United States Congress authorized a
Brownfields National Partnership program that allocated $300 million
in federal funds for brownfields revitalization. The Partnership
brought public and private entities together to redevelop 5,000
brownfield sites. Five years later, the Small Business Liability Relief
and Brownfields Revitalization Act was enacted, which again increased
funding for sustainable brownfield development. 80
The EPA runs a Sustainability Pilot program that promotes
environmentally friendly urban growth at a local level. The EPA
provides funding for these pilot projects and works with communities to
create sites that are consistent with environmental health and
sustainable development, and that can serve as an example for other
communities across the country.81  Funding is provided to local
governments to encourage recycling, green building and infrastructure
design, energy efficiency, resource conservation, development of
renewable energy, and environmentally beneficial landscaping. 82 The
EPA Brownfields Program is supported by other governmental
initiatives, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, which was enacted in response to a deteriorating private housing
market and overall economic recession. The Recovery Act will
ultimately provide the EPA's Brownfield Program with $100 million, to
be awarded to eligible entities seeking to change hazardous waste sites
into mixed-use urban areas that promote sustainable urban growth. 83
In addition to providing funding for brownfield development,
federal and state laws have also been enacted in the United States to
combat some of the other barriers to the revitalization of brownfields. 84
Legislation has been passed to protect brownfield sites from hazardous
materials by promoting or requiring cleanup, and then motivating
http://www.epa.gov/region7/cleanup/brownfields/index.htm (last updated May 9, 2011)
[hereinafter Introduction to Brownfields].
78. Introduction to Brownfields, supra note 77.
79. EPA, Grants and Funding, http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant-infolindex.htm (last
updated Jan. 5, 2011).
80. JOHN S. APPLEGATE & JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA,
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 285 (2006).
81. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Funds Greener Brownfields Projects (July 29, 2008),
http://epa.gov/brownfields/sustain-plts/index.htm.
82. Id.
83. Brownfields Program Activities Under the Recovery Act, supra note 77.
84. See BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT MANUAL, supra note 21.
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redevelopment, despite liability fears. 85 As discussed in Part I of this
Article, the potential for liability can significantly hinder the
reclamation of brownfields. Two federal laws that have negatively
impacted brownfield redevelopment by fostering a fear of liability are
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),86 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA).87 RCRA addresses threats to public health and the
environment from the active misuse of hazardous waste disposal.88
CERCLA identifies the parties responsible for creating hazardous waste
sites, and imposes liability on them for the costs of cleaning up the
contamination. 8 9 While RCRA prevents, in theory, "midnight dumpers"
from disposing of hazardous waste in a brownfield, CERCLA deters
cleanup efforts by imposing strict liability on any operator-developer
who affects a hazardous waste site, like a brownfield.
The United States has responded to such liability concerns by
clarifying defenses to claims for liability, and by providing exemptions
from liability for some owners and recent purchasers of brownfields.90
For example, in 1995 the EPA responded to the unintended
consequences of CERCLA liability by announcing reforms that
incentivize the development of brownfields by lessening the severity of
CERCLA.91 The EPA now encourages the use of "comfort letters" to
spur voluntary cleanup. The letters assure brownfield owners and
prospective brownfield purchasers that CERCLA enforcement action
will not be taken against their properties if they either initiate
voluntary cleanup or agree to perform a portion of the cleanup. The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1977 enables development companies to deduct
the costs of cleaning up brownfields. The United States government
encourages the EPA to cooperate with states and local entities to clarify
potential liabilities of prospective purchasers, lenders, and brownfield
owners, and to coordinate enforcement priorities so that brownfield
redevelopment can occur. 92
In the United States, environmental insurance is also available to
help protect against the liabilities and risks associated with
85. Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6908A (1976).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1980).
88. Id.; APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 316.
89. APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 481.
90. BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT MANUAL, supra note 21, at 72.
91. See Robert Abrams, Superfund and the Evaluation of Brownfields, 21 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 275 (1997); William Buzbee, Brownfields,
Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & IIARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 13 (1997).
92. APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 80, at 267-68.
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development of contaminated land.93 Environmental insurance comes
in various forms, including professional liability insurance, remediation
cost overrun insurance, and pollution legal liability or environmental
impairment liability insurance. These types of insurance policies help
to ease lenders' fears that, in the event of foreclosure, they ultimately
will be exposed to liability as the effective owners of the contaminated
property.
III. VARYING SUCCESS IN Two COUNTRIES WISHING TO CREATE MIXED-
USE SPACES FROM BROWNFIELD SITES
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have experienced
differing levels of success in actually creating mixed-use spaces from
brownfields sites. Each country has relied on and implemented distinct
techniques to convert an otherwise useless urban area into a vital,
thriving, and ultimately sustainable mixture of residential-commercial-
greenspace land. The United States seems to have a critical mass of
such sites, and it will therefore be useful to examine several case
studies from America of successful and mixed-success brownfield
development projects.
A. Implementation of Brownfield Redevelopment in the
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom government has promoted brownfield
development since the 1970s. 94 In the United Kingdom, the primary
focus seems to be on encouraging development of brownfields for one
use residential projects. However, even with public policy supporting
brownfield development, greenfield development in the United Kingdom
is usually more feasible from an economic perspective. Private
investors often are hesitant about developing brownfield sites because
of the expenses involved in clearing and cleaning the usually
contaminated sites.95 Some brownfields are not suitable for parks, open
spaces, or gardening, even though they may be suitable for city
apartments and residential units. 96 Moreover, if an investor wishes to
expand the size of re-development in the future, such a prudent
93. BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT MANUAL, supra note 21, at 66. Environmental
insurance encourages brownfield development by assuring the buyer and lender that they
will not be accountable if additional or different contamination is found at the site, by
capping costs and helping to manage budgets, and by covering legal defense costs. Id. at
67.
94. Andrew R. Harrison, Monitoring and Re-use of Brownfield Land in England and
Wales, 1 (2004), http://www.ecologic-events.de/bodenschutz-bayern/de/documents/Harris
onAndrewRLandlnformLtd.pdf.
95. Brownfield Development, supra note 64.
96. Id.
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entrepreneur may be discouraged from building on brownfield land that
can only offer limited space.
The United Kingdom has exceeded its target of having at least 60
percent of new homes be built on brownfield sites. In 2008, 80 percent
of new homes were built on brownfields, up from 56 percent in 1997.97
However, the Center for Cities, an independent research institute that
studies the economic performance of United Kingdom cities, claims that
this policy has actually slowed residential development and restricted
growth. It argues that the 60 percent target has caused land and house
prices to increase substantially, because of decreases in supply.98
Housing supply has decreased in general because governmental
initiatives that discourage development on greenfields have not
adequately addressed the underlying problems and potential liabilities
associated with brownfield development. The result - that many
builders choose not to build at all - has led to the diminished housing
supply.
This unforeseen secondary effect of the United Kingdom's policy of
promoting brownfield development by restricting greenfield
development is similar to the United States' problems associated with
its CERCLA and RCRA regulations. The United Kingdom uses a
comprehensive system of regulations to control how brownfield
development takes place. These regulations attempt to promote the
development of brownfields by withholding permission to build on
greenfields. At the same time, governmental policies identify
brownfields and make such land available for development. However,
these policies may not provide a strong enough incentive for developers
to risk building on brownfields. Instead, they may discourage
development in general by inhibiting the development of greenfields,
but not correspondingly making development on brownfields a feasible
investment. To avoid this problem, the United Kingdom should provide
more comprehensive incentives for building on brownfields, in addition
to the identification of land that is suitable for redevelopment.
Initially, the policies in the United States were also narrowly
focused on reducing the severity and effects of brownfield
contamination. These policies inadvertently discouraged sustainable
development of brownfields by increasing the risks associated with
investment in such development. 99 As discussed in Part II of this
Article, the United States has responded to these issues by revising the
97. Brownfield Targets Slow Down House Building, LAWSON FAIRBANK (Mar. 16,
2010), http://www.lawsonfairbank.co.uk/brownfield-targets-slow-down-house-building.asp.
98. Id.
99. Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado about Something
or the Timing of the Shrewd?, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 1 (2004), www.rff.org/
documents/rff-dp-04-46.pdf.
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problematic areas of its laws and policies so as to make more attractive
brownfield sites. 100 These reforms seem to have had a positive effect on
brownfield development in the United States. Under the current state
of affairs in the United Kingdom, the choice not to build on a brownfield
is often more attractive than the choice to build on a brownfield. If the
United Kingdom wishes to further encourage development, it should
consider expanding its policies to promote sustainable brownfield
development by identifying and reducing the barriers to such
development.
B. United States
In the United States, investment in the EPA's Brownfields
Program has leveraged more than $6.5 billion in public and private
funding for brownfields cleanup and redevelopment. The EPA's
initiatives have created approximately 25,000 new jobs.101 The EPA
has reported numerous brownfield redevelopment success stories. This
success in promoting sustainable brownfield development is largely
because the EPA has prioritized the reduction of barriers to such
development.102 The EPA in America has promoted aggressively the
idea that the implementation of mixed-use development on urban
brownfields can be beneficial for every party involved. As a result of its
policies, there has been considerable interest and investment in
brownfields.
The following case studies are three examples of brownfield
development in the United States. The first is a terrific success story.
The second might be a success several decades into the future. The
third could have been a success, had economic conditions been better.
In each of them, the planners had a goal of mixed-use development,
where the formerly contaminated site would be transformed into a
multi-purpose, multi-functional location where residents could live,
play, shop, and work in one place, and where automobile transportation
was minimized. These sites were intended to be sustainable
environmentally, and efficient with respect to energy consumption.
And, they held the promise of socio-economic integration as well.
C. Case Studies of Mixed-Use Brownfield Development
1. Atlantic Station in Atlanta, Georgia
"True to its motto 'Live, Work, Play,' the Atlantic Station
redevelopment includes affordable housing and a host of new jobs in its
100. See also text accompanying supra notes 75-93.
101. Introduction to Brownfields, supra note 77.
102. See Region 5 Brownfield Success Stories, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/r5brown
fields/htm/s-stories/index.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2011).
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comprehensive approach to community development. But this kind of
development doesn't just happen on its own. It takes vision and
cooperation among many partners." 103
Atlantic Station is the United States' largest urban brownfield
redevelopment project. It sits on 138 acres in Atlanta, Georgia, where a
former steel mill was once located. The steel mill operated from 1901 to
1997.104 During this time, the land became contaminated with PCBs
and sulfates. In 1997, a private developer proposed a comprehensive
redevelopment plan to transform the site into a mixed-use development.
The site's central location and large size had significant development
potential that could offset cleanup costs. After being decontaminated,
cleaned and redeveloped, the site was opened in 2005 as Atlantic
Station, where the land is currently being used for a variety of uses
including residential, office, retail, and entertainment. 105
The idea for Atlantic Station began as a master's thesis on city
planning by a student at the Georgia Institute of Technology.106 The
transformation of Atlantic Station from a brownfield to a mixite, which
ultimately required an investment of over $2 billion, was influenced by
many factors. Two key elements to its success were the formation of
numerous public-private partnerships, and the strategic
implementation of the comprehensive redevelopment plan. Developers,
bankers, architects, engineers, federal, state, and local governments,
the local transit authority, local schools, and grassroots foundations all
came together to create Atlantic Station. Funding for the project came
from a combination of public and private sources. The site was issued
"Tax Allocation Bonds" by the federal government. These bonds
contributed up to $170 million in cleanup and infrastructure costs. The
U.S. Department of Transportation also provided funding to improve
the sidewalks, streets, and traffic flow. The private sector paid for the
office, commercial, and residential development. 107
Atlantic Station has been recognized as a national model for smart
growth, mixed-use urban planning, and brownfield redevelopment. os
103. Sibyl Howell & Wayne Smith, Live, Work, Play: An Urban Innovation, FED. RES.
BANK OF ATLANTA, http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/partners/partners-vol14no3vol_14
no 3-live work-playanurban innovation.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
104. Id.
105. Case Study, Cooperative Conservation America, Atlantic Station Redevelopment:
Using Smart Growth Strategies to Lower Emissions, http://www.cooperative
conservation.org/viewproject.asp?pid=498.
106. Kathy Morse, A Better Way of Living, PUBLIC HEALTH, Summer 2007,
http://whsc.emory.edu/-pubs/ph/phsum07/pf better-living.html. The student, Brian Leary,
now serves as vice president, design and development, for Atlantic Station, LLC. Id.
107. Howell & Smith, supra note 103.
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Currently, over 50 percent of all blocks in Atlantic station contain a
variety of different functions. More than 3,000 residents and 3,500
employees live and work in Atlantic Station. The community offers 11
acres of parks and greenspaces, bike trails, wide sidewalks, and
numerous public transportation options. 09 Atlantic Station has helped
reduce vehicle miles traveled in Atlanta, conserved fuel, and lessened
air pollution. The Rollins School of Public Health is currently
conducting a study of Atlantic Station to determine the social and
physical characteristics of similar mixed-use communities. The three-
year study is expected to quantify the quality of life benefits that were
envisioned by the developers of the site. Developers are supporting the
study with a grant, and are also providing access for nearly 200
participants to move to Atlantic Station for a year.1 10
2. Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn, New York
The Gowanus Canal empties into the New York Harbor, and was
once a major transportation route for Brooklyn and New York City.
Many facilities operated along the canal, including gas plants, mills,
tanneries, and chemical plants. These facilities emptied toxic waste
and raw sewage into the canal for over a century. The canal is now one
of the most extensively polluted bodies of water in the United States."'
The contamination threatens the health of nearby residents, who use
the canal for fishing and recreation.
The case of the Gowanus Canal is an example of how government
regulations can slow progress at brownfields. Due to the health
hazards posed by extensive pollution, the Gowanus Canal has been
designated by the EPA as a site that is eligible for Superfund money.112
It has been added to the EPA's list of the most severely contaminated
sites in the nation, and the EPA will be either funding the cleanup or
designating responsible parties to pay for it.
The Mayor of Brooklyn was disappointed with the designation of
the Gowanus Canal as a superfund site. He and other city officials
feared that the designation would prolong cleanup of the site, and
would discourage developers from investing in the site due to the
stigma associated with the superfund label. Originally, private
developers who were interested in building mixite sites along the Canal
were willing to pay for cleanup in their respective areas. Now that the
109. Morse, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. EPA, Region 2 Superfund: Gowanus Canal, http://www.epa.gov/region2/super
fund/npl/gowanus (last updated Sept. 22, 2011).
112. The "Superfund" is a CERCLA trust fund that finances cleanup of the worst
hazardous waste sites in the country. See APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 80, at 133-36.
The EPA maintains a National Priorities List of the sites that it determines are worthy of
Superfund dollars. Id.
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EPA is in charge of funding the cleanup, the developers will have to
wait for the responsible parties to be located and for liability to be
assigned for cleanup. This could take years, and will likely precipitate
legal battles among polluters responsible for cleanup. Local groups
believe the Superfund site designation will ensure the most efficient
and comprehensive cleanup. The city has agreed to cooperate with the
EPA, which estimates that operations to remove pollution will continue
until 2025, and will cost up to $500 million. 1 1 3
Assessment and cleanup of the site have already begun, and a full
plan for the cleanup process, which could last over five years, is
expected by 2014. The EPA has already identified several responsible
parties, including the City of Brooklyn, the United States Navy, and
seven other private companies. At least 20 additional potentially
responsible companies are under investigation. 114 Although
preparation of the site for development may be prolonged for decades by
the EPA's involvement and oversight, the parties interested in
developing the Canal as a mixed-use location should ultimately benefit
from the reforms to United States brownfield law and policy that
encourage turning brownfields into mixite after cleanup is concluded.115
3. Gates Redevelopment in Denver, Colorado
The old Gates Rubber factory is conveniently located on a light-rail
transit line near a major intersection in the center of Denver, Colorado.
The Gates Rubber Company was founded in 1911, and eventually grew
to become one of the largest employers in Denver. The 50-acre site was
closed in 1995 after the Gates Company moved its plants overseas.
Cherokee Denver, LLC, a private company in Denver, purchased the
site in 2001.116
In 2004, a major trichloroethylene dump was discovered at the site.
Trichloroethylene is a toxic solvent that is listed by the EPA as a
possible carcinogen. The site was not designated as a Superfund site,
but the EPA did participate in assessing the nature and degree of
contamination at the site. After learning of the contamination,
113. Mireya Navarro, Gowanus Canal Gets Superfund Status, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2010, at Al.
114. Id.
115. Brooklyn has already approved zoning changes that will allow Whole Foods to
build a 52,000 square foot store on the cleaned up banks of the Gowanus canal. Erin
Durkin, Whole Foods Gets City Nod to Build First Brooklyn Store on the Banks of the
Gowanus Canal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/foods-city-nod-build-brooklyn-store-banks-gowanus-canal-article-1.1030115. The store's
plans include a rooftop greenhouse that will be used to grow organic produce. Id.
116. Tory Read, The Gates Cherokee Redevelopment Project: A Huge Step Forward for
Low-Income People in Denver, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 12, http://www.aecf.org/
upload/publicationfiles/cc3622h 195.pdf.
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Cherokee became involved with the city and the local community in
making efforts to fund and clean up the contamination. Local unions
and community groups formed a coalition that pushed for responsible
development. The coalition, which eventually included over 50 groups,
convinced Cherokee to commit to providing quality jobs and affordable
housing.
Development at the Gates Rubber site was seen as an opportunity
to bring numerous benefits to the investors and to the community
surrounding the site.
In exchange for public subsidies and tax increment financing to aid
in cleanup and development, Cherokee agreed to comply with a long list
of conditions stipulated by the local government and surrounding
community. The development project was seen as a huge economic
generator for Denver. It was set to provide 350 affordable housing units
and up to 10,000 temporary and permanent jobs, with preference for
residents of surrounding neighborhoods. The plan was to redevelop the
Gates Rubber factory into a transit oriented, mixed-use, varied-income
community that included residential, retail, office, and greenspace
uses. 117
The redevelopment plan for the Gates Rubber factory was never
fully realized due to the collapse of the real estate market in 2008. The
site remains both an eyesore and a glaring example of an opportunity
cost - the loss of jobs in transforming the site, and the lack of benefits
that would have followed, economically and environmentally, had the
site been changed to the mixed-use plan. The Gates site is a reflection
of what "could have happened" to a brownfield, had (1) adequate
funding been available and (2) economic conditions been better.
CONCLUSION
The successful mixed-use development projects that have been
planned and completed in the United States can serve as an example
for future brownfield developments in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Atlantic Station is one of the most successful brownfield
redevelopments in the United States. The strategy used for
development in Atlanta can be implemented in other brownfield
projects as well. The Gowanus Canal development project, which is still
in the early stages, should be examined when considering the
potentially hindering effects of government involvement. Government
cleanup requirements have caused redevelopment to be delayed by over
a decade.
The Gates Rubber brownfield project is an outstanding example of
the benefits that private-public partnerships can bring to mixed-use
117. Id. at 6.
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brownfield development. The local coalitions, the private developer,
and the city worked together to negotiate a development plan that was
beneficial for every party involved, as well as the surrounding
community. Many lessons can be learned by understanding the
financial obstacles that eventually put this otherwise model
redevelopment goal on hold.
Much of the United States' partial success in encouraging
sustainable brownfield development can be attributed to its
commitment to providing incentives for private investors to engage in
the mixed-use development of brownfields. Another key factor is the
effort the EPA has made to remove the unique legal obstacles to
development that are inherent in contaminate properties. The United
Kingdom is currently facing problems similar to those faced by the
United States, such as the negative secondary effects of laws and
policies regulating brownfield development. To remedy these problems,
the United Kingdom should consider reforming its policies to provide
incentives that convince investors of the unique social and economic
benefits of sustainable brownfield development. This goal can be
achieved by limiting liability, and promoting voluntary cleanup in order
to reduce investment risks. In addition to promoting development
objectives through written agreements, the United Kingdom
government may benefit by playing a more active role in mixed-use
development; it can provide job training and education, become more
involved with encouraging local communities to embrace mixite, and
reduce regulatory obstacles that inhibit the allocation of funding for
cleanup and new infrastructure at brownfield sites.
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RENOVATING SPACE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
P.J. BLOUNT*
Buildings are constructed by first erecting an interior frame or
architecture and then, upon that architecture, the exterior is layered on
giving the building its appearance. In a similar fashion law is often
layered on underlying social and geopolitical structures forming a
structure which then affects how we interpret the underlying social
structure.' Law, to the extent that it is reactionary in this manner, can
only be fully understood when the underlying architecture that it has
been mapped onto is exposed. Often though, like in older buildings, we
find that the underlying architecture has changed. In buildings
termites and settling affect the structure without changing the exterior
characteristics. Law is similar to the extent that the values it embodies
can remain in place well past the demise of the social structures that it
was built to regulate. Due to the dynamic nature of the social sphere,
law can encounter application and interpretation problems later in its
life. Rigid interpretations may be a bad fit for newer developments,
whereas adaptive interpretations can become controversial. Striking a
balance in this spectrum can be difficult.
Understanding the architecture that laws are built on is important
in understanding if and how older regulations can be applied to modern
times. This is especially important in laws dealing with technological
areas which are prone to rapid change but that nonetheless need
regulation. In this article, the term "architecture" is used to describe
the underlying social, cultural, and political environment that
inevitably influenced the development of law. The interests involved in
these areas build a framework upon which the law is then mapped so as
to best serve the goals sought. Obviously though, society and politics
are not static, and when they change the law is often left as a rigid exo-
structure that no longer suits the architecture underneath. It becomes a
* National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law.
1. It should be acknowledged that this is not a perfect analogy, and indeed is one
that can be flipped on its head by arguing that law forms the architecture and society
maps itself around law. In fact most likely both phenomena are happening. It is
submitted though, that at the international level and especially in the area of regulation
of technologies, the competing interests of States create an environment wherein law is
more likely to be mapped onto geopolitical structures than vice versa.
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historic building in need of restoration, and the law can often, in a
sense, be renovated by evaluating the new architecture and remapping
to suit that framework.
International space law (and indeed much of international law) is
currently at a place wherein its underlying architecture has
dramatically changed. This paper will discuss the future challenges for
international space law as it is applied to new geopolitical situations
and the trends that are developing as this process takes place. Part I
will describe the architecture upon which international space law was
built, Part II will discuss how that architecture has changed, and Part
III will analyze the trends that are changing the structure of space law
and shaping its future.
I. BUILDING A COLD WAR BUILDING
It is no secret that international space law is a product of the Cold
War. There is a great deal of literature on its development and the
roles that the United States and the Soviet Union played in negotiating
the original founding principles. 2 This article will, as much as possible,
avoid revisiting this well documented past. However, it will seek to
give an understanding of the regulatory goals that the architects were
building for in this geopolitical climate.
The primary goal of the architects when first negotiating space law
principles was security.3 The popular narrative that accompanies the
Space Race at the beginning of the "space age," involves two
superpowers vying for technological superiority over the other. The
launch of Sputnik is often portrayed as a black eye to the United States
in its quest for space superiority, from a country that should have been
its technological inferior. 4 The oft forgotten part of that narrative is
that the Soviet launch raised a serious strategic threat to the United
2. See generally Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and
Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041 (2004); WALTER
MCDOUGAL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE
(1985).
3. One of the prominent themes in Space Law is the concept of "peaceful purposes,"
this is because of the close relationship of space technology to that of weapons delivery
systems. The lawmaking process held international peace and security at its heart, and
the value is explicitly stated in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty: "States Parties to
the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and
security and promoting international co-operation and understanding." Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].




States, in that it showed that the Soviet Union was much closer to the
technology that would allow for the intercontinental delivery system for
a nuclear warhead (an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - ICBM).
Tensions rose between the two states as they both got closer to
developing not only the delivery capability for nuclear weapons but also
the nuclear weapons themselves. The international community and
specifically the two superpowers saw that there was great strategic
risk, and that it warranted negotiating principles to reduce these
tensions. This resulted in a UN General Assembly Declaration of Legal
Principles followed by the Outer Space Treaty.5 The legal principles
found in these documents were specifically designed to ease tension in
outer space activities. Some of these principles are outright
prescriptions, such as the ban on the "national appropriation" of space. 6
Others are softer obligations that serve to build confidence by placing
strong emphasis on principles such as transparency and international
cooperation. 7 The principles as a whole though served to lay the
foundation of a legal regime that promoted the peaceful exploration of
space by reducing the opportunity for tensions in the new arena.
These principles were later integrated into the Outer Space Treaty,
which has been referred to as a "constitution for space." 8 This treaty,
though, was designed to suit underlying societal and political realities
that shaped the drafters goals.9 Primary amongst these realities is that
the treaty was built around a binary world; one dominated by two
symmetric yet opposed powers. 10 As a result the law had to be seen by
5. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess.,
1280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
6. Id. princ. 3.
7. Id. princ. 6.
8. Stanley B. Rosenfield, Where Air Space Ends and Outer Space Begins, 7 J. Space
L. 137, 144 (1979).
9. It should be noted that this is not a critique of the drafters. They were writing law
for the world they knew, and could not be expected to envision the changes in the
geopolitical climate nor in the nature of space activities. While predictions of future
technology are ubiquitous, they are often incorrect. See generally The Paleofuture,
http://www.paleofuture.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
10. The use of symmetric here refers to goals and strategies. See P.J. Blount, The
Development of International Norms to Enhance Space Security Law in An Asymmetric
World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (2010).
While technological and military might was not always in symmetry, the two states
pursued very similar strategies in coping with the others power. The arms race the
primary example of this relationship. Both sought sheer numerical superiority, as
opposed to others sorts of advantages. This can be compared today wherein both States
and other actors seek to gain strategic advantage via asymmetrical means. For example, a
prominent thought in Chinese theory on warfare is the idea of defeating the superior with
the inferior. See Zhao Nanqi, Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Defense Modernization, in
CHINESE VIEWS OF FUTURE WARFARE 11, 18 (Michael Pillsbury ed., 1998).
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both of these nations as serving its own self interests, otherwise it
would fail for lack of support from one or the other. This, predictably,
had a dramatic effect on the final product, in that law reduced tensions,
but at the same time left lacunae in which states could pursue their
own security interests.
A second underlying assumption that is critical to understanding
the regulatory system adopted is that space activities were to be purely
state undertakings." While future commercial activities were to a
small extent envisioned, international space law was built on the
principle that space activities are uniquely state controlled activities.
To this end the negotiators sought to control state actions as opposed to
those of private actors. The idea of private actors was not completely
ignored though, and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty was drafted to
deal with such situations. This article is quite exceptional in
international law and makes states "internationally responsible for
national activities in outer space" carried on by non-governmental
actors. 12 At the end of the day though, the law was crafted around an
architecture that did not include a full panoply of non-governmental
actors, and has left numerous question about the obligations that states
have to regulate these entities.
This geopolitical situation formed the underlying architecture that
international space law was mapped onto. The space treaties were built
to serve regulatory goals that served the vision of the world held by the
drafters at the time. In fact mapping the law onto this structure was
critical in achieving the primary regulatory goal of increasing
international peace and security. If the law had not been constructed in
such a way as to conform with the geopolitical architecture it is
arguable that the system could have collapsed like a house of cards.
II. THE NEED FOR RENOVATION
In the past 20 years, the geopolitical climate in which space
activities take place has changed dramatically. Most notably, the Cold
11. Eilene Galloway, The Community of Law and Science, 1 PRoc. COLL. L. OUTER
SPACE 62 (Andrew G. Haley & Welf Heinrich eds., Wein, Springer, Verlag 1959) (arguing
that due to the great cost of space exploration "it is a matter for government
appropriations."). See Legal Problems of Space Exploration: A Symposium, prepared for
the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, by the
Legislative Reference Service, Mar. 22, 1961, Washington, Library of Congress, 450
(1961).
12. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. VI. Compare this to the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility which states that States only bear international responsibility when
those actions are attributable to the State. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 8.
It should be noted that Article 11 of the Draft Articles allow States to accept greater
obligations in relation to making actions by non-governmental actors attributable to it,
which is what the Outer Space Treaty does in Article VI. Id. Art. 11.
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War ended and commercial actors have begun to edge their way into the
market. These events have changed underlying architecture that space
law was built around.
The End of a Binary Existence
The end of the Cold War, predictably, has had a dramatic effect on
geopolitics in the world. No longer did two diametrically opposed
symmetric superpowers exist. Instead there remained a dominant
superpower, and "[s]pace went from being a two-player game with both
players starting from the same point and nearly equally matched, to a
multiplayer game with one leading player and many other various
points of a spectrum of capabilities."13 Specifically, Asian states have
begun to get very involved in space activities. China, Japan, and Korea
have all started their own space programs with varying levels of
success. Korea is developing its indigenous launch capability14 , Japan
has become an important partner in the ISS15, and China has become
the third nation to embark on a human exploration program' 6 _ In fact,
some commentators have referred to this trend as a "new space race"
that pits Asian nations against each other, but also in another
iteration - pits the United States against China.1 7
Additionally, developing nations have begun to gain an increasing
interest in access to the benefits of space technology. These states'
interests come in a wide variety. Some partner to gain access to data,
some contract to have satellites launched on their behalf, and others
seek out indigenous technologies. Developing nations have embraced
space technology as way to participate in the global community via
access to better telecommunications technologies as well as access to
the benefits of remote sensing technologies, and this has led to the
13. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY AMBITIONS 4 (2009).
14. Sang-Myon Rhee, Current Status and Recent Developments in Korea's National
Space Laws, 35 J. SPACE L. 523, 526-27 (2009).
15. See Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America Concerning
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (Jan. 29, 1998), available at
http://web1.olemiss.edu/ncrsasl/atlas/archive/files/48fl051fcc3fa68947ea7941fd7340b7.pdf.
See also Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (Feb. 24, 1998), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/structure/elements/nasajapan.html.
16. China puts its first man in space, BBC, Oct. 15, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilasia-pacific/3192330.stm.
17. Bruce Sterling, The New Space Race, WIRED, Dec. 2004, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/12.12/china.html and Jeff Foust, China and the US: Space Race or
Miscommunication, THE SPACE REVIEW, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/1075/1.
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adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution on space and developing
countries.18 States have traditionally seen space as a way improve the
lives of their citizens, achieve security goals, and increase their
international stature.19 Space activities though have not been divorced
from their early roots. Indicative of this is that some states have
pursued space to achieve strategic goals by developing launch delivery
systems. States such as Iran 20 and North Korea 21 have pursued
indigenous launch capability in order to develop completely domestic
space programs and possible ICBM capabilities. These states have used
the terms of the Outer Space Treaty to justify their exploration of
technology that can lead to the development of delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction. 22
International space law was built around the tenets of
international peace and security. To this end the Outer Space Treaty
and its progeny can and should be read as security treaties. As already
stated, they are security treaties built around a bipolar world. The
goals and aspirations of these treaties still remain valid, but the
activities they were meant to support and regulate have changed
dramatically. First, maintaining security in a world with a wider and
more disparately situated set of actors has become increasingly
challenging. During the Cold War "the modus operandi that arose
between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War
that each side appeared to value its own assets more than it valued the
ability to destroy the assets of its adversaries." 23 This strategic balance
is shifting with the proliferation of space actors. The idea that there are
spoilers who might value the destruction of an adversary's space asset
over preservation of their own is emerging. 24 The most accessible
example of this is the entry of Iran and the attempted entry of North
Korea into space activities. These outliers have both sought to become
18. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries, U.N.G.A. Res. 51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
19. For example, the Japanese Space Policy includes sections on economic growth,
strategic growth, and space diplomacy. Setsuko Aoki, Japanese Law and Regulations
Concerning Remote Sensing Activities, 36 J. Space L. 335, 350-64 (2010).
20. Adam Gabbat, Iran Rocket Launch Opens Can of Worms in Space Race with West,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/03/iran-launches-
rocket-carrying- animals.
21. See THE NORTH KOREAN EXPENDABLE CARRIER ROCKET, UNHA-2: SELECTED
LEGAL DOCUMENTS (P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds., 2010).
22. See P.J. Blount, Developments in Space Security Law and Their Legal
Implications, 44/2 LAW/TECHNOLOGY 19, 35-39 (2011).
23. ROGER G. HARRISON, SPACE AND VERIFICATION VOLUME I: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
9 (Eisenhower Center 2011).
24. Charles D. Lutes, report, National Space Forum 2007: Towards a Theory of
Spacepower, 2 SPACE AND DEFENSE 41, 55 (2008).
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space actors, conspicuously though they are also both pursuing the
development of nuclear weapons, and space launch vehicles are a very
similar technology to ICBMs. Both countries though have used the
concept of "peaceful purposes" 25 and have capitalized on the Outer
Space Treaty guarantee of "free acceSS" 2 6 as a shield to their activities.
This is troubling because it allows the very laws that are supposed to
ensure peace and security in space to be invoked to protect the
development of technologies that can threaten peace and security
terrestrially.
Another example of the increasing complexity of space activities
can be seen in the relations between the United States and China. The
United States does not trust China to not exploit space technologies to
increase its military might, and to this end, whether right of wrong, the
United States actively marginalizes China from space cooperation
activities. 27  As a result, China has successfully developed these
technologies without the assistance of the world's leading space power.
However, China also often behaves in a non-cooperative manner that
threatens the security and safety of the space environment, which could
probably be avoided if a more open dialogue was had among the space
faring states. While the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty sought
facilitate such discourse, the gaps left by the geopolitical architecture
leave seams that both the United States and China can exploit.
The Ticket Office is Now Open
The second major development is the rise of commercial actors in
space. Currently, there are several entrepreneurial companies around
the world seeking to gain private access to space for a variety of
reasons. 28 Interestingly, these "newspace" companies are seeking to
step outside the status quo of governmental contracting which has been
the norm for commercial space actors to date. 29 These entities are
seeking to jumpstart business models for space tourism and private
launch providers. While the success of this strategy has yet to be seen,
25. Iran launches homegrown satellite, BBC, Feb. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/7866357.stm and KCNA, Preparations for Launch of Experimental Communications
Satellite in Full Gear, in THE NORTH KOREAN EXPENDABLE CARRIER ROCKET, UNHA-2:
SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 31.
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. I.
27. Keith B. Richburg, Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html.
28. Jeff Foust, The evolving ecosystem of NewSpace, THE SPACE REVIEw, Aug. 15,
2011, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1906/1.
29. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MARYLAND:
THE BUSINESS OF SPACE SCIENCE 11 (May 2011) ("For decades it was largely driven by
government markets and manned space flight. While still substantial, government
spending on space no longer accounts for the majority of economic activity.").
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there is hope that these companies can survive. The idea of privatizing
space access does seem to be gaining ground, as well. Of particular
interest is the new United States Space Policy which relies on buying
services from such providers in the post Space Shuttle era.30 The
government is looking to buy the service as opposed to the hardware. 31
This, of course, begs the question of whether these start-up companies
will rely on government contracts for their existence much as their
predecessors have. Regardless, though, these companies seem to be
fundamentally different, and that difference is helping to change the
state motivations behind space regulation.
The shift that is being seen in space regulation is an important one,
since it serves to inform what state interests and goals are. As stated
above security has been a primary and historical goal of states when
regulating space activities. Commercial actors in space have begun to
change how states view regulatory goals. Specifically, the goal of
fostering commercial space activities to enhance the economic life of the
country and to enhance the everyday life of citizens has been
introduced. This goal is different in form and often conflicts with ideas
of security. A prime example of this is the ongoing debate over property
rights on celestial bodies. 32 Property rights for private entities would
be more economically favorable to commercial space exploration as it
would help to ensure investments of companies seeking to exploit
resources on celestial bodies. However, if as the majority of scholars
argue, these rights are precluded by the Outer Space Treaty, then
private entities will lack incentive to invest in the exploitation of those
resources due to the lack of predictability on whether the investment
will be protected. The non-appropriation clause in the Outer Space
Treaty does indeed serve a security interest by disincentivizing states
from reenacting terrestrial "land rushes" and taking boundary disputes
- a traditional reason for armed conflict - into space.33 The conflict
30. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (June 28, 2010).
31. To this end NASA has sponsored Space Act Agreements through its Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to help commercial actors develop their
technology. NASA, Commercial Crew and Cargo Program: Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/429622mainFS-2009-
006-009-JSC-COTS021710.pdf.
32. See generally FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF
THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME (Martinus
Nijhoff 2009); VIRGILIU POP, WHO OWNS THE MOON?: EXTRATERRESTIAL ASPECTS OF LAND
AND MINERAL RESOURCES OWNERSHIP (Springer 2009).
33. JOHNSON-FREESE, supra note 13, at 34 (". both the Soviet Union and the
United States instead endorsed the principle that sovereignty cannot be extended to
space. Both countries took the approach that it was in their interests to use space to
stabilize deterrence, the guiding strategic doctrine of the day, and to support arms control
toward that goal. That meant that in order to protect their own interests, both had to
accept the use of space by each other, and eventually other countries. This acceptance
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between these goals increases risk for commercial actors in an already
risky environment.
States are now beginning to adopt as a goal the development of the
commercial space industry. This differs from a great deal of national
legislation which is intended to protect national security interests as
well as ensure compliance with international treaties. A robust
commercial space industry can be a competing goal with national
security, and poses specific problems for compliance with international
agreements. While there is now a trend among nations to write such
encouragement into national legislation, these laws must comport with
the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty. But as explored below
these laws can inform, via a feedback loop, us as to the content of the
norms contained in the Outer Space Treaty, especially in light of its
more ambiguous terms.
III. THE FUTURE OF SPACE LAW
Tearing Down the House?
Drawing from the architecture analogy, the immediate question
when approaching an old structure is whether it should be razed and a
new structure built, or whether it can be salvaged and whether it is
worth being salvaged. Are its boards to rotten to support new users,
and can it be adapted to fit the new uses? The first question to be
addressed when investigating the future of space law is whether the
international regime flowing from the Outer Space Treaty can still be
effective in a dramatically changed world.
The arguments for scrapping the system include a lack of clarity in
the Outer Space Treaty, the inhibiting nature of its rules due to
drafting for a different geopolitical climate, and its lack of attention to
commercial entities. 3 4  These arguments point to lacunae and
ambiguous terms found in the regime, which create questions of
meaning and the possibility for low or unfavorable regulability of some
activities. For instance, the Chinese ASAT of 2007 was unarguably a
destabilizing moment for space and led to decreased security and safety
in space. However, legal scholars, though mostly in agreement that the
act was not within the spirit of the law, were hard pressed to find a
reflected a largely tacit acknowledgement that the physical environment of space was so
different, and limiting, that there was little choice but to treat it differently in terms of
expectations of sovereign rights.").
34. See generally John Hickman, Still crazy after four decades: The case for
withdrawing from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, THE SPACE REVIEW, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/960/1. Theresa Hitchens, The Perfect Storm:
International Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy, HIGH FRONTIER JOURNAL, Mar.
2007, at 23.
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specific clause that outlawed such behavior. 35 Most argued that China
violated Article IX by not seeking consultations. 36 States on the other
hand, made diplomatic protests, but did not direct legal claims at
China. 37 This is because the Outer Space Treaty left the use of
conventional weapons an open question, by simply not addressing them
in relation to space.38  Some would argue that this justifies the
negotiation of a new treaty that better protects the space environment.
While these arguments can be compelling, they fall short of being
realistic, primarily due to state reluctance to adopt new space law. 3 9
The last space treaty, the Moon Agreement, was adopted in 1979 and
has only 13 States Parties. 40  States seem to be uninterested in
negotiating new law, and the idea of renegotiating the principle
document is outside the realm of current possibility. More
substantively, renegotiating the Outer Space Treaty would most likely
only result in a different treaty that has many of the same flaws. No
treaty completely covers all possible scenarios, thus no treaty is ever
complete. To this end the Outer Space Treaty actually has great
advantages. It holds very few hard prescriptive articles, and instead
regulates with open language that requires states to communicate in
order to avoid conflicts. This tactic also allows that treaty to develop
via state practice, which adds to its adaptability.
The Outer Space Treaty sets out core values and aspirations that
are still at the heart of international space law, many of which may
have solidified into custom. These core concepts though must be able to
adapt to the actual experience of space actors. As a result, the treaty
must be remapped onto the new architecture. This remapping is
happening through a variety of mechanisms that are helping to protect
state interests as well as increase the regulability of space.
35. See generally Li Juqian, Legality and Legitimacy: China's ASAT Test, 5 CHINA
SECURITY 43 (2009); Eugene Marder, CPR for the OST: How China's Anti-Satellite
Weapon Test Can Breathe New Life into Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, Center for
Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/ChineseASATtest.pdf (2008); Michael C.
Mineiro, FY-IC and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations under
Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321 (2008).
36. Marder, supra note 35; Mineiro, supra note 35.
37. Marder, supra note 35, at 1-2, 11.
38. Arguably, this is by design since Article IV of the Treaty specifically bans
weapons of mass destruction from space and celestial bodies and specifically bans
conventional weapons from celestial bodies, but fails to mention conventional weapons in
relation to space. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. IV.
39. For a history of International space law regulation see Sergio Marchisio, The
Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 31 J. SPACE L. 219 (2005).
40. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial





Soft Law mechanisms are becoming a more prevalent aspect of
international law. States seek legal order in order to create orderly
relations among themselves, but hard law obligations "[entail]
significant costs: hard law restricts actors' behavior and even their
sovereignty." 4 1 Soft law comes in many forms and is difficult to define.
Abbot and Snidal argue that "[t]he realm of 'soft law' begins once legal
arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of
obligation, precision, and delegation" with the "softening ... occur[ing]
in varying degrees along each dimension and in different combinations
across dimensions." 42 Essentially, soft law occurs on a spectrum, and
"the choice between hard law and soft law is not a binary one." 4 3 Due to
their nonbinding nature these mechanisms can help states to maximize
the goals being sought while minimizing the risk taken.44 As a result
soft law agreements are "often easier to achieve than hard
legalization."4 5  This allows states to creatively tackle international
problems for which they are unwilling to make sacrifices of their own
sovereignty.
Space law is no stranger to the concept. In fact it can be argued
that much of space law is built on soft law ideas. This is because a
great deal of the Outer Space Treaty uses ambiguous language and
creates obligations that lack in precision or obligation and are open to
interpretation by states. For instance, Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty states that:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination
and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and,
41. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54/3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 421, 422 (2000).
42. Id. They use the term "soft law" to "distinguish this broad class of deviations from
hard law - and, at the other extreme, from purely political arrangements in which
legalization is largely absent." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 423 ("Soft law offers many of the advantages of hard law, avoids some of the
costs of hard law, and has certain independent advantages of its own.").
45. Id.
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where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this
purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe
that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party
to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.46
The obligations contained in this section are generally "soft" in
nature. The "hardest" obligation is the requirement that states seek
consultations if they think they may cause "harmful interference,"
which does not actually include harmful interference. The other
obligations are extremely soft in nature are place few limits on the
actions of states. States have rarely (if ever) sought such consultations,
and indeed the idea of a consultation in no way precludes a state from
taking a specific action. Instead it only gives other states the ability to
weigh in to the activity. An example can be seen in the aforementioned
Chinese ASAT test. China did not seek a consultation, and more
importantly, no state, save Japan, 47 invoked Article IX, despite the fact
that there was evidence that the United States knew about the test
beforehand. 4 8  Additionally, the United States decided that it fell
outside Article IX when it conducted an ASAT intercept the following
year.49 This is because both states were free to interpret Article IX as
they saw fit due to the lack of precision in the Article. Article IX creates
obligations, but they are soft obligations with a low level of precision
and a low level of enforceability.50 These types of provisions are
46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. IX.
47. Marder, supra note 35, at 11.
48. JOHNSON-FREESE, supra note 13, at 12.
49. DoD News Briefing with Deputy National Security Advisor Jeffrey, Gen.
Cartwright and NASA Administrator Griffin, in USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 51, 52
(P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds., 2009) ("While we do not believe that we
meet the standard of Article IX of that treaty that says we would have to consult in the
case of generating potentially harmful interference with other activities in space, we do
believe that it is important to keep other countries informed of what is happening.").
50. See HARRISON, supra note 23, at 8-9. "Even in areas of Treaty-imposed constraint
that were remained [sic] pertinent," particularly the prohibitions against "interfering with
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common in space law, because they serve state interests. As a result,
while there is a core of hard provision, space law was developed as a
flexible regime that can be re-envisioned with changes in its underlying
architecture. The values that it supports still serve as important end
goals, but the application of the law can change to best achieve these
goals in any given set of circumstances.
Adapting the Hard Law
If, as argued, the Outer Space Treaty is the proper mechanism to
be regulating space activities in space, and this Treaty consists to a
large extent of soft obligations, then through what mechanisms is this
law to be adapted to new circumstances? This is essentially the same
question that is faced when approaching domestic issues and
constitutional interpretation in light of situations not envisioned by the
framers, especially in light of technological advances. When such
questions arise domestically, competing interpretations vie for
prominence, until an official ruling by an ultimate court gives a
(hopefully) definitive answer to the question. In much the same way,
the Outer Space Treaty, the "constitution" for space, has similar
problems. The drafters, taking into account the geopolitical
architecture of the time, were often ambiguous as to meaning. In order
to serve state interests, and as technology and the geopolitical
architecture have changed, the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty's
clauses has gradually become more contested. Unfortunately, there is
no "Space Supreme Court" to give definitive interpretations of what
passages require in light of new developments. International law does
present a tool to help elucidate these meanings.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives a rubric for
treaty interpretation. It starts with the idea that the ordinary meaning
of words within the purpose and scope of a treaty should be used to
interpret the treaty text.51  It also allows, as a tenet of treaty
interpretation, interpreters to take into account state practice in
relation to a treaty to determine the meaning of the text. 52 This can be
a powerful tool when looking at soft terms in a treaty.
Returning to the ASAT example and Article IX, we can see how
such interpretation works. In the case of the Chinese ASAT test and
other states' space-related activities" and "damaging the space environment," the OST
had less than decisive impact - not because of an inability to verify, but an unwillingness
to enforce. This unwillingness apparently stems from concern about disclosing sources
and methods, and a reluctance to contribute to the establishment of norms that might
limit freedom of action. Id.
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1969).
52. Id. art. 31(3b).
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the U.S. intercept of USA-193, the author has previously argued that
state practice points to a de minimis standard of information sharing to
fulfill Article IX requirements. 53  Both states engaged in similar
activity, however, the United States did so with a great deal of
transparency and explicitly acknowledged its Article IX obligations.
China on the other hand acted without transparency. China's test was
condemned diplomatically by the international community and the
United States' was not. From these incidents the contours of the
content of Article IX can begin to be derived. Interestingly, the
adoption of soft law agreements (discussed below) to facilitate more
robust standards could lead in the future to a shift in the meaning of
Article IX to require more than the most basic of information.
Widespread adoption of soft law mechanisms can feasibly transform via
wide state practice to treaty practice.
Extending the Law
It is clear that states are reluctant to adopt new treaties relating to
space activities. One of the major factors for this is that states,
particularly the United States, prioritize national security and are
reluctant to undertake any obligation that would limit activities in
pursuit of such goals. This is best highlighted by the former United
States space policy, which stated that "[t]he United States will oppose
the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to
prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space." 54 States will preserve
their interests in a strategic manner, and not subsume them to new law
unless there is an equally strong advantage. Another issue that stands
in the way of new legal instruments is that of verification. Verification
of compliance with treaties in Outer Space can be technically difficult,
and as a result "[n]o major space actor is likely to accept meaningful
constraints on its freedom of action in space unless it can verify
independently the compliance of others."55 States enter treaties when it
is in their best interest, and unverifiable treaties unavoidably create
risks of noncompliance. As a result, states are reluctant to bind
themselves in ways which they see as strategically limiting. Without
new international agreements states are left to rely on the Outer Space
Treaty and its progeny to regulate space. However, these agreements
have proved to have weaknesses that can be exploited. This has been
illustrated by China's ASAT test as well as North Korea's attempted
space launch, which looked suspiciously like an ICBM test.
53. Blount, supra note 22, at 33-35.
54. US National Space Policy, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.html (Aug.
31, 2006).
55. HARRISON, supra note 23, at 2.
528 VOL. 40:1-3
RENOVATING SPACE
Despite the unlikelihood of a new treaty that helps to ensure the
future security of space, states have sought other innovative solutions.
These solutions have come in the form of soft law agreements.
Instruments such as the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines5 6 as
well as the European Union's Draft Code of Conduct for Space
Activities65 seek to address the changed geopolitical architecture with
instruments to which states can accede without being bound by
international law. These agreements weaken the obligation element so
as to allow states to comfortably pursue goals without the risk of
binding themselves. These types of agreements have advantages for
states. They serve to build confidence among states and help to foster
cooperation.5 8 Also, they can be used as regulation labs, by allowing
states to try out certain regulatory mechanisms with reduced risk if the
mechanisms are not effective. 59 Furthermore, these types of agreements
also can help to fill a void. Whereas before, there was a lack of dialogue
on new agreements, now there is open debate and interaction among
states on these important questions. These agreements will be
analogous to the idea of lex mercatoria, wherein business actors agree
on best practices and follow these practices out of utility and efficiency.
Soft law mechanisms for space activities seek to bring space actors to
the table and facilitate dialogue on ways in which their own self
interests can be fulfilled via more efficient mechanisms.
One of the major components going forward with such mechanisms
will be the exchange of information. Space is becoming increasingly
congested and a higher risk area in which to operate. States, however,
use space as a crucial component of both commercial infrastructure and
national security infrastructure. The ability to operate in space is
critical. In order to do that effectively states must have information
about the environment in which they are operating. This was
highlighted recently when a telecommunications satellite collided on
orbit with a defunct Russian governmental satellite. 60 Information
exchange has been entrenched in the space law regime from the very
beginning, but it has never been clear how much information has been
required to be shared. While data exchange will be important in the
emerging soft law regimes, it is important to note that
56. IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007).
57. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Council Doc. 14455/10 (Oct. 10, 2010).
58. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 41, at 423 ("soft law facilitates compromise, and thus
mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different interests and values,
different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees of power.").
59. Id. ("It offers more effective ways to deal with uncertainty, especially when it
initiates processes that allow actors to learn about the impact of agreements over time.").
60. AGI Media Center, Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 Satellite Collision, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.stk.com/corporate/mediaCenter/news/iridium-cosmos/.
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nongovernmental space actors are also seeking to gain access to more
information about the space environment. INTELSAT has spearheaded
a movement wherein commercial actors will exchange information
about the space environment in order that they may all operate more
efficiently creating another layer of soft obligations. 61 These satellite
operators will engage in this effort despite the fact that they are
competitors. This sort of cooperation highlights an important point
about soft law mechanisms. First is that soft law need not be among
states, in fact as non-state actors pursue the exploitation of space they
will develop standards that become a form of "law." Soft law is about
increasing efficiency and guaranteeing operability. To this end, all the
players, not just states will have important input, and such
mechanisms will be adopted at a variety of levels.
Designing New Rooms in the Architecture
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is an extraordinary clause in
international law. It is one of the rare instances recognized in the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility wherein states have opted to adopt
more responsibility for the actions of their nongovernmental actors than
attributed by customary international law. Article VI states that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are
carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the
international organization and by the States Parties to the
Treaty participating in such organization.
While there is much debate as to the exact content of Article VI,
one must appreciate the burden and risk that this places on states. By
creating an affirmative obligation to authorize and supervise non-
governmental actors in space in addition to making states responsible
for the activities of these entities, Article VI makes it a high risk
61. See Richard Dalbello, Data Sharing for Space Situational Awareness: Government
Responsibility under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, http://www.iislweb.org/
docs/2008-3rd-galloway-dalbello.pdf (Dec. 11, 2008).
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activity for a state to allow commercial actors to operate in the space
environment. In the past legislation has been written so as to help
states effectively fulfill Article VI obligations. Traditionally this has
been through licensing regimes for nongovernmental actors. These
regulations are the feedback loop that helps to inform the international
community what constitutes the proper measures for compliance with
Article VI. Again, this is an area where state action can influence the
interpretation of the Treaty's clause.
As the importance of a healthy commercial space sector has grown,
legislation has begun to increasingly have a different set of goals
underlying it. In general these goals are meant to incentivize doing
business in the space sector. The most prominent example is the oft-
discussed Federal Aviation Administration's Human Spaceflight
Requirements. 62 These United States regulations seek to encourage
private human space flight by, among other things, requiring space
flight providers to give informed consent to space flight participants in
order to reduce possible claims against the space transportation
provider in the case of an accident. 63 These innovative regulations seek
to encourage the industry by reducing the risk of doing business and
thereby increasing the commercial viability of such operations. Other
regulatory regimes have followed suit and attempted to offer other
financial incentives to space actors. 64
This trend is one that will continue as the commercialization of
space continues. It is important to note though, that these are domestic
rules, therefore states must be cautious that they still fulfill their
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, specifically Article VI. The
interplay between domestic legislation and international law will
become an increasingly important theme in the development of
international space law. This is especially true if the number of
commercial actors proliferates as predicted. It should also be noted that
as domestic law develops and defines items such as best practices for
space flight providers, these developments can have influence at the
international level and on the development of soft law mechanisms. For
instance, the FAA regulations seek to not adopt safety guidelines and
standards at a time when it may be too preliminary to know what those
standards should be. This leaves the door open for the industry itself to
adopt these standards for efficiency, creating soft law at the industry
62. Human Spaceflight Requirements, 14 C.F.R. 460 (2011).
63. 14 C.F.R. 460.45. See also Tracey Knutson, What is "Informed Consent" for Space-
Flight Participants in the Soon-To-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 J. SPACE L. 105
(2007).
64. See generally P.J. Blount, If You Legislate It They Will Come: Using Incentive
Based Legislation to Attract the Commercial Space Industry, Air & Space Lawyer, v. 22/3
(2009).
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level. The United States can then, as the industry develops, adopt
regulations that solidify these practices. This adoption can be
influential at the international level as states seek to define how to
engage in space activities in a responsible manner. Mechanisms,
whether hard or soft, that increase safety will be beneficial to
commercial actors, since the perceived safety of the industry will affect
all the entities in involved. States will in turn though have to close the
loop in order to ensure that adopted industry practices comport with
international obligations. As this is done, those mechanisms can
become the mechanisms that build consensus in the international
community via nontraditional law-making routes.
CONCLUSION
Laws, like buildings, sometimes need renovations and updates,
especially when the architecture beneath them has changed.
International space law was mapped onto a geopolitical structure that
no longer controls the dynamics of space activities. It is important that
the law adapt to the changed circumstances. Luckily, international
space law is not in a state of decrepitude wherein it must be torn down.
Instead it can be renovated to work with the new, updated architecture.
This paper has sought to illustrate the likely path that the
development of international space law will take in the future. This
path will be mix of regulatory mechanisms that empower states to best
maintain the domestic advantages they receive from space as well as
the freedom of access and exploration by all states. Importantly, non-
state actors are rising in prominence which leads to particular problems
for international regulations. States will seek to foster these industries,
but at the same time, must fulfill their international obligations.
Though controversial, soft law obligations are the most likely route for
states to take in relation to space activities. This sort of "legal"
mechanism creates favorable situations for states to engage in the
international discourse as well as preserve their own interests.
532 VOL. 40:1-3
Denver Journal





















































































































































































Dean - Natural Sciences
and Mathematics





































Daniels College of Business
Frank Tuitt, Associate
Provost for Multicultural
Excellence
Barbara Wilcots, Associate
Provost-Graduate Studies
James Herbert Williams,
Dean-Graduate School of
Social Work
Tom Willoughby, Vice
Chancellor-Enrollment
Craig Woody, Vice
Chancellor-Business &
Financial Affairs
Pring, Rock
Raghunath, Raja
Rhodes, Paula
Roche, Ed
Romero, Tom
Rosenberg, Howard
Rovner, Laura
Ruan, Nantiya
Russell, Thomas
Scales, Ann
Smith, Catherine
Soma, John
Sousa, Michael
Sterling, Joyce
Sterling, Robin
Taylor, Celia
Thomson, David
Vogel, Mark
Wald, Eli
Wiersema, Annecoos
Ziegler, Ed
